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T H E  
' R I S I N G S  
O N  THE 
N o r t h - W  e s t  F ron t i e r .  
Being a complete narrative, w i th  specially prepared 
maps, of the various risings o f  the Frontier Tribes in  
the Toehi Valley, the Swat  Valley, the Country of the 
Mohmands and Mamunds, a n d  the Country of the  
Afridis and Oralizai; and  of the several punitive c a m -  
paigns undertaken against these tribes, as well  a s  the 
two m i n x  expeditions sent  against the Utman K b e l s  
a n d  the Bunerwals: the whole covering a per-iod ex- 
tending from the middle of June  1897 to tha end of 
January, 1898. 
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THE AREA OF DISTURBANCE. 
N the extent of tlie ares affected, more obviously than in any 
o l l ~ c r  espect, the Indian Frontier disturbances of 1897-98 differ 
fronl all previous border troubles. Froni Waziristan on the left 
tx) Buncr un tlis light a stretch of more than 400 miles of our border- 
I:tnd, irillalited, as Sir George White said i n  a speech at  the United 
Service Club in Si~nl i~,  by 200,000 first-rate fighting men, has been 
invulveil in t h e  outlrealr, and the dates of the various risings indicate an 
itIentitj of design and a unity of purpose never before discernible in 
t l ~ e  liistory c~f frontier disturbances. "The disturbed area on the true 
fro~rtier, nanlrly, the one wliich we guard and protect," wrote Sir Eobert 
IJtrw in all :t~*ticle in the iVationn1 Keuiew, L'conlmences with the 
il~uur~tains on the riglit bank of tlie 1 1 ~ 3 ~ s  near Dirbund, where the 
river emerges fro111 the hillb into the plains. Fronl this point the 
frolitier line follows the line of mountains: i t  takes a long sweep to 
the norttl and t l ~ e n  Lends round to the west and south, enclosing the 
I'est~rt~var Valley, and it  completes a rougli senlicircle a t  ICohat. From 
IioIi;~t our fro~l t ier  goes west to Thull and then north-west up to the 
I~(aatl of the ICurram Valley. Tlle tribes which inlnlediately face us on 
thih f~trxltier line, cun~n~erlcing s t  the top of the semicircle a t  Dirbund, 
trll tltc I ~~ilrlx, are, t;~king tl:enl in their order, the Bunerwals, the Swats, 
t , l~e I:triisr~ fihelu, and the Mol~rtiunds; then come the Khyber Pass 
:tll~l t,iie .ifridis, a r ~ d  lastly, on the nortllern flank of the road from 
iiclf~ztt to Tliull, t11e Orakz:~i. Tliore are rnany other minor tribes aud 
.ctc.tiri~~% uE the larger ones with diifel.ent names, but  t o  niel~tion them is 
u f i i r  cuufuahg, Tlkc ;~,Luvc are our iuuedis te  neigllbours, and are the 
princip;d tribes, and they led the others with them to a great extent 
ir such risings as we are dealing with. 
"Our positions for the defence of this line,-(prior to the outbreak) 4. 
-taking them from the top of the semicircle, have been ' Hoti  Mardan,' 
the head-quarters of the Corps of Guides ; in advance of it i n  the hills 
the Malakand position with its outpost a t  Chakdara; then, further % 
rouud the semicircle, the forts of Abazai, Shabkudhr and Michni, and 
then Peshawar with its outpost of Jamrood guarding the entrance of 
the Khj-ber Pass; then, crossing the spur of the hllls which run down 
towards the river Indus, me come to the station of Kohat with its out- 
posts on the road to the Kurram Valley a t  Hangu and Thull, and the 
flanking position of Fort Lockhart and minor posts on the Samana 
Range. These posts were all occupied by troops or police, while beyond 
them, the road to Chitral, the Khyber Pass, and the Kurram Valley 
were held by tribal levies." 
The map facing the firgt page affords a comprehensive view of the 
whole affected area. The actual tribal outbreaks and their dates were 
as follows:- 
The Maizar outrage on the 10th of June ;  the attack on the Mala- 
kand and Chakdara positions on the 27th July ; the attack on Shab- 
kudhr on the 9th August : the threatening attitude of the Afridis and 
Orakmi on the 18th August, and the attack on the Khyber Pass on the 
23rd August. Thereafter the narrative of events turns from tribal 
;~b'gresuiou, and follows the punitive operations of the Government of 
India's forces. 
P A R T  I. 
THE TOCHI VALLEY AFFAIR. 
PART I. 
THE TOCHI VALLEY A F F A I R .  
THE MAIXiiR OUTRAGE, 
Tric Frontier disturbances of 1597 began, as lias been bviefly shown, 
on tlie 10th of June, wlien a startling outrage was conlmittecl on a B~.itiull 
party in the Tochi Valley. Katurally enough the first account of 
tlle affair which reached head-quarters in India from the  Tochi 
gave but scanty details, but i t  was unfortullately certain that  tlie 
casualty list was a heavy one ; three British Ofiicers, twenty-two men 
of the native ranks and two followers being killed, while three other 
British OfEcers and twenty-four men were waunded. The three Officers 
killed were Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J .  F. Browne, IZ.A., 
and Lieutenant H. A .  Cluickshanlr, RA, both of No. 6 Bombay 
Mountain Battery; whiIe the wounded were Lieutenant A. J. M. 
Higgiason and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cmsidy of the 1st SiBhs, and 
Lieutenant C. L. Seton-Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry. 
I t  appeared that Mr. Gee, Political Officer in bEne Tochi Valley, left 
Di~tba Khel on the moraiag of the 10th June, with a n  escort of 300 men 
from the 1st Siklls and 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns of No. 6 Bon~bay 
Mountain Battery, and twelve sowers of the  1st Punjab Cavali*y. 
Colonel Bunny, conimanding the Tocl~i Column, was i n  charge uf the  
escort. The object in  view was to fix a site for a new outpost beyond 
Sheranni, nine miles beyond Datta, Khel, and also to realise a fine which. 
h.%d been imposed upon the local tribesmen some months back. The party 
got as far as Naizar, which is sorilewhat to the south of Sheranni, and  
halted. What exactly occurred there was riot explained in the first hasty 
despatches, but Mr. Gee, in  a short preliminary report, stilted that  a 
cowardly and treacherous atkack was made ilt 2 P.M., when the troops 
were a t  rest, and the little force was suddellly ruslled by a large body of 
tribewen. A desperate fight followed, the escort lrad t o  beat a retreat, 
( 2 )  
and they were follosved for four llliles along the road to Datta 1Chel- 
Captain H. A. Coopel; 1st Sikhs, was in command a t  that  post, and t h e  
first uews he received was at  5 o>clock, when a sowar arrived, who s t a t e d  
tliat the troops had been attaclied, their British Officers killedor wound- 
ed, ancl that  theirs anim~nition was running short. Captain Cooper 
ordered out two co~npanies of infantry with a fresh supply of ammuni- 
tion, and sent with them the only two British Officers who, with himself, 
liad been lefc at  Datta hllel. Ttiese reiriforcenlents enabled the retire- 
ment to be completed, the tribesmen desisting from the pursuit and n o t  
venturing near the post. 
r l l t i l  more complete i~iformstion arrived i t  was not possible to 
judge how it came about that an escort of such a size was surprised. 
The Pulitical 0Aice1:s reference to the cu\~srdly and treacherous manner 
in wl~icli the original zttscli was niade, pointed to a species of tribal tac- 
tics not unconin~on on the border, namely, the appearance of headmen 
professing friendliness, the gathering of tribesmeu about the canip, a n d  
then the sudden rllsll of others lying hidden near a t  hand. Judging  
from the casualties, the British Officers seemed to have been the first to 
be attacked, for all six nere killed or wounded. The losses among t h e  
%?I 
1 native 1:tuk were distributed as  follows :-1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 sowars 
-rs-ounded; No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 2 killed, 3 wounded ; 1st 
1 Sikhs, 12 killed, 13 wounded; 1st Punjab Infantry, 8 lrilled, 6 wounded. 
i 
Two followers Tere also killed, and one other was wounded. The moun- 
tain battery had four mules killed and five wounded, b u t  the guns were 
brought safely into Datta Khel. Nineteen commissariat mnles were 
lost, while the cavalry detachment had three horses killed. 
The tribesmen concernedin the affair belonged entirely to the Madda 
Ehe l  sub-section of the Darwesh Khel Waziris. They hold the country 
a t  the western end of the Dawar Valley, through which the Tochi River  
runs. The Darwesh Khel Waziris had hitherto behaved extremely well, 
and as portions of the tribe dwelt in  British territory, it was not expect- 
ed that  they would give trouble. During Sir William Lockhart's expedi- 
tion against the Mahsud Waziris, they showed no disposition to join 
with their fellow-tribesmen. Conjecture was therefore rife as t o  why 
the men of the  Madda Khel sllould so suddenly have committed them- 
selves. Meanwhile it mas clear that their pnnishment would have to be 
an exempIary one. True, the season was not very favourable fo r  






































o u t  punitive nieasnpeR with a small column. For tile moment it  was 
decided to immediately reinforce thegarrison of Toclli with one battalioll 
of native infantry, and to move an additional regiment to Bannu. 
followii~g nloves were therefore ordered :-33rd Punjab InfiLntry, 
froln Rannu to Tochi Valley; 3rd Sikhs, from Kohat and the 14th 
Sikhs froin Ferozepore to Bannu ; 2nd Punjab Infantry, from Abbotta- 
bad t o  Kohat. 
Wi th in  twenty-four hours of the receipt of the first intelligence 
t h e  following further particulars arrived regarding the disaster :- 
Mr. Gee, the i?olitical Officer, with his escort, arrived a t  Maizar, as al- 
ready stated, on the morning of the 10th June, nothing having occurred 
on  the road from Dattea Khel to excite suspicion regarding the attitude 
of the  tribesmen. H e  was met a t  Maizar by Sadda Khan, Malik of 
Shepanni, and other local headmen, whose bearing was quite friendly. 
The troops were halted near the village, and Mr. Gee, with only the 
cavalry detachment (12 sabres), proceeded to Datoi, a few miles away, 
accompanied by some of the maliks. The visit was an uneventful one, 
a n d  t h e  .party returned to Maizar. Sadda Khan had meanwhile provided 
food for  all the British Officers and also for the Mussalman sepoys in 
t h e  escort. This was partaken of, and such a show of hospitality threw 
t h e  par ty  off their guard, as even among the Pathalls the lives of 
guests a re  usually held sacred for the time being. At 2 o'clock, just as 
t h e  Officers had finished their lunch, fire was opened upon them from the 
village towers, and all six were shot down, almost at once. At  the same 
time a continnouv fire from all sides was directed against t.he sepoys, 
some five hundred tribesmen joining in the attack. The position was 
apparently unsuitable for defence, and the troops began to retire over 
the  hills in the direction of Sheranni. The number of their assailants 
rapidly increased, and i t  was calculated that a thousand men were 
engaged in the pursuit before the river bank was reached opposite 
Sheranni. It was clearly established that the tribesmen had planned the 
attaclr beforehand, as fresh parties appeared from the hills between 
Sheranni and Datta Khel. The troops did not reach the latter post 
until 11 o'clock a t  night. Their march was necessarily a slow one, as a 
running fight had to be maintained for four miles, ancl they were en- 
cumbered with their dead and wounded. Nine riiles only were lost, 
which spoke well for the sepoys. The Waziris were said to have lost 
ninety killed and a considerable number wounded, Anlong the fornler 
were four mullahs and a malik. It was satisfactory to learn that the 
wounded OGcers anc1 nirn were on the mhole doing well. Lieutenant 
IIigpinson was severely mounded in the left arm; Lieutenant Setnn- 
Brom-ne llnd a flesh wound in the thigh ; Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was 
hi t  in the knee. 
L:~ter  information received a t  Ariny Reacl-Quarters from the Tochi 
fully confirn~ed the first estimate of the bel~aviour of the troops in the 
atTair a t  3P;lizar. I t  appeared that Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, tliough 
mo~.t,zlly wouncleil, almost irnmeditttely the tribesmen opened fire, man- 
aged to issue orclers under which the retirement froin the neiglibour- 
hood of the towers and walls of the village was effected. The men had 
to fall back tn.0 miles, as no ilefensive position offered, but thereafter 
the? quite held their own against the attack. Short~less of arnnluni- 
tion alone conlpellecl further retirement, but this was made without 
disorcler. Not only so, but  when reinforced by the two conipanies froin 
Datta  Khel, bringing up more ammunition, the troops faced about and 
shelled Slleranni village. 
Thus, from a nnniber of separate reports, a fairly complete idea of 
the circumstances of the disaster -mas now obtainable, but the following 
simple, s tmight for~ard  account of the affair from one of the few sur- 
vivors of the little party of Officers presented the events in a more con- 
nected form and in a clearer light :- 
"The recent attack on the military escort which accompanied Mr. 
Gee, Political Officer, Tochi, to Sheranni and Maizar was the work of 
the Madda Khel section of the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels. The Madda 
Khels occupy the Tochi Valley from Sheranni, nine miles above Datta 
Rhel, up to the Amir's boundary, and a portion of them who were not, 
as  a tribe, concerned i n  the attack live in the Eazha, which is a northern 
tributary of the Tochi. Sheranni and Maizar are on the main Tochi 
route from Birmd or Ghazni to Bannu, and the tribe is under agree- 
ment to keep this road open. Maizar, mhich is the name given to a col- 
lection of villages a t  the mouth of the Shawal Algad, eleven miles from 
Datta Khel Camp, had already been fixid on as the site of the most 
westerly levy post in  the Tochi, and it  was nlainly for the purpose of 
finally selecting the site for this post that the Political Officer pro- 
ceeded there on this occasion. B e  had also arranged to meet all the 
Madda Khel  Maliks of the Tochi there, to  discuss the question'of the 
distribution of a fine which was outstanding against tlle tribe. 
"The escort consisted of 200 rifles 1st Silchs, Lieutenant-Colonel 












































Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne, four guns No. G Bombay 
Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, E.A., with Lieutenant Cruick- 
shank, and 18 sabres 1st Pnnjab Cavalry, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 
Medical OfEcer. The escort marched from camp Datta Khel a t  5 A.M., 
and after balling twice on the road reached Maizar a t  9-30. Maizar 
consists of a number of cultivated terraces gradually sloping down t a  
the Shawal Algad, and the men were halted on the highest terrace a t  
an open space under some trees not far  from a kot belonging to the 
Drepilari section of the Madda Kbels. This spot was pointed out by 
the malilis themselves as the best place to camp, as  there was plenty of 
room, and water was available near. The guns were placed close to a 
garden wall in a field clear of the trees. The approach to this camping 
ground is over a small kotal and down a narrow lane through fields 
bounded by low stone walls. The lane runs straight from the kotal to 
the camping ground, which is close t o  a threshing-floor and then curves 
round to the north to the kot. The men were ordered to keep their 
arms wit11 them and not to pile them. A11 neceseary precautions were 
taken-guards, pickets and sentries placed mere considered necessary. 
As soon as this was settled Mr. Gee and Captain Browne, R.A., taking 
tile sowars, 1st Punjab Cavalry, and accompanied by some of the maliks, 
visited Datoi, which lies a few miles further on in the Tochi, while those 
left behind made themselves conlfortable under the trees. 
<'The Political Officer returned about 12 o'clock ; the question of 
the fine was said by the maliks to have been settled amicably; food was 
provided Ey the leading maliks for all the Mussalrnan sepoys, and there 
was not the slightest suspicion of unfriendliness on the part of the tribes- 
men. After lunch, about 2 P.N., Colonel Bunny ordered the pipers t o  
play for the villagers to listen to, and they played one tune. Jus t  as  
they began another, a man was seen waving a drawn sword on a tome' 
$ in the Drepilari kot, and the villagers suddenly cleared off towards the  
village. A single shot was fired, apparently as a signal, and a fusillade 
a t  once commenced, directed at  the British Officers, who were together 
under a tree, and the Sikhs. This was taken up on all sides, the sepoys in 
the meantime falling in a t  once and taking up  positions. Lieutenant 
Seton-Browne was hit in the leg a t  the  second or third shot, and Colonel. 
Bunny was mortally wounded almost immediately after. The guns 
then opened Gre and did great execution among a party of men who 
attempted to rush them, but as they were in an exposed position tho 
two British Officers afforded an easy mark for tile men in the bmgk 
(:qttailrn R r o n ~ ~ e  was ]lit a t  about the fifth shnt and Lieutenant 
Cnl.ili~khP~:t~~li sllt,t nln~ost dipectly after. This mas all withia five 
~t~in:rtt- ref the fir.st shot, and as  the enenly's fire did not slacken, a n d  
tile gt1ti.i 11::d r.iitt.~lclrtl t l ~ e i r  arun~nnition, a nlovenlent was made 
h,ick tu.rvardl: the  k,,tal, guns limbering up find going first u p  
the  lane. 
cL-I~ tllc llfantry retired, the Waziris cnulc out in  great numbers 
F r ~ m  a11 qiilt 3, lrnt n .stnntl n ; ~ s  n~ncle round the corner of the bagla $0 
: x l l , ~ w  t l t c*  \v,*:irlrl+.d illell to retire. In  the nlenntin~e Lieutenant Higgin- 
htln wa-;~ -lir~t l i r r i ~ ~ l ~  the arm and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee. 
The \'i:izit.is .r\-tartx, Il~,\verrr; successfully held in check by a mixed par ty  
of 1st Sikh3 and 1st P~nljnb Infantry, and the latter retired up thekotal 
when every vnu was over. Successive positions vere taken up on the six 
ritlces a ilich stretch fr on1 Jhizar  to the plain above Sheranni, a distalice 
of nbt+l~t trio niik-, m13 tliuudi tlre TS'aziris followed up in a most deter- 
rllillrd ftii.41ic~n and occupied all available positions on the hills round, the 
setirelnivrs w;is orderly and tinlr was given for all the wounded to get 
8afel.v uut  vtl t~ rile plain. Lieutenant Higginson was shot in  the arm a 
ht.~oud time ~vltilc* trussing the hiI1s. The force eventually toolc up a good 
p ~ a i t i o ~ ~  nl,irilt a mile f ~ * u n ~  the last ridge about 5-30 P.N., and waited 
there u n t i l  reinforceulents (two compnnies of the 1st Sikhs) with more 
anr1nunitil311 u11dt.r Lieutennnt deErett, E.A., arrived from Datta IChel. 
Thcse reir~furee~nents cowred nine mjles in 13 liours and arrived at 
G - l a  P.N. 
The tribesmen had been in the meanwl~ile kept thoroughly in 
cheel;, and the guns were now got to work again, and tEle heights and 
the village of She~~nnni Tere shelled. This put  an end to the business 
anrl nu further opposition was met mitl~. Tlie Khiclclar Khels, who live 
on the Tochi bel~rw Slier;tnni, behaved well, bringing out water for the  
sepoys and supplying cherpoys for tile wouncled. The rear-guard reach- 
ed camp a t  19-30 P.X. Colonel Bunny and Captain Browne died on the 
road. One Sabadar (1st P. I.) and 92 Inen were killed and 25 mounded. 
Nearly ail these were Sikhs and not &Iussaln~ana. The enenly are re- 
ported to have :ost 00 killed and u a n y  wounded. 
"The causes of this treacherous attack are not a t  present clear, b u t  
all the circ~rmstanees point to its being premeditated. It is known 
thmt SCI~ILP of the nlaIiks w r e  implicated, and one or two of them were 
killed. Once the afiLir conliuenced i t  no doubt; became a matter of 


































up the tribesmen. The fact that they attacked a party who Ilacl just 
eaten food with them-contrary to all Patlian codes of honour-1.enderj 
the matter additionally hard to  explain." 
To complete the story the following roughly written notes of the 
action a t  &Faizar were received privately from Datta K1iel:- 
"The enemy held a nullah in front in  great strength and had lilled 
the village walls and a 10-foot high wall on the right, the latter .with 
picked marksmen. They also held the rising ground and some huts 
on the left, and a tower in the rear. Our troops were rested on the 
ground between. The 1st Sikhs and the 1st P. I. and all the Officers 
were under the trees to the left front near the nullah, and 60 to 70 
yards from the walls on the right. Yickets were out a t  the front and 
rear, and the guns were unlimbered a t  the right rear 10 yards from the 
10-foot wall. The mules were unsacldled. At  the set-off Captain 
Browne and Lieutenant Higginson were hit by the first volley and 
Colonel Bunny was struck shortly afterwards while talking to Mr. Gee. 
Captain Browne and Lieutenant Cruickshanlr doubled to the guns and 
Captain Browne was hit immediately by a marksman on the wall. The 
guns opened fire with case shot on the nullah. Lieutenant Cruick- 
shank was hit by a marksnlali on the wall, but raised himself up on one 
knee and continued directing the fire on the nullall till hit a second 
time and killed. The guns fired reversed shrapnel when the case shot 
was exhausted, and were commencing common having exhausted shrap- 
nel, when orders were received to retire. I n  limbering up a wheel a 
mule was shot, but Havildar Amardin ran back under fire and piclced 
up both wheels, 72%~. each, l ~ n d  sbr ted  to rejoin the Battery. H e  was 
shot dead and the wheels were not recovered. Cruickshank's orderly 
up a gun weighing 200%~. single-handed and carried i t  to the 
gun mule. The mule was shot dead, so he carried it  to the relief mule. 
Then he went back and brought in Lieuteuant Cruickshank's body. m 
One N.-C. 0. of the battery was hit by a .450 express bullet. Surgeon- 
Captain Cassidy was hit by a Inan in the tower. The ammunition and 
hospital mules stampeded, so 4,000 rounds of M.-18. ammunition, the 
deld hospital, and the Veterinary stores fell into the -enemy's hands. 
The enemy also captured a helio which they now flash from the top of 
"a hill. Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, conducted the retirement till 
the arrival of Lieutenant cieBrett who threw 28 shells into Slleranni. 
One shell struck a mosque, blowing up the mulbah, who ~vas  tvaving a 
greeu flag, into the-air. All tlze bodies were brought in by friendlies. 
( 8 )  1' jE 
Sikhs and Patl~nns were alike mutilated. Mr. Gee rendered great i wt 
asvistance throughout and conveyed the order to the guns for the retire- ad 
ment, but escaped being hit. H e  has it that over 100 of the enemy 
were killed, and their wounded are reported to be dying daily." 
11 0 
All was now known that could be known of the main incidents Th 
of the outrage, but as the details emerged there was much to say of t h ~  
the gallantry show11 by the troops. Colonel Bunny, though nnlortally 
wounded a t  the outset, directed the retirement. Captain Browne, B.A., occ 
though faint from loss of blood, owing to a severed artery, looked 
carefully after the withdrawil of his guns. Lieutenant Cruickshanlr, 
R.A., after being shot down, staggered to his feet and fought his 
guns until h i t  by  a second bullet which killed him. As to the men ,Id He 
with the section of the  battery, they were Sikhs and Punjabis, and s seU 
their conduct was beyond praise. There were only sixteen shells for 4 SUI 
each of tlie two guns, and these were quickly expended as the tribes- s: he nlell were within a hundred yards. I n  order to prevent a rush while 1st 
the  mules were being got ready the native gunners fired powder 
charges. It has already been related how the gunners carried a gun du 
and limber when the mules were wounded. Havildar-Major Mahomed 
Ismail and Havildar Nehal Singh par ticularly distinguished them- C11 
selves. The native drivers vied with the gunners in their gallantry. 
They assisted in carrying off the wounded, and some of then1 even 
began coolly loading up  spare mules with the over-coats of the detach- 
ment in spite of the hwvy fire, but Captain Browne ordered them to 
lead the mules away as the risk of casualties was toogreat. One of the 
Salutris of the battery, named Kewsl, did his best to  dress Captain 
Browne's wound, regaraess of the enemy's approach. As to the in- 
fantry, Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Siklm, must come first on the list 
not merely for personal gallantry, but for the niilitary qualities he dis- 
played. No sooner had the attack begun than he recognized the im- 
mense importance of saying the reserve ammunitioi~ (ten boxes, each 
i 
containing 600 rounds), as he knew the sepoys had only twenty-two 
rouncb in their pouches. H e  told offseven ixen to fetch the boxes, and 
they succeeded in carrying Yix back t o  the firing line. These were 8 
opened and the packets a t  once distributed among the two con~panies 6; 
of the regiment. Sepoy Shiv Singh made two journeys for this am- & 
munition and was twice .wounded, Narain Singh, as senior Native 
Officei-, had the burden of carrying out the details of the retirement, \ 
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were both suffering s-verely from theirwounds. H e  did his work 
admirably. Subadar Sundar Xingl.1, 1st P. I., must be braelreted with 
Narain Singh. He, with his brother Sundar and Jamadar Sherzad, 
1s t  Sikhs, formed up a party of sepoys to cover the retirement, and 
not a man budged until the order was given that they might fall back. 
The enemy closed with them, hand-to-hand fighting taking place, but 
the tribesmen could not force their way through this small body of de- 
termined men. I t  was here that the great majority of the casualties 
occurred. Sundar Sing11 was killed, sacrificing himself in order to give 
more time for the retirement to be effected. H e  mas a young Officer, 
h 4 having entered the service in 1883. Jamadar Sherzad surely earned the Victoria Cross if such a decoration were given to the Native Army. 
c? 
4 H e  first of all cs~rried Lieutenant Higginsoti away, then possessing him- 
$ self of a rifle hc covered by his fire a party of three nien carrying 
i Surgeon-Captain Cassidy to a place of comparative safety, and finally 
I 
he  shared in the desperate rear-guard fight. Subadar Nnwab Khan, . 
1st Silrhs, was among the last to leave the ground. H e  was twice shot 
in  the leg, but his wounds did not interfere with his cool discharge of 
duty on the way to Datta Khel. Coming now to the rank and file the 
gallantry shown was so universal that i t  is difficult to single men out. 
Chief among those who distinguished themselves were Lance-Naik I s l~ar  
Singh, 1st P. I., who killedseveral of the enemy with the bayonet, him- 
self escaping untouched; Eugler 1321% Sing]], who first assisted in sav- 
., ing the reserve ammunition, then with a rifle taken from a dead man 
. . doing some fighting, and afterwards distributing packets of cartridges 
anlong the sepoys whose supply was running out; Sepoy Allayar Khan, i 
1st P. I., who carded Lieutenant Seton-Browne to the first defensive 
position taken up ; Lance-Nailr Assa Singh, 1st P. I., who assisted the 
same Officer when the enemy were pressing closely upon the troops 
during the retirement ; and last, but not least, Sepoy Nurdah, 1st P. I., 
who drove off a party of tribesmen by shooting two of them a t  close 
quarters and then with s few corrirxdes charging them with tlie bayonet. 
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THE OFBICI.~L ACCOCXT. ~ a z i  
FIXALLY there  was the oEcia1 version of the affair, contained in the opin, 
report of Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in Tochi, which may be given too, 1 
in full :- Lieul 
Maizar is the  name given to a group of Madda Khel villages I 
situated above the  junction of the Shawal Algad and the Tochi, and not I 
the name of o n e  single village. It consists of a number of broad culti- I Higq 
vated terraces sloping down to the stream, and is occupied by Drepilari, 
1 
Khoji Khel, Ali Khan  Khel and Macha sections of the Ger portion of 
the Madda K h e l  tribe. It lies two miles beyond the village of Sheranni, 
'r 
R. A., 
and is about eleven miles distant from Datta Khel Camp. 1 
The main road  to Bir~ual and Ghazni, which the tribe is under 4 
agreement t o  k e e p  open, runs through it, and it  forms part of that tract I 
of the Upper Tochi  in which a more extended influence was contemplat- ? 
ed as conipared wi th  the hill tracts of Darwesh Khel country. As long postq 
ago as  September 1896, I had visited Sheranni aud Maizar with the view one 4 
of examining possible sites for the Shera~ini levy post, and you had lect I 
concurred generally with me that the post should be somewhere between the fil 
Sheranni and Maizar. I f 
My chief ob jec t  in making the present visit was to select a final site reach 
for this post, as tlie building season was already far  advanced and the dur C 
sanctioned plan a n d  estimate were expected back frow the Public Works Khnr 
Del~artment, and ,  if possible, to establish a temporary post there for the K h a ~  
Sheranni levies, who si~lce our occupation of Datta Khel have been kept presc 
clove to camp. I had asked Colonel Bunny to accompany me in order At Z 
that he might give me his advice in  the final selection of the site. In Bul 
nly letter, da ted  15th June  1897, I have explained the circun~stance con- Mad 
nected with t h e  realisation of the fine in Honda Ram's case, and my and 
intention of discussing the details of distribution with all the maliks 
concerned on my visit to Maizar. This was an additional reason for 
I 
going np the valley, though the fact that I asked the jirgah to  meet me to c: 
a t  Msizar was m e r e l y  due to my intention to halt there as being the 
I neRs, 
I most convenient place. fhre! 
1 Under o r d i n a r y  circun~stances, with the valley quite peaceful, as we rnalii 




























visit Maizar, as the road lies through open country, and the kotal above 
Maizar is visible from Datta Khel Camp. I asked Colonel Buncy if he 
would mind taking out the same number of men as were employed on 
my recent visit to the Kazha. That visit had an excellent effect on the 
Kazhamals, and as I had not visited Maizar for some time, 1 was of 
opinion that the sight of a large escort would have a good effect Ghere 
too, especially in view of the early commencement there of the levy post. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny agreed to my proposal. 
The following is the detail of the escort that accompanied me :- 
200 rifles 1st Sikhs with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny and Lieutenant 
Higginson. 
100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Seton-Browne. 
2 guns, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery under Captain Browne, 
R.A., and Lieutenant Cruickshank, B.A. 
12 sabres 1st (P. A. V. 0.) Punjab Cavalry. 
Surgeon-Captain Cassidy, 1st Sikhs. 
The 9th was originally fixed for the visit, but owing to ra,in i t  wns 
postponed till the 10th. Sadda Khan and Alambe had been sent on 
one day in advance to make what preparations were required and col- 
lect the local maliks for the purpose of discussing the distribution of 
the fine in Honda Ram's case. 
A start was made from Datta Khel a t  6 A.M. and Maizar was 
reached a t  9-30. I was accompanied from Datta Khel by Khan Baha- 
dur Chulam Muhammad Khan, Assistant Political Officer, Malilrs Nabbi 
Khan, Sabil and his son Dande and Hhanadin of the Kazha ; Shadam 
Khan, brother of Malik Sadda Khan, Mozammil Khan, his nephew, a t  
present officiating as Levy Jaruadar, and Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel. 
A t  Ziarat village I was joined by the Kliiddar Khel Maliks, Salehdin, 
Cful Samid, Syad Khan and Khan Wazir, and a t  Sheranni by the 
Madda Khel Maliks, Khan Habib and Zer Makhmad. Sndda Khan 
and Alarctbe were already a t  Maizar, and met me there. 
Sadda Khan showed me the place where he wanted the troops 
to camp and where a number of aharpoys had been placed in readi- 
ness. This was under. some trees on the topmost terrace, close to a 
threshing floor and not fa r  from the Drepilari kot  of Modai, a small 
malik. I showed the place to Colonel Bunny and the troops were halted 
there. 
( I2 g 
T x~i.zit on at once wit11 most of the maliks mlm had come with 
mn,l tltr c..i\:ilr~- $0 as to inspect Datoi, and callle back before i t  was  
liut. &fi,re going, howerer, I and the Assistant PolitiCd Officer 
i.:i\v rr ,!iiib of the -iIaiiar. Jlalilis, and the!. mere told with reference t o  
tile iinc in flondn Eanl's case that I would have them all up and dis- 
c ~ - s  iiie matteron lny return. Sadda Khan and A'litmbe stayed i n  
K U U ~  1): 111)- eider. C,yjt,ti~l Brourne, X.A., and Lieutenant Bigginson 
acconlpartiuii x:ic t n n a ~ d s  I>atoi ;ind we retllrned to canlp a t  11-30, 
L 1 e 1 1 f t .  The people of the villages round a t  t h a t  
tirnu nppr:~rt.d perfeeti:; friendly, and talker1 freely to  the Pathan 
, ,c~~oYs. E t e l > t l i i l ~ ~  xcrlr:ired in the nay of grass and wood had been 
hu~ti~lied ; :~r:cl : ~ i ~ v n t  ir~iddng- fuud which had beeu cooked in one of t h e  
3I:ii/,:r L o i d  \!as l ~ r o i r l ~ t  down for the sepoys, and a special point was 
iL:ndt. uf ti:e ZritieIi Oniiceibs pnrtaliing of some of it. I then made 
eiicluitieq ah to wliethrr the lucal j i r p t h ,  whi~11 had been sitting under 
O ~ I ~ ~ L L  t r~ t . ,  :~t':ir for bunle time, were ready to come and see me, and I 
nn> toIJ try the lssistant Political OScer that they had come to a n  
tt~liic':i~ic ngrcement by then~selves and that all that was necessary was 
tlinc s i ~ u n l d  come np later and make a formal statement before 
nle. This n-as nhnt ?iZ,~lik Sadda Khan had led Ghulam Mnhammad 
1CIi:~n to l~elitve ; but if the evidence available is to be trusted, Sadda 
1Cllnn'- hf.tt<-mcvt was a delibe~xte lie, for a t  that very time the Maizar- 
.rvnl~ I~nrl r t ~ f i ~ q t t l ,  as they 11ad the day before, to be bound by Sadda 
I<li:lli'r pl(i !~rs'~l* and must have been preparing for the outbreak. H a d  
Sarldc~ given us the slightest inforruatioll of this attitude on t h e  
p:Ut of the 3laiznrwals, which he, as well as the other Mad& Khel  
?rl:iliks, wlio had been there all d&y, must have been perfectly well 
aware of, there would have been plenty of time to prepare for an attack. 
The attack actually clid not take pIace till a little mhile after this, 
al)out 2 P.M., n l ~ e n  v e  had just finished lunch. I was preparing to go  
r o ~ ~ n d  vith Captain B r o w s  and look a t  sites for the post. The pipes 
liar1 begun to plq- a t  tiie request of the maliks, for the villagers to  listen 
to, ancl the sepoys and ourselves nere seated under the trees. T l l ~  
pipes played one tune and had just commenced a second, when suddenly 
all the villagers cleared off to-vards the Drepilari k o f .  It wds seen t h a t  
something was wrong and theorder to fall in was given, but a t  the same 
nionient a signal sllot was fired vhich nau foIlowed by an irregular 
\rolley apparently nimed a t  tlie Officers under the tree. Lieutenant 
Sato11-Eriwmc \Tiis hit in the thigh a t  the second or third shot, a n d  
Surge 
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Surgeoil-Captain Cassidy carried him to a place of con~parative safety 
by a snlall bhusn stack and tied up his wound. Colonel Bunny and 
myself had meanwhile gone towards the trees where the men were, bu t  
the Colonel was mortally woullded in the stomach just as he got there, 
and Lieutenant Higginson was shot in tbe left arm alnlost a t  the same 
minute. The firing had now become general from all the kots round. 
The guns then opened fire with case and did great execution among 
a body of men who had come out of the Drepilari hot and attempted to 
charge them. As they were not protected b anv cover, the two Royal 
Artillery Officers afforded an easy mark for the men who were shooting 
from towers around, and Captain Browne was hi t  in the arm a t  about 
the fifth round from the battery, and Lieutenant Cruickshank was shot 
very soon afterwards, first in the arm and thenin the chest, the second 
wound being fatal. It is niuch to be regretted that no medical aid was 
available for Captain Browne. The bullet had severed the artery, and 
had a proper tourniquet been applied, his life would have been saved, 
but Surgeon-Captain Cassidy was shot in  the knee while going towards 
the lcotal and could give no assistance. 
After about five minutes from the comnlencement of the attack, tho 
guns having expended all their ammunition linlbered up, and Colonel 
Eunny gave orders for a genernl retirement towards the kotal. This 
was effected along the lane which had low walls on either side of it. As 
far as the kotal we were exposed to fire on both sides, and practically 
all the casualties occurred before the kotal was reached. 
A fine stand was made a t  the corner of the garden by thelane, with 
the result that the battery and the wounded men were all safely over 
the lrotal before the ~osi t ion was evacuated. It was here that the 
greatest lossin men occurred, including Xubadar Xundar Singh, 1st 
Punjab Infantry, andmany individual acts of gallantry were peltformed 
which will be duly brought to the notice of Government by the Officer 
Commanding Tochi Valley. The retirement was then continued across 
the six ridges which extend from the kotal above Maizar to the sloping 
plain above Sheranni, xliich is a part of the Tsirai plain. A position 
was taken up on each ridge i n  succession, and the retirement was con- 
ducted in an orderly manner, time being given for all the wounded to 
get safely out on the plain, a distance of about two miles. Directly Maim? 
itself was evacuated, the tribesmen canle on in largenurnbers, which were 
( 14 
constantly bring increased by reinforcements from every village round 
including Sheranni. Tliey followed up the force closely and persisteiltly 
:tnd also occupied all the heights they could along the line of retirement. 
Tllcy were unable to do much damage owing to the steady behaviour o f  
the rear-guard, and they must have lost a good niaily men themselves. 
Lieutenant Higginson had the misfortune to be shot again in the l e f t  
arm while crossing the hills. 
The force eventually took up a good position about a mile from t h e  
last ridge s t  5-30 P.M., and waited there for reinforcenlents from Y a t t a  
Khel, which arrived a t  6-15 P.N., under Lieutenant deBrett, R.A. 
Sorne sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry had been despatched as soon as 
possible to fetch them and warn the camp. These reinforcements cover- 
ed a distance of nine miles in one-and-half hours. They consisted of 
two  conlpanies of the 1st Sikhs and extra gun and rlfle ammunition. 
The tribesmen meanwhile, whose numbers had probably increased 
t o  well over 1,000, had been kept thol.oughly in check, and as soon as 
the gun was got to work (tlie second gun had lost its wheels) the ga ther -  
ing began to disperse. The heights all round, which had been C ~ O M - d e d  
with men, were shelled, and then Sheranni village, from which I had 
nlvself seen large parties issuing to intercept our retirement. This was 
continued until I received a message from Khan Bahadur Ghulam MU- 
Ilanlmad Khan a h o  had escaped vid tlie Tochi with a few nialiks, to the 
effect that he had arrived close to the village and was in  danger of 
being hit. 
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No further opposition was met with. The Khiddar Khels of Z i a r a t  
village gave us great assistance in bringing out water for the men a n d  
c'larpot/s for the wounded, and though a few of them undoubtedly join- 
ed the Madda Khels, the maliks, who hadgone straight back f r o m  
hfaizar when the attack began, were entirely successful in preventing 
the tribe from joining. 
Captain Browne, B.A., had by this time died from loss of blood, a n d  
Colonel Bunny did not live to reach camp. The rear-guard reached 
camp a t  12-30 P.M. Khan Balladur Ghulam Muhammad Khan a l s o  
came in the same night. 
the 
111a1. 
It appears that when the outbreak occurred, Sadda Khan had 
just come over to him from thejirgah with Kotan Khan and stated that 
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alnlost directly afterwards the firing began. Gliulanu Muhammad 
Khan had just gone down to a lower terrace to perform his ablutions, 
and he was a t  once joined by Nabbi Khan, Khangai Macha, Alimad 
Madda Khel, Wadin Saidgi and the Khiddar Khel levies and Border 
Police. His munshi and clerk were also with him. This party was 
afterwards joined a t  different times by Sadda Khan, Shadam Khan, 
Dande, his brother, Khan Habib, Zerin and Mozamnlil Khan and they 
went dowu the Shawal Algad to the Tochi and took refuge on the 
other side of the Tochi in Tarmori Kila, the inhabitants of which were 
just preparing to join the fight. From there Sadda Khan was despatcl- 
ed to  Sheranni to keep the people quiet, and he returnedafter two hours, 
saying he had dispersed the lashkar and the road was clear. Nothing 
could have been further from the truth. I n  consequence of what he 
stated, Ghulam Muhammad Khan started down the Tochi, and, as 
already stated, arrived a t  Sheranni when i t  was being shelled. Mozam- 
mil Khan and Alam Shah, the Madda Khel Daffadar of Kazha, were 
the only Ger Madda Khels who came on with the Assistant Political 
Officer to camp. 
The next day I called the Khiddar Khel Maliks in and asked them 
to arrange to bring in the dead, and this they eventually did with the 
assistance of Kotan Khan, Kabul Khel, and 1 think great credit is due 
to them for the performance of this service, especially as the bodies 
were much mutilated, Mussalmans and Sikhs alike. 
The following is the list of casualties on our side :- 
Three British Officers killed. Three British Oficers wounded. 
Native ranks killed- 
One Subadar and seven men of the 1st Punjab Infantry. 
Twelve men and a Kahar of 1st Sikhs. 
One Havildar and one driver, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery. 
It is a significant fact that of the above total 17 were Sikhs, though 
the force was conlposed of nearly an equal number of Sikhs and Mussal- 
mans. 
Wounded- 
1st Punjab Infantry-Two men severely, two men slightly. 
1st Panjab Cavalry-One man slightly. 
1st Sikhs-Twelve men severely, one mule-driver ddngerously, 
eight men slightly. 
No. 8 Bonibag. Mountain Battery-Two men severely, one man 
slightly, one Rahar  slightly. 
The Waziri loss in killed has been put a t  100 by the maliks, from 
whom enquiries have been made, and as it is probable that a good many 
have died since of their wounds probably a total of 100 is not very wide 
of the mark. 
This is also the opinion of Native Officers who had the best means 
of judging. A large number (some 30 or 40) are said to have been killed 
outside the DrepiIari ?sot by the case shot, and very nearly as many were 
killed a t  the corner of the garden where the stand was made. All 
along the line of retirement the tribesmen pressed close, and a number 
of them were shot down. 
t : * 
Here ends the Political OEcer7s report. The narrative of the 
hft~izar outrage however cannot properly be closed without mention of 
the rew:rrds granted to those who had taken part in the action connected 
with the outbreak. 
The military reports received from Lieutenant-Colonel Gray regard- 
ing the Maizsr aEair were published as  despatches. The Commander- 
in-Chief placed on record his appreciation of the heroic conduct of 
Officers and men, arid declared that " the action was a deed of arms 
second to none in the annals of the British Army.'' The Government 
of India 'L most heartily endorsed this view.'' 
The two surviving British Officers who mere present a t  Maizar, 
Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson, 1st  Sikhs, and Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton- 
Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry, both of whom were severely wounded, 
were recommended for the Distinguished Service Order.* 
With regard to Mr. Gee, Colonel Gray, in his report on the Maizar 
affair, thus referred to the Political Officer whose escort was attacked : 
"Though i t  is not my business to  report on Civil Officers, i t  would 
be uujust to omit mentioning that Mr. Gee's exertions and presence of 
mind were of great value in  the help he rendered during the retire- 
ment and in sending to call u p  the reinforcements!' 
On the recommendation of General Corrie Bird, supported by the 
Commander-in-Chief, the three ~r inc ipa l  Native Officers with the troops 
engaged in the Maizar affair were given the Order of Merit a t  once 
as a reward for their gallantry. Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab 
* Lleutenan~ I%ie,gir~sot~ did not live to  receivc this award, and Xurgoon-Captain 
cabs id^ had already sncc~~mbed to his wound. 
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Infantry, who was killed, was also gazetted to the Order of Merit, so as 
to enable his widow to draw a larger pension. Subadar Narayan Singh, 
1st Sikhs, whose coolness and gallantry were so noticeable, was admitted 
to the Order of British India, with the title of Bahadur ; 23 Non- 
Commissioned Officers and men were given the Order of Merit ; Jhanda 
Singh, cook of the 1st Sikhs, was also admitted to the Order of Merit, 
though a non-combatant, for having carried off a box of ammunition 
under heavy Ere. The widows of eight men killed were admitted to a 
pension of the 3rd class of the Order of Merit. Later on there was 
pl~blished in the Gazette qf India a full list of rewards for the Non- 
commissioned Officers and men. This list will be found among the 
appendices. 
There is only one more fact to chronicle. An impression gained 
ground, when the news of the outrage was first published, that the 
Madda Ehel  had singled out the Sikhs for attack and that the Maho- 
medan sepoys escaped lightly. This was altogether erroneous. N@ 
such distinction was made, and indeed in the m616e it would have been 
impossible. It is sufficient to mention that of five sepoys killed in 
the splendid defence a t  the garden wall three wereMahomedans and 
t l ~ a t  both Sikh and Mahomedan bodies were afterwards found mutilated 
in  the horrible manner peculiar to the frontier tribes. 
A special Gazette was subsequently issued, containing a despatch in 
which the gallantry of Lieutenant de Brett, R.A., on June IOth, near 
Sheranni, was warmly acknowledged. This Officer, i t  appeared, in his 
keenness to keep his battery in continuous play, rammed the charges 
home in a mountain gun with a sepoy's rifle without sponging out be- 
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TBE PDNITIYE EXPEDITIOR. 
AS i t  appeared imperative to punish without delay the villages 
of Maizar and Sheranni, which were immediately concerned in the 
treacherous attack on the Political Officer's escort, the Government of 
India arranged within the next two or three weeks for a punitive 
columli to move into the offending country from Dattn Khel. 
The expeditionary force consisted of two Brigades. Major-General 
G. Corrie Bird, then commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, was given 
the chief command, and the principal members of his staff were as fol- 
lows :-Assistant Adjutant-General, Major J. Wilcocks, D.A.A.G. 
a t  Nagpore ; Assistant Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. 
Nixon, 18th Ekngal Lancers ; Ordnance Officer, Major C. H. Wilson, 
R,.A.; Intelligence Officers, Major G. V. Kemball and Lieutenant G. K. 
Cockerill of the Intelligence Branch at  Army Head-Quarters ; Superin- 
tendent, Army Signalling, Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th B. C.; Field 
Engineer, Major I. Digby, Madras ; Assistant Field Engineers, Captain 
A. L. Schreiher and Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn ; Principal Commissariat 
Officer, Major G. Wingate, Peshawar ; Transport Oficers, Veterinary- 
Msjor G. J. R. Rayment and Captain H. James, Mian Mir ; Provost 
Marshal, Captain P. Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas ; Principal Medical. Oficer, 
Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew. 
The two Brigades were composed as followfi :- 
1st Brigade: Colonel C. C. Egerton, Corps of Guides, Comtnanding ; 
D. A. A.-G., Captain H. B. B. Watkis, then a t  Army Head-Quarters ; 
D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major F. Wintour, Allahabad ; Commissariat Oficer, 
Lieutenant E. A. R. Howell, Sialkot. Troops :-The Peshawar Mountain 
Battery, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 1st Sikhs, the 
1st Punjab Infantry, and the 33rd Punjab Infantry. 
2nd Brigade : Brigadier-General W. P. Symonq Sirhind District, 
Commanding; D. A. A.-G., Captain J. MacN. Walter, Devonshire 
Regiment, then on the Staff at Lucknow ; D. A. Q.-M.-G., Major M. H. 
S. Grover, then D. A. Q.-M.-G., Punjab Command. Troops :--No. 6 
(Bombay) Mountain Battery (4 guns), the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 
I the 14th Sikhs, and the 25th Punjab Infantry. The two squadrons of tho 
1st Punjab Cavalry already in the Tochi Valley and No. 2 Company 
Bengal Sappers and Miners were also ordered to form part of the expe- 
ditionary force. 
Fuller details of General Corrie Bird's staff and of the staffs of the 
two Brigades, as  well as of the conlposition of the force, are added i n  
an appendix. 
Full political power was vested in Major-General G. Corrie Bird 
during the operations in the Tochi Valley. Mr. Gee was appointed 
Chief Political Officer attached to the General, while Mr. Lorimer and 
Mr. Kettlewell were Assistant Political Officers, each attached to a 
Brigade. A proclamation was at once issued notifying to the tribes- 
men in and about the Tochi Valley the reason for the expedition. 
While the concentration of the Tochi Field Force was yet in pro- 
gress, speculation was rife as to the nature and strength of the opposi- 
tion which our troops would be likely to encounter a t  and beyond Datta 
Khel. News received from native sources mentioned that agathering of 
tribesmen in strength was contemplated a t  Sheranni and Maizar. The 
Mahsud Waziris, who were then lying to the south, were said to  besend- 
ing a contingent to join the Madda Khel, while another tribal force was 
reported to bemoving from Birrnal in Afghan territory. As against this, 
the Darwesh Khel in the Upper Tochi Valley were certainly not unani- 
mous a t  that time in the matter of further hostilities : the Khiddar 
Khel sub-section had brought in  the bodies of sonle sepoys killed in  the 
retirement from Maizar, and their headmen were holding aloof from the 
Madda Khel. It seemed improbable also tha t  the  tribesmen of Birmal, 
who are subjects of the Amir of Kabul, would cross into British terri- 
tory. It was quite likely, however, that restlems spiritv among the 
Mahsud Waziris would join their kinsmen in Tochi. Later news from 
the Wnziristan direction stated that the Khiddar Khel a n d  the Sadgis 
from Eirmal were helping the Maizarwals to remove their goods i n h  
Afghan territory, thus giving the tribesmen a free hand for fighting. 
The latter, however, showed no desire meanwhile to assume the offensive 
against the Datta Khel post. 
At this early period there appeared upon the scene a figure of some 
note-an old acquaintance, the Mullah Powiudah-whose movements 
thenceforth bcame a matter of considewble interest to our Intelligence 
1)cp;trtruent in Tochi. The tactics of the Mullah up to the time of the 
~ ~ c l i l u i n a r y  concentration of our troops a t  Bannu were however of a kind 
( 20 1 
which showed that  his influence over the Mahsud Waziris as a body was 
not as  great as three years previously. H e  a t  first tried to induce the 
tribesmen t o  send a contingent to help the Mndda Khel, but there was 
such a faint response to his appeal that  he promptly changed his ground 
.and wrote into our Political Oificers in  the Tochi offering to mediate be-- 
tween the Government and the people of Maizar and Sheranni. This 
step was, of course, taken by him in order to increase his prestige i n  
Waziristan and the adjacent country : i t  was a clever move, but the 
Government could not recognise his position in any way. The Madda 
Khel are a section of the Darwesh Ehel  Waziris, and with the latter the 
>fullah had nothing whatever to do. H e  had, in fact, no status, and it 
would have been most unwise to have any dealings with him. As a 
possible enemy be had to be watched : as afriendly mediator he was put 
aside. Mediation moreover was not called for. The Madda Ehel  had 
deliberately the attack on Colonel Bunny's detachment and had 
carried i t  out in the most treacherous way. Their offence was clearly de- 
fined and their punishment would need to be exemplary. A tribal rising 
of the ordinary local kind, or a raid upon an outpost, is not of material 
consequence in the borderland. Such disturbances are more or less ex- 
pected whenerer our troops occupy positions beyond the old frontier line. 
But-  the Maizar affair was of an entirely different complexion, for it in- 
volved a breach of hospitality and could only have been successful by 
cunningly contrived treachery. The Mullah Powindah himself was said 
to have denounced its treacherous character, but probably if he did so a t  
all he only did it when he found that the Mahsuds would not obey his 
summons t o  raise a force to  help the Xadda Khel. 
From all that  couId be learnt it seemed that the great majority of 
the Darwesh Ehel, many of whom held lands in British territory, were 
as little disposed as the Mahsuds to commit themselves to  hostilities. 
Lest, however, in  view of these facts and in the light of subsequent 
events it should be thought that the Field Force was too large for the 
work before it, it may be a t  once said that the Government of India were 
anxious not to set the whole frontier from Kurram to the Gumal in a 
blaze by sending up a small force which would invite attack, and it was 
expected that large military preparations would have the effect of check- 
ing the fanaticism of any clans who might be hesitating whether 
they should join the malcontents in the Upper Tochi Valley. It was 
known that  the  Madda Ehel against whom the Tochi Valley Force 
were about to move, could muster only 11,200 fighting men, but it was 
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and Mahsud Waziris would join them, and hence the necessity for 
being prepared for more than a mere promenade to Maizar, Sheranni 
and Datoi. The Dawaris also, who hold the greater part of the Tochi 
Valley, were known to be an ill-conditioned and fanatical lot, who 
might give trouble along the line of communications in case of any 
check to our troops beyond Datta Khel. The Kabul Khel of Birmal, 
who were said to have made common cause with the Madda Khel, are a 
section of a big clan of the Utmanzai, and they were in a position to  
fight with the comfortable assurance of being able to get away whenever 
they had had enough, for Birmal is in Afghan territory and is only a 
day's journey from Sheranni. It was therefore impossible to  fore- 
see tha t  General Corrie Bird's force would find no enemy when the 
advance was made from Datta Khel. As had been proved a t  Wano, 
5,000 or 6,000 tribesmen can assemble so quickly, and t,heir movements 
are made so secretly, that their presence is first announced by a rush 
of swordsmen on .our pickets. Waziri tactics are, as a rule, based on 
surprise, and valleys which may have been empty of men in the morn- 
ing may smarm with thousands after nightfall. If opportunity offers 
for striking a sudden blow the tribesmen do not generally hesitate to 
deliver au  attack. The affair a t  Wano itself was but a repetition of that  
a t  Palosin in 1860, when our losses were 63 killed and 166 wounded, in  
addition to 60 casualties among the levies. Any force which moved up  
the Tochi Valley had to be prepared for attaclr, not only from the south 
but  from the north also, for there was no guarantee that  the tribesmen 
from the Kurram border to  the Gumal would not suddenly be infected 
with a spirit of hostility. 
And now to follow the actual course of events. The concentration 
of the troops was carried out as rapidly as possible consistent with the 
collection of supplies and transport. Bannu being the base, l h t t a  
Ehel  was fixed upou as the advanced base from which the force woulcl 
only have to advance about 13 miles to reach Maizar and Shewnni, 
and 6 nliles further to reach Datoi (some tribesmen of which psrtici- 
pated in the Msizar outrage), To ensure the safety of Rannu itself and 
to keep the peace on the border the following additional moves were 
ordered :-200 sabres of the 3rd Punjsb Cavalry and the whole of thc 
3rd Sikhs from Kohat to  Eannu ; the 2nd Punjab Infantry from 
Abbottabad to Icohat, and 250 of thc 4th Silrhs from Dera Ismail Khan 
to Jandouln, Sarwslrai and 1Iniclari Kacli on thc Mahsud frontier. As 
a spccial precaution against thc efl'ects of the heat the Sritisll soldiers 
in the Tochi Field Force vere provided with sola topees in l i e u  of 
helniets and with sun glasses. It is probable that this thought fu l  
measure saved Inany casualties that mould otherwise have occurred 
from sunetroke and fever. 
The concentration a t  Bannu was of course uneventful, but the ad- 
vance to D a t b  Khel aid Saidgai, Idak and Boya was not made q u i t e  so 
serenely, as shots were repeatedly iired into camp, a sentry being ki l led 
in this way a t  Datta Khel. 
The Engineers en route from Bannu had rendered valuable service 
in cutting a good road, partly through solid rock, all the way t o  Boya, 
and in constructing (in twelve days) a crib and trestle bridge, 600 feet 
wide, over the Tochi River a t  Boja. As a result the march t o  D a t t a  
Ehel n7as accomplished with the minimunl of difficulty, and t h e  Field 













THE WORK OF DESTRUCTION, 
WITHOUT a blow being struck or a shot being fired, Sheranni wag 
6ccupied by General Egerton's Brigade of the Tochi Field Force on 
Ju ly  20th. General Bird and his Staff accompanied the Brigade. The 
rear-guard saw a body estimated a t  about 500 men some 2 miles from 
the road who disappeared into the further hills. 
On arrival a t  Sheranni the cavalry reconnoitred the scene of the 
action a t  Maizar and found one man who was brought in prisoner. The 
carcases of five mules and two ponies were seen lying where they had 
been shot down, and about five yards from the wall of one of the kothis 
an ordnance pack saddle and one or two other articles of Government 
property were found and brought in. 
Sheranni itself was quite deserted. I t s  wood wall was torn down 
to serve for firewood for the troops, as the hills in the vicinity were 
barren of vegetation. There was a certain quantity of bhusa, barley 
and clover about in  the village, and the fields around were fairly 
advanced in cultivation. After the bhusa had been gathered and 
sufficient wood accumulated the destruction of the village was begun. 
A few shots were fired into camp that night by a band of about 10 
to 20 men, but no large body of the enemy was anywhere discernible. 
This absence of opposition wag variously explained. The Madda 
Khel tribesmen in a body, with their families, were reported to  have 
crossed the Afghan frontier into Birmal, leaving only scouts to watch 
the approach of General Corrie Bird's force. As Birmal is a tract which 
usually yields only sufficient supplies for its ordinary population, the 
position of the Madda Khel, if this report were true, threatened to be- 
come a very awkward one. I n  another direction i t  was reported that 
the Mullah Powindah had assembled 7,000 Mahsud Waziris near Razani 
in the adjoining Khaisora Valley to  the south, and that his intention 
was to attack Boya or Datta Khel after the advance from the latter 
post to  Sheranni had been made. As a precautionary measure two 
companies were ordered from Miran Shah to Boya. Boya is the post 
on the line most exposed to Waziri raids, as a fair road is said to exist 
to i t  from Khaisora, but  it had been strongly entrenched bjr the Sap- 
pers and was believed to be impregnable against any tribal attack. 
( 24 ) 
-"! 
T\'hcn nil drfcnsivc armngcmcnts had bee11 completed news was received 
that thc BIullnh Powindah had abandoned his intention of attacking 
d 
our troops in the Tochi Valley, and that his gathering of Mahsuds had 
dispersed. Every precaution, however, was still taken a t  Datta Khel, 
Boya, Idak, and Miran Shah to guard against possible surprises, while 
all convoys were strongly guarded. Reports from Wano showed that  
southern XTaziristan was quiet, and no demonstration seemed likely t o  
be made in that quarter ; in fact the Mahsuds as a body had apparently 
shrunk from committing themselves to helping the Madda Khel. Later 
news made i t  almost certain that the Mullah Powindah had returned 
to his own village in Waziristan, and i t  mas further ascertained that  
there was no large gathering of Mahsuds a t  Razmak. The Tochi Field 
Furce had therefore little prospect of getting any fighting worthy of t h e  
name, unless some totally unexpected tribal combination occurred. 
The night of the 25th of July witnessed the successful destruction 
of the towers and fortified houses of Sheranni. The next day parties 
from each corps went out to Maizar to destroy the fortified houses a n d  
towers of the villages. The defences of Drepileri kot were destroyed 
by the Highlanders and Sappers. The towers were blown up, and after 
the troops had left, smoke was seen rising from the direction of Drepi- 
h i ,  the result probah!y of some woodwork catching fire after the  
csplosions necessary to  demolish the towers. As a high wind was 
blowing, and the kot contained a large quantity of bhusa, most of it 
was probably burnt. The troops were again occupied on the 21th of 
July in destroying the kots in the Maizar settlement to the north of the 
viIlage of Drepilari. The village itself, which caught fire, was already 
pretty well destroyed. On tlie 25th Ju ly  the kots to  the south of it were 
destroyed, as also were those in the village of Tormor, which lay some 
two miles up the stream of Sheranni on the left bank of the Tochi. 
With the exception of intermittent and ineffectual sniping, varied 
by small seizures of straggling camels and donkeys, there was nothing 
all this time to suggest the presence of a n  enemy in the neighbourhood, 
and the position eventually became very tiresome. Finally, on the 5th of 
August, letters were sent to all the leaders of the Madda Khels, inviting 
them to come in under safe conduct and hear vhat  the terms demanded 
by the Government were. It was, of course, well understood beforehand 
that nothing less than the surrender of the ring-leaders and the payment 
of heavy fines could well be exacted by General Bird. When first sum- 
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safe conduct promised them. General Bird, however, utiIized the services 
of some of the headmen of the neighbouring tribes, and on the 16th of  
August three Madda Khel Maliks came in. The following afternoon 
General Bird held a Darbar a t  which some Kazha Khel and Tori Khel 
Maliks were also present. I t  was announced that Government demanded 
the return in good condition of the property which had been lost a t  
Maizar, the surrender of some 18 headmen, the payment of a fine still 
for the murder of a Hindu writer there, and a further fine 
of Rs.10,900 for the outrage. Ten days was given them in which t@ 
take the terms to the tribe and discuss them and to give an answer. The  
Dalabar did not last more than half-an-hour, and the people were told 
.that no discussion was to be permitted ; they had been sent fo r  merely 
to receive the orders of Government. 
On the 22nd of August the tribes were reported to be stiTT discuss- 
ing the terms imposed on them, and thereafter news from the Tochi 
Valley became very scant and infrequent. On the 2nd of September 
there was said to be a probability that the sons @f the Madh 'Khel  
Maliks would come in that day and give their answer to the terms 
imposed by the Government, but the expectation was not realised. The 
same day a coIumn, under the Eon'ble Montagu Curzon, consisting of 
the Rifle Brigade, the 1st Punjab Infantry, two guns, and a company of 
Sappers, marched to Landi Khel to make a mad along the right bank of 
the Tochi River to Datoi, and was fired a t  on arrival and also a t  night 
when in camp. The next evening a berated reconnoitring party under 
Major R. M. Maxwell, while returning to Miran Shah from towards the 
Khaisora Valley, was also fired a t  in the dark by parties from both sides 
of the river near the village of Argun ; but no mischief was done. 
I n  this uneventful manner the Tochi Valley punitive operations, fop 
want of an enemy to punish, came to be generally regarded as a t  an> end. 
The aspect of affairs was not enlivened when, on the 14th of September, 
the Madda Khel definitely refused to accept the terms offered them, for 
as they still carefully avoided a collision with our troops By remaining in 
Afghan territory their contunlacy only converted a position of perplexity 
into an absolute deadlock. I t  was perhaps rather sanguine to expect that 
a t  this stage any frontier tribe would agree to give up  leaders whose 
execution was admittedly a foregone conclusion, Our troops meanwhile 
could do nothing. There was no enemy to fight and it did not seem in 
the least likely that there ever would be one. Nevertheless, the Gov- 
ernment of India decided to Ieave the Tochi Force in occupation for a 
time with tlie general idea of thek contin- to overawe the Waeirisi 
' A t  the end of September the political situation Was much the same. 
T h e  Madda Khel showed no signs of submitting to our terms, a n d  
were still over the border. I t  was stated that  the Amir had offered 
them land and water, but in Turkistan, and that they could not nlake 
u p  their mind whether o r  not to accept the offer. No doubt they hoped 
by staying out to wear down the patience of Government, and so be re- 
admitted to their own land on terms less severe than those already 
deliberateIy imposed on them for their conduct. 
A month later-October the 29th to be exact-five headmen belong- 
ing to the villages of Tornlor, situated about two miles a1)ove Sheranni, 
came in and surrendered themselves to General Bird. On the 31st of 
the month Khan St~lleb and three other Sheranni Maliks came in, 
followed shortly afterwards by Sadda Khan and his brother Shadam, t h e  
lleadmen of the hladda Khel tribe. I t  was decided to try then1 by  a 
tribunal to be specially assembled for  that  purpose. On the  14 th  
November General Bird received the submission of the whole of t h e  
Madda Khel tribe unconditionally, and among those who fiurrendered 
were four more of the seventeen men who were demanded by name for  
their share in the affair a t  Maizar. A good many of the proscribed 
headmen, vhose families took refuge in Afghan territory, were said 
to  be experiencing a difficulty in getting away from their asylum and  i n  
removing their families. Five of the men for instance were 
ready to come in and surrender unconditionaIly on the 13th November, 
but during the night receivednews that their faillilies had been detained 
beyond the border, and they naturally went off to obtain their release 
before surrendering to General Bird, which they had sworn o n  t h e  
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General Corrie Bird proceeded to Datta Khel on the 15th November, 
taking with him his prisoners and the jirguh of friendly tribes, fo r  t h e  
purpose of finally deciding the question of assessment and distribution 
of fines among those concerned, and of obtaining proper security fo r  
payment. These points were duly settled, and it was understood that 
the tribe as a whole mould be admitted back to its territory a t  once. 
The work assigned to the Tochi Field Force was accomplished, and the  
Tochi Valley no longer formed part of the "disturbed area," 
St is bu t  fair to add here that though the force only experienced de- 
sultory opposition on the part of the enemy, it  had to fight against iLn 
unhes~lthy yeasou in the hottest t ime of the year, alld agaiust diificulties 
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tvllich olhy those \vho %re actually acquainted with the Toclli TTallcy can 
ploperly appreciate. Moreover, the expedition has been productive of 
a t  least one permanently useful result outside the scope of its strictly 
fiiilitary purpose : a very large extent of country, the whole of it 
in  fact that lies between the Tochi Valley and the Kurram River a t  
Thal, Ilas been accurately surveyed aud mapped by Lieutenant Pirrie, 
tile Survey Officer with the Tochi Force. The gazetteering and recotl- 
tx~issal~ce work WAS done by Major Kernball, who on one day reacl~ed 
the village of Biland Khel which is only some three miles from Thal. 
II * II 
In order to  preserve the continuity of whntis to some extent a 
separate narrstive, we hnve carried events in the Tochi Valley unin- 
terruptedly from the Mitiear outrage in June to tlie submission of t l ~ e  
cdstiysted tribesmen in Noven1l)er ; and have nnde no 111e11tion of tlle 
graver occurrences which were being coacted the greater part of tliia 
tirrle in oLIier territories on our North-West frontier. Tllus, while 
Genela1 Carrie Bird's pu~litive force was engaged towards tlie end of 
July in destroying Sheranni and Maizar, tlie M,~l:ck;~nd l~osition W:LY 
being fiercely assailed by tthousancls of Swatis ; and to this ~t i r r iug pe~iod 
the story now revel Is. 
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PART 11, 
THE RISING IN THE SWAT VALLEY. 
P A R T  11. 
THE R I S I N G  IN THE SWAT VALLEY. 
CHAPTER I. 
THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND, 
A N  outbreak no less sudden than that in the Tochi Valley, and in- 
Bnitely more se r io~s  i n  its extent and sustaiuecl ferocity, began a t  the 
Malakand on tlie 26th of July when our strategical position a t  the 
head of the Pass was attacked by about 2,000 tribesmen. mostly belong- 
3ng to the Swat country. The assailants were for the moment driven 
back with great losses, but also not without a severe loss to the garrison, 
.one British Officer being killed and four others wounded, in addition 
to several casualties in the native rank and file. 
From all the information ultiniately available it appeared that on 
the morning of the day in question, which was a Monday, news reached 
Malakand that a disturbance had taken place a t  Thana, a village afew 
h~iles  to the north-east, opposite Chakdara (the outpost of our Malakand 
position) where the suapension bridge crosses the Swat River. It did 
not then seem that anything very serious had occurred, but later in 
the day further reports were received to the effect that the LLMad 
Fakir," a mullah who had gained much notoriety locally, had gathered 
some hundreds of tribesmen about him and was bent upon mischief. 
I n  the evening the levies employed on the road to Chakdara came 
flying into camp, their report being that the Swatis had risen ea 
marse, and that the "Mad Fakir " was marching down the valley with 
the intention of attacking Malahnd. Colonel Meiklejohn, Commanding 
'the Malakand Brigade, decided, after consultation with Major Deane, 
the Political Officer, to send out a column a t  3 A.M. in order to disperse 
t h e  tribal gathering. But the mullah and his following anticipsted this 
action by attacking the camp a t  half-past ten o'clock a t  night, a most 
unusual hour for Pathans, who usually wait until just before dawn. 
A t  9-45 P.M., while the troops were engaged preparing for the 
march a t  daybreak, s levy jaluadar arrived with the news that the 
L L  Sf,x(l P:tkir '' l ~ i s  fol.ce p:~s.red IUlar* and were advancing UP Ihe 
Uudclhist and graded roads, and that the l~illsides eart of the camp were 
covered wit11 I';~tIl~ns. ~ t l e  aInrn1 was at once sounded, all pickets 
\rere doubled, and the regiments fell in on their alarm posts. Lieute- 
nant-Colonel AlcRae, who comnlanding the 45th Sikhs, taking as 
man?- men as he could get together, a t  once doubled up to the poillt 
.rvllere the old Buddhist reacIles the top of the hill, and arrived 
~t the narrow gorge through which the Buddhist road passes just i n  
time to meet a mass of several hundred Pathans creeping silently up 
the road. I n  another few minutes they would have been in the camp. 
IIe gave then1 a very hot reception, holding this gorge for about 20 
minutes, :~nd finally falling back, as the enemy took possession of 
ground con~manding the gorge, to a very strong positio~l completely 
barring the road, which he held whole remaining time. Colonel 
bl[cEne's p101npt action and the stubborn resistance vhich he, aided 
?il:~j*r TayIos and his small party, offered to vastly superior num- 
bers, urltloubtedlv saved the carnp from being rushed on that  side. 
AS Colonel &Rae fell back to the more easily defensible position he 
WRY reinforced by Lieutenant Barff, and thenceforth that night they 
held in check immense odds, fighting unremittingly till daybreak. 
>l:tjor Taylor T V ~ Y  ~vocnded in the side by a bullet early in  the fight, a n d  
was carried a\T:Ly to hospital, knowing that he could not recover. 
I n  the centre and left of the camp, on the alarm sounding, Lieute- 
11ant Clin~o, with a company of the 24th Punjab Infantry, had manned 
the walls of the bazar comnlanding the nppoaches fro111 the graded 
road and the gorge below it. Another company of 24th Punjab Infan t ry  
under Lieutenant Costello had nlaniled the walls of the coluuiissariat a n d  
hospital enclosures facing the gorge from the North Uarnp, and a t h i r d  
company of thc same regiment supported the pickets 011 the left. 
The remainder of the regiment was held in reserve in their camp. 
NO. 5 C'onlpany Sapperv and Miners had fallen in a t  the walls and 
abattiv surroundiug their own camp. 
It was a pitch dark night, and a t  about 10-15 the Erst shot was  
fired. The enelny made a vigorous rush a t  the Abbott Road picket and. 
qvelapowered it. Dashing through the opening thus made tlley gained, 
* Iharc .ire tuu ~,lacci, quite dist~nct fro111 cxl l  otllcr, ho ~i '~n~cr l ,  and both obtailr 
melrtlor~ in c?iff*relit parts of ttlc Iiarlxtlr~c Thc Khar now refexrcd t o  is bilu+tcU l ~ n  tllo 
road botueen Malilkn~lcl aud Ohakdara. The other Khar heu ou t l i ~  norther11 cuufincu 
of the Mohrudud country. 
t,lie high ground 'hcllind tllc Snppcrs ' lines and s~~rron~idecl t l ~ ~ i r  camp 
aild the colnnlissarint goclown. Coloilel Meiklejoli~r, with his T).il.A.-C:., 
went at  once to the 24th Punjab Infantry cany and ordered Lieube- 
nant-colonel Lamb to bring up another company of this regiment t o  
strengthen the Sappers, and proceeded with then1 to the Sappers and 
Miners' Camp. Lieutenant Clinlo's company was now also ordered into 
this enclosure, as the enemy were getting round his left flank and in llis 
positioll he partially masked the fire which Lieutenant Costello could 
bring to bear on them. In  these positions the troops remained all night. 
The enemy came on with great determination, charging the al~attis 
defended by the Madras Sappers and Miners over and over again. 
The corps behaved splendidly, driving their assailants back and I l~ ld-  
ing their own manfully under a hailstorm of bullets and rocks shower- 
ed on them from the rising ground close in front of their abattis. 
Twice, however, the enemy got through, once taking possession of their 
quarter-guard, in which was all the arnnlunition of the corps and some 
spare rifles. I n  trying to check this charge Lieutenant Watling was 
wounded 1)y a ghazi, who leapt the abattis, but whom he ran through 
as he got in. The man struck him across the shoulder and necl; first, 
but apparently with the back of his sword, and then as he fell cut 
hini again above the heel. Sergeant Byrlle of this company was killed 
here. Colonel Meiklejohn was a t  this time watching the defence on the 
south and south-east faces of the enclosure, to which place Lieutenant 
Watling was carried, and where Major Herbert, who had also been 
shot, was being attended to by Surgeon-Captain Langston. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Lamb, commanding the 24th Punjab Infantry, was leaning over 
Major Hel;bert, asking him about his wound when he himself was struclr 
by a Pullet above the knee, shattering the bone. Colonel Meiklejohn, on 
hearing that the quarter-guard had been taken, a t  once decided that i t  
must be retaken, and getting together 10 or 15 men with Captain 
Holland and Lieutenant Clirno, led then1 on to the attempt. As they 
got sear they made a dash, Colonel Meiklejohn leading Almost imme- 
diately two Sappers werkshot and fell dt his feet, his orderly was cut 
down a t  his side and a Pathan struck him across the chest with the flat 
of his sword. This was really the galIant Colonel's second escape, for 
the bullet which had wounded Major Herbert had first passed through 
Colonel Meiltlejohn's gaiter. Captain Holland was shot here, the bulIet 
passing across his back, going under both shoulder blades, but missing 
his spine, leaving four holes. The reception that this party got caused 
slight checli, but Colonel Meilrlejohn, who .was now atanding ahead 
alone, was immorable, shooting down his assailants with his revo lver  a s  
they came for him. The check wzs only momentary, and the sepoys, 
cheered on by Lieutenant Climo, dashed up to him and into the guard, 
driving the enemy from the enclosure and saving the ammunition. 
Some of the enemy had at  the commencement got into t h e  con~mis- 
sariat e~lclosure and into the room where Honorary-Lieutenant Manley, 
C'onlnliss~riat Officer, and Sergeant Harrington were. L i e u t e n a n t  
&Innley went for them with his revolver, shooting two, and w a s  t h e n  
killed. Sergeant Earrington had a wonderfuI escape : h e  had no 
weapons, the room was dsrlr, and he stood with his back to t h e  wall 
as still as he could. The ghazis walked round the room f e e l i n g  t h e  
wall, but just missed him, and thinking the room was empty left.  Ah 
they canle in  he had heard them say in Pushtoo : " There s h o u l d  be 
two here,:' showing that the men knew the place well and expec ted  t o  
find him there. The attack was carried on for the rest of t h e  night  
wit11 great vigour, and the enemy, having possession of commauding 
ground on two sides of this enclosure, brought a severe cross fire t o  bear 
on the defenders, and continually cl~ilged right up to  the a b a t t i s .  It 
was so dark that, althoogli their yells and shrieks could be heard ,  they 
could not be seen till within five yards of the men's rifles. A t  2-30 t h e  
sonncl of pipes and "toni-toms " coming up the graded road indicated re- 
inforcelnents coming to the enemy, and Colonel Rleiklejohn there fore  
ordered Lieutenant Rawlings, 4th Punjab Infantry, to go up to t h e  f o r t  
and bring down 100 men to this enclosure. The enemy were p r e t t y  well 
all round the enclosure, and i t  was a risky thing to be asked to do, but- 
Lieutenant Rawlings, accompanied by one orderly, did it gallantly and, 
shooting a ghazi who attacked him on the way .with his revolver, rec 
turned safely with the reinforcements. 
At  4-30 A.X. the enemy withdrew, taking most of their dead w i t h  
them, but some 40 bodies were picked up in the camp, most of which 
were recognised as those of men who had been in the habit of b r i n g i n g  
wood, grass, milk, eggs, etc., for sale into camp. 
One very unfortunate incident of the fighting was that the  enetny 
succeeded in looting 19 boxes of ammunition containing 10,400 rounds, 
After the Madras Sappers had been attacked, these boxes, be longi~ lg  to4 
their reserve supply, had been loaded upon mules ready to be t a k e n  u p  
to the fort. The animals were standing in the lines when the tribesnlen 
ten~pornrily captured the quarter-guard, and in the confusion mules  
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A brave deed was performed by Lieutenant E. W. Costello. Dur- 
ing the hottest part of the fight, while the football ground was overrun 
with the enemy's swordsnlen and swept by a heavy fire froni both the 
enemy and our own troops, Lieutenant Costello dashed out upon the 
ground from the hospital enclosure and, with the assistance of two sepoys, 
brought in a wounded Lance-Havildar who was Iring 60 yards away 
i n  the open. For this he was, on the 9th November, awarded the 
Victoria Cross. 
Our losses on this the first night were-British Officers :-Eilled : 
Honorary-Lieutenant L. Manley, Comnlissariat Department ; wounded 
dangerously : Major W. W. Taylor, 35th Sikhs ; councied seriously : 
jieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, Commandant, 24th Punjab Infantry ; 
Major Herbert, D.A. and (4,-M.-G. ; Captain W. F. Holland, 24th 
Punjab Infantry ; Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., Madras Sappers 
and Miners. British N.-C. Oficer :-Tillled : Sergeant Byrne, Madras 
Mappers and Miners. Native ranks :-Rii'lled, 21 ; roourrded, 31. It n l q  
be added that two days later Major Taylor died of liis wound, and on 
the 23rd of August Colonel Lamb also succumbed. 
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THE SITUATIOB I N  THE STAT COUNTRY. 
THE rising in the Malakand was totally unexpected. Since the time 
when the Cliitral Campaign came to an end the Lower Swat V a l l e y  
had been singularly peaceful, and the people seemed well content w i t h  
the new order of things. Trade had expanded, the Chitral road h a d  
been kept open without any difficulty, and splendid crops were e x -  
pected in  the valley. Everything in fact seemed to make for Peace-  
Suddenl-v the "&Pad Fakirn appeared on the scene and q u i c k l y  
cathered about him a large fighting force, whose boldness in a t t a c k -  
ing a stronghold like Kalakand showed with what desperate COurWe 
they were inspired. He chiefly had with him men from Upper Swat, 
Mian Guls as they are called, from their adherence to  the p r in r ip les  
inclllcated by their great Akhund who died some years ago. T h e s e  
tribe,e.sillm are noted for their fanaticism, but another motive for their  
action was the resentment excited by the Khan of Dir's attempts to 
extend his authority over them. Once the Mad Fakir" had succeeded 
ill making a disturbance a t  Thana, he was joined by the Lower Swa.tis, 
carried away by the rising tide of enthusiasm, and as the news of the 
movement spread the lawless Utman Khels from the west and a s e c t i o n  
of the BunerwaIs from the south-east also sent contingents. 
The suddenness of the attack on the 26th July illustrates the 
lnarvellous rapidity with which the tribesmen on our borders can be 
mustered for warlike projects. The few hundreds who assenlbled in 
the first instance a t  Landaki had their numbers swollen by men f r o m  
Thana, Aladand and Khar, as the c L  Mad Fakir " made liis way d o w n  
the valley; and by nightfall the gathering was so large that the 
, mullah was able to attack the Malakand at  once. But  for the n e w s  
brought by the levy jamadar the pickets might have been rushed b e f o r e  
they had been doubled, and the regiments would not have had time 
to reach their posts. The tribesmen apparently waited until after s u n s e t  
before beqinning their stealthy movement along the hills, and this f u r t h e r  
accounts for their sudden and unexpected appearance. Their numbers o n  
this first night were fortunately smaller than on subsequent n igh ts  ; 
otherwise, with the troops broken up into two parties-in the N o r t h  
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Camp and on the Nalakand Ridge-the losses of the garrison must have 
been very great. 
Fanaticism did not entirely account for this deterlllined rising in a 
country which had been singularly peaceful for twu years. The 1c Mad 
Fakir" was, undoubtedly, a power in the country a t  that cime, but  his 
fiery preaching was not the sole incentive which made the villagers 
of Swat leave their rice-fields d t  a nloruent's notice, swarm about the 
Malakaod, fighting with a heroic disregard for their lives, and when 
repulsed turning with savage fury (as will afterwards appear) upon the 
isolated garrison a t  Chalrdara. 
When the pl~rdnh was lifted from Swat in April 1895, the people 
of the valley fought one action on the Malakand and then quietly made 
their submission. At  the close of the campaign they accepted will- 
ingly enough, as it  appeared at  the time, the new conditions which 
mere established. They were formally brought within the sphere of 
British political influence, though permitted to nianage their own tribal 
concerns ; their headmen were subsidised in return for the levies which 
they provided ; they benetited materially by the demand for supplies 
required by the troops left in  occupation of the Malakand and Chak- 
dara ; the trade of the valley developed rapidly, owing to the im- 
proved road to Bajoxr and Chitral and the bridging of the Swat and 
Panjkora Rivers ; and, to add to all this, some of the material benefits 
of civilisation were placed within their reach. Major Deane, the Poli- 
tical Officer to whom their interests were entrusted, was acceptable 
to them, and they showed marked anxiety to refer their disputes to 
hinl for decision. No resentnient was openly mainfested a t  the pre- 
sence of our troops in the country; the relations between the sepoys 
and villagers were of the most friendly kind ; and not a Yingle disturb- 
ance occurred. The annual relief of the Chit12al garrison was carried 
out in  1896 and again in  1891 without a shot being fired in Swat, 
and the Government of Irldia might fairly have congratulated itself on 
the peaceful outlook beyond the Malakand. 
We have spoken so far only of Lower Swat, through which the 
Chitral road runs. In  Upper Swat the some conteiitnie~lt did not 
altogether prevail, tlloagh no danger was anticipated froin that quarter. 
The reason for unrest in the upper country was the growing power of the 
K h a n  of Dir, the man whom Umra Khan had driven into exile among 
( 36 1 
*Ile Swatis, bu t  who rose as the  Chief of Jhandoul fell. Mahomed Sharif ti l l  then that  
Khan, after the campaign of 1895, had all the prestige which attaches H e  claimed to k 
t o  a border chief directly supported by the British Government, and he he said, on his s 
began t o  extend hie authority over that  portion of Upper Swat which his  listeners he 
adjoins Dir. Further, the people in the  Talash Valley beyond Chakdara kand in eight 
were nlade to  feel that  he  might possibly claim to exercise control over every Pathan a 
them. Exactly how far  he pursued a forward policy is not for the his progress f; 
present purpose worth inquiring into, but it  is certain that  the Upper villages in view 
Swatis grew alarmed a t  his pret,ensions. The Mian Guls, the four the villagers fle 
grandsons of the old Akhund, began to fear that such power as they , joined his sta: 
had might disappear, and i t  was difficult to  reassure them. A nlan were carried a a  
calling himself Mohamed Ibrahim appeared in Simla a t  the beginning lute body of tri  
of July bringing a letter addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of another party 
the Punjab from one of the grandsons of the late Akliund of Swat. roused the whc 
It was a n  attempt to  play a trick which is common enough in the East. ing point for 
Those who enlployed him had addressed Major Deane direct regarding Utlnan Khel  cc 
their grievances and had simultaneously sent the emissary to rnalre a 
separate representation at  head-quarters. They hoped to obtain con- 
flicbing orders and thus to mealren the authority of the Political Officer 
on the spot. Their scheming was so transparent that  it was seen 
through a t  once, and their emissary was referred back to Major !)cane. 
This was the situation in the S m ~ t  country when the " Mad Fakir 
appeared on the scene. 
According to tribal reports this man is a native of Swat, who, in 
his ~ a r l i e r  years, travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in 
Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's chief cantonment in Afghall Turkistan. H e  
lived there for ten years and then moved to Kabul. During the sum- 
mer of 1897, he visited Bajour, the Utman Kllel* country and 13uner, 
preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. 
H e  was in league with Hajab-ud-din, the notorious Mullah of Had&, 
whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was already notori- 
ous and who was destined t o  play a n  active part in subsequent frontier 
troubles. When the  '( Mad Faliir " appeared in Upper Swat in July, 
the fame of his preaching spread far and wide. H e  gradually worked 
his way down the valley, with a huge rabble of Inen and boys a t  his heels, 
and on July 26th was a t  Landaki within hail of Chakdara. I t  was not 
* This name is also borne bv several unimportant sub-sections of other and quite 
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till then that he tool< the final step which brought about the rising. 
H e  claimed to be inspired to work miracles ; the Heavenly Host were, 
lie said, on his side ; and he announced that with or without help from 
I+ listeners he would sweep our troops from Chakdara and the Mala- 
kand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism dormant in 
every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous : 
his progress from Landalii to Thana and thence to Aladand, both 
villages in view of the Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one ; 
the villagers flew to arms ; our levies hastily retired, except such as 
joined his standard ; all the headmen, with one solitary exception, 
were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a reso- 
lute body of tribesmen were on the move to attack the Malakand, while 
another party turned their attention to Chakdara, The mullah had 
roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rally- 
ing point for tliousands of fighting nlell from Upper Swat, Euner, the 
Utman Khel country, and even more distant parts. 
rclnent frtintizr 
I' Swnt in duly, 
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SooS after daybreak on the 27th of July, in fact i ~ m e d i a t e l ~  
ehenly had withdrawn after the repulse of their initial attack on the 
hfalakand, Colonel hxeiklejohn, in accordance with his original idea, sent 
out a column consisting of four guns of No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, 
one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, and the 31st Punjab Infantry. 
These troops mere ordered to pursue and break up any gathering i n  the  
Swat Valley and open up  communication with Chakdara. They found 
themselves opposed to large bodies of tribesmen, but the cavalry pushed 
on towards Chakdara. The guns and infantry, however, had to return 
to  Malakand. It then became clear that the rising was serious and 
Colonel Bleiklejohn wired down south to Madan ordering the  Corps of 
Guides up with all possible speed. H e  withdrew the troops from the 
North Malakand Camp, concentrating his brigade in and about the  
entrenched position on the Kotal, where they could best be utilised in  
repelling any attack in strength. At  the same time he telegraphed to 
the head-quarters of the Punjab Command a t  Murree asking that  rein- 
forcements might be sent. During this same day (July 87th) bodies 
of tribesmen appeared on the hills about the Malakand position, bu t  
did not venture upon any determined advance. They were fired 
upon when within range. The Guides arrived in the evening, though 
they had received the order to proceed to Malakand only a t  9 P.M. 
the night before. They thus completed the march of 32 miles, with 
a long climb of seven miles a t  the end of it, in most oppressive heat, 
ih something like I6 hours. It mas a march to be proud of. They 
dropped a detachment of infantry a t  Dargai* a t  the font of the hills 
SO as to keep the road open. 
The garrison in the Malakand a t  that time consisted of one squad- 
ron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 8 Mountain Battery, No. 5 Company 
Madras Sappers, the 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs, 
or something under 3,000 men. Of these, 25 cavalry and 200 infantry 
were ordinarily detached to hold the outpost a t  Chakdara and the 
* This place will not be confused with the now famous heights of the same rlame on 
the Bamana Hange. 
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bridge-head on the Swat River. The Chakdara post was considered to 
be impregnable, and was armed with Maxim guns which could sweep 
the bridge. As ample supplies and reserve ammunition are always 
stored there, not the least fear was entertained regarding the safety 
of the post itself. In  response to Colonel Meiklejohn's denland for re- 
inforcements the following nlovemellts of troops were promptly ordered 
from Murree :-No. 7 British Mountain Battery from the Murree 
nmedia t e l y  the Gullies, the 35th Sikhs from Peshawar, the 18th Dogras from Now- 
a t tack  04 the &era, to Malakand ; three squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers from Now. 
riginal idea, sent &era, and the 22nd Punjab Infantry from Jhelum, to Mardan ; the 
Iuntain B a t t e r y ,  37th Dogras from Sialkote to Peshawar ; and one Native Infantry regi. 
'unjab I n f a n t r y ,  merit from the Bengal Command to Nowshera, where there was only 
:a ther ing  in the a small detachment of British troops, as the Argyll and Sutherland 
t. T h e y  found Highlanders were absent on service in the Tochi Valley. 
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When Colonel Meiklejohn evacuated the North Camp on Tuesday 
afternoon, July 27t11, the tents in the camp had to be left standing, as 
no camel transport was available to move them and they were too 
heavy for the mules, being of the pattern known as "European pri- 
vate's." The enemy burnt them, and as the conflagration must have 
been visible for miles, the tribesmen from a distance flocked in to see 
how far successful tlle Swatis had been. The nunibers of the enemy 
were thus greatly increased, and at  8-30 P.M. they again attacked 
Malakand on all sides. 
The Malakand force had by this time been redistributed, the 24th 
Punjab Infantry with two guns holding a conical hill on the north side 
of the camp commanding the approaches from the North Camp direc- 
tion, and the 31st Punjab Infantry with two guns and the main body of 
the Guides occupying the central enclosurt ; two guns and 100 of the 
Guides were sent to strengtl~en tlie 45th Sikhs on the right, while a party 
of 50 men were sent from the Fort to Maxim Point to close that side 
of the camp and command the water-supply. The attack commenced at 
8-30 P.M. and was carried on with the same determination as on the 
night before, but this time the enemy did not penetrate. They, how- 
ever, succeeded in capturing the Serai, which was outside the line of de- 
fence, and in which 25 men of the 31st Punjab Infantry had been placed. 
The enemy attacked it  with great vigour, and eventually mined it  and 
set fire to the door. The picket held on nlanfully as long as they could, 
but ultin~ately harl to let themselves down by tlle back wall and retire 
to  Llle euclosu~e, in doing which they lost ten men. The 45th Sikl~s and 
24th Puajab Infantry were equally vigorously attacked, but t h e y  
drove off the enemy with great loss. As day dawned the enemy began 
pressing the 24th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Climo, who was in 
command of the regiment, decided to deliver a counter-attack. Accord- 
ingly with 100 men he advanced up the spur to the east to meet t h e m  
and delivered a tremendous 6re. The !enemy drew off, but were pursued 
and driven from crest to  crest in grand style, losing about 90 killed- 
Lieutenant Costello Tvas mounded in this brilliant little counter-attack, 
and our losses altogether on the second night were :-Lieutenant 
Costello slightly wounded ; native ranks, 10 killed, 45 wounded. 
All day during Wednesday, the 28th July, desultory fighting was 
going on in every direction round the camp, and large bodies of t h e  
enelxy could be seen collecting from all directions and joining our foes 
on the hills. -kt 10 o'clock in the evening they attacked again from a l l  
sides, and with the same viaour as they had shown both nights before. 
The distribution of the troops remained the same as on the 27th. The 
attack comme~~ced on the enclosure in which were the Sappers a n d  
afiners, the 31st Punjab Infantry and the Guides-and the brunt of t h e  
fight fell on this position all night, the enemy continually charging in 
the dark right up to the abattis and breast-works, but  they did n o t  
penetrate. The 31st Punjab Infantry suffered heavily, the 46th Sikhs 
also had a very severe time, but they niust have killed a t  least 200 of 
the enemy. The fighting was incessant a11 round the camp, and lasted 
till 3 A.M. It was inlpossible then to estimate the total losses of t h e  
enemy ; they were certainly very large, and in the early morning t h e  
tribesmen could be seen dragging away bodies over the hills. T h e  
troops, however, had beell fighting now for about 60 hours without 
sleep, and were too exhausted forpursuit, with the risk that  they lllight 
have to fight again the following night. Our casualties on this the th i rd  
~ i g h t  were : British Officers-Lieutenant Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry, 
seriously wounded ; Lieutenant Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry, slightly 
wounded ; Lieutentant Maclean, Guides, slightly wounded. Lieutenant 
Maclean had a narrow escape, the bullet going into his moutll a n d  
comillg out of his cheek. Native ranks-2 killed, 16 wounded. 
Signalling communication was re-established with Chakdara on the 
29tl1, when i t  was ascertained that they also had been attacked twice by  
day and three times by night but were holding their own. Lieutenant 
Minchin, Political Oficer a t  Chakdnra, signalled that large bo~lies of 
men were streaming down the valley, the number being calculatcd a t  
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5,000, and that another attaclt might be expected on the Malakand that 
night. Tile determination of the tribesmen in their repeated attacks at  
night showed how large was the gathering, for their losses had been so 
heavy that unless fresh nlen were constantly arriving the attacks could 
not have been renewed. 
All day during Thursday the 89th July, the troops a t  hlalakand mere 
employed strengthening the defences, clearing the field of fire of huts, 
trees, and anything thet could give cover to the enemy, and in arranging 
bonfires to liglit up the appro~ches over ~vhich the enemy were bound to 
nclvance to reach the ceiltral enclosure. The force was augmented in 
the  afternoon by one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major 
Beatson, who were taken into the Fort. 
The same night the garrison was attacked by a very much Iarger 
force than had appeared on the three previous nights ; the attack was 
delivered on both flanlrs and in a most determined manner. Apparent- 
ly  the enemy did not like the idea of crossing the belt of light given 
by the bonfires in front of the Sapper enclosure, and conseclnently this 
portion of the camp had a less severe night of i t  than before. The 
23th Punjab Infantry on the left and the 45th Sikhs on the right 
had to bear the brunt of the fighting this time, and i t  seemed to 
be carried on with even greater ferocity than before. The guns of 
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Wynter, 
xllich had beell working almost ineess~ntly for 84 hours, played 
great havoc with the enemy and rendered valuable assistance to the 
defenders. The attaclr began a t  9-30 and was pressed vigorously all 
night, culminating with a tremendous effort from 2 to 2-30, when it 
suddenly ceased, and the enemy drew off. The increas.ed fury of the 
attack this night turnedout to be due to the presence of the cLXad Fakir" 
himself. On the three previous nights he had sent his infatuated fol- 
lowers on, to fight, saying that he would stay behind and pray. After 
three nights of defeat, and ht~vinq suffered very heavy losses, the 
? - 
beliex-ers began to feel a little dissatisfied with the efficacy of their 
leader's prayers, and suggested that he should come himself and lead 
Chem and then perhaps the heavenly hosts which he professed to be 
able to  call to his aid would come down and assist them. I t  was an- 
argument that he dared not resiat and so he came. His followers, 
firmly believing that the '. infidels " were now to be delivered into 
their hands and that the heavens woulcl be opened and crowds of 
=rued spirits would descend a i d  help them, dashed on to our ranks, 
l ~ t l  1,y rhe l?:~ltirl~imself and his Grstl~eutenant and faithful conlpinion- 
Tllr latter was killed a i d  the Fsliir llirliself wounded. This p r o b a L ) l ~  
I~appcnctl a t  2-30, when the enonly withdrew, thc Fakir hilnsclf f l y i n g  
b ~ k  to Landaki. The accident to their leader considet~ably shook the 
Lclief of his follorver~ in liis divine power and his rapid retirement to 
Lsndaki was no cloubt regarded by tllenl as a proof that  he had n o t  a 
very strong belief in Ilimself. At  any rate, the fighting, though a g a i n  
resunled the nest  night, was no longer pushed with the same spir i t  as 
IlitIlerto. Our casualties t l l ~ t  nigllt (July 29th) were : British Ofiieer- 
1,ieutcn:~nt Costello, seriously \voundcd. IIe had already been sho t  in 
the arm, but insisted on going on wit11 Elis duty, and was again sllot in 
t h e  other a1~11, the bone being fractured. Native wnks-killed one, 
\rounclcd 17. 
A curious fact afterwards came to light which illustrates the kind 
of reverence felt by thc tribesnlen for their mullahs. Tlie " Mad Falcir's '' 
w u n d  necessitated the amputation of two joints of one of his fingers, and 
these joints were buried with great ceremony, a skandard being p laced  
aver tlleril and a shrine erected. But the most amusing thing was t h a t  
the Fakir gave out that anyone who had a wish or want had only to pzy 
a visit to the stwine in order to get i t  fulfilled-and he was believed, 
The four night attacks on Malakand had been made with the grea t -  
est determination, and the total losses resulting had been very heavy. 
They amounted to 36 killed and 106 wounded, including 15 followers 
killed and 11 mounded, :,ostly in the first attack. The casuaIties a m o n g  
the British Officers were the noticeable feature of the affair, two hav ing  
been killed and nine wounded. The regiments being short of Officers, 
the control of the fire could not be so good as i t  would have been with 
it fu l l  complement, and ~ h e  repeated and long night attacks caused an 
enornlous expenditure of ammunition, but fortunately the supply was 
in excess of the regulation number of rounds, which would ordinarily 
have been 400 per rifle. 
All was pretty quiet during Friday, the 30th July, but a very l a r g e  
organisecl gathering was see11 to have joined the enemy, and i t  was 
evident that though the t w o  leaders were hers de conzbat the tribes h a d  
no intention of giving up the fight yet, and the garrison prepared f o r  
another attack in the night. I t  began a t  9-30, but was not delivered wit11 
the salue energy ru before. A lleavy thunderstorm broke over the  scezle 
in the middle of the night, aild the enemy, taking advantage of t h e  
groi~ter clttrkness, tElu noise of the thuuder and the rain, attempted to 
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d t o  
r~ i sh  thc d5th Silrhs. They wcrc met, however, with the aamc pcrfcctly 
cool and steady resistance which1 this gallant regiment had opposed to 
then1 night after night since the fight began, and were bayoneted in 
considerable numbers. The enemy withdrew a t  about 3 A.M.; our 
casualties being only 2 sepoys wounded. 
The next day, Saturday, July 31st, the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras 
arrived in can~p  after a most trying march, the heat on the road being 
intenso, and they were a most welcome reinforcen~rnt to the garrison. 
All was quiet during the day and nothing but sniping into camp occur- 
red that night, so the troops had comparative rest. 
On Sunday, the 1st  of August, Colonel Meiklejohn decided to 
take with him 1,000 infantry, one squadron of cavalry and 2 guns, and 
also 50 Sappers and t r y  to relieve Chalidara. A t  11 A.M. the cavalry 
went down to the plain by the short road to the Korth Camp. This 
move was a t  once discovered by the enemy, who turned up in swarllls 
from every direction. The cavalry, conlposed of the Guides Cavalry 
under Colonel Adams and one squadron 11th Bcngal Lancers under Major 
Beatson, charged them in grand style, and got well into them once, but 
the difficult nature of the pound  and the skill wit11 which the enemy 
availed themselves of it  prevented their going far, and they had to fall 
back, having accounted for nearly 100 of the enemy. They returned into 
camp under cover of the fire from tlle infantry and guns, their casualties 
being : British 0Bcers:-Captain Balfiin, Guides, severely wounded, 
and Lieutenant Keyes, Guides, slightly wounded. Native sanlis :-I 
killed, lZ wounded. Colonel Adams had his horse shot under him. It 
wasnow so late in the day and the enemy were evidently in such 
numbers, that i t  was thougilt impossible to get to Clrakdara that night, 
with the probability of having to fight three fights on the way, one in  
getting out of the lrotal, another a t  But!rela and the third a t  Arnandara 
Pass. The attempt was accordingly put 08 till the next day. 
A t  Chakdara itself, the attaclrs upon the fort had been aImost con- 
tinuous, and i t  looked as if the assailznts intended to wear out the 
garrison, and, if  possible, cause then1 to exhaust their ammunition. 
Practically, i t  was impossible for the enemy to capture thefort until 
the troops holding it had no cartridges left, and even then storming 
parties n~igllt be beaten back with the bayonct, as the fort stands on a 
scarped, rocky eminence of great natural strength. A heliograph message 
had however been receivcd at  Malakand from Glialrdara with the two 
words "Help us" and great anxiety was consequently felt for  the 
little force. A heliograph had been sent in reply 6 6  Expect us to- 
morrow morning. Is t.he bridge standing?" But no reply to the ques- 
tion had come back. It was imperative therefore to relieve the post a t  
all costs. How this relief was carried out at a critical moment will 
presently be related. 
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THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. 
OwrNa to  the serious aspect of a6aira in the Swat Valley orders weye 
issucd from Army Head-Quarters for the troops a t  Malalrand, together 
with those moving up, to  be fornled into a Division for field service, 
the command of which was given to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon 
Blood (then cotamanding the Bundelkhand District), with a complete 
staff. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Meilrlejohn, was to be composed 
of the %yal We& Kent  Regiment, the 24th Punjttb Infantry, the 31st 
Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs. The 2nd Brigade, under Colonel 
Jeffreys, then officiating in command of the Sirhind District, was to be 
conlposed of the Buffs, the 35th Sikha, the 38th Dogras and the Guides 
Infantry. The Divisional corps were t o  be No. 1 and No. 7 British and 
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Batteries, No. 5 Company Madras, and No. 4 
Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, the Guides Cavalry and one 
squadron of the l l t h  Bengal Lancers. Colonel Aitlrin was given the 
command of the Royal Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Schalcli, l l t h  
Bsngal Infantry, was made Base Commandant a t  Nowshera. 
The following was the full staff of the new Malakand Field 
Force ;- 
Commaading, Brigadier-General Sir B. Blood ; Assistant Adjutant- 
General, Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders ; Assistant Quarter. 
master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, Central India Horse ; 
Deputy Assistant Quartemaster-Ger~eral, Intelligence Department, Cap- 
tain H. E. Stanton, R.A. ; Field lutelligenoe Officer, Captain H. F. 
Walters, 24th Bonlbay Infantry ; Signalling Officer, Captain E. W. M. 
Norie, Middlesex Regiment ; Principal Meclical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel 
G. Thomson ; Commanding Royal Artillery, Colonel W. Aitkin ; Ad- 
jutant, Royal Artillery, Captain H. D. Grier ; Field Engineer, Major 
E. Blunt ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieatenants C. &I. 3'. Watkins 
and H. 0. Lathbury; Ordnance Oficer, Captain W. W. Cookson, 
R.A. ; Chief Cummissariat Officer, Major H. Wharry ; Assistant Corn- 
missariat Officer, Lieutenant A. S. Cobbe, 32nd Pioneers; Divisional 
Transport Officer, Captain C. G. R. Thaclrwell ; Assistant Transport 
Qflicer, Captain F. H. Hancock, 26th Punjab Infantry 1 Veterinary 
I 
Officer, Captain H. T. W. M n l ~ u  ; Provost Marsl~al, Captain C. G. P. I field, a n d  thougl 
Edwarcls, 5th Pulljab Cavalry. were t e n  or twel 
north-cast  and t 
1 s t  B~.igade Sfoff:-Commanding, Colonel W. I-I. Meiklejohn ; Dcputy 
Assist~nt Adjutant-General, Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A. ; Depnty S i r  Bindon 
Assistant Quarternlaster-General, Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40tl1 Patllans; troops o n  Sunda, 
Commissariat Officer, Captain C. H. Deville ; Erigade Transport Oficer, ineffectual atten: 
Captain J. M. Ca~uillery ; Begilnental Transport OEcer, Lieutenant R. After inspecting @ 
Harman, 4th Sikhs ; Veterinary O&cer, Captain W. R. Walker. to Army Eead 
Meikleiohn wer 
2nd Brigade 8fnf:-Commanding, Colonel P. D. Jeffreys ; Deputy 
Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. 0. F. Hamilton, Queen:s Royal 
West Surrey Regiment ; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, 
Major C. H. Powell, 1st Guslrhas ; Commissasiltt OEcer, Captain G. A. 
Eawltins ; Brigade Transport Otticer, Captain D. Baker, Gombny 
Grenadiers ; Regimental Transport Officer, Lieuteriant G. C. Brooke, 
Border Regiment; Veterinary Ofiicer, Lieutenant T. W. Rudd. 
Bare and Line of Cornm.unication :-Ease Commandant, Colonel 
V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry ; Stnif Officer a t  Base, Captain IT. 
Scott, Royal Susses Regiment ; Section Conimandant, Captain 0. B. S. F. I 
Shore, 18th Bengal Lancers ; Coniniissariat Officer, Ct~ptain S. W. 
Lincoln ; Assistant Comn~issariat Officer, l ieutenant E. G. Vaugha11 ; 
Transport Officers, Lieutenants R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment, 
and E. F. Macnagliten, 16th (Queen's) Lancers. 
Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood was given the temporary rank 
of Major-General while conlnlanding the Malakand Field Force, and 
Colonel W. H. Meiklejohn and Colonel P. D. Jef ieys were given the 
temporary rank of Brigadier-General wliile commanding the 1st and B~ld 
Brigades respectively under Sir Bindon Blood. 
Orders mere also issued for the immediate formation of a Reserve 
Brigade for the Malakand Field Force. This was composed as fol- 4 
lows :-Commanding, Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, R.A. Troops :- 
The Highland Light Infantry from Cawnpore, the Gordon High- 
landers from Rawalpindi, the 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas from Dhar~u-  
sala, the 10th Field Battery from Rawalpindi, and NO. 3 Colxpany 
Bontb,zy Sappers from Kirlree. I 
I 
The formation of this Beserve Brigade was clue to further inform- I 
ation received as to the attitude of thc tribesmen in the Swat Valley. I 
I t  was by this time clear that four sections of the Bunel wa1s Were in  the 
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field, and though tllc Malnkmld position was no longer in danger tl~erc 
were ten or tmelve thousand of the enemy on tkic hills to the nortll, the 
north-cast and the south-west, as well as in the Swat Valley itself. 
Sir Dindon Blood arrived a t  Malakand in advance of some of his 
troops on Sunday, August 1st (the day when Colonel Meilrlejohn marle his 
ineffectual attempt to relieve Chalrdara~, and at  once assumed comnland. 
After inspecting the Malalrand defences and the garrison, he reported 
to  Army Head-Quarters that all the arrangements made by Colonel 
Meilrlejohn were admirable in every way, and the position absolutely 
secure. H e  described the spirit of the troops as excellent, all showing 
eagerness to be led against the enemy. H e  warmly praised ''their 
soldierly bearing and keenness after the almost continuous fighting of the 
week, with little rest a t  night and exposure to sun during tlie day." 
With such troops there could no lonqer be ally lack of confidence in 
assuming the offensive and in relieving Cllalrdara, as the Malakana 
garrison now comprised more than four thousand infantry, five or six 
hundred cavalry, one company of Sappers and a mountain battery. 
The heliograph, i t  will be remembered, had already told the Mala- 
kand garrison that help was urgently needed a t  Chalrdara. On the 
evening of Monday, July 26th, almost simultaneously with the first 
assa111t on the Malakand, Chakdara had been invested by a large force 
of Pathans, who attacked from all sides. The garrison of four British 
Officers, two companies of the 45th Sikhs, and 25 sowars of the 11th. 
Bengal Lancers, was augmented on the Tuesday, under circumstances 
already described, by two Officers and 40 sowars of the l l t h  Bengal 
bancers from Malakand. Communications in the fort mere commanded 
from nearly all sides by the enemy, who sniped from cover at  from 100 
to  200 yards distance. Frequent attacks were made on the Tuesday and 
;Wednesday, the enemy bringing ladders and bundles of grass to get 
over the wire entanglement. All this time the garrison could get no 
rest, not being able to  tell when or where the enemy's attack would 
next take place. On the Thursday night a desperate assault was made 
on the isolated signal tower, garrisoned by 16 men, but was repulsecl 
with great loss. On the Friday, the strength of the enemy in men and 
Martini-Henry rifles was very much increased, and they so closely sur- 
rounded the fort that no one could leave cover. This critical condition 
of ,~fl~hirs continued till the Sunday. night when the tribesmen made an- 
other fierce onslaught, wliich was still in progress the following morning 
ivhen tlic lelieving force from thc Malalrand dashed victoriously upon 
*tllc scene. 
CIZ-4 PTEB l< 
TIIE RELIEF O F  CEAKDARA. 
THE relief of Chakdara was carried out by Colonel hleilzlejolln in bril- 
liant style on Monday morning, August 2nd. I n  order to  clear the way 
for the relieving column, it  was necessary a t  the outset to  disperse the 
enemy on the hills to the east and north-east, as they commanded the road 
leading into the Swat Valley. This task was assigned to Colonel Gold- 
ney, who took with him two mountain guns,the 35th Sikhs and the 38th 
Dogras, these two regiments being quite fresh, as they had had two days' 
rest after arrival a t  Malakand. A t  the verg. first streak of dawn Colonel 
Goldriey silently advanced from the position his troops had held a t  
night to within rushing distance of the enemy's position without firing 
a shot. He charged the position with the bayonet, taking the enemy 
by surprise. They fired a few wild shots and then fled i n  
every direction, disappearing like rabbits among the huge rocks and 
boulders with which the whole side of the hill down to the foot of the 
graded road is covered. Their exact casualties were never ascertained, 
but seven dead bodies were found and one prisoner was taken. At  the 
same time that Colonel Golclney started, Colonel Meiklejohn also moved 
off with his force, and lie got three-fourths of the way down the graded 
road before a shot was fired a t  him. Those of the enemy, however, who 
had fled from Colonel Goldney's attack had carried the alarm down t o  
thevillages and encanlpments a t  the foot of the hill, and Colonel Meikle- 
john soon saw swarms of men with many banners running out of the 
villages and down the hillsides to  prepare to oppose him. They took u p  
a position across the road ; their right being strongly posted on a conical 
hill west of the graded road, their left resting on a high spur running 
from the main mountainand completely commanding the road. Colonel 
Meiklejohn immediately deployed t o  his left, sending a party to seize 
the levy post, which was about 600 yards in  advance of the enemy's 
position. I t  was grand to see the way the troops advanced. They had. 
longed for this opportunity, and they went a t  i t  with a determination 
that the enemy doubtless appreciated. 
The fire was brisk on both sides, but there was no delaying our 
troops. They rushed the hill occupied by the enemy's right and &ove 
them from it. 
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them from it. The enemy fled up the hills t o  tlw east, and in the diree- 
tions of Rhar  and Butlrela, where they mere met by a friendly stream 
drawn from 13utkela by the noise of the firing. The fleeing and advancing 
portions of the enenly met where the road crosses the saddle of the Dogras 
Hill, and here they re-formed, taking up a position on Dogra Hill. 
Colonel Meilrlejohn, without wasting a moment, advanced on this se- 
cond position, covered by the fire of his guns, sending his cavalry round 
the north point of the hill, so as  to be in a position to cut off the 
enemy from Khar and Butkela. The enemy, however, would not wait 
to be attacked. Many of then1 probably had a reniembrance of the 
Guides' charge over the same plain in  1895, and they fled. They 
were too Inte, however, for in a few minutes the cavalry were on 
them, through them, and beyond them to the villages of Khar and 
Butkela, leaving our polo groulnd and the whole plain dotted over 
with what appeared to the garrison left behind in Nalakancl Fort only 
little black heaps, but were in reality Swatis, B ~ n e ~ w a l s ,  and others 
who would fight no more. The cavalry scoured the m~hole plain, and only 
tllose escaped from them who took to the broad stretch of rice-fields 
on the banks of the river. 
This sudden dart from the Malakand spread terror in  the valley 
and people could be seen hurrying in every direction from the village to  
the river bank, carrying away what they could. Colonel Meiklejohn's 
force, however, had another and more pressing object in view than in 
cutting these men off, and so the cavalry resumecl their direction straight 
for Chakdara, having first dismounted a third of a squadron, and given 
the gathering on the banks a few rousing volleys. Colonel Meiklejohn, 
having taken Dogras Hill, resumed his march, and disappeared from 
the view of those who had watched with admiration. the brilliant and 
dashing manner i n  which the previons week's score was being wiped 
out. 
Covered by the cavalry, Colonel Meiklejohn's force advanced on 
Butkela, which mas occupied by the enemy. The cavalry pt beyond 
the village without a shot being fired a t  them, and galloped on to the 
Amandara Pass, holding it with dismounted men, and then cut off the 
enemy's retreat. The infantry came u p  rapidly and attacked Butkela. 
The enemy made next to no resistance and fled across the rice-fields 
to the river, where the cavalry could not pursue them. AS soon 
as the infantry came up to the h a n d a r a  Pass, tlie c&valry dashed 
( so J w 
on toval-da CYlnkdara, where, from the noise and smoke, i t  vas evicle1lt 
that severe fighting was going on. The cavalry reached Cllakdara a t  
9 A.M. The bridge was intact, b u t  the enen~y were occupying the Civil 
Hospital and the terraces of the hill on which the signalling tower is 
and also innumerable sungars all over the level gronnd and rice-fields 
1:ound the north and east sides of the fort, from whi~11 they lcept up a 
heavy fire. The czzvalry a t  once crossed tlie bridge, part of tlie gallrison 
moving out to cover their crossing, and on reaching the north bank. 
D 
they a t  once moved uut &gainst the  enemy in the open, getting anlong 
those on the litlrd ground and attacking those in the SUllgUT8 in the 
rice-fields with dismounted fire, while the fort supported tllenl with fire 
froni their 9-pounder guns  and Maxims. They killed a, gl.est niany of tlle 
enenly, who began to retire a t  once, some towards Ucll, otllers up tlie 
valley to Upper Swat. I n  many of the sungars light scaling-la~dders 
were found, with which the enemy had evideaily intended to get over 
the wstllv of the fort. 
The Chalidara garrison were in good spirits and holding iheir own 
magnificently. The party in the 3igr~%lling tower were suffering most, 
not having had any ~vater for two days. The only casualty that niorning 
among Officers was Lieutenant Rattray, severely wounded in the neck, 
who was hit in coming out to coPiar $Ire passage of the  cavalry to  
cross the bridge. Other msu,~lties amoag the garrison were very slight. 
The fort had proved itself practically impregnable and the  garrison 
had behaved gallantly. They had been fighting with hardly any sleep 
for seven days. 
ColnnelMeiklejohn arrived with the infantry a t  10, by  which time 
the fighting had ceased. It may be added here that  in addition t o  
the troops already spoken of the Chakdara Relieving Column included 
No. 5 Queen's Own Bappers and Miners. The casualties in Colonel 
Meiklejohn's force in the morning's operations were :-Native ranks, 4 
killed and 26 wounded. No British Officers were hit. 
As for the enemy, their losses had all along been enormous. The 
following were sent in as relkble estimates for the week's fighting a t  
Malakand and Chakdara :-At Nalalcand, 700 ; a t  the figliting with 
Colonel Meiklejohn's force on its way to Chalrdara, over2 500 ; a t  
Chakdara, 2,000. The Maxinls and 9-pounder guns at  Chakdarn did 
great execution. One discharge of grape from the 9-pounder sn~ooth- 
bore i s  s,upgosed to have accounted for 80 men. Ailotllcr sliot, wl~ieli 
g4'6i,er of the 
d 
Eiapperlecl to  land iu the mosquc at Oliakdara \r.liilc the enemy mere 
a t  prayer, killed a considerable nuuiber. Several stories are told of 
tlie iridividual courage of tlie P,~tllnns, and the follo~ving is : ~ n  instance 
of tlieil. extraordinary vitality, as recorded by an eye-witness. One of 
tlie Bengal Lancers ran a Pnthan through with his lance, and being 
unable to extract tlie lance left i t  and passed on. The Pi~thnn pnllecl 
tlie lance out, thl.ew i t  awsy, and attaclced the nest  nlnn who ranie up 
t o  him, wounding h is  horse wit11 his swol-d. IIe tl~eil attacked an 
ORicer of the  11th Bengal Lmcers, who s11c1t llirn through the he,~d. 
FURTHER EVENTS IN THE ,SWAT COUNTRY. 
So completely was the aspect of affairs changed by the relief of 
Chakdara that the lately beleaguered troops had now actually to move 
out and search for the enemy, who had vanished as quickly as they had 
appeared. Sir Bindon Blood was determined not to  give his demoral- 
ised foe any breathing time to rally, and to this end, after doubling the 
Chakdara garrison and replenishing its stores, he arranged, in concert 
with Major Deane, a plan of action under which flying columns were 
t o  be sent out to sweep the  whole of the disturbed country and enforce 
submission. The fulI strength of the field force, on the completion of 
the concentration a t  Malakand, was : two regiments of cavalry, three 
mountain batteries, two companies of sappers, and ten regiments of 
infantry (not counting the garrison of Jellala) ; in all between 8,000 and 
9,000 men. This was quite sufficient for immediate purposes, more es- 
pecially as the Bunerwals, who lay on the flank of any force moving into 
Upper Swat by the river route, seemed inclined to disown the hostile 
action taken by the Salarzai* section of their tribe during the recent 
fighting. I t  was known that the Utman Khels, the Kanazai, the Lower 
Swatis and a certain number of ITpper Swatis were implicated ; not to 
mention the Dushi Khels, the Adinzai, the Showazai, the Shomizee, the 
Nekbe Khels and other sub-sections, whose names are onIy worth re- 
peating by way of showing how general was the rising ; but the whole 
strength of the enemy actually in  the field a t  that time was not believ- 
ed to be much more than twice as numerous as the full field force. 
Sir Bindon Blood accordingly issued the following orders on the 4th 
August regarding the disposition of the t~oops  :-The 1st Brigade, con- 
sisting of the Royal West Kent  Regiment, the 24th and 31st Punjab 
Infantry, the 45th Sikhs, with a proportion of sappers and artillery, to 
concentrate a t  Aluandara ; the 2nd Brigade, consisting of the Buffs, the 
Guides Infantry, the 35th Sikhs, the 38th Dogras, with the Divisional 
troops, to be placed on the Malakand and a t  Iihar. These orders 
were quickly carried out and the two brigades then stood ready to move 
in any direction a t  the shortest notice, equipped with ten days' supplies. 
* There is alsu a Salarzai sfctiorr of the B&jouris. 
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T l ~ e  rising of tlle tribes about the Malaliand did not seem to have 
infected those further to the north with any excitemellt or 
Communication between Gilgit and Chitral was still open, and the last 
letters received from Chitral, dated the 17th July, spoke of llothing 
unusual, though this was of course long antecedent to the Swat outbreak. 
Again, Major Rundle, D.S.O., and Captain Walker, 4th Gurkhas, had just 
arrived in Gilgit, hizving come up by way of tlze Babusar Fass and a i l a s  
with an escort of police levies of the Agency, and had found all quiei on 
the route ; and the Chilas revenue had been duly paid in to Captain 
Godfrey, the Agent a t  Gilgit. Nor were there as yet (August 6th) 
any signs of further outbreaks elsewhere along the frontier. Tl;e Indue 
Kohistan, the Mohmand country, the Khyber, Kohat and Kurranl all 
seemed to be  undisturbed. With regard to Bajour satisfactory news was 
received from the Nawab of Dir that the Bajouris had remained quiet. 
The tribes on the border of Peshawar district-with the exception of the 
Utnlan Khel, who are always ready to turn out wl~en a prospect of loot 
offers--had also renlsined quiet. The Mohmand headmen sent in word 
that  their clans had not participated in the rising. The Buner frontier 
on the Hazara side continued undisturbed, while no signs of unrest were 
apparent on the Black Mountain border. The quickness ~vitli  which 
Malakand was reinforced had doubtless exercised a strong effect upon all  
the tribes who might have been inclined to join the Swatis. It was the  
Lower Swatis, who had generally been despised as fighting men, who 
really formed the bulk of the recent attacking force. Thus the Khan 
of Aladand, whose conduct bad been exemplary since the Chitral Cam- 
paign, and who had provided a portion of the levies, receiving a subsicly 
in return, Was among the enemy killed in one of the attacks. Villagers 
who llad been in the habit of furnislling supplies for the past two years, 
aIld who were perfectly well know11 to the garrison, shared in the ghazn, 
fighting well too. 
The only disquietillg frontier news was to the effect that a number 
of mullahs wit11 a following of fanatical tribesmen had left Ningrilhar, 
Tagao and otlicr districts about Jcllalr~bad to join either the Mull& of 
fi~dcla" or the "Mad Fakir." 
Ji~gnhs now began to come in to Major Deane from the offending 
country beyond the Swat River, and these subruissions were expedited 
wllcn Sir Cindon Blood wit11 the 1st Crigadc under Crigadier-General 
* I'bde Part 111, Chapter 1. 
3feiklejolin ~lloved np  tlie left bank of tlie Swat River into Upper Swat. 
The Lower Svatis generally submitted unconditionally and were allowed 
to return to t h e i ~  villages. 
The strength of the 1st Erigacle was increased for tlie purpose of tlie 
advance by one field and t ~ o  niou~ltain batteries, the Guides C!a\7alry and 
a detachment of the 11th Bengal Lancels, as well as by No. 5 Company 
Queen's Own Sappers and Miners ; and as the tribesmen always dread 
both artillery and cavalry, especially tile former, i t  was not expected 
tllat the progress of this formidable force moiild be seriously resisted. 
The BunerwaIs who were on the riglit flank of the advancing force 
were not expected to nlake any driiionstration ; but to guard against 
possible trouble with them, the 1st Reserve Brigade a t  Mardan under 
Bl,igndier-General J. H. Wcdel~ouse n7as raised to the full strength by 
the addition of the HighLi~d Light Infantry and the 2nd Queen's 
Regiment from Iiaffrtlpindi. General \\rodellouse then rnoved out in 
force to Rustam, 20 llliles nortli-exst of Rfardan, to w;~tch bile southern 
border of the Euner country, haring with hi111 one scluadron of tlie 1O1,11 
B e n ~ a l  Lancers, tile I-Iighla~ld Light Infantry, and tlie 39th Garhwalia. 
The appearance of this force a t  Rustani was very timely as i t  reminded 
the Bunerwals that  they could be attacked both in front and i n  rear. 
The Musa Iihel, holclittg the country between Landaki and Barikot, had 
already subnlitted in  haste before the 1st Brigade started marching. 
Wlaile Sir Bindon Blood was preparing for his advance, orders 
were issued from Simla on the 13th August for the concentration a t  
Rawalpindi of two additional Xeuerve Brigades to be known as the 
2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades of the Mslakand Field Force. The new 
brigades were constituted as follows :- 
2nd Reservo Brigude :-2nd OxfordshireLight Infantry fromFeioze- 
pore ; 2nd Royal Irisli Regiment from Jubbulpore and Saugor ; 1st 
P 
Battalion 3rd Gul*klia Rifles from Almora ; 13th Bengal Infantry from 
Bareilly ; No. 3 Xountxain Battery fro111 Jutogh ; 18th Bengal Lancers a t  
Rawalpindi ; No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers from Kirkee. 
3rd Reserve Brigade :-kt Northamptonshire Regiment from Secun- 
deralad ; 1st Dorsetshire Regiment from Gangalore ; 9th Gurkha, Rifles 
from Lansdowlle ; 1st Battalion elld Qurklla Rifles from Uehra Dun ; 
3rd Field Battery from Saugor ; 3rd Beugal Cavalry from Fyzabad ; 
30. 1C o n ~ p a ~ y  lnladras Sappers from Bangalore. 
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TIIE ACTION AT LBND,IPI. 
M~JOR-GESERAL SIX BINDON BLOOD moved out from Thana on the lef t  
balllr of the Swat River a t  6-30 on Tuesday morning, August 17th. 
As already forewarned by a reconnoitring party, he found some three 
thousand tribesmen gatliered near Landalti to oppose his advance up 
the valley, and to clear these away an actioil became necessary. The 
10th Field Battery got to work without delay, its twelve-pounder guns 
nlaliing excellent practice, and the Hoyal West Kent Regiment at- 
tacked on the left, while Brigadier-General hleiklejoha, with two regi- 
ments and six conlpanies of native infantry and a n~ountain battery, 
advt~nced on the right, to make a turning rnovenlent and so cut off the 
enemy's line of retreat to the hills on the right. The advancing force 
also included No. 5 Company Queen's Own Sappers and Miners. Tho 
tribesmen would not wait urltil this moven~ent -\xmas developed, about two 
thousanc\ retiring rapidly over the Moral1 Pass into Enner. These were 
apparently a conbingent of the Salarzai Bunerwals. The remainder stood 
their ground for some time, but were driven from their position, and by 
11 ax. the action was over, tlie enemy being in full r e t r e ~ t .  
The following are the details of the figliting :- 
On the enemy being sighted at  8 o'clock the force moved steadlly u p  
to the foot of the long spur which runs down to-wards the Swat Eiver  
from the range on tho right, and the attack was conlmenced by the West  
Kents driving back skirmishers from the snlall spur in front, where they 
were presently reinforced by No. 7 Mountain Battery under Major F e p n ,  
who kept up a galling fire on the main body of the enemy, assisted by N N ~ ,  
10 Field Eattery from the plain below. The guns lnad come up to their  
position over ground which was velg difficult for wheeled artillery. 
Meanwhile the main attack under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn was 
developed on the right. The 24th Punjab Infantry, supported by the 31st 
Punjab Infantry, with the 45th Silrhs in reserve, worked their way u p  
thc hill to within 500 yards of the crest line, where they opened a heavy 
fire on the position. By this time No. 8 Bombay MountainBattery, com- 
n~anded by Captain Birch, had joined the firing line and came into action 
a t  a range of about 500 yards. The resistance offered here was slight, 
rind the troops soon won their way to the summit of the ridge. They 
now ivvi~eeled to the left, 2nd swept the crest of the hill before them for 
a short distance, when they a e r e  joined by the West Kent  Regiment. 
The battery (No. 8) opened fire on a small stone fort a t  arange of 600 
p r d s  :tnd after sllelling i t  for about ten niinntes i t  was rushed by the 
7ricst Kents. Resistance had practically ceased, and the enemy were 
see11 stl-earning awal- across the plain below in the direction of Butkel;~ 
3ncl were llarrassed by shrapnel from NO. 8 a t  a longish range. 
All this t i ~ n e  the Guides had been anxiously awaiting their oppor- 
tunity. i~ narro17 causeway conunanded by the enemy's fire prevented 
thew. fronl passing rouud the end of the riclge into the plain beyond, but 
\yllen at last the Snppers had cleared the may both of the enemy and of 
the obstacles placed in the road, they a t  once advanced and were seen 
from above ruoving rapidly towards the village of Kotal. T l ~ e  retreat- 
ing tribeslnen had reached a point about a mile beyond this village and 
ware already close under the hills. Passing the village the Guides 
broke into a gallop; but to those vatching from the hills i t  became plain 
that the fugitives could reach shelter before it was possible for the 
cavalry to overtake them. The heavy rice-fields soon told on the troop 
horses, and a fev, better mounted tlrsn the rest, singled themselves out 
fro111 the nclvancing line of horsemen and bravely forged ahead nlany 
yards ill front of their corps. Then occurred a most regrettable in- 
cident. The two leaders, Lieutenant Greaves and Captain Palmer, were 
met by n heaTy volley-the former mzs shot dead and Captain Palmer's 
horse was killed and he himself shot through $he right wrist. Colonel 
Adams and Lord Fincastle, who were close behind, a t  once dashed up to 
rescue their fallen conlrades, who mere now surrounded by a crowd 
of ghnzia-both their horses were shot under then1 and they found 
thenlselves on foot under fire a t  a distance of about 20 yards. By 
this time Lieutenant MaeLean with a few sowars had arrived on 
the scene and the little party dashed in most gallantly to the rescue 
of the Officers. Lieutenant Greaves' body was safely removed, but 
meanwhile Lieutenant NacLean was shot through both thighs and 
Ned to death almost immediately. Colonel Adrtms and some of his 
men again charged into the hornets' nest a t  the risk of their lives and 
bore away his body. The cavalry now took up their position in a 
neighbouring clump of trees, which they defended until relieved by  
some infantry and No. 8 Mountain Battery. This closed the operations 
of the &zy, and the enemy retreated over the hills Other casualties 
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were Colonel Adams, Gliides, slightly wounded ; three sepoys, 24tll Pun- 
jab Infantry, wounded; one sepoy, 3lst Punjab Infantry, wounded; one 
sepoy, 45th Sikhs, wounded ; two foll~wers, wounded. As some of the 
~unermals  who had been engaged in the fight were retreating into their 
own country over the Morah Pass, they were pursued and routed by 
Major Delamain with two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers who had 
been left behind a t  Thana, and who now accounted for some 20 or 30 of 
these tribesmen. 
As must almost necessarily happen after a desperate fight, some 
rather conflicting accounts were subsequently received as to the details 
of the Guides' charge. TO publish all these would not perhaps make the 
story any clearer, but room may be found for an extract from a, private 
letter of an Officer with the 1st Brigade, the publication of which set a t  
rest the controversy as to the exact manner in which Lieutenants Greaves 
and MacLean met their deaths :-" When the 1st squadron of the Guides 
Cavalry debouched from the causeway, the enemy were alreadJ- taking 
a position on a hill about 19 miles away up the valley. Colonel Adams 
thereupon directed the squadron to move across the plain to a tope of 
trees, about 150 yards from the enemy's position. Captain Palmer 
meanwhile had got separated from his men, owing to the ground being 
intersected by n d a h s ,  and Colonel Adams was unable to make him un- 
derstand his intended movements. Shortly afterwards Captain Palmer, 
looking round and seeing Colonel Adams with the squadron folowing, 
thought he meant to charge the enemy's position. H e  therefore kept 
ahead, followed by Greaves who seemed to have a difficulty in hold- 
ing his horse. Lord Fincastle meanwhile had been following the 
cavalry on one flank, but hearing Colonel Adams shouting t o  Palmer 
he closed up towards the former and rode towards the tope with him. 
On nearing the tope Palmer and Giveaves made a dash for some stand- 
ards a t  the foot of the hill which was now occupied by some four or five 
hundred ghazis. They were at  once attacked, Greaves falling a t  the foot 
of the hill, and Palmer's horse being shot down. The latter, on being 
dismounted, a t  once engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict. Colonel Adams 
called out ' Follow me,' and he and Fincastle went straight for Greaves 
who was now surrounded by  ghasis. Fincastle's horse was killed a few 
yards off, and he ran up on foot, Colonel Adams having already got up. 
The latter dismounted, but Fincastle shouted to him to get up again, 
which he did, while Fincastle tried to get Greaves, who was still alive, 
on to Adarns' horse. The ghazis poured in a heavy fire, and Adams' 
horse was wounded, while Greaves wita $hot dead in Fincastle's arms a s  
he was being liftea, a n d  t h e  latter's scal~bard ~vas  mashed by a bullet'. 
Two sowars nleanwhile h a d  ridden out to  Palnier's assistance, who was 
severely mounded, and g o t  him back to the tope. These two sowars 
then came on t o  help Adams and Fincastle-on whom the ghnzis were 
closing-and one had his  horse killed. Lieutenant MacLean came out a 
minute later, having dismounted the remainder of the squadron in the 
tope, whence they kept  u p  a heavy fire on the enemy ; he arrived just 
in time to check the enemy as they were preparing to rush these two 
Officers. MacLean brought t,hree soxars out with him, two of who111 
had their horses shot under  them. ;Meanwhile Adanls and Fincastle 
had been carrying Greaves nearer the tope. hlacLeail was shot through 
both thighs as he was helping Fincast!e to lift Greaves' body on to his 
horse. Adams and Fincastle then pot back safely to the tope with the 
dismounted sowars who supported the bodies of MacLean and Greaves 
on MacLean's horse. This  tope was held for about a quarter of an 'hour 
until the infantry arrived, the enemy's fire being exceedingly hot as 
our troops were practically attacked on three sides." 
Lieutenant H .  T. Greaves belonged to the Lancasl~ire Fusiliers and, 
being on leave from his regiment, was acting as special correspondent of 
the Times of Indin. Lieutenant H. L. S. MacLean belonged to the Guides : 
he had been ~vounded i n  the previous fighting a t  Alalakand but  had 
rejoined hisregiment. Lord Fincastle belonged to the 16th Lailcers and 
was acting as the special correspondellt of the Times with the Malaltand 
Field Force : in recognitic~n of his heroism General Blood a t  once 
attached him to the Guides Cavalry for duty. 
On November 9th Lientenant-Co!onel R. E. Adams and Lord Fin- 
cast,le were gazetted for t h e  Victoria Cross. 
THE fotce con tin^ 
leaving Landaki 
way, and the tr 
&fitjor Deane rece 
general t e r m s  of s 
tribes of U p p e r -  S 
in the d i r e t i o n  o i  
up the valley t o  I! 
River, and cam pet 
completely s e t t l ed  
and their a r m s ,  s c  
dulcb to  and from 
including s o m e  C 
The Guides C a ~ i  
survey parties d i c  
of ihe a d v a n c e  u x  
uccomplisliedl, a n t  
Brigade s t a r t e d  t 
We may pau 
&his march of t 
Swat Valley, as j 
part in  it. The gx 
quite u n k n o w n  t 
the map cornpi1 
although ira the I 
proved to be .COI 
valley, w h i e h  k e  
From Chakc 
a s  far  as Bariko 
almost due i~ostl 
bearing, r u n n i n g  
j oiu the S w a t  Ri. 
fer t i l i t~  -ai; t f ~ a  






t h e  
j u s t  
t w o  
bola  
tstle 
, u g h  
his 
t h e  
aves 
10U1' 




h a d  
a n d  
a n d  
)ncu 
CHAPTBR VIII. 
CONCLUDING OPERATIONS IN THE SWAT VALLEY. 
THE f o x e  continued its rt~azarch into Upper Swat on the 18th Sugust, 
leaving Landaki a t  snnrise. No opposition was encountered on the 
way, and the troops camped near the village of Ghalajai. Bere 
Major Dearne received a letter from the Mian Guls and other tribes in 
general terms of subnlission to the Government. This included all the 
tribes of Upper. Swat. The " Mad Fakir " was said to have rnovcd off 
in the direction of Burner. The next day, August 19th, the force moved 
up  the valley to  Mingaoi-a, a large village on a tributary of the Swat 
River, and camped there for five days. The Swatis appeared to have 
completely settled down, and were sending in every day their submivsions 
and their arms, some of them even assisting Major Deane in forwarding 
dalcs to and from Chakdara. Over 800 guns and rifles were collected, 
including some Government rifles stolen froru the Malskand Fort. 
The Guides Cavalry made a number of peaceful reconnaissances, and 
survey parties did some work in perfect securitj-. In  short, the object 
of khe advance up the Swat Valley seenlecl alreedy to have been fully 
accomplished, and on the 25th August Brigadier-Genera1 Meiltlejohn's 
Brigade starhed to retrace its steps. 
We may pause here for a moment to describe in greater detail 
this laurch of the Field Force under General Sir Bindon Blood up the 
Swat Balley, as i t  llad been one of grertt interest $0 all who had taliell 
part in it. The greater part of thc country travelled over was previously 
quite unknown to Europeans except from the reports of natives ; and 
the map colnpiled from various sources by the Intelligence Branch, 
although in the main correct as to names and iilterniediate distances, 
proved to be considerably out as regards the general direction of the 
valley, which keeps a more easterly bearing than had been estimated. 
From Chakdara the valley runs straight, general clirectionE.-N.-E., 
a s  far as Barikot, a distance of sonae 12 mihs, whence it  turns sharply 
almost due north for a short way, and then again resumes its easterly 
bearing, running about N.-E. for some 20 miles. Numerous side streams 
join the SwatEiver a t  various points, and the whole valley is of wonderful 
fertilitj -at t l ~ a t  tilae of the year i t  was green with luxuriant crops of 
growing rice and Incliasl corn. Villages are thiclil~ scetbered along each 
side of the main stream, and around them are the invariable graveyards, 
shaded by groves of trees, which form such a characteristic feature i n  
the scenery of this part of the world. Numerous remains of Buddhist 
"stupas, " monasteries and other buildings are passed, which woulcl afford 
a n  interesting field for investigation to the archreologist. Most of 
these remains are of great antiquity, as is proved by  the writings 
of the Chinese traveller Hiuen-Tsiang, who ascended this valley some 
1,4W years ago, and whose remarks upon prominent features and 
objects of religious interest were verified in  numerous instances by  
Major Deane, Political Agent, who took a number of interesting 
inlpressions of Pali inscriptions, and also of tlie footprints of Buddha, 
which latter and their exact location are accurately described in the 
manuscript above referred to. Even a t  this early date Hieun-Tsiang 
speaks of the remilins as " old and ruined. " 
As one advances up the valley the scenery becomes wilder and more 
mountainous. The hills, which rise to  heights of 3,000 or 4,000 feet 
above the river bed, beco~rie more rugged and bolder in outline, while 
the snowy peaks of the Kohistan are seen towering in the far distance. 
These rise to altitudes of 16,000 or 17,000 feet and form a fine back- 
ground to the vista of the river winding sluggishly along through its 
green level valley bounded on either side by bare rocky hills on which 
the pines begin to  show themselves a t  elevations of 4,000 to 5,000 feet. 
The furthest point reached by the cavalry reconnaissance on the 
2lst August from Mingaora (the present capital) was Gutibagh, about 
1% miles higher up, where a halt was made on the summit of a small 
eminence opposite to the junction of the Arnawai River with the Swat. 
From here the view extended some 5 or 6 miles further, beyond which 
point the river appears to trend i n  a more northerly direction towards 
the Kohistan or hill-country proper-the valley itself still fertile and 
thickly populated. Between Mingaora and this point the village of 
Manglaor was passed : this was the former capital and is surrounded by 
numerous Buddhist remains. Here, and for a few miles higher up, the 
valley widens, instead of narrowing as was expected, and broad stretches 
of cultivation are found on both sides of the Swat. 
The reconnaissance to the Karakar Pass on the 25th August lifted 
the " purdah " of another hitherto unexplored country. This pass leads 
from Barikot in the Swat Valley into the Salarzai portioli of Buner; 
and is one which is much used for the export of grain from Upper 
Swat southwards to Busta111 and other Inclian marts. The pass is an 
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easy one, some 4,500 feet in  height above the sea level, and finom its 
summit a fine view is obtained of this portion of Buner. The general 
character of the country appeared to be similar to Swat, that is to say, 
mountainous country with wide, level river beds which are fertile and 
highly cultivated. Immediately below the pass is an open valley, now 
green with growing crops, drained by a stream which makes its -way 
through a break in the hills into a larger valley beyond. Mountains rise 
in the background, beyond which lies the Indus, and on the nether side 
a river of considerable size (the Barundu) is seen winding its way south 
and east through a broad fertile valley. 
Thus the expedition had served to reveal some 40 miles of new 
country of a highly interesting character. The Swat Valley is of great 
fertility throughout. The principal crops are Indian corn, wheat, barley 
and rice : fruit trees are scarce, although doubtless they would flourish 
if once planted and cared for. Vines, tomatoes and water-melons are 
grown and ripen well. The villages are of the usual Pathall type, flat- 
roofed, built of stone and rubble, the household utensils few and rude, 
with grain stored in bins made of earth and straw, or else buried in the 
ground. The old Buddhist road, flagged in places, is still the principal 
means of communication up and down the valley, and is good enough 
except atthose places where spurs run down from the hills and dip steep- 
ly to  the river. Here the roadway is generally very bad, being rough, 
stony and uneven, and it was such a, place that delayed the Guides in 
their pursuit of the enemy after the action a t  Landaki. 
As regards the Swatis themselves both Upper and Lower are of 
pronouncedly Semitic type with aquiline noses, thin lips, and sharp 
gleaming eyes. Most of the elder men are bearded, and many of the 
faces show signs of strong individuality arid character. They are power- 
fully built, and wonderfully active on the hillside. As regards the 
women few or none (except old hags and quite young girls) were seen, 
as they had all been removed to safe retreats among the hills during Sir 
Bindon Blood's occupatioil of the valley. 
On the 27th August the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General 
Jeffreys, marched out to Thana, to relieve the returning 1st Brigade 
which was ordered to rest a t  Khar, Sir Bindon Blood and his staff and 
the Royal West Kent Reginlent proceeding to Malakand. This move 
was thought a t  first to prelude an advance into Buner-a measure by no 
means uncalled for in view of the fact that  the Salarzai section of the 
Bunerwals retained some twenty rifles and a large amount of Martini 
ainninnition captured a t  the JIalakand. But the idea, if i t  was ever 
eutertaiued, was ~.eIinquished, greatly to the disappointment of the now 
F 
idle Pielcl Force ; and the following moves were ordered :--"The 2nd 
Brigade, wit11 divisional troops, will march back past Khar  to Golagrnrn 
to  await orders ; the 1st Erigade remaining a t  Khar. A small force of 
all arms will proceed to Uch to support the Khan of Dir in settling the 
right bank of the Swat. The 1st Reserve Brigade, henceforth styled the 
3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, will withdraw from Rustani I 
and concentrate a t  Mardim. 
Colonel Reid was given command of tile force moving to Uch, which 
mas conlposed of the 10th Field Battery, all the 11 th  Bengal Lancers 
available except one squadron, the 38th Dogms, and the BBnd Punjab 
Infantry. Ucll is situated about six niiles from Chakclara on the Dir 
Bo:td. On tlie -29th August the troops conlposing the Uch force con- 
eelitrated at  ChakdiLra, and nloved off to Ucll the following day, when 
tliey were joined by iUajor Deane. The work of disarmament there was 
at once bezuri, and large quantities of firearms were readily brought in, 
showing that the spirit of theSwatis to the north was thoroughly broken. 
These mere the clans which suffered such severe losses a t  Chakdara. > 
The Khan of Dir was then a t  Uch, and he was well pleased to see the 
policy of disarnia~uent being carried out so thoroughly. 
The 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, which had been 
marclied back to Golagram to await orders, was now directed t o  move 
out against the Utman Khels, starting on tlle 30th August ; and Captain 
Walters with one tl*oop of tlie 11th Bengal Lancers was sent on in  front, 
two days aliead of the brigade, to  reconnoitre the passes. Tlie Inzari 
Pass, 12 miles from Ehar  (which is not to be confused with the pass of 
the same name in the Mohmand country), was reached by General 
Jeffreys without opposition, but there the advance came to an abrupt 
end, the brigade beint: a t  once recalled to Kliar 
> 
There were two reasons for this sndclen cancellation of tlle move- 
ment against the Utman Khels. In  the first place, the Mohmands on the 
Peshawar frontier had risen in force in  front of Shabkadr (under 
circumstances which will presently be related) ; and the whole of Sir  
BindonB!ood'sDirision-that is to say, General Jeffreysl Brigade moving 
against the Utlxan Khels, General Meiklejohn's Brigade resting a t  Khar, 
and General Wodehouse's Brigade watching the Euner frontier a t  RUS- 
tam-was required to be available a t  Rhar  to co-operate a t  any 
moment with General Elles's Division a t  Peshawar, in  case i t  should be  1 
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decided to advance into the heart of tlie illohmand country and deal 
a knock-out blow a t  the new rising. The second reasoil for recalling 
General Jeffreys' Brigade from tlie Utman Khel passes was connected 
with events transpiring or a t  least impending in the direction of Uch. 
The Hadda Mullah, of whom much will have to be told in subsequent 
pages, and whose Mohma.nd army just alluded to had already beell 
severely chastised by General Elles's troops, was apparently bent on re- 
trieving his fortunes in a new direction ; in other words, he was reported 
to be preparing an attack upon the Khan of Dir. News was brought in 
that the niullah had succeeded in collecting a large force of Western 
Mohmands for this purpose, and that he was trying to persuade the 
Utrnan Khels and Bajouris to join him. I t  was therefore considered 
advisable to keep General Jeffreys' Brigade in hand a t  Khar, instead of 
losing i t  for a time in trivial operations against a comparatively small 
clan like the Utrnan Khels, so thatin the event of the Khan of Dir 
being seriously threatened the brigade could be promptly despatched 
to join Colonel Reid's Column a t  Uch. From Uch to Sado on the Panj- 
kora River is one march only, and a force placed there could check any 
hostile movement against Dir. 
It has been mentioned that the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier- 
General Wodehouse was withdrawn from the Bunerfrontier to Mardan in 
order to be a t  hand for possible employment with General Elles's Division 
against the Mohmands. The move was no sooner carried out than the 
brigade was further ordered to Uch (instead of General Jeffreys' Bri- 
gade) to join Colonel Reid's force. The march was quickly accomplished, 
and on assuming command of the united forces a t  Uch, General Wode- 
house at  once sent out a sn~all force to take possession of the Panjkora 
bridge from the Dir levies which was effected without oppositioi~, 
though only just in  time to forestall the Mohmands. 
On the 5th September orders were issued for the 2nd and 3rd 
Brigades of Sir Bindon ~ l o o d ' s  Field Force to move to Nawagai on the 
northern confines of the Mohmand country and then turn southwards 
right through the heart of the Mohmand country according to circum- 
stances, with the view to eventually effecting a junction with the force 
under General Elles which would advance from Shabkadr on the southern 
side of the Mohmand country to meet Sir Bindon Blood. 
* +. U 
And now it will be convenient to leave the Malakand Field Force 
tenlporarily and to turn to those events a t  Shabkadr which added tlie 
Mohmand country to the "disturbed area" on our frontier. 
BART 111. 
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CHAPTER I. 
THE LAID ON SHABKADR FORT. 
WHILE in the early part of August Sir Bindon Blood was preparing 
for the advance up  the Swat Valley which led to the fight a t  Landaki 
and to the subsequent subjugation of the Swat tribes, another grave 
outbreak of tribal fanaticism was disturbing that portion of our border 
which faces the Mohmand territory. 
The facts are briefly these. About four o'clock in the afternoon of 
Saturday, August 7th, some four or five thousand Mohmands made a 
sudden incursion into British territory near Shabkadr Fort, 18 miles 
north of Peshawar. They moved upon the Hindu village of Shankar- 
garh, which is the bazar of Shabkadr, and burnt it, killing two men 
who had remained there. The rest of the villagers, having been warned 
of the approach of the raiders, had already sought refuge in the Fort, 
held by a detachment of the Border Police. Shabkadr itself was not 
very fiercely assailed, but some sort of an assault upon i t  did take place, 
and the Border Police fired on the raiders, killing and wounding a 
number of them. 
On the news of this outbreak reaching Peshawar, the same evening, 
Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, comn~anding the Peshawar District, 
took out a reinforcing column consisting of four guns of the 51st 
Field Battery, two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, four com- 
panies of the Somersetshire Light Infautry, and the whole of the 20th 
Punjab Infantry. The cav:tlry went on ahead, and arrived at  Shabkadr 
a t  6 A.M. The guns and infantry were a good deal delayed in crossing 
the Kabul River, having to be ferried over. By this time the raiders 
had disappeared and were reported to have hurriedly retired acrosa 
the border on the approach of the reinforcing troops. 
SllaGkadr Furt was built by the Sikhs. I t  stands on a 111ound and 
has walls iifty feet high, SO is practically impregnable to any force with- 
out artillery. Shankargnrh was :tn old Sikh Cantonlllent bazar, 
inhabited chiefly by rich Hindu money-lenders, who had very profitable 
dealings with the tribesnlen on botfl sides of the border, which is only 
three milesdistant. A t  the time of the raidshabkadr was held bg- forty 
or fifty Border Police, and the atbck lasted from about 4 P.M. to  5 A.M., 
the little garrison accounting for some forty of the tribesmen without 
b 
1 0 s  to themselves. 
This raid, it may be said a t  once, though the fact was not learnt till 
afterwards, was the direct work of tlie notorious Mullah of Hadda, Najib- 
ud-din, who has alretady been alluded to in these pages, and who was a t  
that  time a great power among the more fanatical tribesmen in the 
3fultmand country, as well as in Eajour and the Utnlan Khel districts, 
I t  was this mullah who tried so hard to create trouble for us during the 
C'hitral Campaign, and i t  was he again beyond all doubt whose plotting 
had indirectly hepled to bring about the recent rising in the swat  
T':tlley. H e  lived a t  the supposed village of Jarobi* at  the head of 
the Bohai Valley, in that part of the Mohmand country which is F 
unlder the Aniir of Kabul, and was known to have intimate relations 
will1 the Sipah Salar, General Ghulam Hyder Kllant Kark i  (corn- 
~u:tnding the troops in Eastern Afghanistan, with head-quarters a t  
Jellalabad). Wl~ile the recent attack on the Malakand was proceediiig 
the Had& Mullah had collected a body of men and sent them to help 
the Swatis. A few days before the present raid on Sllabkadr the  mullah 
had succeeded in stirring up the fanaticism of the Northern and Western 
Mahmands, and had gathered a considerable body of men about him. 
This force advanced dourn the Bohai Valley, crossed the Nahaki Pass, 
and then entered the Gandab Valley, and so into Bvitish territory a t  
Sllabksdr. The raid was doubtless designed to effect a diversion in 
favour of the Swatis, still suffering from their failure to capture the 1 
Witlakand or Chakdara. If the Hadda Mullah had timed llis effort so 
that Shabkadr should be attacked on the same day as the Mala- 
kand, he would have done a clever stroke of business, and widespread 
rnleasiness would have been caused all along OUI* Peshawar frontier. As 
it was, our troops (as already shown) had swept the Lower Swat clear of 
tribesmen, and two full brigades in the Malakand were now readv L~ 
The mystery c n r ~ c l o p l ~ ~ g  thi.; plnre ~ ~ 1 . 1  d i ~ p ~ l l m  n couple of mouLJls LLer n hou 
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operate in any direction, while a reserve brigade had been forn~ed at  
Mardan which could move a t  a few 11ours' notice into the PesllawarV,zlley, 
As for tlte Mohlnnnd tribes, a few words will suffice to tell all that 
needs to be stated here about them. They hold the cou!ltry bounded 
on the south by the Kabul River from Jellalabnd to its entrance into 
British territory, and on the north by Eajour. They extend west- 
wards to the hill country above the Kunar River, and in the east they 
touch the Peshawar border and the Utman Khel country lying about 
the junction of the Swat and Panjliora Rivers. Under the Durand 
Treaty they came partly under the political influence of the Indian 
Government and partly under that of the Amir of Eabul. The actual 
den~arcation of the zones of influence has never been carried out, the 
attempt to form a Boundary Comn~ission having come to nought a few 
months previously. The following is an official description of the 
blohmand territory : "The country of the Mohmands is divided naturally 
into two parts, the rich alluvial lands along the bank of the Kabul 
River from Jellalabnd to Lalpura, and the country to the east of Lalpura, 
consisting of a network of hills and valleys. The principsl of the latter 
are the valleys of Shilman, Gandab and Pandiali. They are, as a rule, 
dry and arid water-courses, raging torrents in heavy rain, but usually 
presenting a stony and shingly bed, from which slopes of barren ground 
lead to the rocky spurs and ranges that flank them." As the Durand 
boundary runs from Landi Kotal eastwards of Lalpura and then along 
the watershed separating the basins of the Kunar and Panjkora Rivers, 
the most considerable portions of the country are within the British 
zone. The fighting strength of the whole tribe is put a t  between 17,000 
and 18,000, the Baizai accounting for one-half of the total. These hold 
the eastern part of the countivy adjacent to Eajour and the Utman Khel 
border. ~ h :  Mohmands had never been accounted an enemy of much 
importance in previous conflicts with our troops. I n  1880 they made 
but a poor resistance, when some 5,000 of them, who had crossed the 
Kabul River near Dakka, were attacked by a column 850 strong under 
Colonel Boisragon. On an earlier occasion, in 1879, a small detach- 
ment of 170 men of the Merwara Battalion, under Captain O'Moore 
Creagh, successfully held a position near Kane Dakka against several 
thousand Mohmands who attacked for six hours. As a tribe, tlte 
Mohmands are split up into six clans : the Baizai, already mentioned, 
good fighting men ; the Tarakzai, (including the I s  Khel and Barhac 
Khel), 2,800 ; the Halimzai, 2,600 ; the Khwaizai, 1,800 ; the Dawezai, 
800 ; and the Gtmanzsi, 400. There is a comparatively easy route illto 
their country fro111 Matts, a few miles north of Shabkadr, over the 
Inzari Pass ' This is known s s  the Alikandi route, and i t  might have 
been used by the Chitid Relief Force in 1895 in preference to that  over 
the Malakand, but it was thought desirable not to enter the Mohmand 
country a t  that time. 
*.Another pass bearirlg this uame, situate in the Mridi country, comes iuto the 
narrntlre later. 
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PROMPT REPRISALS. 
TH* reparding the retirement of the Mohmand raiders after 
the arrival a t  Shabkadr of strong reinforcements from Peshawar was 
true only in part. They withdrew to the low hills which run from the 
main ranges to within a mile of the Fort, which is three rniles from the 
border line. Here they remained out of gu~lshot range. Their numbers 
increased on Sunday night, August Sth, the presence of the Hadda 
Mullah serving to attract contingents from all the Mohmand clans, with 
the exception of the Tarakzai. 
On Monday morning, August Sth, a t  daybreak, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Woon, 20th Punjab Infantry, who had been left in comn~and a t  Shab- 
kadr by Brigadier-General Elles, nloved out his troops to the attack. 
H e  had a t  his disposal four guns of the 51st Field Battery, two squad- 
rons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, two companies of the Somersetshire 
Light Infantry, and the whole of the 90th Punjab Iufantry 600 strong, 
or a total of between 1,100 and 1,200 men. The enemy's line was about 
two miles in length, some 6,000 men, a t  least, being assembled. Their 
right rested on the high hills, their centre extended across the low hills, 
while their left stretched into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. 
Colonel Woon began his attack with the infantry, shortly after 6 o'clock, 
but  could make no impression on the position, and his small force was 
outflanked by the Mohmands, who streamed out into the plain on either 
hand. To guard against the infantry being completely enveloped, 
Colonel Woon began to withdraw towards the Fort. 
A t  this period of the action Brigadier-General Elles arrived on the 
scene and took command. H e  had had to return t o  Pashawar on the 
previous day to arrange the disposition of the garrison there (weakened 
by the sudden call upon it) and to report by telegraph to Army Head- 
Quarters the state of affairs on the border. H e  left Peshawar again 
early that morning, taking with him two companies of the 30th Punjab 
Infantry. On arrival a t  the ferry over the Kabul River, he heard the 
sound of heavy firing a t  Shabkadr and a t  once pushed on, leaving the 
infantry to follow. 
(ierlc.rnl Ellcs ~.e:~ched the scene of action at  8-40 A.M., by~yvhich time 
~no , t  crf  the enemy l~acl smar~ued down frolll the low llills were en- 
g;rqrd with uar infitritry in the open, and he at  once saw the favourable 
~,pp)rtunity offered for using his cavalry. He first concentrated the Ere 
of the four guns upon the enemy's left, and then directed the two squacl- 
mns of the 13th Bengal Lancers to charge from right t o  left along 
the sl.lo8e line of tribesmen. This charge was brilliantly carried out 
under the leadership of Major Atkinson, commanding. The two squad- 
ronsof Lancers swept right along from end to end of the line, rallying 
and re-forming on the left of the infantry. Their losses were few, bu t  
Major Atkinson and Lieutenant Cheyne had their horses shot. By this 
tinie the two con~panies of the 30th Punjab Infantry had come up, and 
nn infantry attack was ordered againat the enemy before they could re- 
corer fronl the effects of the cavalry charge. The Mohmands were driven 
bxk, and pursued to the foot of the high hills, on which they took re- 
fuge. Bad an additional cavalry regiment been present they would, i n  
Cirneiltl Elles's opinion, have been almost completely cut off, but  as  it 
a:w, their losses were very heavy, as the dead they left on the ground 
sllowed. The action was over by 10-30 A.H. ; Genera1 Elles not con- 
sidering it  desirable, with the small infantry force a t  his command, t o  
prlnll further into the hills, pardcularly as his merl had been hotly 
enq~ged for four hours. The Mohmands, however, had received a 
suiticicntly sharp lesson, and they began to retire over the hills when 
the troops returned to Shabkadr, and by two o'clock not a man was 
be seen. The Hadda Mullah, who was present during the fight, had 
evidently seen that his defeat could not be retrieved. 
t 
Our casualties in this affair were 12 killed and 52 wounded ; not 
f heavy Iosres considering how sharp was the fighting, and the number of 
I the enemy. Se~erely wounded : Major Lumb, Somersetshire Light In -  
I fantry, bullet wound in the neck ; Captain Blacker, 51st Field Battery, 
X bullet wound in the leg. 82khtly wounded : Lieutenant Cheyne, 13th 
1 Bengal Lancers. The details of the casualties were as follows :-Somer- 
3 set~hire  Light Infantry : 4 men killed, 8 wounded severely, 1 
I 
sliglitly; 20th Punjab Infantry, 7 killed, 20 wounded severely, I 
slightly; 13th Bengal Lancers, 1 killed, 8 wounded severely, 6 
slightly. 
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the enemy's line of retreat. The enenly changed front to meet this, and 
swarmed on both f i a ~ k s  under heavy rifle fire from our left, and they 
pressed hard to cut us off from the Fort, distant about 2 miles. Most 
of our casualties occurred a t  this t h e ,  but the artillery kept the 
enemy off on our right. General Elles with his Staff arrived a t  this 
moment, about 9 A.M., and took over command. H e  lengthened 
and threw back our left and ordered the cavalry out to the right 
front. Captain Blacker of the Artillery here received his wouud. The 
cavalry charged down the enemy's line, rolling i t  up, and in spite of 
the heavy ground and bad going, the charge was brilliantly executed by 
Major F. C. Atkinson, Lieutenant A. G. B. Turner, and Lieutenant 
Cheyne and two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, supported 
by the artillery fire directed ahead of the cavalry line. The enemy 
immediately fled to the tops of the foot hills, and remained watching 
in groups. Shells dispersed the groups, but our force was too small to 
enter the  hills in pursuit. On our side the total number engaged was 
just 800, and with these were only 15 British Officers, including General 
Elles and  Staff, and four of these were wounded in addilion to the Medical 
Officer. The latter was struck by a stone knocked up by a bullet, and 
incapacitated for a short while, but he insisted on returning to duty. 
Certainly first aid to the wounded was efficiently performed, and in this 
case saved many lives. None of the wounded have yet died, and none 
apparently are in  bad case. Seventy-seven were killed or wounded, 
a loss of about 10 per cent." A curious fact worth mentioning is that 
the ground on which the action was fought was practically the same as 
that on which Sir Colin Campbell in 1852 with 600 men met and 
defeated 6,000 Mohmands, and where again in January 1864 Colonel 
A. Macdonnel, of the Rifle Brigade, with 1,750 men, defeated a body of 
5,000, who held the low hills facing Shabkadr. The success of the latter, 
like that  of General Elles, was due to the cavalry, the Mohmands being 
tempted into the plain and then charged. A squ;ldron of the 7th 
Hussars on that occasion made three successive charges which enabled 
the infantry to act with decisive eKect against the enemy's broken line. 
Hrtving withdrawn the troops to the neighbourhood of the Fort, 
General Elles returned to Peshawar, and immediately ordered up to 
Shabkadr the remainder of the Somersetshire Light Infantry and 250 
of the 37th Dogras, so as  to be ready to assume the offensive if the 
Mohmands should reappear. At 9 o'clock, however., a heliographic 
message was received from Slldbliacll stating that no enemy co111d be seen 
even on the distanl hills. 
8 s  i t  was impossible to say how far the excitement extended 
alongthe border, General Elles called up three companies of the 8th 
Bengal Infantry from Nowshera, and a t  the same time asked for one 
battery of artillery, a regiment of native cavalry and one of native 
infantry, it being important to have a garrison a t  Peshawar. The 
Gordon Highlanders, under orders from Army Head-Quarters, had been 
despatched from Rawalpindi by train a t  midnight on Sunday, August 
8th, and reachedPeshawar on the Monday afternoon; the 2nd Queen's 
from Jullundur replacing them a t  Rawalpindi as part of the He- 
serve Brigade of the M:~lakand Division. Tlle arrival of the Gordon 
Highlanders filled the gap at  Peshawar caused by sending the Somer- 
setshire Light Infantry to Shabkadr. The troops now watching the 
Mohmand Frontier were the 51st Field Battery (four puns), two 
squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers, the Somersjtshire Light Infantry 
(740 strong), the 20th Punjab Infantry (600 strong), the 30th Punjab 
Infantry (300), and the 37th Dogras (250); a handy force of about 
2,200 men. 
A reconnaissance was made on Tuesday, Aueust loth, five miles 
into the llills from Shabkadr without any enemy being seen. The 
Mohmands, however, were reported as int,ending to return to the attack 
after replenishing their ammunition and food supplies. They were said 
to have lost between three and four hundred killed and several 
hundred wounded in the action on the 9th August. 
The reinforcement of the Peshawar garrison was most pronlptly 
carried out. I n  addition to  the Gordon Highlanders h-on1 Rawalpindi 
and the three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry, the 2nd Battalion 
1st Gurkhi~s arrived on the scene. The Gurkhas had been intended for 
the Reserve Brigade a t  Mardan, but on arrival by train a t  Nowshera they 
were sent straight on. The 9th Bengal Lancers and the 57th Field 
Battery from Campbellpore were also ordered up. These reinforce- 
ments enabled General Elles to send the whole of the 13th Bengal 
Lancers to Shabkadr, thus raising the strength of the force there to 
about 2,500 men. Apart from this detached column General Elles 
eventually had the following troops in Peshawar itself : one section of 
the 5ls t  Field Battery and the whole of No. 57 Field Battery, No. 5 
Company Bengnl Sappers, 9th Bengal Lancers, the Devonshire Regiment, 
the Gordon Higblanders, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Gurkhas, five 
companies of the 30th Punjab Infantry, six companies of the 37th Dogras, 
and three companies of the 8th Bengal Infantry 
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As tllc gencral situaLion on the North-\Vest Frontier now presented 
itself, however, itwas obviously wise to still further strengthen the 
garrison of Peshawar so as to have a second column ready to take the 
field in case the tribal excitement should spread. The Government of 
India therefore ordered up the following troops :-4th Dragoon Guiards 
and '' K " Battery Royal Horse Artillery, from Rawalpindi; tlie 26th 
Punjab Infantry from Jullundur, and No. 3 (British) Mountain Battery 
fro111 Jutogh, Simla Hills. 
For  the next five days or so phenomenally heavy rains calne down 
and made matters extremely uncomfortable for the Peshawar and Shab- 
kadr garrisons. The fair vale of Peshawar almost disappeared under 
water, and the roads were turned into bogs, the one to Shabkadr being 
a veritable slough of despond to Transport Oficers. The new bridge 
over the Kabul River, which runs midway between Peshawar and 
Shablradr, was a triunlph of engineering skill. The current a t  that time 
was coming down with a roar a t  a speed of from ten to twelve knots an 
lioui; and was generally level with and sometimes overflowing the 
banlts ; but the bridge, which was held by wire hawsers, splendidly 
withstood the flood : it consisted of country boats, pontoon system, and 
its length was about two hundred yards. 
Fortunately the floods did not interfere with any urgent military 
operations, fur the reason that no immediate operations were possible 
without an enemy ; and the Mohmand warriors, imitating the beaten 
Swatis a t  Chskdara, had completely disappeared. The Mullah of 
IIadda was so discredited that he had retired temporarily to his haunt 
in the BohaiValley. The " Mi~d Fakir" in Swat, in replying to a mess- 
age from the Hadda Mullah asking for congratulations, was reported 
to have sent the answer-" Dog, you have done nothing ! " which indeed 
was the plaiil truth. On August the Bnd,  however, about a fortnight 
after theaction a t  Sllabkadr, i t  was reported a t  Peshawar that the 
Hadda, Mullah had again worbed up the Mohniands, aud that he in- 
tended to attack both Shabkadr and Michni, one tribal column coming 
down the Garidab Valley and another by the more northerly Alikandi 
~ o u t e .  This demonstration was announced as arranged for Monday, 
August 33rd. If i t  had actually taken place the Mohmallds would have 
had a warm reception, as more cavalry were now on the scene with 
General Elles than were available on the 9th of tlie month ; but the 
still snlarting tribesmen were apparently not to be thus easily inflamed 
a seconcl time, As a matter of fact many of them were attending 
peacefully to their fields, the recent heavy rains having rendered agri- 
cultural work a necessity ; added to which the war council of the tribe 
was for t h e  moment hopelessly torn by internal dissensions. 
* * * 
While General Elles was awaiting permission from head-quarters to  
press home retaliation upon the Mohmands, signs of restlessness were 
being reported day by day from the  Afridi and Orakzai country, and a t  
length on Tuesday, August 24th, the smouldering embers of fanaticism 
# 
in  this new direction burst suddenly into flames, and a fierce attack v a s  
made upon our Forts in the Khyber Pass. This new rising, however, 
and the grave events which succeeded it, require separate narration, 
and are only mentioned here for the sake of chronology, and because 
they influenced the Government of India in deciding upon the further 
exemplary operations against the Mohmands now to be described. 
fiuarxa the .first 
t ~ a s  received in Pes 
extensive punitive I 
boi-der, and that tl 
h a n d .  Definite orde 
kadr of two Isrigadc 
be drawn from the 
f o r c e  a t  that time r 
just been depleted 1; 
f r o n t i e r  of the 6th I 
the 30th Bengal Inj 
The proposed n 
the Hadda Mullah 
time with 4,000 Bai 
Icadr. His other an: 
c u t t i n g  round to Ch 
m e n t  across the Pan 
Wodehouse,  and ow 
ing Brigadier-Gene 
tion. Everything 1 
and decisive, as two 
d e m n e d  country fro 
two brigades of t l  
Wodehouse  and Br 
and east, while Ger 
gadier-General Wee 
m o v e  forward from 
The compositic 
f r o m  Peshawar wer 
Commanding : 
,Genera l ;  A.-D.-C., 1 
R.E. ; Comnlanding 
B. A., Captain W. K 
d agri- 
e tribe . 
CHAPTER I IL 
, r t e r s  to 
3s were 
, a n d  at 
a t i c i s n  
lck tvas 
3wever ,  
? r a t i o n ;  
b e c a u s e  
f u r t h e r  
THE MOHMAND EXPEDITION. 
Dunraa the .first week in September the welcome announcement 
was received in Peshawar that the Government of India had sanctioned 
extensive punitive measures against the various tribes on t h e  Peshawar 
border, and that the Mohmands would be the first tribe to be taken in 
hand. Definite orders followed for the immediate concentration a t  Shab- 
kadr of two brigades under the command of General Elles, the  troops to 
be drawn from the force already in and about Peshawar. The Peshawar 
force a t  that time numbered something like 9,000 men, although i t  had 
just been depleted by the despatch to the disturbed Afridi and  Orakzai 
frontier of the 6th Benqal Cavalry, the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, and 
the 30th Bengal Infantry. 
The proposed movement against the Mohmands was well timed, as 
the Raclda Mullah was once again reported to be on the war-path, this 
time with 4,000 Baizai Mohmands, his intention being to re-visit $hab- 
Iradr. His  other ambitious plan (already described) for attacking Dir and 
cutting round to Chitral had come to nought, owing to the rapid rnove- 
ment across the Panjkora River of the Uch force under Brigadier-General 
Wodehouse, and owing also to Sir Bindon Blood's promptness in  recall- 
ing Brigadier-General Jeffreys' Brigade from the Utman Khel Expedi- 
tion. Everything pointed to the operations of our troops being short 
and decisive, as two powerful forces were about to move upon the con- 
demned country from opposite directions. Sir Bindon Blood, with the 
two brigades of the Malalrand Field Force under Brigadier-General 
Wodehouse and Brigadier-General Jeffreys, was acting from the north 
and east, while General Elles, with two brigades (commanded by Bri. 
gadier-General Westnlacott and Brigadier-General Macgregor), would 
move forward from Shabkadr on the southern side. 
The composition and staff of the Mohluand expeditionary force 
from Peshawar were as follows :- 
Commanding : Brigadier-General Elles with the rank of Major- 
General; A,-D.-U., Lieutenant E. Elles ; A. &.-M.-G., Major P. Sulivan, 
B.E. ; Conimanding Royal Artillery, Colonel A. E. Duthy ; Adjutant, 
R. A., Caplain W. B. McLeod ; D. A. &.-M..G. for Intelligence, Captain 
f;. A. Hoghton, 1st Bomb- Grenadiers ; Field Intelligence Officer? 
Lieutenant C. E. E. F. I<. &lvmcq,loid, Hyderabad Contingent ; principal  
RIedical Oficer, Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend ; Field Engineer, M a j o r  
Kelly ; Assistant Field Engineers, Lieutenants W. A. Stokes and  c. B- 
L. areenstreet;  Ordnance Olficer, Major F. E. Rowan; Chief Commis- 
mriat Oficer, Captain G. R. C. Westropp ; Divisional Transport Officer, 
Caph~ir~ F.C. IT. Rideout; Commissariat Officer for the Baseat Shabkadr, 
Lieutenant E. G. Vaughnn ; Veterinary Officer, Veterinarj--Captain F- 
W. Forsdyke ; Provost Marshal, Riajor H. S. Massy, 19th Bengal  
Lancers. 
1st Brigade :-Con~manding, Brigadier-General Westmacott. Troops : 
Somerset Light Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, 2nd Battalion 1st 
Gurkhas. 
2nd Brigade :-Commanding, Erigadier-General C. R, nlacgregor. 
Troops: Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 9th Gurkhas, six companies 37t;h 
Dogrss. 
Diuisional Troops :-13th Bengal Lancers, No. 3 British and  N o  5 
Bombay Mountain Iratteries 28th Bombay Pioneers, and one regiment 
of Imperial Service Infantry. 
The Maharaja of Patiala and Sir Partab Singh of Jodhpur joined 
General Elles's personal staff as extra Aides-de-Camp ; Ma.jor W. J. 
Bythell, X.E., accompanied t h e  Nohmand Expedition in cliarge of the 
survey. 
It will be noticed that certain Imperial Service Troops were includ- 
ed in the expeditionary force, and the following notification on the s u b -  
ject, which was iss~ted from the Foreign Department on September 5 t h ,  
affords all the explanation that  is necessary :-"The tribal disturbances 
on the frontier have pronlpted the ruling Chiefs in all parts of India  to 
come forward with their wonted loyalty to press upon the Governor- 
General in  Council the services of their Imperial Service Troops. The 
G~vernor-General in Council has resolved that the time has come when 
the assistsnce of the troops so loyally prepared and maintained may be 
accepted from the Chiefs of the Punjab, and when they may be  allowed 
to co-operate in  punishing those who have made and are making p e r -  
sistent efforts to  disturb the pe~we of that  Province. It is impossible 
to employ cavalry to any great extent in the expeditions which have 
now to be underkzken ; the  Governor-Geacral in Council has therefore 
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clecided to accept from the States i n  t h e  Punjab  the service of four bat- 
talions of infantry and of two companies of  sappers and Miners. Tliese 
troops will irnn~ediately ~ r o c e e d  t o  t h e  front .  I t  has also been deter- 
nlined to utilise the services of t h e  Qwal ior  and Jaipurtransport trains 
did such good work in the  C h i t r a l  Expedition, and which the pat- 
riotic action of His  Highness t h e  M a h a r a j a  Sindhia and His Highness 
the Maharaja of Jaipur places again at t h e  disposnl of the Government 
of India. Orders have been given t h a t  t h e  thanks of the Government 
of India should be conveyed t o  a l l  the Chiefs from whom oflers of 
troops have been received. The urgency  and unanimity \vhich charac- 
terise the action in this respect of r u l e r s  of States in India emphatical- 
l y  testify to the spirit of loyalty w h i c h  animates them." 
The plan of campaign, already outlined, may now be more fully 
unfolded. During previous border w a r s  the  custom in attacking hostile 
tribes had been to march st,raight i n t o  their country on one line of 
advance. This had always enabled t h e  tribesmen to p t l i e r  a t  a single 
point, generally a pass, offering a g o o d  defensive position, thus compel- 
ling our troops to storm breastworks before  making good their entrance 
into the country. I n  some instances h e a v y  losses had been incurred by 
our troops i n  this way, and progress  had necesmrily been slow. The 
present expedition was being conduc ted  on very different lines. Our 
possession of Lower Swat and t h e  opening  out of the road to C11itralC 
through Dir permitted of a s t roog f lank movement being made against 
the Mohmands, pending the development  sf which General Elles 
would not move out from Shabkadr. Sir Bindon Blood had crossed 
the Panjlrora River a t  8ad0, a n d  was marching rapidly due west up 
the Ushiri Valley to  Mandia, t h e  r o u t e  followed by Sir Robert Low 
i n  the Chitral Campaign. From B l a n d i a  a raad leads south-we& up the 
Khaluzi Valley to  the high range  w h i c h  separates Bajour pager from 
the Mohmand country. This r a n g e  Sir Bindon Blood intended to crosB 
by a pass overlooking Nawagai, t h e  head-quarters of the Khan of that 
nitme, who had assumed a part icular ly friendly attitude towards the 
British Rci. This Chief is a n  o ld  r i v a l  of Umra K h d s  and his 
territory i n  the south touches t h e  M i t t a i  Valley, a tract a b u t  which 
there had been a dispute between t h e  Governnlent and the Amir of 
Kabul. From Sado to Mawagai is a b o u t  50 miles. When our troops 
reached Nawagai, they would be  in r e a r  of the Mohmands and could 
niarch to ally point in their country. A caravan route leads due south t o  
the Peshawar border and this would perhaps be the best to follow 3s iB, 
pRases througl1 Lokerni in the Bohai Valley, wllerc tlie Mohmands have 
1n:inj- vil1:tges. The >1ohn~ands, on the appearance of Sir Bindon 
Gloorl's Division a t  Sawagai, mould be obliged to gather their fighting- 
Inen to oppose his advance southw:~rds. They had never been attacked 
from the  north before, and would clearly be taken a t  a disadvantage. 
But  a t  the rery time a t  which their attention would be turned to 
Naxagi~i ,  their scouts would bring in news that another big force had 
entered the country froin Shabkadr and ~vss pressing forward through 
the C+andab defile upon Lol;erai. This place is 30 miles from Nahvagai 
and about 50 from Si~abkadr. I s  each division was 5,000 strong, and as 
tlle total atsength of tlie 3Iohmands was only 17,000, of which one-half 
llad to be furnished by the Bdizai clans to the extreme west, the 
tribe \\-ss llot likely to n~ske  much of a fight against the  two forces. 
Tile 31uhnlands nre n povert~--stricken race, and, unlike the Afridis, 
wcre badly armed, as they had never been able to purchase breech- 
loading iuibes. I n  the r ~ i d  on Sht~bkadr they were assisted by the 
clans which owe allegiance to the Amir, but help could not, i t  was 
believed, reach theru froxu this direction now, as Abdur Rahrnan* 
had sllolvn that he would not permit his subjects to  join in  the 
iighting on the borcler. As our two divisions nloved to meet each 
otlier in the Bollai TLIley, the tribesmen would probably flee to the 
Ilills, tllougll they nlight make some show of resistance a t  the outset. 
Tlieir villages x~ould lie open to the troops, and columns could be 
sent out in various directions. Jwrobi, the head-quarters of the 
Hadda SIullah, would doubtless be visited, as it lies a t  the head 
of the valley and could readily be reached. This then was the plan 
of operations, and predictions were not wanting that within a week 
the Mohmand operations would be over, the four brigades being 
then free to move against the Afridi and Orakzai cornhination. A s  a 
matter of fact, the expedition (as mill be shown) occupied more than 
a month, and to a t  least a portion of the troops engaged afforded quite 
a s  much fighting as even a keen soldier could desire. 
No proclamation was issued to the Mohmands before our troops 
moved into their country. Our Political Officers, however, made known 
that  t h e  visit was not made in order to deprive any tribe of i ts  independ- 
ence, b u t  becanse the British Government were determined to "take such 
measures as would illsure its border against being attacked in the 
future.:' Further, the S1olim.znds were informed that if any opposition 
The attit,ude of tllc Amir tolvards the various tribes breaking the peace on our fron. 
tier is alluded to more iuI1y in a Inter chapter. 
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was offered, those who engaged in hostilities would be followed up and 
punished. 
On Saturday, the 11th of September, Major-General Elles and the 
Divisional Staff nloved out from Peshawar to  Shabkadr, and CoIorlel 
A. Gaselee, then conmanding Cawnpore station, took over the command 
of the Peshawar District with the temporary rauk of Brigadier-General. 
On Monday, the 13th September, the whole force was concentrated on the 
shabl~adr-Michini road, and after a delay of two daysmarrhed off. This 
short delay, it is worth explbining, was due to causes affecting General 
Blood's fur ther  advance upon Nawagai. Major Deane, before leaving 
General Blood and returning to Swat, desired to secure the conlplete 
submission of the Utman Khels, who had apparently been wholesonlely 
alarmed by the  march of onr troops. All their jzrghas were anxious to 
come in, and General Blood a t  Major Deane's request halted his 
division for two days for that purpose. Hence the date of General Elles's 
advance was changed from the 13th to the 15th September, as it was 
most important that  the combined advance of the two divisions should 
be so timed tha t  the enemy could be caught between the two armies ap- 
proaching simultaneously from north and south. It was now expected 
tha t  General Blood and General Elles would join hands a t  Lokerai 
on the 18th September : whereupon Sir Bindon Blood would assume 
supreme command of both divisions with full political power. 
The advance from the Shabkadr side was uneventful enough. On 
Wednesday, September 15th, General Westmacott's Brigade marched 
through tlle KhornppaX defile into the Gandab Valley. Half of General 
Macgregor's Brigade followed in support. The Eadda Mullah was 
reported t o  be in the Gandab Valley just ahead with a gathering of 
tribesman belonging to the Khwazai and Utman Khel sections, the 
numbers being unknown. No enemy, however, was seen on the march, 
which proved to be a difficult one. The remaining troops of the divi- 
sion followed i n  due course, and General Elles soon found himself in an 
advanced position in the enemy's country, practically unchallanged. 
C C * 
Leaving the Shabkadr Division thus marching on unopposed, tlza 
narrative has now to follow the more chequered fortunes of the two 
brigades under Sir Bindon Blood on the opposite borders of the Moh- 
mand country. 
*Another place bearing this name i s  mentioned in later pages cleal~ng withthe 
Oralt~Jj risiug. 
CHAPTEH IV. 
VITLI G E S E R . ~  JEPFREYS' BRIOlIDE. 
GEXERAL WODEHOL'SIZ'S Brigade, accompanied by  Sir Bindon Blood, 
reached Nawagai on Monday, September 13th, the canlp having been 
sniped a t  the previous night a t  a place called Lhamshak. NO jirgahs 
had come in, and evidently the natives were hostlle, as snlall parties 
itrmed will1 Xartinis had fired the previous day on two squadrolls of the 
11th RengalLancers reconnoitring the MohrnandV~~lley. But the Khan 
of Nawapi  wss friendly, and while the troops remained in his territory, 
collected grain nnd supplies for them. No large body of the enunly 
being in sight, instructions were issued to the Survey Officers with the 
force to examine the SIittai Valley closely, with a view t o  the settle- 
ment of its boundaries. This was an important step to  take, as the  
A n ~ i r  of liabul, when he claimed the valley the yesr before, had 
sent troops to occupy it .  The country could now be surveyed without 
interruption (ss i t  seemed), up to the Dulmand Border, after which 
the brigade could. swing round and march due south v i i  Lolrerai 
up011 STakhdand, in order to  unite with General Jeffreys' Brigade 
entering the Xohn~and country by the route east of Nawagai which 
leads direct upon Yakhdand. But neither General Wodehouse nor 
General Jeffreys was able to adhere strictly to these plans, owing t o  
the difficult positictn of the one and the resolute opposition ellcountered 
by the other. 
Wiile in the neighbourEiood of Inayat Kili on the 14th September a 
determined attack was made a t  night on General Jeffreys' camp and the  
firing lasted for nearly six hours, two British Officers being killed, and  
one dangerously wounded, while nine men in the rank-and-file were hit, 
andabout 80 horses and transport animals lost. The tribesmen attack- 
ing mere Mamunds*and Salarzai, who inhabit the valleys of south 
Eajour west of Munda. It has just been mentioned that a day or two 
previously a cavalry reconnaissance in the MoEmand Valley was iilbed 
upon by tribesmen, but Sir Bindon Blood did not stop to punish them as 
there was no large gathering to be found. These tribesmen were 
Mamunds, and seeing one brigade thus pass on harmlessly to  Kawagai 
* A  clan of the Bnjouci tribes, uot to be confused with the Mohmands. 
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they seen1 to have thought they could harass the troops which still re- 
mained south of the mnge of hills separating Bajour from the Mohmand 
country. Generitl JeRreys had intended crossing this range the follow- 
ing day, September 15t11, and had sent the Buffs and Sappers to hold the 
crest for the night. His camp, with the transport animals, was in the 
best position available, and i t  was guarded by shelter trenches, whicl~ the 
35th Sikhs and the 38th Dogras lined when the enemy opened fire. The 
tribesmen must have got the range accurately, judging by the results 
of their fire, but they made no attempt to rush the entrenchments. 
Firing began a t  8-15 P.X. on the face of the camp occupied by the 
Guides Infantry. A t  10 o'clock there was a lull, but a t  10-30 heavy 
firing recommenced on the face occupied by the 38th Dogms and the 
35th Silrhs, and Brigadier-General JeEreys proceeded thither to direct 
the fire. The attack was continued until 2-15 A.M., when the enemy 
retired carrying their dead with them. The disproportionate loss 
anlong the British Officers was due to the fact that they waked about 
without cover, condacting the defence;. while the men weFe protected 
by shelter trenches Tfre enemy were extremely well armed, and 
creeping along various nullahs, gained positions whence a most galling 
fire was delivered. The troops were directed to avail themselves of 
cover, but the necessity of sending messages involved exposure, 
principally of Officers, resulting in the losses already mentioned. All 
lights were extinguished, yet such tents as stood were pierced by 
bullets. Tlie enemy were everywhere repulsed. Our casualties in 
detail were :-British Officers-killed: Captain W. E. Tomkins and 
Lieutenant A. W. Bailey, 38th Dogras ; dangerously wounded : Lieu- 
tenant H. A. Harrington,* 26th Punjab Infantry, attached to the 38th 
Dogras. Natives-killed: one havildar, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, 
one sepoy, 38th Dogras, and two followers ; voounded, 5. Seventy-six 
horses and mules were hit. Captain Tomkins and Lieutenant Bailey 
were buried the next morning with military honours. Lieutenant ' 
Harrington's condition was hopeless from the first, the bullet having 
penetrated the brain, 
That same morning, as soon as light allowed,.a squadron of the 11th 
Bengal Lancers, under Captain E. H. Cole, went out and overtook the 
Mamunds a t  the foot of the hill, killing 21, with the loss of one 
horse killed and one wounded. 
"Died of his wounck a fortnEght later. 
The enemy, homevet., did not appear to be ~Tish~art~ner?, and though 
they mere quiet the  nest  night, they had boldly cleclared their intention 
of returning zftcr resting. Clearly they had not been punished suffi- 
ciently. General Jeffreys accordingly reealled the Euffs and Sappers 
from the crest of the Rambat Pass, and proceeded to visit the 
oalleys whence t h e  enemy had come. The idea of joining General 
Wodehoase's Brigade a t  Yakhdand was given up in favour of punitive 
operations in the Blanlund (or Watelai) Valley. How far these operations 
would delay the movement of the b r i ~ a d e  into the 1CIohnrand country 
was not yet plain ; but  in any  case Sir  Binclon Blood with General 
Woc.lehonse couId carry out the plan of joining hands with General 
Elles. The incident shoved the wisdom of having sent large forces 
forwarcl from the Swat Valley. If there had been only one brigade on 
the northern Mohmand borders, the plan of the Mohmand Camptxign 
would have fallen through. Now, however, General Jeffreys could 
conifortably devote his attention to the two sections of the Bajouris 
which had thus unexpectedly assumed a hostile attitude, and in the 
event of this task occupying a considerable time he could return to 
the Swat Vnlley uid Sado, as the  troops aIready in the Mohmand coun- 
t r y  would be sufficient to deal with any possible Mohmand combination. 
Sir Bindon Blood, on hearing what had happened, ordered anotlier 
squadron of the 11th Lancers a t  Nawagai to join General Jeffreys, 
seeing that the cavalry already in the Watelai Valley had been used 
against the Mamunds to such good purpose. 
The Mamunds and Salarzai were plainly in a sullen temper, but  
whether they wouJd be able t o  gather in any great strength seemed 
doubtful, as  the Bajour clans as a whole had not m. '1 cl e common cause 
with them. I n  oyder, however, to  be prepared for possibIe compli- 
cations, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, which 
since its return from subjugating the Swat Valley had been awaiting 
developments, was moved from Sarai t o  the Panjkora River, a depGL; 
being established a t  Sado on the  river bank. 
On Thursday, September 16th, General Jeffreys' Brigade fought the 
important and in some respects memorable action of the  Mamund Val- 
ley, which b e g w  a t  7-30 in the morning, continued throughout the day, 
and did not finally cease till after midnight. In this severe engage- 
ment nine OEcers, including t h e  Bripdier  himself, and 140 men were 
either killed or wounded. This was the greatest loss that had occurred 
in froaLier wafiare in a single day since the Ambela Campaign. The 
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f a c h  aye tllesc : After t l ~ e  uight attack onGcllera1 JefrreYs' chrljp on the 
14th September. the brigade lnoved f ~ o m  Inayat Kili to the head of the 
Watelai Valley, t o  punish the Mamunds by burning severalof tllcir vil- 
lages near a t  hand. To expedite Lhe work of destruction Gcneral 
Jeffreys divided his attwlting force into three columns, each of wlliclt 
was to  operate independently of the other two. The right column unllerq 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian consisted of the 38th Dogras, a section 
of Sappers and two guns. Tlie centre colunln under Colonel P. H. 
Goldley co~lsisted of one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, four guns, the 
35th Siltlls and the Bugs. The left column ~znder Major F. Canlpbell 
illcluded the Guides and was instructed to operate in the neighboudlood 
of the camp. A t  7-30 the cavalry with the centre column came in con- 
tact with tlie enerny, and firing began. The tribesmen rctired slowly, 
taking advantage of cover, alad slzooting accurately. Five companies of 
the 35th Sikhs belonging to the same column now arrived and cleared 
the enerny from the hillside, reaching a village, which they partially 
burned, Che tribesmen ascending the hills. A t  12 o'clock only a few 
snipers were visible, and tlie retirement of the colurun was ordered. As 
soon a s  this had begun, large numbers of the enemy appesred showing 
great couriqe, and being armed generally with Martinis they pressed the 
retreat severely. The p o u n d  favoured the tribesmen, who succeeded iu  
out-flanking the 35th Sikhs. Their swordsmen and snipers frequently 
csnle to  within 40 yards, and the Caficers had to use their revolvers freely. 
Tliere was also stone-throwing. The rear conlpany was encumbered 
with the wounded. Here Lieutenant Heplles was killed and Lieutenant 
Cassels wounded. The enerny showed the greatest daring, and firing 
was maintained at under 100 yards for 15 minutes. As soon as the 
ground adn~itted, the charge was sounded, and the men responded well. 
Fixing bayonets they drove the tribesmen back up the hills. Some of 
the Buffs forming part of the same column under Lieutenant J. Hasler 
came up, and the enemy in retiring across the open suffered considerable 
lossfrom their fire. Allthis fighting was confined to Colonel Goldney's 
column. Colonel Vivian l a d  found the villages alIotted to him too 
strongly held to be attacked by so small a force and had returned to 
ca,np. Major Campbell's colunln had also avoided an action for the 
same reason, 2nd after destroying some small hamlets had retired. 
As soon as the enemy's resistance to Colonel Goldney's column 
was found to be vigorous, orders had been sent to the two other 
columns to concentsdte, and reinforcements were ordered fro111 the 
camp. Brigadier-General Jef&eys, who now arrived fronl the camp,  
ordered the Buffs again to occupy the village, to complete its destruction9 
and recover the bodies of the killed. Covered by the fire of the eth 
Bengal Mountain Battery, the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs re-occupied the  
hill again, the tribesmen retiring and inflicting slight loss by  sniping. At 
2-30 the village was completely destroyed, and the force began nlarching 
back to camp again. The enemy once more attacked the columns, a n d  
the Buffs and Guides covered the retirement with great steadiness, b u t  
still the enemy, displaying a standard, advanced recklessly, and t h o u g h  
suffering severe loss from carefully-aimed volleys, followed the troops to 
the camp, frequently firing a t  close range. Night had now come on, a n d  
the darkness was intensified by rain, but vivid lightning. enabled t h e  
enemy to continue firing a t  the marching columns. The steadiness a n d l  
endurance of the troops were admirable, and the camp was reached by 
the main body of the troops in perfect order a t  8 o'clock. 
Meanwhile, in addition to the main attnck, the hills to the r i g h t  of 
the enemy's position h i d  been crowned by one strong company of t h e  
35th Silrhs under Captain Ryder. This company was a t  5 o'clock a t t a c k e d  
by large numbers of Mz~munds, and desperate fighting ensued. It was 
here that Captain Eyder and Lieutenant Gunning were wounded. To 
extricate these troops two conlpanies of the Guides were detached f r o m  
the main body, and in spite of severe fighting, darkness and rain, t h e y  
were relieved and reached the  canlp safely. Their losses were, however, 
severe. 
I n  the darkness and the pelting rain, which made i t  impossible a t  
times for one company to hear or see anything of its nearest neighbour, 
four guns of hro. 8 Mountain Battery and a half comparly of Sappers  
who had been covering the Guides's retreat found themselves separa ted  
from the main body, together with a few men of the Buffs. Brigadier- 
General Jeffreys, himself belated, and literally in the dark as to  the  exact 
whereabouts of the remainder of his brigade, joined these stragglers and 
assumed command. On reaching the village of Thana he decided to give 
up the idea of reaching camp that night, and halted the force, and they  
took up a n  entrenched position. The enemy, however, occupied half the 
village, and severe fighting a t  close quarters ensued. The guns fired 
case-shot through the walls, and eventually the enemy were expelled 
with the bayonet. Here Lieutenants Wynter and Watson were 
wounded, and the Brigadier himself had his head cut open by a fragment 
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of rock. Captain Birch, R.A., had his left side cut by a bullet, and 
other Officers had bullets through their helmets. As soon as nloonlight 
allowed, the cavalry, the 38th Uogras, and four companies of the 35th 
Sikhs proceeded from the camp and relieved the place. Our casualties 
for the day were :-British Officers-killed : Lieutenant V. Hughes, 35th 
Sikhs, and Lieutenant A. T. Crawford, Royal Artillery. Woundrd: 
Lieutenant G. R. Cassels and Lieutenant 0. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs ; 
Captain W. I. Rydw, 1st Gurkhas (attached to the 35th Silths) ; Lieute- 
nant F. A. Wynter, Royal Artillery ; Lieutenant T. C. Watson, Royal 
Engineers. 8light ly  wounded : Brigadier-General Jeffreys and Captain 
A. H. C. Birch, Royal Artillery. British soldiers-killed, 2 ;:danqeruusly 
wounded, 1 ; severely wouwded, 3 ; slightly zuounded, 6 ; (all of the Buffs). 
Native soldiers-No. 8 Mountain Battery-kzlled, 6 : zuuunded, 92. 
Guides-kzlled, 2 ; wounded, 1 Subadar, 2 Havildars, and 7 men. 35th 
Sikhs-kilkd, 22 ; mounded, 44. 11th Bengal Lancers-zoounded, 2. Sap- 
pers and Miners-lcrlled, 4 ; mounded, 16. 
Another account of this action, which gave rise to much criticism, 
was published some time later. The followiilg extract from it is worth 
adding :- 
"The idea of the punitive operations in the early morning was it let 
loose nearly the whole brigade in the valley, to punish every village of 
importance i n  a single day, and then march back again t o  Inayat Eili. 
The brigade was already due in the Mohmand country to co-operate with 
General Elles's Division : its Commander and the troops composing i t  
had the further prospect of Tirah before them ; and there was every 
inducement therefore to polish off ' quickly the Manlunds who had been 
%old enough to fire into the camp below the Rambat Pass. To each 
Commandant was allotted a village, or group of villages, and he  was 
directed to deal with i t  independently. Thus the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs, 
the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry, each six companies strong, 
moved off to acconlplish their respective tasks : a detachment of the 
11th Bengal Lancers, the Mountain guns and the Sappers being held 
ready for emergenzies in case of any particularly strong opposition. 
The 38th Dogras on the right found the village of Damodolah far  
too strong t o  attack without artillery, and Colonel Vivian very 
sensibly returned to camp, instead of knocking the heads of his 
.men against mud walls. On the left the Guides were successful in 
sweeping through some small hamlets, but hild they pushed on to Agrah 
and Gat, theywould probably have had to withdraw, as the 38th Dugras 
had clone. Fur t l~cr  up t11c valley the BufEs liad lIisposed of one vill<<~;t. 
ztisu. I t  \\'is in the centre tlrxt 111ntters ~vellt wrong. Tlle 33tll  Silills 
puslwd on well into tltc hills at the far end of the valley, and as tile fur- 
t l ~ e r  tristake was ~uacte of splitting t11r six c o r ~ ~ ~ a i i i e s  nto three parties, 
the 3I~inn1lds yaw their cIi;tnce and got to close quarters. T h r e e  conl- 
ptnies which Ilad begun tu burn the \illage of Sllalri Tangi w e r e  forced 
back, and the? had to abanclou tlie body of Lieutenant Hughes, w h o  l ~ u d  
been killed. Word was seut b;tck for the Buffs and Guides t o  come up 
with all speed, and chr 1 Itlil Ezng;tl Lancers lutacle a cllarge wl~icll, though 
i t  could riot be driven llonle owing to broken ground, prevented t h e  Siklls 
from bri11g su~rlrurkded. ITiien the reinforcenlents arrived the Maillu~lds 
were driven b.~ek, and Lieutenant Huylles's body was recoserecl. Tlleri 
canre a long h:tlt of sowe three llours, which enabled tlie enenly t o  col- 
l w t i n  full stlength ; and when the retireiucnt was eventudlly ordered, 
the trqibtisnlnn pttrsrled their usual tactics with considerable success. 
TWLI C I J I U I J ~ I ~ ~ ~ S  of Sikhs, Iiuiding a hill over 9,000 feet high, w e r e  lef t  to 
fight their I V : L ~  dltwn :tlorie : an order, i t  is said, was sent t o  therrt to 
retire, but i t  never reached Ct~ptain 32vder. There mas some desperate 
fighting, aud the Gtiiiles 1nf:~ntly l i d  to double back to save t h e  Siklls 
\vho were attacked b j  o\-eru.llrluling r~unlbcrs. I t  was here that  t h e  hetlvy 
losses vcsurl.ed. The ~~ctrrement don-rl the Watelai Valley was weary 
wotk fur t l ~ e  troups, fur CL t lu~nderstorn~ G C L I D ~  on, and as the enerlly closed 
in, i t  bec~~lie  p i t ~ i ~  dark. Tile guns, nit11 ,L half conip~ny of S ~ ~ p p e r s  and 
15 nieii of the Uutf;, gut separated f l o ~ n  tlle~r escort of four. companies of 
the Siklls, and in tile tLick dar1;ness General Jeffrrys f u u ~ ~ d  I~imself belaL- 
rd with this srurrll party. Tile valley is intersected with raviiies, and 
niarching a t  night was no easy matter, as the Guides, wlio fo rmed the 
rear-guilrd, dibcorered. The General erentually decided to t a k e  up a 
position under the walls of a. *illage, aud here for four or. 6ve h o u r s  the 
linndful of British soldiers, gunnels, .and Snppers had to defend tllerll- 
selves i~,gainst he enemy a t  very close quarters indeed. There were no 
means of sending off to camp for assistance, and it was not u n t i l  the 
moon rose that the party were extricated, abdut a n  hour after iuidniqhb. 
The details of the fight under the village walls go to  show t h a t  Oficers 
and men behaved with the finest courage. Lieutenant Wynter f o ~ l g l i t  llis 
guns after he was mounded, until through faintness from loss of blood 1le 
could no longer give orders. Then a sepoy took him in his amrs ,  alld 
for hours shielding lliln with his own body against the fil.e. 
It was an heroic action, and the sepoy was severely wounded, while  thus 
protecting hi8 Officer. Another man coolly beat out with his coat tile 
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t l~e  
bundles of burninji straw ml~icll the Mamnnds threw fronl t l ~ e  h o ~ ~ s e -  
tops to light np the ground and enable ?hem to aim. The morlr was 
perilous in the extreme, but the sepoy went allout it  caIn11~-, and re- 
peatedly extinguished the flaming straw. A Sapper was sent out into 
the open to watch a door in  the walls from which i t  was feared the 
enemy might rush : his figure was outlined clearly ~vit11 every flash of 
lightning and he was repeatedly shot at,  but he stuck to his post, c;1lling 
out from time to time to show thilt all was well. Again, hfajor 
Worlledge, with the relief party from the camp, finding that he could not 
reach the spot whence the noise of firing came, sent out a sowar to open 
communication with General Jerreys. Tllis man passed safely througlI 
the tribesmen who were on the move across the valley, reached the vil- 
lase, only to qet a volley from his own friends, delivered his message 
ancl carried back another to Major Worlledge. Other instances of de- 
votion and gallantry could be given, but enough has heen said to show 
that, as at M;~icar, the Malalakalld, Chakdara, and tlre Sarnana* our troops 
acquitted themselves in splendid fashion." 
General Jeffreys in his oficial despatch afterwards repsrted several 
C o l l ~ p i ~ L l ~ ~ s  acts of gallantry during the fighbing on the 16th September, 
and amongst them, as most remarkable, the hehaviour of tlie Guides 
under Major Campbell, Captain Hodson and Lieutenant Codrington 
when they relieved the company of the 35th Sikhs which had got 
isolated, a t  wllich time llavildtlr Ali Cful of the Guides perticularly 
distinguished himself. Captain Ryder and Lieuteuant Gunning with the 
relieved company of tlie 35th Sikhs and Captain Cole mith one squadron 
of the 11th Bengal Lancers did valuable service. Other Officers specially 
mentioned were Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, and Captain 
F. Duncan, 23rd Pioneers (distinguished himself .ivhen Lieutenant 
Huglies was killed), Captain Birch, Z.A., and the men of No. 8 Bengal 
Mountain Battery, Lieutenant Watson, R.E. (wounded three times), 
Lieutenant J. M. C. Colvin of the Sappers, and Major Hamilton, 
D.A.A.-G. 
I n  subsequently reporting the Mamund V a l l g  action t o  Bsmy 
Head-Quarters, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, to whom General 
Jeffreys had reported events, entered into a full and detailed exarnina- 
tion of all the facts. As this day's fighting has been much discussed 
and in some quarters severely criticised, we give in an appendix virtually 
* Not yet related. 
tlie wl~ole of Sir Eindon Blood% deepitches, these being the 0111~ ofFicial 
data :~vailable from which an opinion as to the tactics of the day can 
fairly be formed. 
All was quiet in the camp a t  Inaj*at Kili on the night of the 17th 
Septe~nber. At  six the foilowing morning, the available strength of the 
2nd Brigitde moved to attack the fortified village of Damodolah. The 
tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers, and firing began a t  8-45. 
The 35th Sikhs crowned the spurs to the right of the village, and the 
38th Dogras and the Battery occupied poaitions on the left, the  Guides 
Infantry in the centre, and tlle Buffs in reserve. The village was 
carried and conlpletely deutroped. The retirement was brilliantly exe- 
cuted by the Guides, and the enemy had no chance of rushing. The 
BnEs corered the homeward march of the brigade, inflicting loss oil the 
tribesmen, m-ho pursued. ;\luch grain mas captured. The casualties 
were :-35th Sikhs-killed, 1; 7uoundeol, 8. 38th Dogras-killed, 1; zoound- 
ed, 2. Guides-tcounded, 1, Firing ceased a t  3-30. 
Sunday, the 19th of September, was free from fighting, bu t  some 
further punitive work was carried out, owing to the fact that  the 
~Iamuncls, who had by this time sent in their jirpahs, neverthe- 
less refused to coniply with the terms in~posed by  General Jeffreys. 
This clan, which nurubers only about 1,500 figh Ling men, was show- 
ing much determination, and though now suing for mercy, still 
refused to surrender its own rifles and those captured in the 
attack on September 16th. I t  mas desirable, therefore, to  demol- 
ish the fortifications of the villages in the centre of the Malziund 
'L'alley, and on the nlorning in cluestion the force rnoved out against the 
village of Zagadirai, four or five miles from Inayat Kili, and destroyed 
it. No opposition was encountered, and later in the day jirgohs began 
to come in again. These jirgnhs were informed by General JeRreys that 
no propomls would be entertained unless their arms were surrendered. 
One day's grace was given to allow of this being made l~nown. Much 
indignation was excited in the force by the news that the tribesmen 
had disinterred the bodies of the &Iahomedan native soldiers killed 
in  the recent fighting and had insulted their remains. 
The following day (September 20th) Sir Bindon Blood, who had 
been kept well informed of events by means of the heliograph, was able 
to report from Nawagai to Army Head-Quarters that he had not found 
i t  necessary to reinforce General Jeffreys' Brigade, which had proved 
itself quite equal to deali 
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itself quite equal to dealing with the Mamunds, "in fact (he telegraphed), 
since Thursday night when the tribesmen inflicted such heavy losses 
upon the brigade, the operations in the Mamund Valley seem to have 
been completely successful!' 
Successful they had undoubtedly been, but hostilities were farfrola 
being over. A t  the very time when Sir Bindon BIood a t  Nawagai was 
telegraphing that the end of the fighting in the Watelai Valley was now in 
view, General Jeffreys' Brigade was obliged to nlarch out to  attack the 
fortified village of Zagai (once owned by Umra Khan). Sharp fighting 
ensued, chiefly with the Buffs on the right, and severe loss was inflicted 
upon the tribesmen.' The village was taken and the retirement cleverly 
executed. Firing began at  8-50 A.M. and ceased a t  12-30. A re- 
connaissance by a squadron of the 11th Bengi~l Lancers had revealed th: 
fact that the village was strongly held. The Buffs were on the right, 
the  38th Dogras in the centre, the Guides Infantry on the left., and the 
35th Sikhs in  reserve. Firing began on the left a t  8-50, and the guns 
came into action near the centre about 9-15. The Buffs, who had fur- 
ther  to go, were engaged about 9-20. The enemy as usual retired, snip- 
ing ; the village was occupied, and all the fortifications were destroyed. 
A t  11 A.M. the retirement began, and immediately afterwards 
the tribesmen gathered on the flanks. On the left, the Guides 
Infantry were threatened by about 600 tribesmen displaying standards. 
These were dispersed by long range fire. On the right, the Buffs retired 
with admirable discipline, in spite of very sharp iire. Excellent prac- 
tice was made with the Lee-Metfords ; Lieutenant F. S. Reeves's section 
killed five men a t  one valley. The Dum-Durn bullet was most effective. 
Lieutenant R. E. Power was slightly wounded in the right arm, but 
after the wound was dressed he returned to his company. Lieutenant 
Keen was shot through the left arm and in the body. After the Buffs 
were clear of difficult ground, the line of the regiment lay across the 
open fields, and the enemy from cover fired with effect, several men be- 
ing wounded. Firing ceased when the troops got clear, as the enemy 
did not dare to follow into the open. On the extrenle left, considerable 
numbers of the enemy appeared. Captain E. H. Cole's squadron trotted 
forward, causing the tribesmen, ever in  terror of cavalry, to bunch 
together. The Battery immediately exploded two shells with great 
effect, and this ended the acbion. The brunt of the fighting fell to the 
Buffs. The casualties were : two Officers wounded (Second-Lieutenant 
G, N, 8, Keene, Unattached List, and Lieutenant R. E. Power of the 
Buffs) ; British soldiers-wounded : Buffs, 9 ; 9;ative troops-38th Dog- 
ribs, 2. Total casualties, 13, . . 
On the night of the 2lst September, firing into camp took place, 
and several animals and one native orderly were wounded, and on the 
22nd the important village of Dag was captured-together with great 1  
stores of g r a i n w i t h  the loss of one hilled and two wounded. 
'> 
~ 
,WHILE General Jt 
In the 2nd Brigade alone the losses of a sinlgle week anlounted to deal with the aggi 
24 British Ofiicers and 153 men, besides nearly 150 transport a~liruals, 
R . Mohmands was st( cavalry horses, and OEcers' ponies. But General J e f f r e ~ s  had now and the Mohmar 
demonstrated the ability of his troops, vhen not divided iuto a number 
their subnlission 
of weak parties, to  sweep the valley from end to end. The Badda Rlulla 
General Jeffreys and his Brigade may now be left, settling accounts 
with the Mamunds, while the movements of General Wodehouse's 
Brigade with Sir Bindon Blood at Nawagai are brouglltu up to date. 
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CHAPTER Y. 
WITH GENERAL WODEAOUSE'S BRICtdDZ: 
,WHILE General J e f f r e ~ s  was countermarching his Brigade in order to 
deal with the aggressive Mamunds and Salarzai, the punishment of the 
Mohmands was steadily proceeding. Sir Bindon Blood was at  Nawagai, 
and the Mohmand tribes to the south of this position had tendered 
their submission and agreed to surrender the arms demanded of them. 
The Hadda Dcullah, however, was reported to have assembled a large 
gathering on $he Bedmanai Pass, twelve miles from Nawagai, and it  
became evident after the arrival of this news that Sir Bindon Blood's 
position was by  no means an easy one and might in certain contin- 
gencies become even critical. General Elles was still a t  or close to 
Shabkadr and could not therefore be looked to for prompt help, should 
help be required. The IFadda Mullah, with a large gathering, occupied a 
strong position in  the Bedmanai Pass. The Mamund and Salarzai tracts 
were either in a blaze or a t  the combustion point. Between these two 
hostile forces lay Nawagai. The Khan, a man of great influence in 
those pa&., might, by throwing his influence against the British have 
seriously increased the difkulties of the campaign. The pass of 
Nawagai would have been closed, and General Elles, arriving with 
his Brigade from Shabkadr, would have had to stand on the defen- 
sive or even to fall back without attacking the Mohmands a t  all. 
I t  is i n  fact easy to realise how serious the effects of such a develop- 
ment might have been. 
Bold measures were necessary. Sir Bindon Blood decided to 
remain a t  Nawagai, to  keep the Khan loyal and the pass clear at all 
costs. This action kept the tribesmen in two sections-the Mohmand 
on one side andthe Mamunds on the other. I t  also paralysed the Khan, 
supposing his friendship were weak, though subsequent events proved 
his loyalty to be sincere. It maintained the communications. But it 
was not unattended with difficulty and danger. 
. Sir Bindon Blood considered himself strong enough to holdhis posi- 
tion in  spite of any attack that might be made, and he judged rightly. 
_On Friclay, September 17th, between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, 
some 800 tribesmen were seen aesr the n~outli of the Eedmanai Pass. 
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The greater part of General Wodellouse's Briqade turned out, but the 
enemy re~nained among the rarines and only the cavalry could get near 
them. A few rounds were fired by dismounted men, and the Mountain 
Battery fired some shells. The force returned to camp i n  the evening. 
Evidently the Hadda Mullah was feeling his way. 
A t  midnight, September 19th-20th, the Hadda Slullah, venturing out  
from his rarines, made a half-hearted attack upon General Blood's camp. 
Some 150 of the enemy, chiefly swordsmen, were in  the first line, a n d  
about 1,000 in the second line. The first line crept up  unperceived t o  
~vitllin about 30 or 40 yards of the parapet held by the Queen's Regiment, 
and began firing, but being met by steady volleys, dispersed in a few 
minutes, after t r j ing other faces of the eamp in a half-hearted way. 
The tribesmen then turned their attention with much shouting to t h e  
picket held by the Khan of Nawagai7s nlen on the low hills a mile t o  
the west. After half-an-hour's sniping a t  this picket they made off. 
Our casualties were one man of the Queen's Regiment killed and one 
wound~d.  The enemy left no dead or wounded on the ground. 
On the following night (September 20th-21st) another attack was 
made in force, the Hadda Mullah having been joined by the Saffi Mullahs 
and a contingent of Shin~varis from Afghan territory. The total strength 
was estimated a t  3,000. Tactically the assault showed considerable skill, 
regular rushes being made, covered by rifle fire. It began abouh 
9 P.M. and firing continued till 1 P.M. Constant charges were made from 
all directions more or less simultaneously. The troops on their par t  
behaved with the utmost steadiness, and the fire discipline was perfect. 
The safety of the camp was never for. a moment in doubt, though some 
of the tribesmen must have advanced to within ten yards of the parapet, 
as their bodies were afterwards found a t  that distance. The enemy must  
have suffered heavily, as they came under a cross-fire, and our men could 
see them plainly as they stood up. No. 1 British Mountain Battery fired 
four star shells very successfully. General Blood had been warned a t 8  P.M. 
by the Political Officer that the attack was intended, so everything was  
ready when the  enemy appeared. The Mountain Battery was of t h e  
greatest value, firing shrapnel as well as star shells. The casualties 
were :-In the British ranks, one man killed and four wounded ; in  t h e  
Native ranks, fourteen wounded, most of these slightly. Brigadier- 
General Wodehouse was shot through the leg. Some horses and mules 
were shot. The enemy had breech-loading rifles, some of which were 
Lee-Metfords, as  the bullets picked up  in the eamp showed. 
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General Blood illoved out the troops next morning to find the enemy, 
but they had disappeared. H e  tl~ereupon inarclied without fllrther delay 
right on to  Lokerai, where he knew, from heliographic signals, that he 
should nieet General Elles, who had successfully carried out on his side 
the advance from Shabkadr. 
On the night of the 21st September, after tlie meeting between Sir 
Bindon Blood and General Elles, there was considerable picket firing a t  
individual tribesmen who endeavoured to approach the camp, also some 
sniping on the part of the enemy. Three star shells were fired. On the 
morning of the 22nd September the village of Das, west of Agrah, was 
attacked. The tribesmen, as usual, after the destruction of the village, 
followed and harassed the returning troops, and tlie following casualties 
occurred :-Guides Infantry-killed, I ; dang~~ously wounded, 1 ; 35th 
And now to trace briefly the less exciting movements of Major- 
General Elles's Division up to the time of his meeting Sir Bindon Blood's 
tack Was troops a t  Lokerai. 
, ~ u l l e l l s  
General Elles with his two Brigades under Brigadier-Generals sf;ren8th 
Westmacott and Macgregor marched out from Shablradr, as has been lble skill, 
, abou+J stated, early on the 15th September. Five miles out, the 20th Punjab 
Infantry, forming the advance-guard, were fired on. The Ellorappa defile 
ade from 
,was found impassable for camels, ana the General sent back orders for the leir part 
perfect- 2nd Brigade to  haltand camp, and left the 5th Company Bengal Sappers 
gh some and the 28th Rombay Pioneers to improve the road. The six miles of 
parapet, very bad road were turned into one passable for camels by the evening 
my must of the 18th September, a very creditable piece of work for both Sappers 
e n  cor~ld -and Pioneers, and General EIles continued his marched with a proportion 
e1.y tired of mule transport on September 
15th to Galanai, 16 miles from 
1 a t 8  P.M. Xhabkadr. 
ling was On September 17th, news of General Jeffreys' fight a t  Rambat 
f of the arrived. General Westrnacott and the 1st ~ r igade ,  with the 20th 
tsUalties PunjabInfantry, No. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, and two 
; in the squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, moved on six miles to Esuj Khel, 
igadie,, t l~ ree  miles south of the Nahaki Pass. Plenty of forage was fou~ld in 
mules the valley between the top of Khorappa Jangi and Nahaki, but little 
were supplies for the troops. Helio conlmunication was established a t  
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Tb e Lower Mohluands, or IIalimzais in the valley between Rhorappa I 
and Naha%i, accepted General Elles's terms, i.~., Rs.500, 300 jezai ls  and I 
2,500 maunds of grain ; all breach-loading rifles to be given up, and free I 
forage to be provided for the force while in the district for seven days I 
commencing September 19th. The 13th Bengal Lancers, after a recon- I 
naissance towards Lokerai, reported very barren country beyond Nahaki 
with very little water. General Macgregor with the Oxford Light 
Infantry, the Patiala Regiment, and the Bombay Mountain Battery 
marched from Dand to Galani on September 19th. 
The Saffi Mullah with 2,000 men was reported to  be a t  Kung, 9 
miles from Nahaki, and Major F. G. Atkinson with 100 men of the l a th  
Bengal Lancers, was sent to investigate the truth of the report. The 
Lancers were fired on from two sides, but they advanced in line, and the 
villagers fled. The Lancers held the village, and soon some villagers 
returned and spoke to Major Atkinson. H e  found two Sikh bunnias, On the ~ o r u j  
who said they had bought up all  the grain to sell to the flirkar. and, after sonle of 
Ibfantry, with 2 
On the 21st September General Elles with General Westmacott selves in clearing1 
arrived a t  Lokerai and met General Blood as already stated. General expgctati~n, provl 
Macgregor had been left behind with two and a half battalions and two faced Geneml 
guns to hold a Nahaki Pass, which dominates the whole Mohmand attack at  6-30 hi 
and the Maxim t2 
I but the Maxi111 
Having seen the  completion of the first pa r t  of the plan of cam- ~nfantry moved f 
I 
paign Sir Bindon Blood left General Elles on September 23rd and rode driven back UII' 
down to Innyat Kili to  see how the operations a g i n s t  the Mamunds the Pass. Generl 
were progressing. E e  had previously made over General Wodehouse's General Westma 
Brigade to General Elles, who united it with General Westmacott's it was not actui~I 
Brigade for the purpose of making what was intended to be a n  over- and four wound 
whelming descent upon the Hadda Mullah's gathering reported to be excellent prxctic 
still holding the Bedmanai Pass. Unfortunately General Wodehouse ance of the i19s1 
himself was not able to continue in command of his brigade being General Gmveti 
obliged, owing to the wound i n  his leg, to proceed by sick convoy to 
I macott's Xrigac. 
I 
India. This was hard luck on a brave Officer, as much fighting had and towers werl 
yet to take place. Colonel B. C. Graves of the 39th Garhwalis was given T h i ~  emy v 
the command of the 3rd Brigade of the Malakand Field Force, with tlie previous wfi 
the t e n ~ p o l a ~ y  rank of Brigadier-General, and hereafter in the narrative Blood's camp a1 
of the Mohnland Campaign the brigade which has been known all along and frtiled, micl 
% General Wodehouse's Brigade will be styled General Graves's Brigade. very little 111: 
i 
t 
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CHAPTER VI. 
ON September 2912d, the  day before Sir Bindon 131ood left Nawagai to 
join Brigadier-General Jeffreys in the Mamund countl-J, General ElleM 
concentrated General Graves's Brigade and General Westmncott7s .Ekigade 
at  Kuz Chinarai, his camp being four miles north of the Bedn~nnai Pass, 
held by the Hadda Rltullah and his supporters. The Mullal~ l~ad  outposts 
a t  the foot of the Pass, and our cavalry were Gred upon when reconnoi- 
tring the position. Little parties of the enernywere also apparently proml. 
ing about the camp, as two followers were cut up and two wounded. 
On the morning of the 24th September, the troops moved forward 
and, after some opposition, carried the Bedmanai Pass. The got11 Punjab 
Infantry, with Maxim detachments, particularly distinguished them- 
selves in  clearing the heights. The capture of the Pass, contrary to all 
expectation, proved easy uf accon~plishment, as only 500 of the enemy 
faced Genera1 westmacott's Brigade, when it  moved formard to the 
attack a t  6-30 A.M. As to the actual assault, the 20th Punjab Infantry 
and the Maxim gun detachments led, and were opposed on every ridge, 
but the Maxim fire and the spirited manner in which the 20th Punjab 
Infantry moved forward were too much for the tribesmen. They were 
driven back until a t  last our troops crowned the peak 2,500 feet above 
the Pass. General Graves's Brigade was meanwhile moving in support of 
General Westmacott's up the centre, and guarding the right flank ; but 
i t  was not actually engaged. Our casualties were only one sepoy killed 
and four wounded. No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, made 
excellent practice. The hills are most precipitous, making the pelbform- 
ance of the infantry more creditable than would at first sight appear. 
General Graves's Brigade returned to E u z  Chinarai, General West- 
macott's Brigade holding the villages round Bedmanai. Several forts 
and towers were destroyed. 
This easy victory over the Badda Mullah's forces was at t r ihted to 
the previous want of success on their part in the night attack on Geueral 
Blood's camp already described. They had made their real effort then, 
and failed, and when General Elles7s two Brigtdes faced them tlle!. 1l:td 
very little heart for further fighting. The contiugeut of hfglrdn 
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tribesmen also, who had been expected to help, no doubt considered 
a wing of the 28t 
it  more advisable to retire across the frontier while their line of retreat 
sappers and  the I 
was still open. 
four squadrons of 
General Elles determined to advance from the Eedmanai Pass on t o  Kung, started to  d 
the much-talked-of Jnrobi, where the Hadda Mullah had his head- sort of amphithe 
quarters, uncertain whether that fanatical leader would be able to rally of the Gurkhtls wa 
his men for another stand. The Afghan border is only a mile away, ;Iround, which we 
and once beyond this the Mullah and his followers would be safe, f o r  brought into actio 
British troops cannot cross the Durand line. of Gurkhas on the 
by the guns and 3 
I t  is of no great i~nportance to describe in detail how General Elles 
job, but s n l a r t l ~  C 
advanced from Beclmanai through the Eohai Valley breaking into t h e  
tile forts and tov innermost seclusion of this hidden country, and sweeping away in the  
i was most delibera general destruction the very nest and hiding-place of the Hadda Mullah. 
As i t  turned out, the only spot bearing the name of Jarobi was a small and the Oxfords. I i. Enapp, commandi glen, very picturesque to look a t  but quite devoid of mystery and signi- 
I k Tile Khwazai j l rg  ,ficance. As for the often-mentioned " head-quarter buildings " of the  
I so their forts and Hadda Mullah, these were found to consist of nothing more than a few 
1 
wretched mud huts. The troops had to pass through a difficult defile, 
j . way back, were sp 
but no real opposition mas offered to their march. They, however, were - k the Mohmands, w I 5 their breech-10ade 
fired a t  repeatedly by small parties of tribesmen, and some thirteen o r  
fourteen casualties occurred during the advance. They returned t o  
I . 1 There was no 
1 Bedmanai, having satisfactorily punished the various villages visited. L Utmaneai and R 
!i The plan of operations had been admirably conceived and carried out. E were t c  1 General Elles moved his force i n  two culumns parallel with each other, I Boniersets, with 
4 sweeping the valley, thoroughly destroying all the forts, and punishing General Elles fro1 
i 
villages which declined to submit. Such opposition as was offered was at Peuhawar. 
B easily broken a w n ,  and General Westmacott's Brigade pushed quite so~clier ii.r~d llad 81 
close up to the Durand boundary line. At  Manzari Chena our troops evcrTthi~\g irk t 
were a t  the foot of the Sibala Pass, over*which a road leads to Jellala- wl~st was goillg 0 
 bad. They skirted the range of hills which forms the boundary of Tile Pat i t~la  ltcg 
Afghanistan in this direction, and worked southwsrd, punishing the  (il.aveu ill ~ l ~ i ~ s t i s  
Khoda Khels, who would not accept the terms offered them. These V, ill1 tlie enculy. 
operations must have convinced the Baizai, who had been hostile all  
through, that  the force opposed to them was too strong to be faceit The nlilibr; 
Their neighbours in the east, the Khwazai, submitted. 
rvah I I ~ W  over, 
With regard to the punishmelit of Khoda Ehels just n~entioned, a tiel~,watu c u l i l l l ~ n ~  
few details may be given, as these villagers alone of all the otllers offered Leyirining of 0c: 
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I &fed No, Mountain Battery, the 20th Punjab Infalltry, 1st GurklIas, 
( b  p a t  
i3 
a willg of the  58th 130mbay Pioneers, half of No. 6 Conlpany Bengal 
L& Sa~J?ers and the Devons' Maxim, joined by the Oxfords, who witll 
I g t o  
four squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers liad marched from ~ ~ l ~ ~ k i  to 
4 '&ad- Kung, started to dest,l'og. the forts and towers of the Khoda Khels, all in 
1 F 11 a sort of amphitheatre about two miles from camp. The advance-gl;ard 
grt of the Gurkhas was met with a heavy fire from the villages and heights b day, around, which were held for nearly a mile. The guns were immediately 
I @  f o r  
L#@' 
brought into action and soon cleared the villages, while four companies 
of Gurlrhas on the left crowned the heights, their advance being covered 
I #les by the guns and Maxims. This cron-ning of the heights was a dilticult 
k the job, but s n l a r t l ~  done. Meauwhile the Sapper3 thorougl~ly distroyed 
I C 4  &he tlie forts and towers, and when this was completed the retirement 
1 j 7 p h .  was most deliberately carried out, covered by the guns and Maxims 
$>dl and the Oxfords. The casualties were : five Gurkhas wounded, Captain 
1 eigni- Knapp, commanding the guns, had his horse bit on coining into action. 
log t h e  The Khwazai j frgah canle in to General CVestmacott during the fight 
1 a Few so their forts and towers, which were to have been destroyed on the 
1 defile,  xvizy back, were spared. The Khorla Khels were the best armed clan of 
L &ere the Mol~mands, which no doubt explains why they refused to surrender 
7 
l e 0  Or their breech-loaders. 
,,a t o  There was now no prospect of further fighting, as the Dawazai, 
,isited. 
Utuianzai and Khwazai had all made submission ; and the troops 
d o u t .  were permitted to enjoy a well-eirned rest. On September 28th, the 
~ t b e r ,  
Sonkersets, with the Maharaja of Patiala (who had accompanied 
( ishing 
General Elles from Shabkadr) returned to the Divisional Head-Quarters 
3d was a t  Pesha\var. His Highness liad been heated all along like any other 
1 q u i t e  soldier and had sharecl all the hardships of service. H e  had faced 
troops 
in a true nlilitary spirlt, taking the greatest interest in 
ellala- 
what was going oa and showing the real Sikh lceerl~less to see fighting. 
ary of The Patlala lleginlent, i t  ruay be added, was used uuder General 
=g t h e  
(:raves in cllsstisiug the N ~ t t a i  and Sara Valley, and can~rt into contact 
These 
wiL1i the ei*elr>y. 
i I e  a l l  
face& 
The nlilitnry part of this short but very successfu1 expedition 
V J ~ S  now over, and the troops under General Ellev moved back in 
lea, a separutc columns to Perihawar, e ~ c h  fo~ce taking its own route- BY 
b~~~ beginning of Oclober tlle nfvl~n~and eupeclition could fairly be Yoken 
of of as an w e n t  of the past 
The cfrect of these short but conlpletely successflll operations 
hxd heen very great. The utter rout and ~recipitate flight of the Hadda 
5IulI:~h Iind made a deep inlpression on the tribes, who were paying 
111) fines and surrenderin,rr arms in all directions. The campaign, con- 
cirictcd in ctn unexplored and mountainous councry, with very bad loads, 
over ditiicult passes, and with a great scarcity of water-the enemy 
l~ihving breached tlie tanks, which are the chief sources of supply-had 
been virtually conrpleted within a little more than three weeks of cross- 
ing the frr,lltier*. The rapid advance and attack on the Bedmanai Pass 
orle ~ I L V  IK'fure it  ~ ~ i ' n s  expected, and a t  the moment when everything led 
the etieruy to anticipate an attack on Mittai, and the subsequent sudden 
appearance uf C4enen~1 Etles's furce in Jarobi, the Mullah's stronghold, 
had utterly upset itny ~rgnnised resistance and prevented any further 
tribal cut~ibi~iations. Tlie attacks on Sliabkedr and other villages 
werw now avenged and the tribes, if appearances go for anything 
will be quiet fur rnitny years to come, while the prestige of t h e  
Elitis11 Guvernrnrnt is cotnpletely re-established throughout the length 
i~11<1 breadth of tlie LIohniand country. The Mohmand count1.y was 
t~,i~ver.seil n every direction for three weeks, the troops lived free 
up~,n tlle country, ~vliich was equivalent to a fine of four thousand 
Inpcrs a day, seventy-two tovers and forty forts were destroyed, 
iuid t l ~ e  troops petiet~ated to  the farthest recesses of the mountain fast- 
rlexbes deerned by the clansmen inaccessible to British arms : 800 swords 
and 100 guns, including breach-loaders and Enfields, were collected by  
tlle tinlr tlie troops left the country, as well as fines aggregating thirteen 
t l~o~~s i tnd  rupees in cash. A remarkable feature of the expedition was 
t h i ~ t  after the demolition of the l a ~ t  Bnizai forts the troops were in no 
way nlolestecl, and marched about the country in perfect peace and  
wcurity, and not a single offence was committed on the line of commu- 
nication. Prom these symptoms it is fair to conclude the Mohmands 
had taken to heart the lessons taught them. General Elles was fortu- 
nate in having as Chief Politicnl Officer Mr. Merk, whose intimate 
kllowIedge of the people and country and great experience of frontier 
lllatters generally conduced not a little to the rapid progress and 
pletiun of the upe~*atiots. 
We have  ow to follow the adventures of Sir Bindon Blood with 
General Jeffreys' Brigade in the Namund country. 
IT has  been stated 
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F'LTRT~ER OPERATIONS AGAINST TBE MAXUNDS. 
IT has been stated that on September 23rd, Sir Bindon Blood, after 
sending off General Elles with two brigades to capture the Bedmanai 
Pass, left Nawagai with his staff and divisional troops for Inayat Kili 
to see how the operations under General Jeffreys against the Mamundv 
wereprogressing. The situation a t  Inayat Eili  a t  this period was 
somewhat peculiar, as for two reasons the 2nd Brigade mas for the 
moment compelled to stand fast. I n  the first place i t  had lost a large 
number of transport mules, and in an undeveloped country of this kind 
the tnobility of a large force must always depend on its pack animals. 
Secondly, the memorable fight of the 16th September, the attempt to 
clear the Watelai TTalley in one day, had resulted in 150 wounded men 
being thrown on the field hospitals, and these could not now be carried 
nor could they be left behind, because deducting an adequate guard for 
them the rest of the brigade would not have been strong enough for the 
figlltiog which was to follow. Hence up to the time of Sir Bindon 
Blood's arrival on the scene with reinforcements only those villages 
within striking distance of the camp had been visited and the 
more remote villages of the valley remained untouched. Sir Bindon 
Blood's first step was to restore the mobiiity of the force. The wounded 
were sent to Panjkora where General Meiklejohn's Brigade was 
awaiting employment, and the transport animals killed were now 
replaced. 
The last fight recorded in the previous chapter dealing with the 
Mahnlund Campaign was the taking of the village of Dag on September 
a n d .  Early the following morning the brigade marched to visit the 
fortified village of Tangi, the inhabitants of which had been concerned in 
the recent fighting. The enemy appeared a t  first in small numbers, and 
the guns came into action a t  8 o'clock. Firing continued until 11-45 ; 
the village was taken, the Guides first seizing the hills to  the left The 
38th Dogras were in the centre, the 35th Sikhs on the right, and the Buffs 
i n  reserve. As usual, on the troops returning considerable numbers 
of tribesmen appeared, bu t  not many cared ta face our t r ~ ~ p s .  i% 
file of the Buffs now advanced f rom cover, and the Lee-Metford fire 
a ~ z i n  checked the enemy. O u r  casnalties were : the But'is, Major 
R. S. H. Moody, slightly wounded ; 38th Dogras, severely wounded, one. 
Lieutenant F. S. Reeves of t h e  Buffs had a curious escape, the bullet 
striking his revolver and glancing thence through his case. 
Here i t  may be mentioned t h a t  as  the Mamnnds live partly in  
Bttjuur and partly in Afghan territory, cultivating lands on either 
side of the frontier, they were  always able during these punitive 
ope~ations to  retire in  safety when  hard pressed and then return 
again when our troops withdrew. They are notoriously turbulent, 
and tlie Afghan authorities have had  much trouble with  then^ since 
Asnlar was occupied a few years  ago. ]luring the Chitral Exped~tlon 
they caused us constant annoyance. They were among tho tribesnlen 
who opposed our troops in the  advance beyond the Panjkora, and they 
were up in arms the whole time, tlie 'Lsniping" into camp in the 
Jhandoul Valley being laid a t  the i r  door. Again and again Sir Robert 
Low and Brigadier-General Waterfield wished to punish them but this 
step was forbidden from head-quarters. Our troops remained inactive 
for months, though the Mamund Valley lay only one march from 
Mandia; and the Field Force returned to India leaving the clan 
l~ntouched. I t  would have been a simple matter to  have sent a stronq 
brigade to Inayat Kili and thence t o  have visited every village held by 
the tribesmen, for none are  more then ten or twelve miles d i ~ t a n t  ;but  
the Government would not sanction any punitive measures. The result 
was that the Mamunds, and  t h e i r  friends the Salarzai, believed that  
our troops were afraid to approach them; and thus, three years later, 
they were now harassing a force marching past the mouth of their 
valley and not intended to interfere  with them in any way. That 
a grave disaster did not occur o n  the 16th September when General 
Jeffreys' Brigade weakened by division began reprisals, was due solely 
to the staunchnessof our troops. However, the present punitive opera- 
tions were going far to  retrieve p ~ s t  omissions and already the  Marnunds 
were beginning to send in the i r  jiryahs. For a whole week after the 
capture of Dag and Tangi hostilities were stayed whiIe negotiations 
with reference t o  the surrender of arms proceeded. Meanwhile, on 
September 25tl.1, the Buffs marched off to Nowshera to join the 
Tirall Field Force and w c ~  e relieved by the Royal West Kent Regirnent 
frorn Panjkora. Their departnye was nluch regretted, as in tlle recent 
fighting they had ~1101 
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fighting they had shown themselves worthy of the finest traditions of 
the British Infantry. 
At this stage of affairs i t  did not seem to be advisable to hasten 
unduly the evacuation of the Mamund country. Apart from the fact, 
t h a t  no arms had actually been surrendered, there were other and 
wider consider~tions to be seriously weighed. General Elles was about 
to return to Shabkadr, and it  was doubtful in Sir Bindon- Bloocl's 
view what course the Mohmands intended to pursue. True all the 
large Mohmand gatlierings had been dispersed; the Boliai, Mittai and 
SuranValleys, south-west of Nawagai, had been visited, and the Hadda 
Mollah. chased into Afghan territory, while in the central parts of 
the Mohmand country our troops had effectually overawed the people. 
But there were probably some thousands of tribesmen just over the 
Afghan border who would return as General Elles's Brigades moved bacli 
to  British territory. Nawagai might beconie their objective, as tlie 
Khan 1i;~d cast in his lot with the British authorities. Inayat Kili is only 
one march from Nawagai, and General Blood would thus if required bc 
able to extend a helping hand to the Khan until the excitement caused 
by the expedition had subsided. A t  the same time the reality of the 
submission of the Manlunds and the Salarzai would be assured. 
On the 27th September Mr. Davis, Political Officer, in an interview 
with the Mamund jivyah found them determined not to give the 50 
breech-loaders originally demanded as a punishment for their share in 
the attack on Chakdara, or the 22 Martinis captured from our troops 
on the 16th September. They admitted having taken part in the Chak- 
darn attack without provocation, and coolly offered the excuse tllat all the 
world was doingghazn and they went too. They further admitted going 
five miles from their valley to attack General Jeffreys' camp a t  Markanai 
on the 14th September. They stated that therifles taken on the 16th Sep- 
tember were in  the hands of trans-frontier tribesmen from the Kunar 
Valley, who had shared in the fight, and that they could not be recovered. 
The j ir ,gnA flately refused either to give up breech-loaders or surrender 
hostages, but  offered a sum of money and a number of useless old match- 
locks. Eventually they left to consult the tribesmen, promising to 
return. The promise was not kept, and on the 30th September, as no 
further reply had been received and as this amounted to a refusal of 
the Government terms, General Jeffreys, in the absence of Sir Bindon 
Blood who, anticipating a peaceful subnlission, had moved off with a 
sn1:~11 escort to Ysmi, resumed pnnitive operations. All the villages in 
the centre of t l i s ,  valley were dealt with, and there was no opposition, t h e  
tribesnien declining to  conie into the open ground. 
On the morning of the 1st Odober the brigade uilder General 
Jeffreys attacked the village of Xgrah and very severe fighting ensued, 
resulting in  the folIowing casualties:--British OfEicers-kzlted: Lieu-  
tenant-Colonel O'Bryen, 31st Punjab Infantry, and Second-Lieutenant 
Browneb CIi~yton, Royal West Kent Regiment ; severely zuoun~ed : 
Lieutenant Isacke, Royal V e s t  Kent, and Lieutenant Peacoclc, 31st  
Punjab 1nf:rntt-y: slight(y wounded : Captain N. Styles. British soldiers 
-%pa1 %-cut Kent, killed, 3 ; wounded, 15. Native ranks-Guides 
Caval~y, tcoundrd 4 ; 3lst  Punjab Infantry, 7iitlcd, 7 ; mounded, 15 ; 
38th Ilogras, tuounded, 4. Total c.asualties : British Officers, 5 ; soldiers, 
45. The eneniyJs losses were also heavy. 
Some itexription of this severe action is called for. The Guides 
Cavalry reconnoitred the ground, and reported that the village w a s  
occupied and that the adjacent heights mere strongly heId. The enemy 
appeared in considerable numbers both on the hills where they displayed 
standards and aniong the scrub in broken ground to the left. The 
action mas opened by the cavalry who at  8-20 A.M. were fired on f r o m  
the scrub and hills. Disnlounted fire was a t  once ordered by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Adams, and desultory skirmishing ensued. Meanwhile, t h e  
infantry were advancing, and a t  9-19 A.M. the battery came iuto action 
shellingthe enenly on the heights. The Guides Infantry then advanced 
to clear the hills to  the left. The enemy, who occupied mortures 
and sanqars, maintained a sharp fire, but on Major Campbell ordering 
the  Guides to  charge, the hills were splendidly carried. The Royal  
West  Keut had now advanced in the  centre and the 31st Punjab In- 
fantry on the right, and very severe fighting ensued. The British Infan- 
t r y  cleared the village and attacked the triribesmen in the sangars behind 
it. Second-Lieutenant Chyton was killed by a volley a t  close range, a n d  
theenerny a t  once charged, causingatemporary check ; but MajorWestern 
advanced with Lieutenant Jackson and one and-a-half companies of t h e  
Royal West Kent, and drove h c k  the enemy and captured the sangars 
a t  the point of the bayonet. The losses had already been severe, a n d  
the  31st Punjab Infantry who had ascended the rocks on the r i g h t  
of the village, with a long spur on their flank occupied by the enemy, 
became exposed to a close and deadly cross-fire. I t  was here that  Lieute- 
nant-Colonel J. L. O'Cq-en was killed. Moving swiftly from point t o  
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point he directed the fire and animated the spilsit of t l ~ e  men, 
were devoted to Iiin~. I t  was not long before tlie cnenly's nlarksmen 
began to take ainl a t  this pronlinent figure. But fc,r a consideri~ble 
period although bullets fell everywhere around him, lie renlained nnhurt. 
A t  last 1iowevp.r he was shot through the body a l ~ d  carried mortally 
wounded from the action. The fact that Colonel O 'Er~en  had beell 
specially selected-while still a young man-to tlle conlnlanrl of a 
battalion, goes to  show what a loss tlle army in I ~ l d i s  susbined by 
his death. Already he had passed through the drudgery of the lower 
ranks of the service and had reached a point when all the bigger prizes 
of the profession appeared in clear view. Arid though tlle deatll in 
action of a Colonel a t  the heacl of llis regiment is perlleps the finest end 
that a soldier can hope for, everyone a t  the front deeply regretted the 
premature dose of an honourable and brilliant militarj- career. All the 
positions were held until the Sappers had completely destroyed the 
whole of the village. The return to camp was then ordered. The 38th 
Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian now advanced to supporb 
the 31st Punjab Infantry on the right. The enemy, however, did not 
press the retirement as vigorously as usual, and the display of the 
cavalry prevented any advance into the open ground, but rnucll firing 
was maintained from the hills with sonie effect. No. 7 British 
Mountain Battery fired sharpnel a t  close range and kept tlie nearest 
spurs clear. A11 firing ceased at, 2 10 P.M., and the homeward march was 
not further molested, which was a tolerably sure sign that the enerny 
llad suffered heavy losses. The OEcers displayed great gallantry, most of 
the Royal West Kent having bullet holes in their clothes and helmets, 
and nearly all having strange escapes. The Guides Cavalry were of the  
greatest service during the action. They held a large foree of the enenly 
in check on the left for five hours by dismounted fire and by threatening 
to charge whenever the tribesmen pressed heavily or advanced frona 
the broken ground. No. 7 Battery Royal Artillery fired 140 sharpnel 
shells during the action, and when i t  was apparent that the Ro~w1 
West Kent  and 31st Punjab Infantry were severely engaged Major 
Fegan advanced his guns within 800 yards of the e n e v  and by 
constant fire kept many spurs clean. Though the guns came under 
sharp fire only one mule was killed. The want of more troops was. 
severely lef t ;  three additional battalions could have been fully em- 
ployed ; and only the great skill with which the Guides ~va1u .y  on the 
left were handlecl checked the eneniy's advance from that direction. 
The 31st Puujab Infantry also suffered from having no battalion or?, 
theirs right fl:lnk. The difficulty and danger of attacking fortified villages 
in broken ground aud high crops are always great, and i t  should be 
renlerubrred that after all adequate c a m ~ - ~ u a r d  aud the details were 
deducted Cie~le~xl Jeffi*eyd Brigade could only parade for fighting 
sunle 1,300 btroug. Of tlds small number the loss in a fortnight of 245 
\\'as severe. 
On the 2nd of OctoberSir BindonBlood and Head-quarters with four 
guns of X o .  8 Brtttery and four con~paniea 26th Punjab Infantrsy arrived. 
nt 1nay:~t Iiili, the 1Vth Field Battery and the Highland Light In-  
fantry fulluwing on behind ; and it  was hoped that this formidable 
cuncentr;~tion of artillery would prodrice decisive effects. I n  his report 
to h r l t ~ y  Head-Quarters Sir Bindon Blood telegraphed :-"I am crowd- 
ill:: every nyaxi and gun on the decisive point and expect there will 
be an eud of the 3iamund business in a few days." H e  was right. 
On the 3rd October a t  6 o'clock in the morning, t h e  2nd Brigade 
with two btttteries of artillery, under ~rigadier-General Jeffrteys, attack- 
ed the village of Badilai. Very little opposition was encountered until  
the return ruarch of the troops commenced. Firing began a t  8-45. Tlie 
31st Punjab Infantry clesred and occupied a spur on the  right, while 
the West Iient moved against t11e village, and the 38th Uogras cleared 
the hills to the left, the Guides Infantry covering the left flank, on which 
the cavillrj were also posted. The guns came into action a t  nine o'clock, 
shelling the village, which was captured and completely destroyed. Up  
to tliis time only two casualties had occurred, but as soon as the with- 
drawal of the troops began the enemy appeared in great numbers, as  
rnany as three thousand being roughly counted. Firing now became 
brisk and all the corps were involved, but the 31st Punjab Infantry were 
l~lost eeverely pressed. The cavalry covered the retirement with great 
skill, but though the enemy showed much boldness, they did not advance 
in to ground which reudered charging possible, and took refuge in nulluhs 
whenever threatelled. Firing ceased a t  2-30, and the force reached camp 
safely. The whole affair was extremely successful, but  the loss was not 
small. Sir BindonBlood and theHead-quarters Staff watched the opera- 
tions and reconnoitred the valley. The casualties were as follows :- 
R o ~ a l  West Kent-danyerously wounded, 1 ; 3lst Punjab lnfantry- 
killed, 1 ; wounded, 5 ; Guides Infautry-zoounded, 3; Guides Cavalry- 
wuun(ied, 2 ; 39th Dogas-killed, 1 ; wounded, 3 ; total-kzlled, 2 ; 
wourided, 1.1. During the day General Meililejohn ancl Staff' arrived, 
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THE RISING OF THE AFRIDIS AND ORAKZAI. 
-- 
CEA PTER I. 
i THE BREWING O F  THE STORN. 
I 
1 ' ABOUT the middle of August, while Sir Bindon Blood was moving nut 
E from Chakdara to subjugate the Swat Valley, and while General 
I 
I 
Elles on t he  Mohmand border was awaiting permission to follonr up lliw 
, initial success against the Hadda Mullah's forces a t  Shabkadr, there 
I 
came news of restlessness among the Orakzai, a tribe found in the hill 
country to t h e  west of the Eobat district. A mullah had been trying to 
induce them to  rise and attack our frontier posts, and had met with 
i t some success, though the tribesmen were urging that they had 110 
representative leader to conduct the operations. The Oraklai country 
i a t  that time was watched mainly from Fort Lockhart, our chief outp~ut 
on the Samnna Range, a strong defensible position where six con1p;tnies 
of the 36th Sikhs were stationed. A couple of days later another report 
came in that the restlessness was spreading westwards and that 
Parachinar, our  last post in tlie Kurram Valley, was threatened bp s 
large lashkar. As there seemed to be good foundation for both reports 
i t  was promptly decided to reinforce the Head-quarters garrison at Kohat 
(tl~is post being the support of both Fort Lockhart and Paracllinar) 
with the following troops :-The 9th Field Battely frorn Mian hlir, a 
wing of t he  Scots Fusiliers from Sialkote, the 18th Bengal Lzncem fru)rn 
Rnwalpindi, and the 15th Sikhs from Ferozepore. On inquiry it v:u 
ascertained tha t  the mullah who was trying to brew mischief for 11s in 
tllis llew direction was one Saiad Akbar, belonging to the Aka Khelu, 
a poverty-stricken section of the Afridi tribe. 
Further disquieting news was received shortly afterwards regard- 
ing the Afridis, who were said to have entered into a war alliance with 
the 01-akzai tribe, the compact being that two simultaneous attacks 
should be delivered on British territory-one on our Kohat border, by 
the Orakzai ; and the other on Jamrud and the mouth of tho Khq-ber 
by the Afridi*. The Aka Khel Mullah, Saiad Akbar, &after suficiently 
inflaming tlie Orakzai, llad passed from their country to Tirah, the 
summer hertd-quarters of the Afridis. Apparently this fanatic was 
bent on doing in these two tracts of country what the "Mad Fakir " 
had done in Swat and what the Mullah was at that time doing in 
tile country of the Molmands. 
The Orakzai are numerically a ~owerful  tribe, mustering some 
25,000 fighting wen, and of no mean martial qualities. They hold the 
hills to the north-west of the Kollat district; the Afridi country lying 
to the north, while westward the Oralczai borders touch the Zeinlukhts 
"and extend to the foot of the Safed Koh Range. I t  is to the south that 
our own border faces them, and previous expeditions into the M3anzai 
Valley had been undertaken in order that the Samana Range might be 
held by a chain of pasts,  locking the tribe from raiding into British 
territory. Since Fort Zockhrzrt and its posts had been held the tribes- 
men had not ventured on ally hostile den~onstration, but they bad 
been sullenly defiant and miglit now, while the whole frontier was in 
a ferment, be expected to give trouble if undeterred By the strengthen- 
ing of the Kohat garrison. But no unanimity seemed probable. Of 
the six divisions of the tribe Ule Daulatzai ancl one sub-section of the 
Mahomed Khels were receiving allowances for keeping open the Kohat 
Pass, and these i t  was reasonably conjectured wo~ild in any event remain 
on their good behaviour. Moreover, the Oralszsi are split up into two 
grcat factions, Samil and Gar, so that R general. combination seemed 
difficult of attainment. The mass of tlle tribesmen are Sunis, but there 
are some Shiah sub-sections, and sectarian quarrels are not uncommon, 
Moreover as the whole tribe are a good deal dependent on the Kollat 
district for supplies, and especially for salt, i t  mas believed that  some 
sort of pressure could be brought to Bear upon them ; but i t  was never- 
theless recognisecl as possible that they might listen to evil counsels 
and try conclusious with our troops. 
The Afridis hold the country to the south and west of the Khyber, 
and their settlements touch the west of the Peshawar district. They 
are divided into eight clans, of which six, the Kuki, Malikdin, Earnbar, 
Eamar and Zakl;a Khels and the Sipah are known collectively as ithe 
Khyber Afridis. The Alra IChels are founcl furtl~er to tlle soiitli, beyond 
$lie right banls of the Bara River ; while the Adam Khels hold the hills 
between the Peshawar z r ~ d  Kohat districts and are regarded as a separate 
community, their interests not being identical with those of tlie ckns.to 
the north-vest. Tllc wliole tribe covers an area of abolrt 900 nquaro 
nliles. I n  the summer months tlle majority of tlie Afridis move t o  
~ i r a l l ,  a lligll pkteau inhabited chiefly by the Orahzai. The Rajgul a n d  
Maidan Valleys are studded with their mat huts during the hot weather, 
and their flocks and herds find good pasturage. The Kuki Khels always 
resort to Rajgul, while Maidan is left for the other clans. I n  the winter  
the whole population swarm down into the Bara and Bazar Valleys, a n d  
also into the low hills bordering the Jnmrud plain. Tirah had never been 
visited by our troops, and was regarded as the Afridi stronghold. In t h e  
I 
Afg11:m W i ~ r  of 1878-80 two expeditions were sent into the Bazw Valley, 
1)ut i t  was not then con~idered expedient to enter the Rajgul and Maidan 
Valleys, as this woulcl have involved the employment of a t  least 10,000 
men. Tlic Afridis muster in all some 26,000 or 27,000 fighting men, of 
wllorn about 6,000 beIong to the Adam Khels, 4,500 to the Zalcl~a I<hels ; 
xrlcl 4,000 each to the Kuki, Maliltdin and Kambar Rhels. The Kulci 
Khels under Alnin Rllan were the clan which had sent levies in to  the  
JCllyl~cr, and tlieir stnnding feud against the Malilcdin Rhels as well as 
t their profcssion~i of friendliness towards the Government of India pre- 
i vented a t  least a portion of tliern joining in the contemplated rising. 
Tlic Afridis are men of fine physique and grand fighting qualities, b u t  
their general cllaracter is of the worst. It is thus described by one 
antllority : '' Rutliless, cowarclly, robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous 
niurder, nro to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought u p  from his earIiest 
cllildl~oocl m i d  scenes of appalling treachery ancl nierciless revenge, 
nothing can change 11in1; as he has lived, a shameless, cruel savage, 
uo he dies. And i t  mould seem. that notwitlistanding their long 
intcrcourse wit11 the Eritish, and that very large numbers are, or  have 
h e n ,  in  our ~lervice, and must have learned in some poor way what fai th 
x~icl n~crcy and jnsticc are, yet the Afridi character is no better t han  
i t  Tvns itr tllc d;~yu of his fatl~ers." :Fronl sucll material as tllis, however, 
g-oo~l riolilieiw llavc been mide of the men enlisted in certain nat ive * scginlontx, ancl the tr:tined Afridi fights wit11 splendid dlan. Tlle blood 
f(rutls aiirl clu;rrrcls bctwe.cn the various clans lead to n~uch  internal  
jig11 tiug, 1 )r~t itily colll~~lorl ~nenacc to tlieir country unites them, 
Alrcli~dy in tbe prcscnf: in~tnncc they seemed to have sunk their  
cliifi41*cncc~ ; r ic l  to 11:~vc baxlclcd togctller in their hostile preparations 
i~g:lillxt &lie Uritixll Uovcmment. Tliey mere posing as  something 
o r  I L L  l i o  f ~ n t i c .  Tlieir leaders liad intimated to  t he  
:~lltIl()lbiti(:s at, I.~~HIM,w;L~ tl l i~t  certain 'concessions wcre desired from 
tlic Ciuvmnmetit of India. Tllesc wcrc t l ~ e  wil;l~drswal of all troops 
i 
from the Swat Valley and the Samana Range, the rectification of the  
salt- tax, and the rendition of all AAidi women living in British 
territory. Given these terms their fighting men would return to their 
homes. 
For some days after the first rumours, Orakzai gatherings continued 
to  be reported, but they were apparently waiting for the Afridis t o  
move before carrying out their threatened attack on the Samana. Their 
attitude had caused some alarm among the friendly Turis of the lower 
I(usran1, but reassuring news came presently from Parachinar. The ! 
garrison there was so confident of holding its own that  one hundred 
men llad been sent to reinforce the smaller post of Sadda held by 25 t 
of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry as a, link with Thall, which lies near the 
I 
junction of the Kurram and Miranzai Valleys. The hostile tribesmen 
had gone to the length of cutting the telegraph wire, but messages were 
being sent through daily by somztrs without hindrance. Apparently 
the tribes in the Kurram Valley, like the Orakzai of the Samana, 
were waiting in some doubt to see how matters developed in the 
Iillyber direction. i I 
Brigadier-General A .  G. Y eatman-Biggs, then Commanding the  I 
Presidency District, was ordered up from Calcutta to take command of 1 
the troops at Kohat, and by the 22nd of August he was able to have a 1 
I 
strong brigade ready to move out either to the Samana Range or to I 
Eurram. No more striking instance of the want of union among the 
congeries of tribes on the North-West frontier had ever occnrred than 
this vaciIlation of the Afridis and Orakzai. Instead of descending upon 
us swiftly and suddenly as the Smatis and the Mohmands had done, 
they were by their hesitancy giving us an opportunity to make better 
defensive preparations. I 
On the Peshawar side, owing to  the intelligence that 10,000 Afridis 
were marching on the Khyber Pass from the Bozai Valley, Captain 9‘ 
SF. 5. H. Barton, Assistant Political Officer a t  Lancli Eotal, was with- 1 
drnwn from that post, but the garrison remained in occupation. It was 
said that the Afridis, after capturing the Ehyber Pass, meant to take i 1 %  
Jamrnd, our post a t  the Peshamar end of the pass. Jamrnd was ordi- 
narily held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry from Pesha- 
war, while the Khyber Rifles, who were garrisoning the Kllyber, had 
their hesd-quarters there. General Elles, who had not yet moved out  
from Peshawar against the Mohmands, now despatched No. 3 (British) 
& 
Mountain Bgttery from Peshawar to Jamrud Fort, together with strollg 
I 
detachments of British and native infantry and some cavalry. Mahomed 
Aslam Khan, Comnlandant of the Khyber Rifles, also concentrated four 
of his companies there. The remainder of the Khyber Rifles were distri- 
buted between the fortified sarai a t  Landi Kotal, the strong Fort at Ali 
Musjid, and the minor posts along the pass. These minor posts, it was 
already foreseen, might have to be given up if the Afridia should sweep 
down the Khyber, but Landi Kotal and Ali Musjid, if held with deter- 
mination, could not, i t  was believed, be captured by any tribal force with- 
\ out artillery. The tactics of the Afridis would no doubt be to close tllo 
I W b e r ,  and then appear in strengtll about the low hills which are 
found near the mouth of the pass. They were scarcely likely to venture 
far into the Jarnrud plain, where they would lay themselves open to 
attack by cavalry, unless their numbers sllould indeed embolden them 
to make a demonstration againat Jamrud Fort itself. Their raiding 
parties might also be expected to appear to the south, where Forts Bsra 
ttnd Maclreson, garrisoned by the Border Militia, guard our frontier 
between Janlrud and Kohat. 
8 
& I n  a very short time General Elles had a coIumn at Jamrud com- 
posed of "K"  Battery, R. H. A., No. 3 (British) Mountain Battery, 
the 4th Dragoon Guards, a wing of the Gordon Higl~landers, seven com- 
panies of the 1st Gurkhas, and a wing of the 26th Punjab Infantry. 
Bara Fort was held by detachments of native cavalry and infantry. By 
way of reserve there was the Shabkadr column, watching the Mol~mand 
country, and a big garrison of 5,000 or 6,000 men in the Peshawar 
Cantonments. 
On the 21st of August the Afridis really began to move, the Slta 
Khels, the Malikdin Khels, and the Zakka Khels having collected their 
fighting-men and started out from Tirah. Eventually six out of the eight 
clans into the Afridis are divided joined in the hostile dernonstra- 
f? tion. Five of these, the Malikdin, Kambar, Kamar, Zakl~a Rhels, and 
tile Sipah have already been mentioned as forming with the Kuki Klrels 
the Rllyber Afrirlis : the sixth were the Aka Khels, south of the Bara, 
I River, to wllich the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged. Tlle Kuki Xhels 
would not join, and their astute malik, Amin Khan, actually sent some 
of llie followers to assist in the defence of Ali Bfusjid and Landi Kotal. 
TIlc Adurn Khel~c the last of the eight Afridi clans, holding the hills 
bcl;ween Pesh~war and ~ o l l a t ,  are in a sense a distinct community, and 
were far-aightcd enaugli t o  aee thst any tempornry success wcurea 
4 
by a h i d  mould have t o  be dearly paid for in the long run. They are 
subsidised to maintain the road through the Kohat Pass and they doA 
dined to close the pass when urged to  do so by the mullal~s. Their $'goh 
went into Kohat when summoned, and the clan afterwards remained 
quiet. Some tribesmen bearing the name of Adaln Khels did as a matter  
of fact join the Afridi lashkar, but these were a, sub-section of quite a 
different clan inhabiting Tinth. This duplicatioll of trans-frontier names 
is of frequent occurrence and is apt to be confusing. 
I n  order to be un the safe-side, General Elles despatched a flying 
column of all three arms to Bar& to watch for any hostile demonstra- 
tion in that quartel; while the Jamrud column was kept even more 
on the alert than usual. The Commander-in-Clzief, seeing the advisabil- 
i ty of having a Iargc Force of cavalry in and abont Pesliawar, order- 
ed up tlle 6th Bengal Cavalry from Rawalpindi, and these arrived a t  
their destination on August 22nd. This gave General Elles 18 squad- 
rons of cavalry in all, appareutly quite enough to smash up a, t r ibal  
force 10,000 strong if i t  should venture from tlie hills. 
Information reached Peshawnr about this time which shed a curious 
side-liglit upon the tribal r sings on the frontier. It appeared t h a t  
both tlle Hadcla Mullah and tJ-e 'L Mad Fakir " wrote to Saiad Alcbar, 
Aka Kliel Mullall, urging him to incite the Afridis and Oralrzai to take 
up arms against the British. 5, iad Alrbar hesitated at first to respond 
to the appeal, but eve~tually on the 13th August he managed to assemble 
a number of Afridi maliks in Musjid Bagh in Tirah the summer head- 
quarters of the tribe. Here there was a great divcusaion as to the  
propriety of attacking British territory. The headmen were divided i n  
opinion, many of them taking the sensible view that such a n  atcaclc 
could not be successful and might bring reprisals upon tbe Afridis as 
a whole. Saiad ahbar then left for the Orakzai country, and  here he 
succeeded in exciting the tribesmen to such an extent by worlrirlg upon 
their fanaticism that they agreed to attack the Eohat border if the  
Afridis woulcl move against the Khyber and Jamrud. The mullall 
hurried back to Tirah with this news and i t  was sufficient to excite the 
Aka Khels and Zakka Khels, who gathered their fighting-men at once. 
But, as has been seen, the delay in bringing about the tribal combina- 
tion had given the Government of India ar-iple time in  which to rein- 
force the garrisons of Pe~hawar and Kohat, and it was now clear t h a t  
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TEE CAPTURE OF THE KHYBER FORTS BY TEIE AFRIDIS. 
AFTER twelve days of doubt as to the real intentions of the Afridis, 
tile question was finally settled on the 23rd August: by a sudden and 
overwhelming attack on Ali Musjid and on Fort Maude, the latter a 
small fort about three miles from Jamrud' and just within the mouth 
of the Kl~yber Pass. The tribesmen hacl'apparently advanced from the 
Bozai Valley by the Alachi route, which brought them into the pass quite 
close to Ali Musjid. This fort washeld by a detzchment of the Ehyber 
Rifles and some Kuki Khel levies who, either because they mistakenly 
thought they could not possibity pprevent i t  from falling into the hands 
of the enemy, or because they did not care to shoot down their own 
countrymen, abandoned it and retired to Jamrud ; and the Afridis a t  
once burned the building to the ground. Advancing further along the 
pass the raiders came upon Fort Maude, which though small mas strongly 
built and well placed on an eminence overlooking the road. I t s  little 
garrison, some 40 or 50 of the R h y b e ~ ~  Rifles, behaved staunchly, but 
could not save the situation, for the Ehyber was now swaming with 
Afridis, whose line extended 14 miles. 
A t  three o'clock in the afternoon, the news reached Jamrud that 
Fort Maude was being attaclced, and '( K "  Battery, with an escort 
consisting of the 4th Drag-oon Guards and four companies of British 
infantry, was ordered out towards the mouth of the Khyber Pass with 
a view to render assistance if tliis should prove practicable. As t l ~ e  fort, 
however, was some distance up the pass itself, this force could not with 
safety move far into the hills, where i t  would have been liable to flank 
attacks. The battery eventually opened fire a t  3,200 yards on a number 
of tribesmen who were sighted, These retired a t  once, but  it was not 
found possible for the guns to proceed up the pass, and the would-be 
relieving force was obliged to return to Jamrud. At  night Fort Maude 
was seen to be in flames. The post was one of no great importance in 
itself, but  there was no telling how far its capture might encourage the 
Afridis to press forward. 
Though the Afridis took Fort Maude they did not take the garrison. 
When " I(" Battery wiath its escort came into action a t  3,200 yards, i t  
temporarily scared off the assailing horclc, and the gt~rrison, sccing tlrc 
llopelessness of t{lrc. position, took aclvantage of tlre brief but welcomc! 
divel.sion to  withdraw in safety, joilliilg thc lmttcry and returning wiLh 
it  to Jnmrlzcl. During that  night Jamrucl itself was sniped, but tllrre 
mere no casualties, and nest nnorning all the enemy had ili~rn~pearcd. 
There was a reason for the disappenl-nnce. An attack was to be 
maclo that day on Landi IIotal, the fortifiecl snrni already mentioned, 
further up the Khyber. This attael; b e p n  about noonday and the 
garrison, as a whole (for there were defections), offered n steady resis- 
tance, keeping the eneniy outside cluring thc afternoon ancl evening, 
and continuing to stand to the defe~lce right through the night. Noh 
until 10 o'clock the nest morning-ancl then only by means of treachery 
on the part of certain Africliu within the stronghold-did the cnemy 
get inside. As i n  the other instances, the lxlilcling was set on fire, after 
which the raiders withclrew and soon afterwards dispersed quietly but  
exultingly to their homes. 
Sonle of the details of the t:tlii11g of Lanai I<nt:~l are interesting. 
The garrison of the sarni consistecl of five Native Oficers ancI 370 men 
of the  Kliyber Rifles, including 25 recruits ,zncl ~nunshis,  Of tllese 1.20 
belonged to miscellaneous clans ; thus 40 were Shilnlani 3%011msncls, and 
a siniilar number were fi-om the Peslin\~-nr Vdley, while the rest were 
Adam Khela and men from the neighboul.hood of the ICohat Pass. Of the 
remaining 250, '10 were Lnwargai Sllinnlaris, within whose limits Lancli 
Kotal lies, while 180 were true Afridis, their numbers being pretty 
equally divided among the 3fullagol~is, Zakka ancl Malilrdin Ichels. 
These 250 rifles formed the bulk of the garrison, and they seen1 to have 
behaved steadily enough on the 24th August, firing volleys at  any groups 
of tribesmen who tried ta  approach the walls of the sarot. On themorn- 
ing of the 25th w Shinwari jemadar named Jhawas Khan was mounded, 
ancl the Shinwari sepoys then concluded they had done sufficient Gght- 
ing. They accordingly jumped down from the north wall of the snrni 
and bolted away to their villages. 'If we are to believe the story of some 
of the  Khyber Rifles who afterwards came into Jemrud, the Afridi por- 
tion of the garrison were so disgusted with these deserters that a volley 
was fired upon them as they fled, three or four men being hit. A little 
later some Shinwaris and Zalrka Khels among the attaclring force managed 
to scale the wall on the north-east face near the Officers' bungalow, but 
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tlie wall began exchanging greetings the reverse of hostile with their 
fellow-tribesmen outside, and tlle sequel was that some traitors within 
opened the gate and the tribal mob poured in. It is not clear, and i t  
probably never will be what exact proportioil of the besieged gxve 
friendly adnnittance to the besiegers rand what proportion remained loyal 
to tlieir salt. But there were uncloubtedly many true-hearted soldiers 
among the garrison, as tlie protracted resistance would itself suffice to 
prove. 
The MuLlagori and Shilmani sepoys escaped over the wall wit11 their 
rifles, while tlie Zalcka and Malilrdin Kliel men took refuge under 'tlie 
flags of their clans~uen in the nttaclcillg force, and joined in looting the 
post. The Adam Kllel sepoys liad joined tlle besieging lashkar at  the very 
outset. Of the 40 Peshawnris, six were c&rriecl off as prisoners, while the 
remainder were allowed to escape after tlieir rifles lrad been seized. 
A Subadar who was killed just before the enemy eflected an 
entrance into the sarai, and who conducted the defence, lmd t ~ o  sons 
in the attaclcing force, and one son with him in the Khyber Bifles. 
The Subadar commanding the Mullagori company, when the enemy 
tllrough treacllery effected an enhrance into tlie Fort, collected his 
company and fought his way tbrough, losing several men in cloing so. 
I Ie  tlien took his company through the Shilmani country, back to 
Jamruii, witliout the loss of a rifle. 
When the Landi ICotal sarai had been looted and the quarters for 
tlie troops set on fire tlie Afridis began to b1,er-llc up, making for tlieir 
homes in the Bazar Valley, and carrying their dead and woullded with 
tliem. This was done in spite of the protestations of the mullahs, who 
llad organised the raid, and wlio wished to keep the 1 nshlcar together. 
There was apparently llot enough fanaticism a t  work to induce the 
tribesmell to rernaia, and moreover they were runnillg short of supplies. 
Tlle most they were equal to was a promise to gather again on Septem- 
ber 15th. 
Coming now to consider the loss which the Khyber Rifles suffered 
t;hrougliout the whole raid upon tlie Khyber, ColoneI Aslam Khan, 
their old commandnnt, who was acting as Political Officer in the Khyber, 
put i t  a t  10 only, killed and ~vouncled. The losses of the Africli tiailes- 
Inen T V C ~ C  put a t  3-1 at  Fort &It~uclc, 12 a t  Ali Musjicl, and 200 a t  Laucli 
3t<olal. 
It may be worth recalling here that in the agreement of 1881 
between the Government of India and the Afridis the following 
paragraph was subscribed to by the headmen of the tribe : " w e  
understand we are exclusively responsible for the future manage- 
ment of the Khyber, and that Government in no way shares in this 
responsibility, and this position we accept." Under the same agree- 
ment a corps of Thezailchis was raised among the tribes to garriso~l Ali 
Musjid ancl Landi Kotal, and this during the succeeding sixteen years 
had expanded into the corps of the Ehyber Rifles, about 1,000 strong', 
the cost of which had been defrayed by the Government of India, the 
annual charge being roughly two lakl~s. Yet another lakh yearly had 
been paid in tribal allo~vances. As an offset againt this the tolls levied 
on caravans had been collected by Government, The Afridis, therefore, in 
their raid not only attacked their fellow-clansmen enlisted i n  the Rifles, 
but  broke the agreement which had beec in force since 1881 and had 
worked till then without a hitch. 
Before leaving the Kliyber i t  has to be lllentioned that one of tlie 
most serious results of the capture of Landi Eotal was that a n  immense 
quantity of ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy. When intelli- 
gence came in that 10,000 tribesmen were marching on the  Khyber, 
Captain Barton, strong in the belief a t  the time that the pass would be 
held, sentup fifty thousand rounds to that place, and when he  was 
peremptorily recalled by Sir Richard Udny he had of course to leave 
this reserve behind him. No effort was made by the authorities at 
Pesllawar to secure the ammunition, tliough three days elapsed before 
the Africlis entered the pass. 
THE RISINQ O F  TEE ORhKZriI. 
A PURTRER example of the extraordinary want of tactical combina- 
tion anlong the frontier tribes was supplied by the ioilctivity of the 
Orakzai while their allies the Afridis were raiding the Khyber. TIle 
Orakzai, i t  will be remembered, had bound tllemselvzs by a conlpiict 
with the Afridis to rise as soon as the latter made a demo~lstration, yet 
they waited until tlie Afridis had withdrawn frolu the Khybrr aud 
entirely dispersed before themselves comw encing hostilities, thus losing 
a great opportunity. Now that the attention of our Pcsllawar and 
Kohat troops was no longer anxiously engaged, the Oralczai a t  last made 
a tardy advance upon our border and on the 26th of August imitated 
the Afridis by capturing the Ublan Pass. But their success was 
short-lived, for the  very next day, as will presently be related, General 
Yeatman-Biggs recaptured the pass and completely routed the Oralrzai 
Eashkar. 
The Ublan Pass, some six miles north-west of Kohat, lies on the 
boundary line separating the Bizoti section of the Oralczai from British 
territory. I t  was obviously a matter of very considerable importance, 
looked a t  from every point of view, that no disturbance sllould be 
allowed to ferment unchecked in the neighbourhood of a pass tvllich 
overlooks the high-road of our communications to Uurram and is within 
so short a distance of a comparatively small cantonment like Kohat. 
Before narrating in detsil the events which occurred during the re- 
capture of this supposed impregnable position by the then small force 
under General Yeatman-Biggs, on the 27th August, i t  may be 
interesting to glance briefly a t  previous operations directed against the 
Bizotis. I n  March 1868, various offences against life and property com- 
mitted by this section of the Daulrttzai clan culminated in the occupation 
by them of the Ublan Kotal with a threat to attack the towers and 
village a t  the foot of the pass. Accordingly on the morning of the 11th 
March, a small force moved out from Kobat collsisting of two guns of a 
light field battery and some 500 men of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Iofantry. 
Tlle position was assaulted and the eneluy gradually driven back into a 
strong breastwork situated on the summit of a perpendicular crag on 
the right of the pass. Three attelnpts were made to storm this position, 
all of which failed, rzncl the troops retired at sunset, having suffered the 
bcavy loss of 11 killed and 44 mounded, incl~ldillg 1 OEcor killcd ;llld 
2 wuuuded. Again in  tile following. yea' pass was crossed secretly 
a t  night by a force sent out from g o h a t .  This movelllent being totally 
unexpected no resistance was encouutere$ alld the force moved clawll to 
the village of Gora on the other side. Having destroyed this village tile 
troops returned a t  once over the  pass, ~losely followed by the enemy, 
who had by now taken the alarm and Tvere up in a m s .  The losses oil 
this occasion were 3 killed and 33 wounded, most of the casualties occur- 
ring on the way clown from the sunlmit  of the pass, where the troops 
were exposed i ~ t  every turn of the pat11 to a galling fire fro111 above. 
This short resum& of operations in the  neigllbourhood of the U b l a ~ l  
may suffice to show that the position is one of great n a t u r ~ ~ 1  strength, 
justifying the Bizatis to a certain ex ten t  in their boast tha t  when pro- 
perly clefoilded i t  was impregnable. L e t  US now turn to actual events. 
On the 25th August news was brought  in from Mahomedzai, the for t  
wliich is situated near the foot of t h e  p:tss, that some sniping l~acl been 
going on a t  night and that the enemy had occupied the sungars wllicli 
had been the scene of the defeat of o u r  troops 29 years ago. The same 
day Major Ee~viclie-Copley, Intelligence Officer, and Captain Walre, 
Orderly Officer to General Yeatman-Biggs, rode out from K o l ~ a t  and 
reconnoitl*ed the ground. Tlle next nigllt O U ~ '  levy post was rushed by 
sollie Bizotis and Utirzan Khels,* and one m:%n was killed, one llavildsr 
and one man wounded, and the remaining levies fled for refuge ho Mallo- 
n~edzai. A t  dusk on tlle 26t11, Mahomedzai had been rei~lforced by one 
conipally of tlle 2nd Punjab I n f a n t r y  under Captain Cooper. 
A t  4 A.M. on t l ~ e  27th August a force consisting of one scluadron 3rd 
Punjab Cavalry, six guns No. 9 Field Battery, two companies Royal Scots 
Pusiliers, and tlle 2nd Punjab Infa i l t ry  moved out from Kohat to attack 
tile pass. General Yeatman-Biggs arr ived on the scene a t  daybreul; alld 
the guns took up a position near a t a n k  on the plaii~ a t  the foot of tllc 
pass, and opened fire a t  2,200 yards. After  some very prel;ty sllooting, 
Major Weclderburn succeeded in a lmos t  co-mpletely silencing the enen~y's 
frontal fire and also that on the crags t o  our left, but tlle latter afterwards 
broke out again during the advance. Dispositions were t l ~ e n  u~clc fur, tllc 
attack, the 2nd Punjab Infantry lead ing  and the Royal Scots Fiisilicl'~ 
lying in reserve, with the squadron of the 3rd Puujub C~ivnlry as escort 
to the guns. The troops advanced up the centre of the pass, ;md wliau 
about half-way found tllelllselves exposecl to a galling arld ve1.y ;~ccu~.nte 
- - 
Frolri a previous explatlt~tiorl it will be u~ldertitood that this clan ha:; no aonncctio~l 
wit11 the U t ~ n a n  ILhels lying Bctweerl Swat anti Ht~,jo~u.. 
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f ie ,  coming chiefly from tlle left flank, where a number of sharpshooters 
were concealed amongst some steep crags overloolri~lg the pass. These 
crags were a serious difficulty during the whole progress of the 
enpgcment : they are perpenclicular and quite inaccessible, and i t  is 
in~possible either to scale or to outfli~nk them. Here a number of the 
enemy renxtined concealed, keeping up a galling fire, ancl no counter-fire 
coulcl dislodge them. About 8 n.nf. the Kotal was gained-Lieutenant 
Elsmie, Adjutant of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, milo hacl led his company 
most gallantly froni first to  last, being the first to arrive at the summit. 
The enemy did not wait to try coacl~~sious a t  close clurtrters, but were 
seen rapidly retreating in a fairly compact body down the other side of 
the pass, where they crossed the Bara River and enbered the village 
beyond. Volleys were fired after them, both from the main attack and 
also by the men of tlle 2nd Punjab Infantry on the rlght. Meanwhile 
the right attack had been having somc sharp work : after fighting their 
' way from ridge to ridge they gained the crest and swept the enemy be- 
fore thein, the two conlpanies being well lead by Lieutenant Eales and . 
Subadap Blluta Ram respectively. Tlie troops had to fight their way up 
a rocky and alrnofit precipitous hill with little or no available cover, 
ullder a burlling sun and exposecl to a heavy fire. The heat indeed was 
terrible, and the European troops suffered a good deal, one man dying of 
heat-apoplexy. No water was procurable, and the groruld was too bacl 
to allow of mules being brought up. The casualties cluring tlle aclvance 
were : 1 sepoy, 2nd Pun jab Infantry, killed, and Subadttr Akhbar Khau 
and to aepoys, 2nd Pun jab Infantry, wounded. 
The retirement began about 10-30 A.N. and was carried out 
in echelon, the main body moving off first down the centre of the pass, 
follomred in turn by the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the two companies of 
the 2nd Punjab Infalltry who hacl originally advanced on the right. 
The enemy promptly followed up, and it was now that most of the 
casual ties occurred. During a11 this time the snipers concealed anlong 
the crags on the left had maintained s galling fire, and thcy now kept 
n~oving down and liarassing our rear-guarrl. About. half-way down 
Captain Baird Smith ancl Lieutenant L. A.  North, both of the Royal 
Scots Fusiliers, were severely wounded, the former in the ankle, and the 
latter in the stomach, the bullet by a fortunate chance running round 
under the ribs and coming out without having penetrated very deeply. 
Sr~rgcons-C:~ptain Beyts and B;~miield, A.&I.S., rendered protnpt and 
11lYiciont aid t o  the wonnclccl ; thc forlncr with the aid of n sepoy carrying 
n ~--c~iincltltl Officer for some distance down the hill under a heavy fire 
~vl~ea tlrc ground was too bscl for L o l i e a  to be used. The re t i r ement  
wag well end steadily carried out, but the troops on reaching the foot 
of the p s s r e r e  alirlost completely exhausted, 16 men of the ~ o y a l  
Sct)ts Flisiliers lrxvirl~ been kllocked over by the sun, However t o n g a s  
1r:lcl b e ~ u  sent out from Kohst for these and the wounded, and a f t e r  a 
t;llr,rt rest tlre reorainder- marched back to cantonments going well and 
strong. Tlie total casn:tlties were : 1 private, Royal Scots Fusiliers,  
n~lcl 1 sepoy, 2nd Punjab Infantry, killed; 2 Officers, Royal Scots Fusilieras, 
3 IVsrrt~nt Otficei~s, 2nd Ptinjab Infantry, and 8 sepoys wounded, of wl lom 
two afterwi~rile (lied. Several of the enemy were dressed in khaki and 
~ p p e ~ r e d  to be old sepoys, botli from the steadiness and accuracy of 
t h t ~ i r  fire and fro111 the manner in which they a t  once distinguished 
the C)R.',curs. They were i~~tl.med chiefly wit11 Sniders. 
TThilc the action on the Ublnn Pass was in progress other hostilities 
of lew rrlngllitude were occurrit~g to the west, on the Ssmana Range. 
the even i~~g  of the 20th August, pressing news having been 
at  Kohat frc.rnl both the Kurram Valley and the Samana posts, a f lying 
et,lumn started a t  7 P.I~. fop Hitngu, under the commandof Colonel Rich- 
itrdson and consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers, four guns No. 2 Deraja t  
Jluuatain Buttery, the 6th Punjnb Infantry and one squadron 3rd 
l'unjab C'tkralry. Tlre 26 miles mere covered by 5 A.M. the following 
~norniug, and the force encmlped a t  Hnngu facing the  Samana Range. 
1Zutrlours of the enrnly's movements and intentions being most conflict- 
ing, a a~ecoirrlnissance was lnade by the cavalry the following day to 
Nrtrai, about. 7 miles from Eangu, and a t  the eastern end of the Khan l r i  
Valley in rear of the Samana; but ~vvitlrout encountering any hostile 
force. The following days mere spent in reconnaissance in various direc- 
tions, but nothing definite could be ascertained regarding the enemy's 
position. JTariouu dates were giro11 for intended tribal attacks, Friday 
heiap the ~uost  likely day of the week, as  the one nlost favoured by 
the PrupI~et.. The mullahs were said to have given out that  all Silclls 
were to be wipeclout, but special attention was to be paid to  the 5th 
~uuj t tb  Infa~rtry, this regiment being apparently singled out for t r iba l  
revenge urvi~ig to their occupation of the Samana for a year previously. 
Oil the 2211d -4ug11st a convoy of ammunition to replenish Forta 
Lnck1i;lrtand~ulistant I u s n  was sent up to the Samilna from Bangu 
under Colonel Jnmeson, tlie escort consisting of tile 5th Punjab 







































and his flying column. No opposition was met with, alhhough i t  wad 
ascerbained afterwards that a thousand of the enemy had been watching 
the force the whole way, but had tliought i t  more prudent not to attack. 
+ For tlie next few days nothing happened of much interest except that 
the usual rumours of a n  intended attack on the camp were more 
, frequent than ever. 
On the morning of the 27th August a t  7 A.M., the troops at Hangu 
were aroused l)y three loud reports coming from the border police posts 
of Lakha just above Hangu on the Samana ridge. As this was the pre- 
arranged signal of distress, a colunin was a t  once ordered out, consisting 
of the 16th Silrhs and two guns, under Colonel Abbott. This column left 
a t  9 A.M., and comniencecl the ascent up the graded road to Lakha. The 
enemy never appeared in large numbers, but  contended themselves with 
firing from behind every possible bit of cover, and managed to enfilade 
tile road so successfully that the infantry were forced to leave i t  when 
about half-way up and make a direct ascent up the lihuil. The ground 
was most diacult and steep, bnt the regiment went straight ahead, 
sweeping all opposition away and reaching the crest in a marvellously 
short time everything considered. The enemy melted away on the 
northern slopes of the Samana and also away to the east where they 
could find excellent cover. During this advance the 15th Sikhs lost one 
follower killed, one follower wounded and one sepoy wounded. Mean- 
while a wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry had moved out from 
Eaugu under Major F. P. L. White in support, and on reaching the 
crest this wing managed most successfully to keep the enemy in check, 
while Colonel dbbott  with the 15th and his two guns moved further 
west to carry out the taslr assigned to him, viz., to relieve Lakha and bring 
away the garrison with their. rifles and ammunition. This movement 
was followed up by small parties of the enemy iucessantly : they did not, 
however, venture to anything like close quarters, Having relieved the 
Lxkha Post, Cvlonel Abbott halted, after firing a few sliells a t  the 
enemy dispersing down tlle northern slope of the Samana. Then hear- 
ing that tlie post of Saifaldara, still further to the west, was also hard 
pressed, Colonel Abbott pushed on as rapidly its possible, this movement 
being sinlilarly covered by the 5th Punjab Infantry. Whilst all this 
was being done, the remainder of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Colonel 
Jameson had moved out from Hangu up to the foot of the hills, ready to 
cover Colonel Abbott's retirement. It was, however, found ilnpossible 
.to signal successfully so as to ascertain Colonel Abbott's intention, and 
eventually this w iag, \vhich was accompanied by Colonel Richardson and 
Stn$ movcd along the foot of the llills to the Snifi~lldara road wllere i t  
W ~ L S  tlloogh t Culonel Abbot t  would eventually descend. Great  a l l s i e ty  
WikS for some time felt regarding his force, as liesvy firing Was co11tinue'- 
1~ lieard and nothing could be seen of the force. At 7 P.M., llowever, the 
remaining wing was much relieved to see some guns about half-way d o w n  
tlie Snifaldara road from the Saniana, and this proved to  be Colonel 
Abbott's force retiring covered by the first-mentioned wing of t h e  Bth 
Ptlnjitb Infanti-y. The remailling wing now halted, and moved s t r a i g h t  
up tlie spms covering the  zig-zag road, for some thousand feet. T h e  
ascent was estre~iiely difficult overlluge volcanic jagged rocks with  large 
cr*evices intervening, and the men were quite exhausted when they  
r~irclird tlie last position to be held. Jfealiwhile it wilg getting qui te  
clitrli, :%lid the  enemy grew bolder, yelling ancl firing as  they canlc 
alo~lg clo~-ri tlle rocky spurs and even venturing 011 t h e  road. O n e  
sl~li~11 budy of some 50 iu nttenipting a kind of clrarge met  wit11 a 
severe check, six of them falling from a volley fired by t h e  5th  Punjab 
Infit~ltry. The retireriient Iiitcl now to be finitlly made, for  when the zig- 
a;Lg:.s ]lac1 beell 11it~~ccl the  road debouched into a small basin behind t h e  
lnw hills, and then passecl tllroug1:h the latter in a very narrow defile. 
When the 1:~st rmuainiug companies reached tllis place, the  enemy were 
still furtllcr eriibolclel~ed a i d  2iovered all round, &outing and  firing con-  
tiuuuusly. Still, fortunately, tliey did not charge home as they m i g h t  
alld it was perhaps the darkness alone vhich prevented the  regimenti 
1i;~ving n very bail time. As it was; three nien were lost, two of w1lorn 
11owever turned up during tlie night, the other being cut  up. It was a 
great relief to  reacli tlie open countiy beyond. After for~l i ing up, t l i e  
vhole coluuln movecl off and 1~cachecl the camp a t  IIangu, unuuolested, by  
11 F.M. ; niost of tlie t.roops Iiaving had no foocl and very little water 
for 14 hours. 
Tbe following night the troops werc aroused by a t ramp of f e e t  in  
the distance and the familiar sliouts of B gllazi rush. The  men fel l  i n  
cliiitc quietly a t  their posts, ancl n few scattered shots were fired by t l i e  
enemy, but notliing more occurred. Tliat same niglit the Royal I r ish 
:md the 9 th  Field Battery arrived in camp from IColltlt, wliich perllaps 
explained why the expected attack mas not made. 
P There was now a fairly strong force concentrated a t  Eangu, ready f 
to move anywhere a t  the  shortest notice. A t  the same time there  were 
persistent ruruours tha t  Hangu itself ancl the vicinity would shor t ly  IJI: 
atk~cked, ancl this prevented Colonel Rich,zrdsJs flying ccolurnll from n lov-  
ing on to the ICurram Valley. A-force was llelcl in rqiltliuess tqmovc O L L ~  
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ancl assist Gulistan, but  they helio'd that there was no urgency. On the 
night of the 29th August, just as the me11 were retiring for the night, 
fairly heavy and continuous firing began from the overlooking hills, 
aeveilal bullets falling i n ~ n d  a b o ~ ~ t  the camp one grazing a sepoy's puggari 
and one falling near the field hospital. The troops fell in, as usual, per- 
fectly cluietly and witl~out he slightest confusion, and refrained from 
returning a single shot, and the enemy a t  last left the camp in peace. 
Transpolat, field hospitals, and other accessories had now been rapidly 
coming up, and the force received a useful addition in the Bombay 
Sappers and Miners. 
Meanwhile news hacl been received that  the border police post at  
Shinawari had been attacked and burnt, and that the Orakzai, embolden- 
ed by their success, had attaclred and pillaged the adjacent villages of 
Icahi and Nariah, looting the Hindu bunniahs. The following morning 
the Field Battery and the 18th Bellgal Lancers moved out to Shinawari, 
hoping to catch the enemy returning to the hills with their spoil. No 
sign however was seen of them, and the little force returned to camp 
on the evening of the 30th August much fatigued, having covered 40 
miles. This movement was carried out under Colonel Mansel, 3rd 
Punjab Cavalry. That same evening i t  was noticed that several men 
were lurking about on the near hills above the camp, whence the firing 
had come, and some few weFe seen to make for a cave, evidently a refuge 
whence to safely snipe into camp. Accordingly one of the 12-pounders 
was trained on to the cave during daylight, and about 9 P.M. a shrap- 
nel shell was fired into it. As may be easily imagined, no more snip- 
ing occurred, and five or six bodies were being buried the following day. 
On the 31st August General Yeatruan-Biggs with his Staff rode 
into Hangu from Kohat, bringing in news of the arrival of his brigade 
safely through the Icohat Pass. When about six miles from Hangu, the 
General's baggage was attacked by a, small raiding party of the enemy. 
The drirer was wounded, and Major Bemicke-Copley's servant was hit 
three times, without however being seriously hurt. The Major's bag- 
gage was riddled by bullets. Some of the baggage w.as carried off, but 
I the escort to a large convoy then arriving, assisted by a small party sent 
out from' Hangu, managed to recover everything and drive off the enemy. 
The Maharajah of Euch  Behar joined General Yeatman-Biggs a t  
Hangu on the 8th September. His Highness had volunteered for 
active service on four previous occasions, but this was the first time he 
had been allowed to proceed to the front. 
THE RELTBF OF THE KURRAN VATATJET FORTS. 
THE night before the arrival of General Yeatrnan-Biggs, t he  15th I 
Sikhs, two lmouutain guns, two squadrolls of the 18th Bengal Lancers 
and the Bombay Sappers and Miners, the whole under Colonel Abbot% 
moved out from Hangu towi~rds T11.1, serious news having been received 
that  a general and sirllultatleous attack waa intended on Thal and Sadda 
and various other points in the Kuryam Valley. The C O I U ~ ~ ~  was 
followed a t  rnidday on the 1st September by the 5th Punjab Infantry, 
two other mourl tain guns, and two other squadrons, lathBengal Lancers, 
the whole beirlg accolllpanied by Colonel Richardson, who hadnow beell 
appointed to the comnland of all the troops composing the Kurranl 
relieving force as well as of the troops already in the Kurrarn. This 
proved a most tiring ruarch, for the troops had been ou half rations for 
some time. The heat was terrific, the sun blazing down on t he  men's 
faces. The trailsport column, having been nlade up in a great hurry, 
consisted of carts, donkeys, bullocks, ekkas, besides the regulation canlels 
and mules. Doaba was safely reached by the second half of the relieving 
colunln a t  about 11 P.M., but the rear-guard did not arrive until 2 A.M., 
]laving been fired into. Two of the snipers were captured and brought 
into Thal, where they were incarcerated. The troops bivouacked a t  
Doaba inside a thorn zareba which a little while previously had  been 
occupied by the 1st half of the colunin under Colonel Abbott. 
I t  was ascertained that Captain Chesney of the 18th Bengal Lancers, 
who was with the 1st half of the column, after reconnoitring towards 
Shinawari had obtained a guide to show him a good camping ground 
a t  Doaba. This guide made a deliberate attempt to lead the cavalry 
into an  ambush, for when nearing the large nullah which runs to the 
west of Doaba, i t  was seen to contain some 1,500 of the enemy, the 
ground moreover being unsuitable for cavalry work, and the enemy being 
in great strength. Captain Chesney dismounted some men andfired a t  the 
ambuscaders, retiring gradually so as to allow the 15th Sikhs to come up. 
He  managed thus to kill three or four of the enemy, who disappeared 
in all directions on the approach of the 15th Sikhs ancl the battery. 
The guns completed their rout with a few well-directed shells, aiid the 
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colunln inarclled into Doabn. Tlle second nig1:t they +ere fired into 
heavily, good aim being talcen at the mess table mllere the Officers were 
dining and where x lnnlp was burning, Colonel Abbotk I l a v i ~ i ~  a, very 
narrow escape. Some con~pnnies were sent out, and a few volleys man- 
aged to keep the camp free from sniping for the rest of the night. Just 
before the arrival of the 2nd half of the column Colonel Abbott had left 
for Thal, intending to push on to Sadda in theEurram Valley as soon as 
possible. 
The camp of the 2nd half of the column was somewhat confused, 
and in the pitch darkiless it was aln~ost impossible to find one's way about 
the zareba, amid the jl~nlble of transport animals. The troops were com- 
pletely exhausted after their 23 miles in the heat, and had scarcely energy 
left to cook their food. At  6 A.M. the following morning, Colonel Richard- 
son pushed on with the cavalry in the tracks of Colonel Abbott, to Th;tl, 
followed by the 5th Purljab Infantry and two guns under Colonel 
Jsmeson. This was again a very trying march, and the troops had 
comparatively little 1.est to prepare them for it. A t  1 P.M., however, 
Thal was safely reached, and the march of 36 miles completed in 36 
hours : no great record in itself but for the fact of the heat and want of 
food. The men, however, were rewarded here, for supplies were 
plentiful, and they could rest till the following morning. The cavalry 
meanwhile hacl hada small engagement. Whilst camping near Thnl, some 
of the 18th Bengazl Lancers had gone into the village, and the last of them, 
who, by the way, was a Sikh, was shot dead just as he entered. T l ~ e  
alarm was cluickly sounded, and the men, who were about to water their 
horses, mounted as they were, turned out and pursued some 20 or 30 
arn~ed men, who fled across the surrounding fields towards the hills, 
firing as they went. Six were killed and 14 taken prisoners, but  unfor- 
tunately the man who had shot the sowar escaped. His property, how- 
ever, was confiscated and destroyed, and the occurrence evidently had 
a good general effect on the people. Apparently that same night lmd 
been fixed upon for a big attack on Thal fort. The troops lined the 
rampai3ts all night, but the force was evidently too impossing for the 
enemy, and the following day the Kabul Khel Waziris, who were breed- 
ing this trouble, had dispersed. The march to Sadda was resumed 
in the same order on the 3rd September, Colonel Richardson pushing 
on wit11 the cavalry in support of Colonel Abbott, and the remainder 
following a few hours later. Everything looked wonderfully peaceful 
and fertile all along the Kurram Valley. 
Colonel Abbott's hzlf 6f the colunln Alizai on the morning of 
.the 3rd September, and Sadda a t  3-30 P.M. 011 tile 4th, thus corrlplcti~lg 
very fine march under exceptionally difficult circumstauces, the  men 
being without tents. The 2nd half of the column halted a t  Manduri, 13 
miles beyond Thnl, rnarcl1t.d the next day to Alizai, 9 miles, and 
reaclled Sadcla on the 5th September a t  about 2 p . ~ . ,  in pelting rain- 
3rd Gurlillas arrived shortly afterwards, wlzereupon the ICnlq~anl 
Valley Brigade under Colonel Richardson became con~plete, consisti~lg 
of the 16th Bengal Lancers, No. 2 Darajat Mountain Batte1.y (4 guns), 
m e  conlpaay Bombay Sappera and Miners, the 15th Sikhs, and the 5 t h  
Punjab Infantry. 
No doubt when Colonel Abbott with the advance troops reaclled 
Sadda, after marcliing 49 miles in 40 hours, a little disappointmellt was 
felt a t  finding all quiet instead of a hardly-pressed garrison sellillg 
their lives dearly. Hut as a matter of fact the arrival of the troops was 
most opportune and prob,zbly saved the situation in the  valley. A 
gathering of some 3,000 to 4,000 Oralizai was threatening Saddu village 
seriously, aiid the militia post a t  Balesh Khel still more closely, a n d  
their advance-guard of 500 men had actually comlnitted tllerrlselves t o  
an  attack, the remainder waiting to see how things would go. So Bard 
did the enemy press, that one mullal~ was killed at the very door of t h e  
.fort. The moment the troops neared the place, however, the  whole 
gatliering melted as if by n~agic, and everything was now perfectly 
peaceful again. A t  Parachinnr, beyond Sadda, the garrison could no 
doubt have held out against immense odds. Sadda, with its garrison of 
50 Sikhs, 100 Kurram militia, and 300 or 400 Turis, would also have 
been a hard nut to crack. Yet the position mas critical, especially i n  
view of the scarcity of ammunition. Worse than all, the slightest ad- 
vantage gained by the tribes would probably have doubled bheir nuni- 
bers, and part of the Lower Kurram might also have risen, while t h e  
rest of the valley would have been given over to fire and sword. The  
political effect of such a reverse would have been serious. All this was 
saved by Colonel Abbott's promptness. Opening a telegram, as  i t  af ter- 
wards transpired, from the Political Officer in the Karram Valley t o  
the Commissioner (which was also addressed to the Officer colnmanding 
the troops on the road), he saw that troops were urgently required, ancl 
instead of waiting for orders determined to advance a t  once. Colonel 
Richaidson arrived in time to approve of the plan. Meanwhile tile 
troops, consisting of two guns No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, the  15t11 
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SiliIls and llaIf of NO. 4 Company Bnnlbay Sappers, Elad begun tllrir 
trying ~usrcll to Sadda. The heat, as alreacly described, was intellse 
clity wliileat night heavy rain adcled to tlie discomfort of tile ~ 1 ~ 1 1 .  
Owing to sc;rrcity of mule transport only one blanket per rn:Ln could be 
taken, and owing to the hoelility of t l ~ e  ~i l l i lger~,  supplies could 
scarcely be obtained. Once in tlie Iiurram, ]lowever, tllc friendly Turis 
readily brought out supplies. 
I t  has been said that the arrival of ColoneI Richardson's flying 
column altered the situation in the Rurranl V;tlley. Tllnt situation, so 
f i ~ r  as i t  I-lad developed before the appearance of the relieving troops, 
111ay now be described at  a little greater length. On tlle 20th of August 
it  was reported that the Mussazai, blamozai, and Alisherztti, three power- 
ful sectioils of the Oralrzai, had risen ~ ~ n d  detern~inecl LO attack Sadda in 
force. The wire was worlting RS far  as Tlial, but news was received 
thatrtn important telegram, wllicll sllollld llave been taken on fronl 
'l'hi~l to Hangu by sowars, I ~ n d  been brought back to Thal : tllc sowar 
carryinr it, instead of fincling a relief a t  the first police post, had 
found the post quite deserted. The rrlail had brought news of fighting 
on the Satuana, ancl i t  seemecl as if the distul-bances on tlle Samann 
were spreacling to the country between Tl~a l  iind EEangu. As a 
matter of fact raiders were out in Upper &1iranzai, and even Xur- 
rani villagers were turning against tlle garrisons. Under the circum- 
stances, it seemed as if the Kurram Valley mould be left to look after 
itself. The Sikh garrison of Ssdda therefore wiis increased by 25 irilles. 
and 200 Kurram militia mere ciespntched under G~ptaill hlaconcl~y, 
District Staff o s c e r ,  to the village of I3uasl~n Ali, 7 miles east 
of Sadda. His orders were to endeavour by making a show of 
strength to postpone the attack of the tribes as long as possible, arid to  
help the neiglibouriug villages as for as possible, but not to engage any 
overwhelming force of the enemy; in the event of the tribes attacking 
in force, a retreat was to be made to the Iiurrnitna River, G miles f r o ~ u  
Paraclzinar,where troops would be ready to cover the retirement. For the 
above purpose a movable column was orgauised, consisting- of 20 sabres, 
3rd Punjab Cav~rlry, two guns No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, 100 riiles 
36th Silibs and 309 rifles 1-5th Gurkha Rifles, the whole under the cow- 
mand of Major Vansittart, the Oficer cornmancling the Kurram garrison. 
As little transpolat as possible accompanied the column, pl.actically 
nothing but reserve anlmunitian ancl one day's cooked rntions were 
carried on mules. On tlie. 31st AugusL, Captain- &ll~ajmch~- - re~rrrfed 
that tllere had heen slight, firing during tlie night ill the d i ~ ~ ~ t i o n  of 
h d a l l l ~ ,  ;~Mussszni rillage about 3 miles from Sndda ; and 6lla-t although 
tlie Manlozai and Aliuher>zai liad gone off to the Samana, they had 
left 700 o r  800 Musuazai tlirelttening Saclcla. A later report improved 
upon tliis by stating that 2,000 tribesnleri mere collected 5 rniles from 
Sadda. Still graver news was received in the eve~iing, when t h e  
Political Oficei* received a telegl-am saying that tlie advance of rein- 
forcenleats I~ad been postponed for tlie present. This, however, was 
capped at 10 P.X. by infoi*rnlttion arriving that 3,000 Ahid is  a n d  
Omkzai llad now collected a t  Badttmit ; that they had brought their  
woxllen-folk and  rations, and that they intended to make a combined 
;ittack on Srtclcla on tlle ilight of the 31.~1 September. Tlie wire was still 
working as far as Thal, and a, message asking for troops was seut off in  
the middle of the night. Almost immediately afterwards the line was 
broke11 up in three separate places, and damaged to such an extent t ha t  
no ttttempt was made for the tinle being to repair it. On the morning of 
the 1st Septenlber the Intelligence Officer heard that the Afridis ancl 
Orakzai liad been waiting for con tingents to arrive from the Chamkannis 
and Alishel.zni, amo~lgst whom niullalls had beell sent to stir u p  afeeliilg 
of fanaticism and hostility against tlie Government. But these two 
sections weiwe disinclined to join the tribal gathering, so the Afridis 
had voted to attack without them. This they did the same night. 
About 2,000 nien marched straight for Sadda, halting in the jungle 
about a mile off. The remainder proceeded to attack Balish Khel, an 
isolated nlilitia post, about 3 miles froni Sadda, which was built so as to 
enable raiders to be cut ofT, when returning to the hills. The Afridis 
apparently did not relish the idea of leaving this small post in their 
real; and so determined to take i t  first, ancl then, uniting their forces, to  
attack Sadda. Tlie firing began in broad daylight, and increased 
as twilight deepened into darkness, when a continuous fusillade was 
kept up on every side till midnight. The BaIish Khel Post consists of 
a small tower with a courtyard on the south side, in  which are the lluts 
inhabited by the garrison, which amounted a t  the time of a tbck  to 20 
men of tlie Kurram militia, under a havildar, No doubt the Afridis 
expected to make short work of this mere handful of men. But the fire 
kept up from the ramparts was so severe that for a long time none of the  
attackers dared venture near tlie walls. About midnight ammunition 
began to run short; the Afridis crept up to the courtyard gate, ancl began 
to  hew it to pieces with axes. This they soon succeeded in doillg, bu t  
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They tried, hut  fnilcrl t o  sct the huts on fire. Matters weye getting 
sta~*inils for the little gai~isnn,  ;tnd they mncle signals of distress by tlu-ow- 
ing UP bundles of burning grass frolri the top of the tower. Tlie enemy 
mere now closillg in; ~ v l i e ~ i  help a t  Inst arrived from two directions. 
Fifty illell (Mt~lilc I<llels) i t l ~ ~ i ~ e c l  from S;tclila, and charged right up to 
the for t  walls, losing two of their number in doing so. The Africlis 
drew off, leaving two bodies in tlie gatevray of the courtyarcL Fifty 
Kun+arn militia also arrived from Hassan Ali, b u t  they were just too late 
to get inl;o toucli with the eneniy. Only oi:e of our men in  the fort was 
woniicled. How many of tlie attaclrers were killed, it is impossible to 
say, but  the  Koran and standard of the ~iiullali who led the attack were 
fonnd on tlle gsouncl in  the morning, and blood staiiis were found here 
and there. Tlle darkness of the night, however,. and the good cover 
atI'ordecl by nullalis mere a great advantage in favour of the attaclring 
l)ar(;y. The Afridi liavildar in cornlnand of Baliuh IKliel had been 
called to by name, and asked to surrender ; but  lie remained faith- 
ful to his sitlt, and repliecl to these overtures b y  volleys of Snider 
bullets. Both he and his men fouglit as well as men co.uld, and the 
pasty of villagers from Ssdcla (only ti0 strong) sho~veil great pluck in  
goiiig out to lielp tlie post, knowing as  they did tllrtt the  Afridis were 
attacking in force. It was 1~1cky for them that  they did not stumble in  
tlie clarlrness on the  2,000 men who were only waiting for the post to 
fall to aclvallce and make an attack on Sadda. The 2nd September 
passed away quietly, so far  as tlie tribes were concerned, except that some 
sowars m7ere fired a t  close t o  Paracliinar, when returning from patrol, 
about 11 P.M. Bu t  a passengey in the mail elcka brought in the pleasantly 
astonishing inforniation t l ~ t  troops were on the road between Tllal ancl 
Sadda, and that they would probably reach the  latter place by the even- 
i l ~ g  of the 3rd September. No official intimation of any nlove of troops 
liacl been received since the  telegram came stating tha t  tlie advance 
had been postponed; but next morning U r .  Hastings and Major 
Vansittart, who had proceeded to Si~dda, got a letter saying that troops 
would arrive a t  Sadda by 6 P.M. The arrival of reinforcements was of 
course a still greater surprise to tlie Afridis tlian to  the  garrison ; and 
instead of attempting a further attack the tribal gathering broke up. 
The road into Sadda, on the  3rd and 4th September, presented a 
most extraordinary sight. On the 3rd, before the news of tlie advance 
of reinforcements had been confirmed by letter, bands upon bands of 
friendly Turis, horse and foot, could be s.een making tlieir way from 
Trill ,pr T<on.anl to Sacl& and o t,llcr point3 li1iei)- t o  he attacked Lower 
I<anlrr~l. Tllr big att:~ck ~vas expected on tlie night of the 3rd 
Lei.; all these llletl were going down to help to  beat off the  common 
erlellly; tlley all gladly responclod t o  the call of the Political Officer? and 
erelay rillage spnt  s contingent, just as they rvould have done in t h e  old 
di~ys, 11ef01.e rvc touk over the safe custody of the  valley. Many aT1 old 
raider's heart lanst hare bent qnieker as he thought of the  past, when 
lit* l l i~d rirlclen fort11 in jwt the saine 1v.z). on some foray fa r  across the  
I~order. Ercec.llloade~~s were very scarce, but  two-tllircls of the  men had 
je:nils, arlcl all of t l~enl  had the long Pntllnn knife stuclr througT1 their 
kr~lnmer hu,tds, ~vllile 11ere :tnd there was a revoluer or pistol, the la t ter  
gthn~rally of n:ttire ~vorkmansl~ip. To look at their merry faces, one 
1vo111~1 l~nvc inlngincd they were off to some wedding or other + a n z ~ ~ ? ) n  
:uld not going to fight against odds for hearth and home. The 
Turi car:~lry especially took things with evident lightness of heart.  
f IPIY and t,hel.e a grass chnpl i  woulcl be stuck up in the  middle of the 
rontl, and the next xuiilute i t  was to  be seen a t  the end of a lance 
in the sir. The way tliey g,zlloped along the hard high road was 
wonclerful to see. Tlle following day they were t.o be seen returning 
t u  their llonles : the ar~t~ivnl of reinforcements in the very nick of time 
llit~l rllncle tlieir presence no longer necessary in Lower Kurram. The 
Turiw, the reader may be reminded, are Shiah Mahomedanr, ; whilst 
their tribal neishbours are almost witllout exception Sunnis, hence the  
division mid inveterate animosity between the two. 
But llostilitics mere not yet a t  an end in the  Kurram Valley, despite 
tlle arrival a t  Suddn of Colonel Richardson's flying column ; indeed the 
very presence of so large a force in  reinT seemed to incite the  now out- 
flanked Orakzai tribes in the neigllbourhood to  renewed aggression. On 
the 16th September a t  10-30 P.M., t he  Sadda, camp was attnclred f rom the 
dil'ection of the  Karmana defile. Tlle advanced picket of the  5th P u n -  
j:~b f nfan try was driven in by a sudden rush of the enemy, assistecl by 
villagers living three miles east of Sadda,. The retirement was admir- 
ably covered by tlle steady company volleys of the  lit11 Gurlzllns, 
under L ie~ t~enan t s  Kitchen and Browne, and the section volleys of the 
5thPunjab Infantry. The portion of the camp attacked was t h e  east 
face, held ~ a r t l y  by the wing of the  5th Gurkhas, under Major Vansit-  
tart ,  mllicll had just arrived after a trying march from Parachinar, wi th  
two mountain glxn~, and partly by a wing of t h e  5th Punjal, Infantry. 
The plan of tlle attack had evidently been carefully thought out, the  
force held by the  Gurkhas being kept engaged by several hundred of 
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the enemy, whilst tile main attack WRS zllsile on t,lle soutll-east corner 
held by t l ~ e  5th Punjab I i l f a n t ~ ~ .  13elae the ground, esl,eciiLlly t l ~ t  
forwerly held by the 5th Purljab Infantry picket, lent itself sdrllir- 
ahly to the tzctics subsequently ac'lupted by tlle enenly, who, fincling 
the garrison on the alert, abanclolled the idea of rushing the  camp, 
and settled clo.vvlz to a muslretry attack, pouring a steady and fai1'l.y 
well directed fire into the ctlnlp for about 32 I~ours, exceptfor Z~reaku 
of five minutes. The defence of the east face was vulutibly stre~lgthened 
by a company of the 15th Silrlls, sent up by Colonel Abbott wit11 adniir- 
able foretllought. All the troops actively ellgaged .v.vTel*e i n  positicrn in 
tlle shortest possible time, and the first two steady and precise volleys 
of the gallant Gurkhas disabused the enemy's mind as to the possibility 
of effecting a11 entrarlce in that quartel-, altllough their rrlailitsiilirlg a, 
position on broken ground 500 yards from the Gur.lihss, coupled with 
tlle ul~certaiu light, which conceslecl their numbers, prevented a, counter- 
attack. Two con~pariies of the 5th Punjab Infantry under. Lieutenant 
A. Q. Ames, and one company of tlle 15th Siklls, the whole under 
Colonel Jameson's imulediate command, consequently bore t h e  ruain 
bruut  of the enemy's attack. Colonel Richnrclson, comnlalicling t h e  
flying column, and his Staff Oficer, Captain Rennecly, were qnickly 
on the spot, arranging f o r  a reinforceruent, and were assisted by 
Captain Eardley-Wilmot, and Lieutenallts liickets and Norman, of the  
18th Bengal Lancers. The discipline of all ranks was excellent, and 
although the casualties amongst the horses and transport were heavy, 
the  order that prevailed throughout the attack of tliree hour*s spolre 
highly for the arraugenlents of the column and for the q~rie t  energy of 
all the British and Native Olficers whell exposed to a fire to wllicll there 
was no opportunity of xsponse. The enemy was estirllated at 2,000 
sti*ong; their casualties were unknown, but  fronl a visit t o  Badhura 
village i t  was apparent that lmge numbers were wounded, tlle dead 
having already been buried. Our total casualties were : 1 nlau killed, 
5 wounded, and 5 followers mounded ; 2 llorses killed and 9 wounded ; 3 
mules killed and 2 wouncied ; 2 camels killed and 5 wounded. 
A ~veek later the Chamkanni tribe, of about 1,700 fighting men, in  
north Rurram, joined the ranks of the enem.. ; a fact of no great import- 
ance except so far as  i t  illustrated the unusual extent to which excile- 
anent on the borcler hacl now sprcad, for accorclillg to Bellew's Hares qf 
fy,$ani8tan tl.1~ Cllsmltaniiis al-e '' a, quiet, inoi2"eusivc% and industrious 
people, and distinguished by the nou-exis teilcc ~ ~ m o n g  tllulu of f c t ~ d ~ ~ l  
iigllls and highway robbe~ies." 
1 
TRIBAL ATTACK ON OUR sauax;ra - slinsaIIERI AND QULISTAN. 
OX September 10tl1, infol.mation rencl,ecl General Y e a t m a n - B i g s  o n 
the  Sarliana that  rt combined Ol.a,kz:~i alld Afieicli lnshknr had b e g ~ r l l  
t o  1 ~ v c  down the Rhanki  Valley. A reconna,issance confirnled the 
news, as severill thousnnd ruen were seen nlarching eastwards. I t  W;LS 
surruisrd that Shnhu Kllel was their first objective, and that tlie l i t r g e  
villi~ge of I b ~ r t h i ~ ~ z i t i  on the Koll~t-H,ang:.u lwad might a lso be t l l r e ~ ~ t -  
eneil. Slialiu Kllel is only three ~ni les  north of Ibrahimzai,  w l i i c h  
agitin is five lniles east of Hsngu .  General Yeatn1;~n-Biggs a c c o ~ d i n g l y  
se t  his colurun in niotion, and rnal*ched along the Sanlazltl, r idge to- 
\ v a ~ d s  Laklia and Sllitli u IChel in  orcleib to intercept the  enemy and  cove l '  
1brahi:uzai. The colurun consisted of ,z detucliluent of the  Royal  Irish 
Reginlent, tlie I s t  Bitttnlions of the Bricl ancl 3 rd  Gurlrllas and t h e  2n ci 
P u n j i ~ b  Inf;lntry. The enelny, wlio ciime in touch witli t h e  realQ uf the 
columu at dusk, nulubered from 3,000 to 4,000, all Sheilrhan, Misllti ancl 
IYIalit KIiel clatls of the Ol.alizai, ci~rrying 11 stsnclsrds. T h e y  a t t a c k e d  
the rear-gu:~rcl, colisisting of a htlf battalion of the  3rd G u r k l ~ a s  aild 
five corllpanies of the  2nd Gurkllas, about 4 miles from t l le  b i v o u a c  
by Gogrrt Hill. Tlie rear-guitrd kept the enemy in  clieck by  s t e a c l y  
volleys, in spite of ruslies nlacle up to 20 yards from the xuuzzles, ~ ~ i l d  
escorted id1 the lllule transport in safety. Tlie snrwans l e f t  t h e  c s m c l s  
ancl bolted, with one exception, aud the camels tlirew off their loads a u c l  
w a d e r e d  off tile road, several being hi t  by bullets. Two compsnies of 
the  2nd Y unjab Infsutry, unclel* Lie uteliallt Elsmie, acco~upai~iecl  b y  
Captain Scudamore, Deputy Assis taut Quartermaster-General, went 0x1 t 
and cover'ed the retirement of tlie Gurkhas very smartly, Of t h e  enell ly 
Y a r  -UuI~amed, a leading Cliief of tlie Sheilihan, five lesser chiefs of t l l c  
Mala Kllel, and 25 others were killed, and e very Irzrge number of 
mvuncled were carried off. Our castlalties were 4 killecl and 9 
wouuded. Captain J. G. Robinson, 2nd Gurlilias, was s l ight ly  wounclucl. 
The bodies of our ki l le~l  wert recove~*ed the next morning by  Col.uiief 
Lawrence's column. 
Having checked the enemy's nclvance, General Yeatman-Biggs w ; ~ s  
obliged, owing to the  want of water, to retul-n to I-Iangu, where I l i s  
column halted on the  12th ancl13th Septiembcr, rer~cly to move out a g a i r ~  
in any direction shoulcl t he  encmy reappear. 
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As for the Oralrzai, finding they were bltrckcil 011 tile cast of tllc 
Sa ruana  they turned tlieir sttentiuli to tlie ~11lilll posts on tIlc rilngc? 
i tse l f ,  a Inshkn?. moving up from ICh~mppit so its t o  place itself betJlrcen 
F o r t s  Loclrliitrt and Gulistsn.* 
After repeated assaults, the tribesmen succeeded in capturing on 
the  12th September, under circumstances that  will long be 1*e1ilcnibcl.e;l, 
the small post of Saraghel-i on the bet\vecrl the tnlo follts. Tllc 
~ ~ r i s o n ,  which consisted of only 21 men of the 36th Sil;lls, mxtle ,z 
g s ~ l l ~ i i t  defence, holding out from 9 o'clock in the  morning till 4-:3(1 
i n  tlie afteriloon against odds which from the first mere clcarly over- 
~vhelming.  Two ~let~ernlined assaults n7ere brilliaa tl y repulsed, but : ~ t  
tlle third rush tlie eiielily succeeded in  brcalring down tlie door, a1111 
w h e n  the plucky Sikhs maliiiiilg the witlls ruslied down fro111 tlleir posts 
t o  defend the  doorway tlle slvarrniug tribesmen scaled the I\-alls anrl it11 
was over. But  not a sepoy even then thongllt of sulsrenclel.ing while 
l i f e  l*emained, and eventually the whole of the  gnlli~nt defellclcrs fell 
v ic t ims to their heroism. One stout-hearted soldier in the guartlroonl 
lrillecl twenty of the eneniy without h u r t  t o  himself, and lost liis life 
by  refusing to budge when the Afi5dis, un:~ble to get a t  hiw, firally set; 
t h e  room on fire. The signaller, as bmve as the rest, coolly kept up 
coillmunication with Foyt Lockhart up till the very last ~uonient. Tile 
eiltil-e ga~rison in fact beliaved with splendid courage, slid t1lcr.e is 
perhaps no more touchirlg i~lslitnce of illflexible clevotiorl to duty tlmn 
t l l i s  in  the  whole narrative of frontier fighting. Tlie details of tlle 
f igh t  will never be laown, fol- not a soldier crme out t~f S;~raghc~i  itlive, 
b u t  if tlie story could be told it would beyoild doubt be one of the 
  no st tllrilling that  Sikh valour 11th~ ever ful~iiished. 'l'lle f x t s  reltttecl 
h e r e  calve mainly from tlie eileuly, and may i10t be nbsulutely corrcct, 
b u t  a t  all evelits no more reliable account of the fall uf Sa~agLeri will 
ever be obtaillable. 
A fund was subsequently openecl b y  the pi once^ with the object of 
benefitting the widows and fauilies of tlle 21 fallen Xilclis slid of 
erecting some suitul~le monument in  tlle f'unjab to perpetuate tlle 
memory of the defence of Saragheri. Cefore the elld of the year over 
l%a.20,000 had been subscribed. 
It has been mentionecl that the signaller a t  Saragheri kept u p  
co~~ln~ui~ ie l t t ion  wit11 Fort  Luckllnrt while the Afridis were storrui~lg tlle 
walls. On tlie rcccil~b of the news of the attack, the  garrison a t  E u ~ t  
Locklial-t attemptecl a cliversion by sending out 100 rifles, but this 
little force wits threatened on its rigllt flank and foroecl to fall back. 
The capture of Saragheri and the sluugllter of its brave little gaypi- 
son served to clirect attention sonie time later to the systeni under wllicll 
small posts are held along the fronlier. '' Son~e of them," wrote the 
Pioneer in an indignan t ar ticle, " are certain death- traps in case of at- 
tack by large bodies uf tribesnien, and in the interests of those wlio have 
t o  clefend tlleiu sonietliing should be done to give tlie garrisons some 
cllance of holding out until help call reach them. In more than one in-  
stance we read of wooden-dooi-s having been forced open: iu there ally 
good reason why those doors should n ~ t  be so placed as to be out of the 
reach of iLny one who has not a scaling ladder 1 Cannot thick sheet-irou 
be substituted for wood All along the borderland and in Afghanistan 
a r e  towers wllicll nlight well be taken as patterns for our very small posts. 
Tlle lower portions of these are of rocks and stones; the door is 10 or 15 
feet above the ground ; and access to tlie tower is gdined by a l t~dder  
which is puslieci up m2ien there is an alarm of an enemy approachiiig. 
- 
A t  Saragheri, and a t  Sadda also, the doors seem to have beell flush wit11 
the  grouiid, and the tribeemen could thus get a t  the111 with pickaxes, and, 
in the case of Saragberi, force an entrance. Tlie fact seems to be tllrlt our  
a~llaller posts are built for occupation by levies, and the men ordinarily 
occupying them cau generally arrange to make terms with their assailaiits 
'and so escape with their lives. But when war breaks out and there is a' 
great  rush of hostile bodies across our frontier, some of the posts have t o  
be tnken over by regular troops and held a t  all costs. They are hastily 
provisioned, a scanty supply of water is given to tbe garrison, and only 
in t he  matter of abundant ammunition are our sepoys made l~appy. 
They cheerfully face the danger illto which tlisy are thus t h ~ u s t  and  
they die fighting t o  the last. There nlust be something very wrong ill a 
system thns makes the fate of a small pxrty of soldiers a foregone 
conclusion. We are told that i t  was essential to hold Saragheri in older 
t o  ~naiiltain colvmunicatioll by signalling between Forts Lockhart and  
Gulistan. I f  that were so the little post sllould have been originally 
made so strong that it could llold out for a t  least three or four days,'' 
The opinion may also be quoted here of an Officer who inspected 
what  was left of Snraglieri after it  had been re-captured by our troops.* 
H e  cleclared that the post was situated in a hopeless pli~ce and that an 
attacliiiig force coulcl get up czll round, uncler cover, quite close to the  
* The re-uityturo of Sarngheri hits yet ta be related. 
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walls. To hnvr clrfencled it successfully 'LOO n1t.n at lcxst woulil llnrc 
bee11 ~*equired, and tlle door slionld have been I~~l lc l , -~roof ,  The 21 
~ i l &  had no chance of holding their orrn. The discorcry rrrns also llladc 
that  tlie br~stions of all the forts on the Sanlana lii~ve a '' dencl corner," 
so that if s few men can manage to creep up uucliscorered they can tlig 
away a t  the walls in perfect safety from ride-fire. This mas ~vllat 
actually llappened a t  Saragheri. 
On the 12th of September, a t  the time that Sn~aghcri mas attacl<ed, 
Fort  Gulistau was closely invested by a large Orakzai Inshicar. On the fiL1l 
of Saragheri, a t  ahout 4 P.M., the investment of Gulistan became n regular 
ntltack, the enelliy tliere being joined by a co~lsiclerable part of the force 
wlllch liad been at Saraglleri. During the night of the 12tl1-13tl1, the 
enemy, who were in great force behind Picket Hill, about 350 ynrds from 
the western end of the llornmo~*k, pushed their advanced parties close 
np to the hornwork, especially on the west and north. On tlie ~l~oriiing 
of the 13th September, the qituation was decidedly serious ; in ilddition 
t o  the force attaclring Fort Gulistan all corninunicstion cut off by 
Inshka~*s of the eneny holdillg Saragheri heights, t l ~ e  Gogra heights and 
the Saillaus Suk. The niost adv:tncecl post of the enemy, with several 
standards, was witliin 20 yards of tlie south-west corner of the horn work, 
under cover of banks improved by xa~rgars erected du~ ing  the clnrk night. 
The enemy, elated by their success at  Saragheri, were very bold, ancl i t  was 
Iea1.ecl that they might, RS they had done st Sitr~gheri, breiacli the fort 
wnll a t  tile dead angle of a bastion. Under these ci~.cumstance~ BEajor 
Des T T ~ u x  approved of the suggestion of Colour-Hilvildar Kala Singl~, 
36th Sikhs, who volunteered to take his section and attempt to drive 
the enemy out of their advanced post. The responsibility was very 
great : on the one hand, should the sortie be successful, the moral effect 
would he very great, both in dispiriting tlie enemy and in raising the 
spirits of the garrison; on the other hand failure would mean sometl~ing 
very nearly akin to disaster ; and in any case it was certain that the 
snlall garrison, origiilally numbering 166 of all mnks, but already much 
reduced by casualties, would suffer still greater losses a t  a time when 
a single man could ill be spared. 
Havildar Rala Singll's section numbered only IG men in addition t o  
their gallant leader, but they were men indeed. The enemy a t  tlle 
immediate point to be attacked nun~be~ed  a t  least 200. Tlie little party, 
wit11 bayonets fixed, crept out of the soutll-east gateway and along the 
south wall of the hornworlr; then when within 20 yards o r  so 
OF t 1 1 ~  F D P I ~ I P  1lli111~ B 1.11~11. They wclae met with such a fire 
tllilt tliey caul no t  get 11p to the enemy ; but, tl~ollgll sadly rechccd 
t l l ~ ~ j -  lincl nt) tllouglit of rctrcnt, b u t  lay clown a t  a distance of only 
s i r  IXICCS Rwn tlie enemy's sangnr and returned the fire. A t  tliis 
junrt1n.e Colaur-H:~vildar Suuder Singh a ~ i d  19 men posted in the  horn- 
n.l,i-k ;rt ttie lienrest poilit to  tlie songat*, \~i thout  waitilig for 01-del-s 
iltill of their own initi:itive, scl-arnLlecI over tlie wall and joilled ICala, 
Si1i:h.s s ~ ~ t i , r ~ l ;  nnr  the coilibinecl pnrtjr then clia.~ged the enemy, 
killthtl and \\~uunrlccl ;L grent numbe~*, drove the remaiudel* out and  cap- 
t11l.t.d tlll-ec ctf tlieir stnncl;tl~cls, which they brought back to the  f o r t  
:~iuitlst ~'iliyi~ifi ~ 1 i e ~ ' r s  f o111 tlleir comrndes. It mas then discovered that 
t,\\.o \vc,nntletl llierl 1l:ld lwei1 left beliincl. Three sepoys, two of wlionl 
11:111 t i l l~en  part in tlie sortie, a t  ollce of t h e i ~  own iritiative again g o t  over 
t l ~ e   all :u~il ~muglit  he two n~ounded men in. 
Tlnring t11e s o ~ t i e  a hot fire was kept up from every effective riff e in 
tllc f, 1r.t :uiil llnl-~lworlr, :incZ tlia~llrs partly to this tlie casualties were 
ll4d g,rlscntur, tliougll 12 of the first party and four of the second were 
~v4,rltltlecl nrld sevei:tl afterwards died. 
Tlic eifect of tlie sortie was great, the gnrrison xvei-e in tlie highest 
s~iirits, mliilst, i t  is snid, the tliree sections.of the M;trnuzai represented 
Ily tlie three stanclnrds capturecl, returned to their homes, and Fort 
I iulistntl saw tlieill no niore." 
ILavililar Ii:tln Sing11 \vas so seriously wounded that he clicd shortly 
nftcrivrti~cls. Tlie so-cczllecl hornwork i ~ t  Fort Gulistan, is a n  enclosure 
x l ~ ~ u t  SO yards long by 30 broi~d, linviilg tlie fort on one side and being 
stirruunded by a, wall of loose stolles-a meye stln.yar-on the  qtller 
tlirrc sides. Tliis wall littd been tempo~arily improved in places by 
logs of firewood, and atta bags and kerosine tins filled with earth alld 
stones, to give a little head cover to  the defenders. 
3Tajor Des Vwux now got through a letter for help t o  F o r t  
Lock1i:~rt on the pretence of asking leave to surrender, the Afridis 
having ofrered to spare the lives of British Officers if all the forts mere 
given up. By evening the enemy closed all  round, and kept up a 
Iieavy fire. Tllere were several casualties anlong the Oficers ancl 
Inen, who had now been a t  their posts for 30 hours continuously. The 
enemy kept up the  fire all night again, but a t  7 P.M. the ga~r i son  saw a 
field battery in t h e  hliranzai Valley firing on the enemy, and were rnucll - 
* Till here the story of the seige of GuIistan is given in the exact words of Colonel 
Haughton's official report, 
, 0 l*#! 
a*' 
encouraged. All the next day and right through the nigh t-the third 
night of the attack-the fatigued garrison were forced to stand to the 
defence, but  a t  8 o'clock on the morning of the 15th September they 
again heard firing in the distance, indicating the approach of help from 
Hangti, and felt cheered, though the enemy now closed in more fiercely 
than ever. A t  noon the trihleforce then occupying the captured Sara- 
gheri post was shelled out by General Yeatman-Biggs'a relieving force and 
soon afterwtrds Gulistan itself was rescued and the enemy completely 
drivenoff. The strength of the Gulistan garrison was as follows :-Major 
C. H. Des Voeux, Commanding. ; Lieutenant H. R. E. Pl*att, Surgeon, 
Captain C. B. Pratt, and 165 rifles, 36th Sikhs ; besides Mrs. Des Veux, 
four children and two nurses. The Major had conducted the defencq 
with untiring couragt: and cheerfulness, and was well backed up by Lieu- 
tenant Pratt.  The Medical Officer, assisted by Miss McGratll (Mrs. Des 
Vceux's nurse) attended and nursed the wounded under continuous heavy 
fire; Miss Teresa McGrath's heroism was spoken of by Major Des Veux 
in the witrnlest terms. The total loss was : 2 killed, 8 dangerously wound- 
ed, 8 seriously and 24 slightly wounded, of whom M i d  not report them- 
selves wounded till the fort was relieved. There is no doubt that this fort, 
as well as the small posts of Snngnr and Dhar, would have fallen but for 
the timely arrival of the relieving column. The following is  an extract 
fro111 a private letter, dated 18th September, received in Australia, from 
Major Des V ceux, and published in the Queenslander :-'' My men here 
fought like tigers, but  we lost heavily-44 out of 166, lrilled, wounded, 
a n d  missing. Things were very serious ' indeed, but my men pulled me 
through. The enemy were all round, within twenty yards, well under 
cover and firins! like mad. I ordered a sortie a t  8 A.M. on the 13tl.1, as 
the enemy were getting too close, and it was carried out with the most 
splendid gallantry, and we ~aptured  three staudt~rds. Teresa (Miss 
McGrath) surpkssed herself attending to the sick and wounded. Her 
name has gone forward for reward and I hope she will get it .  She will 
certainly get the medal, and probably an order. I have recommended 
thir ty of my men for the Order of Merit: (The Indian Victoria (-;'ross), 
. . . A good many of illy poor wounded are deiLd or dying ; the rest 
have been sent to Port Lockhart. I had 10,000 tribesmen all round me 
for three days, and we heldout ; they could have taken the fort easily 
if they had had the pluck. We lrillecl. and wounded 200 of the enemy." 
It afterwards transpired that  Mrs. Des Vceux, who gave birtli to a 
daughter during the fighting, Bail done noble service pr.eviously in 
attending to the wouaded. 
We have now to relate how i t  came about that Generiil 'Yeatmarf- 
Biggs's relieving colarun arrived on the scene a t  such an opportune 
moment. I t  is necessary to go back to the 10th September, when Gene- 
ral Yeatman-Biggs, hearing of the advance of the Orakzai and Afridi  
Inahkar, had marched his column along the Samana ridge and after some  
rear-guard fighting had driven the enemy back up the Khanki Valley- 
I t  will be remembered that the absence of water on the Semana had 
compelled tlie General to hurry back wit11 all speed to Hungu, and 
it mas while he was making this return marc11 that we left him, in 
order to follow tlie further movements of the enemy. Prom this 
point the Special Correspondent of the Pioneer a t  Hangu may be allowed 
to take up the narrative :- 
" At 3-30 P.M. (he wrote) just as we had started on our return to 
Hangu, we received news by helio that the greater part of the lashkar 
we had been hunting had doubled on its tracks, and was a t  that 
~~ioment  investing the posts wt: had left the day before ; Saragheri and 
Gulistaxi being hard pressed. ,There was not a drop of water to d r i n k  
nearer than Hangu, and to fight our way back in the dark witllout i t  was, 
in view of the condition of men and animals, a physical impossibility. 
Very reluctantly the General, not daring to leave Hangu unprotected, 
followed the convoy, and we toiled painfully down the path, nirich 
harassed by the tribesmen, and a t  6-30 P.M. arrived in camp dead beat .  
A11 nest day we rested as well as we could, after receiving the news of 
the fall of Saraglieri, which reached us that evening, haunted by the f e a r  
that me should be too late to relieve Qulistan, which, be i t  remenl- 
bered, contained English women and children. As a diversion, five 
sq~iadrons and four field guns were sent offunder Major Middleton, 
3rd Bengal Cavalry, to get as near as possible under Gulistxn and do 
what they could. As it turned out, this was a good deal, for though 
their fire at  that range could not be very effective, their appearance not 
only greatly cheered the beleagured garrison, but  misled the enemy 
by suggesting to then1 that our advance would be made by Doabzt. This 
they showed by breaking up the roads and planting aangars against us. 
cc At midnight the relieving force started from Bangu, carrying o n l y  
great coats, waterproof sheets, blankets and one day's provisions, wi th  
every pakhal we could muster. The whole force was concentrated at 
Lakha by 4-30 A.M., and a t  daybreak we advanced to  Gogra Hill. A s  we 
anticipated, the enemy, though taken by surprise, soon took possession 
of an ideal position on the hill with advanced posts at Tsalai, with 11, 
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's against us. 
ar~yzng only  
~isions,  with 
standards and ZLIJOI~~ 4,000 n~en. They ope.ned a Ilbt and fairly accurate 
fire on our advance, but  the guns which were brought up quickly into 
,the front line soon produced an effect, and the 3rd Gurkhas,supported by 
the 2nd Gurkhas, stormed the hill. The enemy's retreat was pounded by 
the guns and l~n,a-~ang.e fire of the Royal Irish, and Colonel naughton 
on the west, hurrying down from Lockhart Fort with all of t l ~e  36th 
Sikhs and signallers and sick of the Itoyal Irish that could be spared, 
materially quickened their pace. 
iL Our force rapidly pushed on for Fort Lockhart, passing on its way 
the little post of Ssngar, besieged for the last 24 hours ; its garrison 
of 41 men of the 36th Sikhs, were drawn up, as we passed, proudly 
displaying a standard they had captured in a smart little sortie the night 
before. On we pushed to Fort Lockhart, and the General, mounting 
the Fort tower, could see Saragheri Hill onwhich the captured post stood, 
covered"withmasses of the enemy. A t  last we believed in the oft-reported 
'thousands' of the lashka~., for there must have been a t  the lowest 
computation 8,000 tribesmen in battle array. Still there was no nems of 
Fort  Gulistan, so the General ordering up the guns, soon had the hill 
so swept by shrapnel that on the advance of the infantry not a soul was 
found. It was a thousand pities, for hadwe but known it, Gulistan was 
safe for some hours yet, and had we but had the tinle we might have 
inflicted heavy loss on an enemy whose line of retreat would have been 
open to oiir fire. However, so far  as we knew, no time was to be lost, so 
limbering up we pushed on another two miles, and there, on the oppo- 
site hill, stood Gulistan Port still bravelyholding out. The slopes above 
and beyond were literally packed with swarms of the enemy,now warned 
.by the sound of our guns that the time for their departure was a t  hand. 
A t  the sight of our skirmishers on the skyline every manof thebeleaguer- 
ed garrison who could stand, wounded or whole, sprang to the parapets 
and opened a heavy fire on the now wavering foe. Our guns hurried 
up and, unlimbering, poured in their shrapnel, while the infantry, racing 
down the steep hillside, did their best with long-range volleys to per- 
suade some at  least of the tribesmen to stay behind. The guns under 
Captain Parker made beautiful practice, even at  extreme ranges, across 
the wide valley, searching out and dispersing every group we could 8ee 
and putting shell after shell into a village where the tribesmen had 
imagined themselves a t  least secure. 
" Saragheri was a piteous sight; the fort, which only two days before 
we had deemed impregnable unless reduced by want of ammunition, 
.,ate* o r  food, was nlnlost let-elled to tlie glvou11d, while the bodies of its 
galant gt;ll.dson lily stril2ped and horribly mutilated amid the ruins of 
tile post they had so bravely held. Tlie whole attacl: had been clearly 
visible to the garrisons at  Gulistan and Lockhart, who were however 
powerless t o  render effective aid. After the second assault on Saragberi 
tn-o of the enemy hzd been left behind in a dead angle of the 
Flanking Tower. These, working with some instrument, l x ~ d  speedily 
removed a atone and then mass after mass of masonry fell. Soon a prac- 
ticable breach was made, and in leas time than i t  takes to write all 
was over. Eundreds swarmed in through the breach and over t h e  
tv~lls. The little garrison, 21 rifles only in all, before tlie fight began, 
retreated to their sleeping quxrters and fought i t  out grimly t o  the E 
bitter end.* Tales have come from the very enemy, how one man in t h e  
I 
i 
gu;trd-room slew 20 before they burnt him inside, and how one wounded 
man on his chnrpoy shot down four before they could gain admittance. 
Their comrades looked on silently as me drew out corpse after corpse, 
hut tl~er-e will be, I ween, a bitter day of retribution to come. Sil:hs 
Gur'kll;~~ have now seen their mutilated dead. 1 , 
''Homeve~; Fort Gulistan was safe, and with lightened hearts, some I 
of ns pushed on. By 2 P.M., we were within its walls. Blackened w i t h  
I 
i 
gunpowder, worn out wit11 36 hours of continuous toil and stress, m a n y  
I 
bandaged and blood-stained, the garrison still presented a brave front.  
Drawn up at  the gate were the survivors of the sortie with the tliree 
standards they had captut.ecl. Out of the original garrison of I65 
rifles two had been killed, 8 dangerously and some, I fear, mortally 
wounded ; 8 aeverely and 24 slightly wounded. Of these latter, 9 did 
not report themselves mounded till relief had come. Major Des VEUX, 
who had his anxieties doubly intensified by the presence of his family, 
had been the life and soul of the defence, guarding against every danger  
and showing a fine example of cheerfulness and steadfastness to all .  
Lieutenant Pratt, an Officer of a year's standing had ably seconded 
him, though suffering from dysentery : Surgeon-Captain Yratt bad 
untiringly tended the wounded under heavy fire, helped by Miss  
Teresa McGrath, Mrs. Des Vceux's maid, who amid the flying bullets 
could be seen here bathing a wounded sepoy's head and there tying up 
another's arm till the doctor could come. Lasb, but not least, every 
sepoy of this gallant band did his duty, and st times almost more t h a n  
his duty, in a way wortlly of the proud name of Sikh. The state of 
* This account, it  will be noticed, differs slightly in detail from what may be called 
the enemy's version of the affair, already given. 
1 the f o ~ t  map be better iinsgined tlinil described. Bearing in mind the 
number of dead ancl wounded in tliitt small space and the impossibility 
of any but the most primitive conservancy arrangements, i t  is due only 
to the wonderful purity of this mountain air that the place was in 
any way endurable.)' 
Leaving the fort with two mountain gulls and the 2nd Punjab 
1 Infantry to guard it, the main colunln returned to Fort Loclthart and 
there bivonncked, having marched since miclnight 24 miles without 
food and conie into action three times. From " friendly " Rabia Rhels 
it mas afterwards ascertained that the losses of the enemy, all told, 
during these several operations, exceeded 400, incllxding some 180 killed 
in the taking of Saragheri. The next day General Seatman-Biggs 
visited Qulistan and issued a stirring Force Order extolling the heroic 
defence of these two posts and promising to forward the names of the 
most distinguished for valonr. Major Des Vceux presented to him his 
Offlcers and, last bnt not least, Miss McGrath, and he then visited the 
wounded, marly of whom wore gliastly signs of what they had gone 
through, and gLve orders for the remedying of the most obvious 
defects of the post. 
For the time being hostilities had ceased, but there was every prospect 
of this kincl of desriltory fighting being resumed. The difficulty which 
General Yeatman-Biggs hncl to face was one not easily overcome. Each 
time his troops advanced on to the Samana Rsnge the ti7ibesnlen a t  once 
drew off in to the Klianki Valley, and then began nlarching eastwards 
so as to threaten our border north-east of Hangu. But i t  was impos- 
sible for any large body of troops to ren~ain on the range for more than 
two days at  a time, as the water-supply was limited and the springs only 
yielded a certain quantity. This quantity was ample for the normal 
garrison of six conipanies of infantry, but not for a wlrole brigade with 
followers and transport anilllals. Hence the marching and counter- 
marching that htd to be done. I f  the Omkzkzai had only advanced well 
beyond the $amsna there would have been some chance of punishing 
them severely, bu t  large as their numbers were they were not bold , 
enough to do this. The operations therefore became a game of hide 
and seel<, wit11 the 2dvantw.e on the side of the Orakzai that they c011ld 
move rapidly from point to point, a s  they Vera not incommoded by 
any transport train and each man carried his own supplies. Our forts 
were strong enough to resist auy ordinary attack, but they could not 
be left to be beleaguered for dsys togetl~er. 
After tlie fighting nf the 15th September, cuInlinatingin the  relief df 
Gulishn, the tribal g:ttIlerings on the &m;~na disappeared, and  the  A f r i d i  
loshkar, separating itself from its Orakzai allies, returned dispirited to 
Tirnh. The Oritkzsi villages in the nei.ghbonrhood of the Samana forts 
were completely abandoned, the enemy betaking themselvea wit11 a l l  t h e i r  
cattle into temporary secuility up the Khanki Valley. A reconnaissance 
aIong this valley as far as Khornppct showed that all was quiet, a n d  
advantage was taken by Genellal Yeatman-Uiggs of the suspension 
of hostilities to improve the very defective water-supply of the  Sarnana  
by digging fresh titnks, and to repair the roads and the telegraph lines. 
On the 18th of Septelilber a representative jirgah of tlie Aka Khels came 
i n  professing their loyalty and pleading that they were; in fear of the 
more powerful clans of the Afridis. They received orders r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  making of a road through their country, a n d  departed promising 
compliance. 
Several plans for assuming the offensive against the Orakzai were  n o w  
considere'3, but  the time was not deemed ripe for any general advance  
into the Khanki Valley. The plan most favoured was to move fou r  
reginlents with nlountain guns down to Khorbappa, where water  was 
plentiful, and take up a strong position within a mile or  so of the 
Xhanki  River. This movement, i t  was thought, would cover the f r o n t  of 
tlle Samana, and would a t  the same time permit of the Sappers and 
nvorki~ig parties improving the two routes from Shinawari, which a n y  
punitive force advancing into the Afridi country later on ~ ~ o u l d  have 
t o  follow. The Orakzai would then hesitate to move down the Ehanki 
Valley, as their rear would be threatened. In order, however, to  
guard against possible raids east of the Samana, more troops were sent 
to Kohat, no as to permit of a flying column operating in  the neighbour- 
hood of Ibrahimzai and Hango: the Northamptonshire Regiment 
the  2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkhas were railed from Rawalpindi to  Kuahal- 
garh, whence they marched to Kohat. 
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TIIE TIRAH PUNITIVE EXPEDITION. 
EARLY i n  September the Government of India announced their deter- 
mination to  institute punitive ope~stions on an extensive scale against; 
both the  Afridis and the Oralrzai : the  can~paign to be under the supreme 
control of Lieutenant-General Sir William Locltl~ai~t, Commanding 
the Forces in the Punjab and Comnlander-in-Chief-Elect of the Army 
in India. Sir Mrilliam Lockhart was then a t  Home, but he left Brindisi 
.on the 3rd Septen~ber a t  almost a dayJs notice, accompanied by Major- 
Generd Lord Methuen, who desired to have au opportunity of seeing 
how a big frontier expeditio~i s carried out. 
W e  publish a t  the  end of this volunle full details of the composi- 
tion and staff of the Tiratl Field Force, as f in~~l ly  selected after several 
necessary revisions. A s  will be seen, i t  was a magnificent force, and 
indeed was quite correctly described as " the flower of our  Arn~jr  in 
India." It comprised, firstly and most importantly, two divisions, each 
consisting of two brigades and divisional troops, the whole forming 
what was officially styled the "Main Column.:' This colu~nn was 
,to be under Sir William Lockhart's personal direction, being ctlarged 
with the foremost task of advancing over the  Samana into the heart of 
the  Orakzai and Afridi coul~try and sweeping away all opposition en route. 
The column a s  a whole was composed of eight reginlents of British In-  
fantry aud  twelve regiments of Native lufarltry, with six Mountain Bat- 
teries, one regiment of Native Cavalry and five companies of Sappers. 
Three subsidiary colurnns were also formed, oue to move from Peshawar 
inLo the Bsra Valley, another to stand reitdy for action in the Kurram 
Valley, a n d  the  third a reserve brigade n~acle up of four regiments of 
infantry and  the Jodhpur Lancers placed a t  Rawalpindi. The following 
corps constitued the several columas of the Tirah Field Force :- 
MAIN COLUMN. 
First Division. - Commanding : Brigadier-General W. P. ~ ~ r n o n s , '  
C.B., (Commanding one of the  Tochi Valley Brigades), with tihe local rank 
of Maj or-General._ . . 
1st Brig.zde.-Comnlanding :* Brigadier-General R. C. Hart,  V.C., 
C.B., (Conmanding Belgaum District). Troops: 2nd Derbyshire 
Regiment, 1st Devonslzire Reginlent, 2nd Battalion 1st  Gurkhas, 30th 
Punjals Iuft~ntry. 
2nd Brigade.-Cornrnatlding : Brigadier-General A. Gnselee, .C.B., 
(Comnianding Cawnpore Station). Troop : 2nd Yurksliire Ragimenc, 
1st Royal West Surrey Regiment, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurltllt~s, 3rd Sikhs. 
Divisional Troops.-No. 1 (British), No. 2 (Del-ajat), No. 1 (Icohat) 
Moui l t~ in  Batteries, two scluadrons 18th Bengal Lnrlcers, 28 tli Bombay 
Pioneers, Nos. 3 and 4 Conlpanies Bombay Sappers, Nrtbl~a Itilperial Ser- 
vice Infantry, Mrzler liotla Imperial Service Sappers. 
271d Bi11ision.-Comulandi~~g : Major-Generi~l A. G. Yesttnan-Bigs, 
C.B., (then Co1nnl:tnding tlie troops already on the Sami~nn). 
3rd Brigade.-Con~mandi~~g : Colonel F. J. Icenlps ter, D.S.O., 
(Assistant Adjutant-General, Maclras Conl&and) with tlie telrlpornry 
sank of Brigadier-General. Troops : 1st Gordon Higlllanders, 1st  "Uorset- 
shire Regiment, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, 15th Siltl~u. 
4th Brigade.-Commanding : Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, C.B., 
D.S.O., (Commanding Nagpur District). Troops : 2nd ICing's Own 
Scottish Borderers, 1st  Northsmptonsllire Regiment, 1st  Battalion 3rd 
Gurlzhas, 36 th Sikhs. 
Divisional Troops.-Nos. 8 and 9 (British) and No. 5 (Borubay) 
Mountain Batteries, Machine -gun, 16 t h Lancers, two scluadrons 18th 
Bengal Lancers, 21st Madras Pioneers, No. 4 Cornpany Madras Sappers, 
Jh ind  Imperial Service Infantry, Sirmur Imperial Service Sitppers. 
Line of Comnzunicasion.-Commanding : Lieutenant-Genestbl Sir A. 
'Power Palmer, K.CY B., (Oomruanding Punjab Frontier. Force). Troops : 
No. 1 (Rashmir') Mountain Battery, 22ad P u n j  ab Infantry, 2nd Bsttalion 
2nd Gurk t l ;~~ ,  39th Garliwal Rifles, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 3rd Bengal 
Cavalry, No. 1 Compa~ly (Bengal) Sappers. 
PESHAWAR COLUMN. 
Comnlandillg : Brigadier-General A. G. Hamnlond, C , B ,  I>.S.O., 
(Commrtudiug Rawalpindi Station). Troops : 2nd lioyal I~l~l i~l t i l l i l lg  
--- 
* The comrna~~d of this brigade was origianlly g i v e ~ ~  to Oolo~~el  far~ Efalnilton, V,C., 
i ) . ~ . ~ . , . ~ r ~ u t ~  Qqilrlerinyter-9euer.l in India, bub h o  l?c~cl tho alinlorttrau t o  be llkro\n~ 
from his horse betore the iightrng had begurl and his iojurics placed hFm hors dc conbat .  
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Fusiliers, 2nd Oxfordslzire Light Infantry, 9th Gnrkhas, 34th Pioneers, 
45th Sikhs, 57th Field Battery, R.A., No. 3 British Mountain Ba t te ry ,  
9th Bengal Lancers, No. 5 Company Bengal Sappers. 
KURRXM MOVABLE COLUMN. 
Commanding : Colonel W. Hill (Assistant Adjutant-General for Mus- 
ketry). Troops : 12th Bengal Infantry, Kapurthala Imperial Service 
Infantry, four guns 3rd Field Battery, R.A., GthBengal, Cavalry, one 
Regiment Central India Horse. 
RBWALPINDX RESERVE BRIGADE. 
* 
I 
Commanding: Colonel C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O., (Commanding 42ud 
Gurkhas and oftieiating in command of Fyzabad Station), with tempo- 
rary rank of Brigadier-General. Troops : 2nd King's Own Yorkshire  
Light Infantry, 1st Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 27th Bombay 
Light Infantry, 2nd Regiment Hyderabad Contingent, Jodhpur Imperial  
Service Lancers. 
The approximate strength of the Field Force, including tihe Reserve 
Brigade, was as follows : British Officers, 1,010; Native Officers, 491 ; hos- 
pital assistants, 197 ; British troops, 10,182 : native troops, 22,123 ; grand 
total, 34,203. Excludiilg the Reserve Brigade the totn.1 was just under 
31,040, with 18,250 followers, 966 ordnance mules, 13,000 pack mules 
and 2,200 camels. The strength of the 1st Division was about 9,460 ; 
2nd Division, 9,268 ; Line of Communication troops, 5,000; Peshawar 
Column, 4,500; Kurmm Movable Column, 2,600 ; Rawalpindi Reserve 
Brigade, 3,200. The British infantry regiments were shown as h a v i n g  
each 29 Officers and 103 rank and file : tlie native infantry regiments 
each 9 British Officers and 16 Native Officers and 721 rank and file. 
Major-General Sir Bindon Blood and Brigadier-Generals Jeffreys 
and Meilrlejohn were to have been given commands, the former of a 
Division and the two latter of Brigades, in the Tirah Field Force, but 
this arrangement mas prevented owing to the necessity of retainiug a, 
full Division at and beyond the Malakand to watch Nrtmagai and Bajour, 
the Mamunds being th,en still in arms. 
A question arose at  t l~ i s  juncture whether i t  would be quite wise to 
strain the loyalty of the Afridi sepoys in the Indian Army by employing 
.them against their kinsfolk in the forthcoming Tiral.1 Expedition ; and 
w11ile the point \Ifas still being pubIicly discussed, a Government  Order 
was issued on the 7th of October, whicli set  tlle question a t  rest. T h e  
order read as follows:- 
" T l ~ e  Government of India lived at peace with the Afridi t A b e ,  and 
made an aggreeme~lt witli them under wilicli British forts in the K h y b e r  
were entrusted to their care. Allowances were paid t o  the  t r i b e ,  and 
arrns issued, so that they might be strong in the allialice of f r i e n d s h i p  
with the Government of India and liave the  means of forcing t u r b u l e n t  
Ixrsons to keep the peace. Without ally provocatioli tlie Af r id iv ,  i n  
conj~uiction wibli other tribes, have broken their slliallee wit11 t h e  B r i t i s h  
(Povernlnent, and lmve attacked and clestroyed forts which their tribe 
had engaged to gw~rd. Furtlier, they have waged war a g a i n s t  our  
garrisons on the Sanlana and elsewhere, killing some of the s o l d i e r s  in 
the Britiali service and causing great loss of property. The Br i t i sh  
Ciovernment, collficlent in its power, cannot sit  down quietly u n d e r  such 
defiance and outrages, and lias been forced by the  wanton acts of t h e  
Afridiu the~nselves to inflict punislilneilt on them in their o w n  c ~ u n t r y ,  
and to send a force into Tirah to exact reparation for what has l a t e l y  taken 
place. The Africli soldiers in the service of the Governnlent h a v e  g i v e n  
proofs of their loyalty, devotion and courage on nlaiiy a hard-fought  field, 
and tlie value of their services has been fully appreciated by the Govern- 
ment of India. After a most careful consideration cf t h e  c i rcurnstar~ces  
connected with the Tiri%h Expedition, t l ~ e  Government have d e c i d e d  to 
sIiow consideration to tliose Afridi soldiers who wish to be l o y a l  t o  t h e i r  
engnge~nents, arid to excuse them from gervice i n  the  campaign which t h e  
Governrrlent has been forced to wage against their fellow tribesmen. 
On tllese grounds ztlone i t  lias been determil~ecl that Afridi so ld ie r s  who 
are serving i n  regiments detailed for service on the Pesbawar-Kohat 
border, are not to be employed near the Tirlth frou tier a t  tlle present 
time, but their services will be utilised elsewhere. Tbe n e c e s a a q  orders 
to tliis efl'ect will a t  once issue. As far  as possible care wi l l  be taken 
that 110 property belonging to the Afridi soldiers in the  se rv ice  of t h e  
Government who have not talren part in the raids on British territo1.y is 
either confiscated or destroyed during the  time our troops a r e  engaged 
in  Orakzai or Afridi territory." 
Tlie Afridi soldiers in the ranks of the  native army had done s u c h  
.splendid service that every effort was made to  spare t l t en~  a l ly  reproach 
in con~ruu~licating tlia foregoing Order to ~egirnenls cornposed in  whole or 
part of Pathaus. At the Ysme t h e  the Itct that desertions had occurred, 
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the action of the Govenlment ivas quite justified. As to the ~ i u r u b e ~  
of trans-frontier tribesmen enlisted in infantry bnttaliuns it  ~iiay be. 
interesting to state here that these nunlbered about 4,000 in all, of 
wllonl 1,907 were Afridis, 309 Orakzai, 283 Bunerwals, and 234 Gllilzsi ; 
while Bajouris, Duranis, Swatis, Shinmal-is, Hazards, and Mohmands 
mustered less tllsn 200 each ; and Waziris, Utmttn Khels, alicl other clans 
contributed between them only a total of 226. 
Sir Richard Uclny received orders to accompany the Tirah Field 
Force as Civil Political Officer, but to General Sir TVilliani Lockhart was 
comnlitted the supreme political as well as military control of the expedi- 
tion. Colonel R. Waburton, C.S.P., who hacl recently retired frmn the 
political charge of the Ehyher, and whose Itnowledge of the Afridis and 
their country is probably unrivalled, wns also askecl b y  the Government 
to return temporarily to  the scene of his former labours, and to accolrlpany 
tile expedition. Mr. Lorimer, Mr. King, Mr. Donald and Mr. Blakeway, 
were appointed Assistant Political Officers v i th  the force. 
Tl~ere was a good deal of survey work to he done during the 
operations in Afridi land, for no European llad been in the country since 
Captain L. H. E. Ti~clter, in 1872, made a hurried trip /)id the Bara Vi~llcy 
to the eastern portioll of the plateau. Colonel Sir T. H II~)ldich, li.E., 
was given charge of the survey parties, tlle Departn~ental Officers with 
'him being Major Bythell and Captain C!. L. Robertson. Sir Pertal, 
Singh was permitted to join General Lockhart's Staff as Aide-de- 
camp. 
Sir William Loelchart arrived a t  Simla on the 20th September, arid 
after visiting Rawalpiladi ancl Murree, reached Kohst on the 5 th Octobel; 
accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General W. G. Nicholson, 
C.B., and Lord Methueu. He  had the  great advantage of being abIe to 
bring to bear on the task before him not only exceptional ability but 
exceptional kilowledge ; for the 35iranzai Canpaigns of 1891 and 1592 
had made the Sanvana Range and the Khanki Valley familiar ground l;o 
him. I t  was quite expected that the Afridis would give our troops plenty 
of fighting, particularly as a mischievous notice in Urdu had been 
circulated among them by their mullah stating that a war of extermina- 
tion was to be waged against them. To counter'act as far as possible the 
Gffects of tlgg fdse aunou~lce.ment arid t o  present tlle T i ra l~  Expedit iu~ 
in its true light in the eyes of the whole of the north-west border, 
, Sir William Lockhart issued tile followillg proclamation to the Afridis i 
i and Orlakzai preparatory to advancing against them:- 
'' In the year 1881 the A fridis of the Khyber Pass entered into treaty 
engagements with the British Government, undertaking, in cansidera- 
tion of certain allowances, to maintain order throughout the Pass, to  dea! 
with offences on the road, to furnish levies for the above purposes, and 
t o  abstain from conlnlitting outrages in British territory. U p  t o  the 
month of August 1897, these engagements have been, on the whole, 
faithfully observed, But during that  and the succeeding month t he  
Afridis have broken their engagements, attacked, ~ lunde red  and 
burnt  the posts in the Khyber Pass, which were garrisoned by the levies 
furnished for the pl~rpose by the Afridis themselves, and have joined 
the Orakzni in an attack on British posts and villages on the Kohat 
border. For these offences all tribal and service allowances hitherto 
granted by the British Government to the Afridis and Orakzai a re  de- 
clared to be forfeit, and entirely a t  the disposal of the British Govern- 
, ment to withhold or to renew, wholly or in part, as they may think fit. 
The British Government has also determined to despatch a force under 
my comnland to march through the country of the Orakzai and thg 
Afridis, and to announce from the heart of their country the final terms 
of the British Government. This advance is made to mark the fact that  
these tribes took part in  the attacks above mentioned, and tha t  the 
British Government have power to  advance if and when they choose. 
The Government have neither the intention nor the wish to inflict 
unnecessary damage on the tribes, provided they immediately make sub- 
mission and reparation. The terms and conclitions on which such 
submission will be accepted will he announced to the jirgahs of the tribes 
when I have arrived in Tirah, and I am authorised to enforce the fulfil- 
ment of these terms and conditions, and of any further terms and con-. 
ditions which opposition by any tribe, or section or illdividuals thereof, 
may render i t  necessary to impose. It is therefore notified that  al l  who 
wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess their own 
'country and to see it no more in the power of and occupied by the &!irkar, 
should assist to  the utmost of their abilities in  the work of enforcing 
compliance with my orders and with the said terms and conditions, by 
which means they will save the tribes from the further punishment which 
any opposition to the advance of the British troops will infallibly bring 
upon them, and the tribal country from further ,~ccupntion~~ 
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Some time afterwards the Musuazai clan in tlle R~zrranl Valley sent 
back to Fort Locltllart the copy of the Qovelmment proclanlation wllich 
had bee11 sent to thenl, and on the back of i t  they had scribbled tEleir 
views. They had four grievances : one was that the British Government 
had occupied tlie Khyber ; another that the salt tax was too high (their 
I 
desire being to buy four maunds for a rupee) ; the third was a protest 
against the occupation of the Sumana Range ; the fourth also related t~ 
this subject, their colllplaint apparently being that our forts prevented 
free passage over the range. Tlze Kham Khel Chamkannis replied 
t o  Sir William Lockhart's proclamation, saying that they had no option 
bu t  to fight, as they were under the orders of the Ealrir of Swat and the 
Hadda and Aka Kliel Mullahs. The proclamation also drew forth a 
h ,  
reply from another clan of the Orakzai, the Daulatzai, near Kohat. 
They ulleged they had se~~ious grievances against the Government in the 
matter of the salt tax, while they complairled that unfaithful wives who 
leave their huslsz~nds and take refuge in British territory, were no longer 
surrendered, as was the case formerly. 
Before proceeding to describe the advance of the Tirah Field Force 
i t  is necessary t o  make a digression in order to explain at  some length 
the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan towards the frontier risings 
and the relations which came into evidence between His Highness and 
the fanatical tribes tlien in arms against us. 
C H A  PT23IZ Jf1L 
THE ATTITUDE O F  THE AMIR. 
WHEN, on enq~liries being made regarding the &fohnland attack oil 
Shabkadr on August 7th, it  nras ascertained that the H*~dda Mullah llad 
with him on that occasion a consiclernble number of men r n h o ~ v e ~ e s u b j e ~ t ~  
of the Amir, hailing from Eastern Afghanistan, public attentibn became 
directed to the policy of our ally of Eabul with reference to the hostile 
frontier tribes generitlly, and the Government of India were not slow to 
recognise the extreme iinportarlce of this factor in planning operations. 
Various rumours was cilvu1:xted connecting Abdur R.dlman more or 
less intimately with the earlier rising in Swat, and when, afterwards, 
the Afridis captured the Iihpber, there was some ~v11o thought they 
perceived the hiznd of the Durani Cllief in this new outbreak also. To 
clear the air, a strong expression of the Governor-General's opinion 
I regarding General Ghulam Hyder's relations with the Hadda Mullah 
and the part taken by Afgllans from Jellalabad district in the Mohnland 
disturbi~nce, was forwarded to the Amir, together with an admonition 
that something more than a mere formal disclaimer of responsibility 
1 
was expected from him. The response to this communicntion was satis. 
factory enough, especially as His Highness had forestalled i t  by pre- 
I 
I viously despatchiug a firman to  Jellalabad forbidding his sabjects to 
I engage in hostilities on the border. The reply to the Governor-General 
I was couched in very explicit terms. The Amir denied that any Afghan 
1 soldiers had shared in the Mohruand fighting, and at  the same t iue  
solemnly and personttlly engaged on behalf of the Sipah Salar and 
the regular army that no such hostility should ever be comillitted by 
i them. As regards non-military Afglrin subjects, he alleged that if any 
I 
i of them had joined the Mohmands at  all they must have done so secretly, 
i 
I1 for they would not dare to take up arms openly for fear of him. He ; I  attributed all the border distui~banceu to the action of the mullahs, 
especially the Ha& Mullah, who he said had in former years excited 
risings against the gad i  of Kabul, and he denounced t h e i ~  conduct. 
The Amir had certainly known in years gone by what i t  was to be 
plagued by fanatical mullahs, but he had made short work of these when 
they became dangerous to his authority. His sincerity in disappr*oving 
I of the present tribal risings ~huwn  by the careful manner in which 
he arranged for the forwarding of his reply td thr  Viceroy. So anxious 
was he that  his answer should be safely delivered a t  its destination that  
he took the precaution of sending a duplicate cia^ Kanilahnr. His postal 
runners always use the Shilman route to Peshawar in preference to the 
Khyber  route, but bnowing that  the Mohmand country was disturbed, 
H i s  Highness sent mounted niessengers from Kabul through Ghazni 
and Kandallar. The duplicate letter reached New Chaman towards the 
3 
end  of August, whence it was forwarded to the Gobernor-General's 
Agent  a t  Quatta. 
About the same time the British Agent i n  Kabul reported that the 
Amir  read in public durbar on the 17th August the Viceroy's letter 
which called upon His Highness to  restrain his subjects from taking 
p a r t  i n  the frontier disturbances. I l is  Highness solemnly swore that  
h e  had always maintained friendly relations with the E~.itish Govern- 
ment, and had never induced his subjects or sepoys t o  take hostile action 
against the British. The Amir alsoread the draft of his reply to the 
durbar, which was very largely attended, as i t  ujas held on the anniver- 
sary of his assumption of the title of Zin-ul-iMzllat zoa ud-din. 
A few days after this durbar the British Agent addressed a letter 
t o  His Higliness on the subject of rumours which had reached him that  
people froxi1 Lughnlan and other places in Afghanistan were still joining 
the  Hadda Mullah, and that supplies were being sent from Lalpura for 
the support of the Mullah's gathering. The Anlir a t  once replied in a n  
autograph letter, reminding the Agent of what had taken place a t  the 
du~but; and adding that thong11 the Mullah's disciples had helped the 
Mullah secretly they certainly had not done so openly because of their 
fear of His Highness. The Amir also informed the British Agent that  
h e  had issued instructions to all officials in Ningrahar, and they were 
now secretly keeping a watch; that he would us far as possible watch 
the  clisciples of the H < ~ d d a  Mullah in Afghanistan; and that  the Gov- 
ernor of Lughman had recently attacked and dispersed a gathering of 
500 men collected by one of the Mullall's disciples who were about to  
prboceeil from Luahn~an to join the Mullal?. The Governor had also 
arrested 40 of them, and was taking steps to capture the leader of the 
gathering, who Elad escaped. This last statement was quite true, and i t  
was also true that some Sangu Khel Shinwaris, who had coIlected near 
Pesh Bolak and who probably intended midiiug for the Kllyber a t  the  
invitation of the Mullah Saiad Altbar, had been dispersed by Afglqsn 
crLvalry. Fuxther, under orders from Kabul, the Afghttu troaps were 
witlldmnn from the outlying posts because of the possibility t h a t  t h e y  
might be tempted to slip away temporarily to join some tribal gather-  
ing. At  the same time the Amir issued orders that  no bodies of a r m e d  
tribesmen fleeing before the Government of India's troops in a n y  of t h e  
operations about to  be undertaken, should be allowed to enter Afghanis- 
tan. In  return for Abdur Rahman's frankness the  Government of I n d i a  
were no less open with him and in further correspondence in formed 
His Highness that the expeditior~ against the Mohmands h a d  b e e n  
undertaken p~incipally to punish the Hadda Mullah and his ga ther ing  
and to disperse all who opposed our troops, and that  there was no in- 
tention of remaining in the country. 
After the attack on the Khyber and the subsequent spontaneous 
dispersioll of the Afridi force, the mullahs, in  order to induce the tribes- 
men to renew hostilities played the bold game of pretending t h a t  t h e  
Andr was a t  their back, and even paraded mule loads of ammunition 
which they asserted had been sent from Afghanistan, but which h a d  
actually been captured from the Khyber Rifles a t  Ali Musjid a n d  L u n d i  
Kohl .  As a, ruatter of fact they knew very well that the Amir, so f a r  
from sympathisitlg with the Afridis in their rising, was extremely a n g r y  
with them for having closed the Khyber, as this caused heavy loss to 
him owing to the stoppage of the caravan trade, besides preventing a 
consignment of arms and stores imported by him from Europe b e i n g  
sent up from Peshawar. 
About the middle of September the Afridis began to realise t h e  
danger which menaced them, as definite preparations for invading Tirah 
had by that time been begun. They held a big jirgah and decided to 
send a deputation to Kabul to ask the Amir to help them in the coming 
struggle. The members of this deputation got as far as Jellelabad, w h e r e  
they were stopped by the local Afghan officials and turned back, in 
obedience to orders received from Kabul. A request was preferred 
for ammunition but this was refused. Thereafter, to remove all possible 
doubt the Amir caused to be posted in Kabul a public reply to the A f r i d i  
deputations. The notification, which was dated September 2&d, was as 
follows :- 
"The Afridis of Tirah have sent me now eighteen of their  men,  
consisting of Maliks, Ulama and Elders, each sect sending a separate  
petition and asking for help. I n  accordance with my orders they w e r e  
detained in Jellalabad, their petitions were sent, t o  me and I have ref used  
them. I have written and sent them replies to their petitions to 
Jellalabad, that they may receive them and go back. The particulars of 
their petitions are as follo~vs :- 
" ' The British Government have been from olden times gradually 
encroaching upon our couutry, and even upon Afghan territory, and 
they have erected forts a t  various spots and places. We complained 
of this to the Afghan Government on numerous occasions, but Your 
Highness paid no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being help- 
less and llaving regard to  Islam and our constancy in religion, we have, 
under the guidance of God, opened the door of jehad in the face of the 
said a o ~ e ~ n m e n t ,  and we have severed our connection with them in 
every way. We have plrundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana 
above Hangu, one fort a t  Shinawari a t  the foot of the Samana in British 
territory, one fort a t  the Ublan Pass near Kohat, one thana at  Tora 
Wadi, a second thana a t  Kahi, one thana a t  Ghalo China, one lhana a t  
Shams-ud-din, one t7tana at  Chardi, one lhnnn a t  Ear Killa near Khatak, 
one lhnnn a t  Namak, one thanaat Narai A b  and the Hindu bazaar at  
Narai Ab. There are three big forts on the top of the said mountain 
which have not been taken yet. By the grace of God we will destroy 
and  burn these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position 
on the top of the mountain ; and at  its base, from Kohat to Rud-i-Knrman 
i n  the district of Kurram, the frontier of the Orakzai runs, and the 
tribesmen have been mdking jehnd from time to time within their respec- 
tive limits. We will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British 
Government and become their subjects. We will nevar give up the reins 
of authority of our country to the hands of the Government. On the 
contrary, me are willing to tender our allegiance to the Government of 
the King of Islam. It is incumbent on the Government of Islamnot only 
t o  loolr after our interests and to consider our position, but that of the 
whole of Afghanistan. We therefore send these eighteen persons from 
among our SFaliks, Ulama and Elders, with our petitions to Your High- 
ness' presence. We are a t  present engaged in a jehad on the Samana 
Range, and FF-e request that Your Highness will be pleased to do what 
is for our good and benefit ; and by the grace of God we will act up to 
Your Highness' instructions, because we leave the conduct and manage- 
ment of our affairs in the hands of Your Highness in every respect. 
W e  have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to Your 
Highness. This iq  the time to gain the object of Your Highness. A11 
t h e  Moslems are now a t  the disposal of Your Highness in the shape of 
regular troops, artillery and money. I f  the British prove victorious, 
they will ruin the Moslen~s. Tlte services t,o be done on this side may 
be left t o  us Your T-Iighness. W e  hope th:tt after the perllsnl of our 
petition Your IIi,nhness will favour us with a rel~ly. Dated 7th Ral~i-  
11s-Sani, 1315. ' 
I have perused your petitions, all of which were founded on one 
ohject. I now write to  you in reply that  i t  is eighteen years since 1 
came to Kabul, and you know that I went to  Rt~walpincli l ~ y  
t l ~ e  Khyber  route. I n  consideration of my friendship wit11 the Britisll 
Government I had gone to their country as  their guest, and 011 my way 
I found many of your tribesmen on both sides of the Pass who m:~de 
salaams to  me. I f  what you now state is true why did go11 not tell me 
a t  that  time about the matter, so that I might have conferred with x i s  
Escellency the Viceroy i~bout i t ?  Some years after this, when the boun- 
dary was being laid down, Sir Mortimer 1)urand passed througll tlie 
Khyber and came to Kabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this 
and saw the Mission with their own eyes. Wily did not then your 
Mullahs, Maliks and Elders come to me when Sir Mortinler Durand canie 
with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could have di.;cassed 
the matter with Ilin~ ? A t  that time you all reniained silent, and silence 
indicates consent I do not know on what account a brertch lias now 
taken place between you and the English. Now, after you havc fougl~ t  
with them and displeased them you inform me. 
"I have entered into a n  alliance with the British Governn~ent in 
regard to matters of State, and up to the present time no breach of the 
agreement has occurred from the side of the British, notmitllstancling 
that  they are Christians. We are Moslenls and followers of the ~el igion 
of the Prophet and also of the four Khalifas of the Prophet. How c:tn 
we then commit a breach of an agreement O What do you my about the  
verse in  the R ~ r a n - ~  Fulfil your promise: to  fulfil s pronlise is the first 
duty of a Moqlem. God, on the day when the first promise mas taken, 
aslied all the creatures whether he was their God or not. They said: Yes, 
you are our God and our Creator. Therefore on tlie di~yof the resrrrrec- 
tion the  first question will be about the observance of ag~~eerucntx. 111- 
fidelu and Moslenls will thus be distinguished by t l~ix test.' You will thuu 
see tha t  the matter of the agreement is of grezt importance. I will 
never, without cause or occasioli, swerve from an agreclllcrit, because the 
English up to the  present time llave in on way departed fruril tlle liue 
of boundary laid down in the rnap they have agreed upon with rile. Tllc.11 
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instance of a few self-interested persons bring ignon~iny on myself and 
nly people. 
"What you have done with your own hands you niust now carry 
on your own necks. I have nothing to do with you. You are the besb 
judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into trouble-(ltte r.al!y, 
spoiled the matter)-you want me to help you. You have allowed the 
time when nlatters might have been ameliorated to slip by. Now I can- - " 
pot say or do anything. I have sent back from Jellalabad the blaliks 
you had deputed to me. I gave them each a lunoi and Re.10 for their 
road expenses, and I did not trouble them to come to Kabul?' 
The An~i r  also issued in Eastern Afghanistan a proclamation by way 
of warning to Afghans. I t  began :- 
"This proclamation is from Amir Zia-ull Millat wa ud-din"-(i.e., 
Light of Union and Faith). Let i t  be know11 to the learned men of 
Afghanistan, whether in the Aulir's territory or the hill tracts, that I 
hive come to know of pour circumstances by your petitions as well as 
through my informants, and am fully aware that you talk in your houses 
and meetings that I (the Amir-) have sold you to the Britisll Goverume~lt 
for money, and that in these days when fighting is going on between 
you and the British Government I have held myself aloof and am sitting 
in  ease and comfort. Under these circumstances I think it  advisable 
to  explain to you all the facts in detail, and mention the intent and pur- 
port of your talk." 
His Highness then proceeded to explain a t  length the policy of the 
13ritish Government towards Afghanistan in Shere Ali's time. "Shere 
Ali," he said, "was a fool, and his son, Yakub, also a fool; the former fur 
intriguing mith Russia, the latter for making hi~nself responsible for 
Blajor Cavagnari'a safety when he himself had not nlacll control over 
the Afghan troops and tribesmen." He pointed out that the English had 
pever any intention of annexing Afghanistan in those dhys, but wished 
only to avenge Major Cavagnari's murder and find a ruler in the place 
of Yakub Klmn. He (Abdur Ral~lman) recugnised these things and 
satisfied himself that the British Government ouly wished to defend 
Afghanistan from any enemy that might t~rise. H e  explained how he 
had had to exercise full authorily, as he had failed to make the Afghan 
people wise and moral. Turning then to the tribesmen he dho.rved how 
they "tendeled their allegiance to the Blitish Uovernnlent, accepted the 
allowances, made agreements, and then, without any cause, raised dis- 
turbances and rebellion a t  the instance of a fakir mrbose parentage is  
not even known to the King of Islam." As they did not consult hinl  
when they raised the revolt, they were not justified in throwing t h e  
blame up011 him. They had frequently declared to the British Govern- 
ment that they were independent of the Amir, and had set thenlselves 
u p  as kings. That being so, they should settle their affairs themselves. 
H e  added:-" Why do you call these disturbances.jehad or g 7 m a  4 
The time will come for jehad, and, when i t  does come, i t  will be announced 
to you. If you behave yourselves courageonsly on that occasion, I 
shall be glad to call you religious.1eaders. But the first condition of 
je iad  is the co-operation of the King of Tslam. I t  is curious t h a t  t h e  
King is on friendly terms with the English and yet you are making a 
fuss about jehad. It appears that you yourselves are independent kings, 
and do not require a king over you. A similar instance occurred in 
France thirty years ago, when the people there revolted against their  
king, dethroned him and sent him to London, where he died. I will 
never interfere with you in religious matters, nor prevent you fro111 
prosecuting your own object provided these be in accordance with t h e  
principles of religion; but the present disturbances have nothing t o  do 
with religion, because all Mnssnlmans and most of the Khans and tribes- 
nien are taking sides with the English and helping then]. When you 
yourselves are rendering them assistance how can I be to blaine ?"-(It 
should here be noted that the proclamation, though issued late i u  Sep- 
tember, was dated August 13th, that is to  say, before the Afridi soldiers 
fighting on the British side had been withdrawn from the front.)-After 
noticing that  the tribesmen in talking among themselves, were ascribing 
the rising as due to the British occupation of Chitral and Swat, tile 
Auuir said :-Ic I tell you that in  taking possession of Uhitral the object 
of the British Government is not to assess revenue, or tax theni. Tllc~ir 
only desire is  to increase the population of the country and strcngtllcll 
their own position, so that it  may serve as a barrier againrt any futrlr-l: 
invasion by Russia. They have remitted the revenue of villages in SwaL 
of which they have taken actual possessiun." 
His Highness conclrlded :-" I n  short, I have nothing to do .rvit,ll 
your affairs, and no concern with you because I have no trust i r l  you. 
Do not be led to thinlr that, like Sl~ere Ali, I an1 suclk a. foul as tu ~ 1 1 1 1 0 ~  
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with the British Govex-nn~ent, and if I Tvere to (lo such a foolisll thi~lg, 
I am sure you would assume the positioll of simple spectators." 
i 
I n  the foregoing proclanlation there was an echo of the Anlir's for- 
mer utterances so far as the unruly and troublesome character of his 
I people u-as concerned. I n  his letters to the Indian Government in 1880-81 
I 
I when he had just become Amir, he frequently referred to his difficulties 
in dealing with his subjects. Thus he wrote : "The people of Afghanis- 
tan are of such a nature that they step beyond the bounds of subjection 
and aspire to the position of rulers." And again : "The ignorance of 
evil-minded persons, the un\visdom of the principal persons in Afghanis- 
tan, and the short-sightedness of this nation, are manifest. They incite 
the people to tumult and commotion, and drive tliem out of the path of 
humanity. A wise man is unwise in their sight. They leitd people astray, 
and for the sake of a trifling gain they prefer disorder and tumult. For 
their own selfish ends they wish to see the whole world desolate and 
ruined. From their ignorance they do not know and see what vould 
tend to their lasting comfort." In other letters he abused his unruly 
subjects i n  unlneasured terms, and appealed to the Government to give 
t 
him rifles and ammunition in order that his regular army nlight be 
equal to  keeping the peace. 
After this nothing farther was heard of the An~i r  in connection 
with the frontier operations, and it may be said a t  once that tllruugll- 
out the remainder of the fighting the A n ~ i r  adher-ed honourably to the 
attitude he had taken up. Nothing further rerl~t~ins to be said there- 
fore on this head except a word aboiit the Sipah Salar. Beyond all 
reasonable doubt General Ghula~n Hyder continued secretly to urge 
the 01-akzai end Afridis to remain ill a ~ ~ m s ,  but his action was clearly 
contrary to the line of policy taken by his wester, and the Sipah Salar 
would no doubt have beell called to account hid lle not been in a posi- 
tion to defy the A~ni r  owing to his illfluellce over the troops and tribes- 
me11 in the Jelldabad distlict. 
CROSSING THE BAMANA--THE CAPTURE AND ABANDOWMENT OF DARGAI. 
BY the beginning of October the concentrdtion of the troops composing 
the Tirah Field Force was in full swing, and the tribesmen now began 
to realise to  the full the meaning of the ~ r e ~ a r a t i o n s  menacing them. 
A n  urgent,jirgah of the Orakzai and Afridis was held a t  Bagh, in Tirah, 
a t  which i t  was decided that  unless a n  arrangement could be nlade 
with tlie Government of India to include all sections of the two main 
tribes in a n  amnesty, attacks should be made concurrently on t h e  
Kurranl, the Samana and Jamrud. The Chanlkannis, Zaimukhts a n d  
Alisherzai of the Kurram country were not represented a t  the jirgah, 
but  the Tirall Alisherzai attended. An oath was taken on the Koran 
that  if any individual tribe or section should come to a n  understand- 
ing with the Government that  did not include all the others, that  clan 
should he publicly a~lathenlatised as enemies of Islam. A11 the  same 
the Khanki Valley Oralczai, who had been giving us so much trouble 
on the Sanrana, became considerably less pugnacious, and before very 
long all of them were asking to be allowed to ruitke their- submission, 
promising to surrender all loot and Government rifles. The Mislltis 
also made humble salaartcs and offered our. troops a free passage 
Ohrough their territory. But  a t  this late stage the tiibes had too 
much to answer for : no reply was returned to their overtufes, Genersl 
Yeatman-Biggs especially declining to treat with tlie enemy w l ~ i l e  
they still had raiding parties oat  on the Samana, hapassing our outposts. 
13ut the Kohat Pdss tribesmen had behaved well, and they now cvnti~lued 
impassive, causing us no annoyance during the march of the several bri- 
gades from Kl~ushalgarh to join Sir  Willianl Lockhart. The Adu~rl 
Khels on the one hand and the Jowakis on tlie other refused to obey t he  
exhortations of the Mullall Saiad Akbar to  join in the so-called jshad, arid 
carefully refrained from molesting tlle a d v a n a ~ n ~  oolurl~ns. Tile lant 
march into Kohat, through the pass, was indeed suflicie~ltl~ trying wit,ll- 
out the addition of hostilities ; as no proper road existed, and there was 
only a rough pebbly track, about 19 miles long from Airus1 (Jra)Jutlu, 
tlie last hdting-place before Kol~at.  
On the 10th October Brigadier-General Hart's columl~ arrived ; ~ t  
Kohst; next day Brigadier-General Kempster's column lllarched ill; 
2nd tile day a f t e ~  that Bripsdier-General Westrnacottls colhnln emepg- 
ed from the long pass. F I - o ~ ~ ~  Rollat the troops marched to Sllinawari, 
* .  
where they stood with their faces to the north ready to marc11 up011 $@ 
the  Samana as so011 as the Sappers and Pioneers should I~ave prepared i 
t h e  way. 
On the 7th October a.ji,:sah was held a t  Kandi Mishti in the Khanki 
Valley of the irresolute Mishtis, Sheikans, Abkhels and Mulla KlieIs 
who had come across the Sampagha Pass for the purpose. The Abkhels 
upbraided the Mishtis for having given in to the Sirlrar, and the Mishtis 
I 
denied this, but admitted they did not want to fight. A bigger jbgah of 2 I
t he  Oralrzai tribes was held on the 10th Octc~ber a t  which i t  was decided ! 
t o  hold the Sampagha Pass against General Lockhart's advance. 
On the 19th of the month the Mullah Saiad Akbar again issued his 
war orders, in which something like a tactical disposition of his available 
forces was apparent. Thus the Kuki and Zakka Khels of the Bazar and 
Khyber districts were to hold Ali Musjid road ; the Zakka Khels of thb 
Cara Valley, the Sipah, Kamar, Aka and the Usturi KheIs were given the 
Bara route ; while the Kambar, Malikdin, Zskka and Adam Khels of the 
Maidan were to co-operate with the Orakzai in defending the Tirah passes 
facing the Saniana Range. Thc clans were also to give mutual aid when- 
ever necessity might arise. I t  was thus plain thab Sir William Lock- 
hart's advance wonld be opposed a t  the Sanlpagha and other passes 
leading into the Rajglil and Maidan Valleys. The Sampagha Pass, i t  
may be explained, leads direct from the Khanki Valley, and the ap- 
proach to it  is fairly easy. The late Colonel Mason reconnoitred almost 
to  the top of the pass during the Miranzai Expeditions of 1891, so 
that  our troops would march over ground which have been mapped out 
to a certain extent aud would present no great difficulties. The pass 
can be turned on either flank, and it  was clear that many thousands of 
tribesmen would be required to hold it  even for a short time against 
the fol-ce which Sir William Lockhnrt would be able to bring to bear 
when once he liad concentraited his two divisions in the Khanki valley. 
The Sampagha is allnost dlie north of our line of forts on the Samana, 
and i t  was apparently intended to form the left of the enemy's line of 
defence, the right resting oh the Arhanga Pass, seven or eight miles 
away. This latter pass again was said to be an easy one for pack- 
animals, but i t  had never been reconnoitred. Once our troops crossed it 
the  southern valleys of Tirah, the summer quarters of the Afridis, 
would lie beneath them, and almost il-mediately Sir WiIliam Lockhart 
mould be in the Ireart of the tribaI country, if a11 went well ; for the 
distances t o  be traversed from the Khanki Valley are  short, the ranges 
of hills guarding Tirah on the south being within one march fi80111 the  
left bank of the Khanki River. 
TO follow the actual operations. On the 11th October a working 
party on the  Chagru Kotal road over the Samana consisting of Pioneers, 
Sappers and 1,000 Punjab coolies was fired on by the enemy, of whom 
very large nulnbers were disclosed near the village of Dargai. Fortu- 
nately General Yeatman-Biggs, who had gone down a spur from 
Gulistan i n  force t h a t  morning on a reconnaissance, was close a t  hand, 
and he quickly brought his guns t o  bear on the assailants who there- 
upon retired, and the  force returned to Fort Lockhart that  evening with 
no casualties. Reports were afterwards brought in that the losses of 
t h e  tribesmen in this little brush were very heavy. One of the surest 
tests of the success of an action was whether the troops were followed u p  
during the return to camp, and in this instance the rear-guards were 
left quite unmolested, which went to prove t l ~ a t  he enemy were for the 
nonce thoroughly beaten off. 
On the  12th of October a covering party of a half-battalion of the 
15th Sikhs and the Jhind Inftlntry on the north side of the ICotal was 
fired on and compelled to withdraw by a force of Gar Orakzai who pressed 
the retirement vigorously. No. 2 Uerajat Mountain Battery however 
successfullj- covered the withdrawal, and the only casualties were one 
Jhind sepoy severely and one slightly wounded. After this the enemy 
continued almost daily to annoy our working parties on the Chagru 
Rota1 road, the completion of which was essential to a rapid advance of 
t h e  expeditionary force. 
Finally on the 17th October Sir William Lockhart issued orders for 
the  forward movement, as follows:-"On the 20th October the 3rd 
'Brigade, under Brigadier-General Kempster, with No. 8 Mountsin Bat- 
tery Royal Artillery, No. 5 Bonlbay Mountain Battery, the machine 
gun detachment and signallers of the 16th Lancers, one squadron and 
head-quarters of the 18th Bengal Lancers, the 21st Madras Pioneers, 
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers, the Sirruur Sappers, and Gurkha 
scouts will advance on Khorappa in the Khanki Valley under General 
peatman-Biggs ; and  on the 21st October a column, under Colonel 
Fhaytor, composed of the Northamptoil Regiment, tlie 36th Sikhs and 
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the T:~lni spur, to  protect the right flank of the 3rd Brigade mov: 
ing in the t'hxgr'u Valley. The troops named above, under aenera) 
Ye;ttman-l),igjis, will stand fast a t  Khorappa, and in1prove the road above 
and 1 1 ~ 1 0 ~  tllat place, ColonelChaytorls column advancing from Talai 
t o  1iliornl)pn; and on the same day the remainder of the ebd Division, 
i.e., tlrc .it11 Brigade and remaining Divisional troops, under Brigadier. 
Gener~ttl Wcstrnacott, will advance from Shinawali to Khorappa, as also 
a wing of the Line of Con~munication troops for the'pern~anent garrison 
of Iihalappa. On the 22nd October the 2nd Division wiIl cross the 
Khanki Rivcl- and move t o  Khangirhar and entrench for the night, 
the 1s t  Division will march from Shinawari to  Ehorappa. On 
tho 23rd Octc,her the 2nd D~vision will advance to the vicinity of 
[ilinndnki and entrench for the night, and the 1st Division advance t o  
JChangirl)al*. A wing of the Line of Communication troops will advance 
fi'oll~ Sllir~awa~*i to Rhosappa on the same date, as permanent garrison. 
4;1-eneritl Yeatman-Biggs accompanies the 3rd Brigade on the 25th." 
I t  has been mentioned that  the working party on the Chagru Kotal 
r o d  llad been repeatedly interfered with by parties of tribesmen coming 
from the direction of Da~gai ,  a village on the Samana Range west of 
Gllagru Koti~l.  I't was now determined to puuish these tribes, and it w t  
arranged tha t  Sir  Power Palmer, who commanded all the troops on the 
Line of Communications, should for this purpose have the troops of the 
2nd Divifiinn temporitrily under his orders to  co-operate with the troops 
he already had a t  Shinawari. It is necessary here to attempt to  ex- 
plain, though it is difficult to do so clearly, the military geography of the 
grorind wliich was destined to be the venue of the most important action 
fought during the whole campaign. The village of l h r g a i  lies on the 
surt l~ern side of a plateau: and from this plateau a very steep and narrow 
f;pur, gradually growing less steep, runs down to a village on Chagru 
I ic~h~l .  This village is situated on a narrow neck or saddle from which 
the roiid vuns south to  Shin;bwari, 6 miles distant, and in a more or less 
~~ort l ier ly  direction into the Khanki Valley to Khorapp.  This saddle, 
tltc~nglr n:br~.ow, is a long one, and a t  the other end, after the road falls 
*ito the ( : ~ I ; L ~ I ~ u  Valley, on the northern side, is another v*e called 
&fill,l;~ I<lli~ll. From Mama Khan to Dargai a very steep, stony and 
g1:u.rl,w ~iloltrititin tnboli runs up the spur to Dargai ridge, mostly on the 
IlaJrihr~rn side of the spurr~nd well under view and fire from the tribesmen 
iliIltli!lg tllc. of the plateau, wl-lich 011 the Cllagru Kotal side is 
yreciilibur hialvas gently away on the western or further fiid@~ 
South of the Dargai plateau a very liigll and broken spur trends circui- 
tollsly down towards Shinawari, the summit of this spur commanding 
the Dargrti ridge and plateau. 
Thegeneral idea of the operations ordered by Sir William ~ o c k h a r ~  
was that Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade and some of t h e  Divi- 
sional troops of the 2nd Division, and also the 3rd Sikhs of the 1st 
Division, 2nd Brigade, the whole under the command of Sir P o w e r  
Palnler, shoald start a t  4 a M., ascend this long spur and a p p e a r  
on the right flank and rear of the Dargai position. This ~ o s i t i o n  
had been artifici:tlly strengthened by sanga~s or stoneworks, a n d  
to take it  in front by the one narrow ~ i l t h  approaching i t  would have  
been an aln~ost inlpossible task if i t  had been strongly and resolutely 
held. If,  on the other hand, a frontal a tbck  by another column 
from the direction of Chagru Eotal and Mama Khan under  t h e  
conlmand of Brigadier-Genearl Westmacott were threatened a n d  m a d e  
strongly demonstratire, there r a s  every chance that  the  enemy's 
kttention might be distracted and General Kempster's Brigade allow- 
ed to execute its advance to some extent unperceived, a n d  c u t  
in on the tribesmen either in flank or when retreating. Presumably  
it was intended that the frontal attack should, if it was t o  be 
merely demonstrative, a t  all events wait for the flank a t tack  to 
develope, but so difficult was the country which Brigadier-General 
Kempster's Brigade advancing to make this turning movement  
had to traverse, that a t  12 noon, though the column had s t a r t e d  
a t  4 A.M., there were no signs of it  apparent from the Samana Suk, 
whence Sir William Lockhart and his Staff were watching the operations. 
Nor indeed is this to be wondered at, for the c ~ e s t  of the hill a long  
which General Kempster had to advance was a series of precipitous 
spurs, to  cromn which was almost an impossibility, and many baggage 
animals carrying ammullition were lost owing to their falling over  t h e  
clis. So razor-like in shape were the crests of these hills t h a t  it was 
quite impossible for even a mountain battery to come into action. 
As very few of the enemy were in evidence about the Dargiti ridge, 
Brigadier-General Westmacott (commanding the column which was 
to create the diversion in front for the benefit of General Kempster) 
decided on making his attack without waiting for Brigadier-General 
Kempster's flank attack to develope. Brigadier-General Westmacott had 
under his orders two mountain batteries, No. 9 Mountain Battery ~~~~l 
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Captain de Butts, also the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the North, 
empton Regiment and the 1-3rd Gurkha Rifles. The remaining regi- 
ment of Brigadier-General Westmacott's Brigade, the 36th Sikhs (who 
had recently come prominently under notice for their gallant defence of 
Fort Gulistam under Major DeaVceux and their equally gallant though 
~insucceusful defence of Fort  Saragheri) were retained for the day a t  Fort 
Lockhart, for the contingency might arise that Fort Lockhart itself 
would b e  attacked if all the garrison except the half-battalion 2-2nd 
Gurkhas were withdrawn. For this reason then the 36th Sikhs were 
not able either on the 18th or again on the 20th to take part in the 
operations against Dargai. Thus with three battalions and two Moun- 
tain Batteries Royal Artillery at  his disposal the task lay before General 
Westmacott of capturingtlie Dsrgai ridge, with the possible, butin these 
precipitous regions far from certain, assistance of the flanking column 
cornrnanded by General Kempster. 
About  9 A.M. the two mountain batteries opened fire on the 
Dargai ridge and on the point more especially where the precipitous 
path is seen to cross the ridge, a t  a range of about 1,800 pards ; whilst 
the infnntry, with the exception of two conlpaniev Northampton 
Regiment, .who remained as escort to the guns, pressed forward to the 
village of Manla Khan. The enemy meanwhile appeared in small num- 
bers gradually increasing from the direction of Dargai village, and fired a 
few shots a t  9-30 on the infantry now in and behind Mama Khan village. 
The infantry, covered by the ground and avoiding the path which 
lay on the  enemy's side of the spur, advanced slowly along the precipi- 
tous hillside, the 1-3rd Gurkhas leading, the King's Own Scottish Bor- 
derers in second line, and the six con~panies Northampton Regiment in 
thircl line, till they reached a saddle with a few fir trees on it about half- 
way between Mama Khan and Dargai, and in advancing beyond which 
they rmrst come under the enemy's fire. About 11 A.M. the infantry 
operied fire from here, aud the guns, which had temporarily ceased fire, 
joinecl in again. Thence the Gurkhas, led by  their Colonel forty yards 
ahonrl of everybody else, advancecl by rushes from one coigrl of vantage 
t o  xnotliler, covered frcm the redr by infantry fire and forming up where- 
evi2r arly cleid ground gave them breathing tirile for a fresh advance, 
Tkle King's Own Sccrttish Borderem ~lieanwhile, in the second line, 
l.apitlly clccrea~irly t l ~ e  distance between themselves and the 
q;,ll+kbit.q styainil~,n every nerve to reach the aurrlnlit simultaae- 
exdye ~ h c  800 yar& start fLe Gurkhas had, llowever, was not, on 
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such ground and with soldiers so accustomed to hill warfare a s  the 
Gurkhas, easily regained; and before they could quite catch them 
up  the leading Gurkha company, 1-3rd Gurkhas, with Liuetenant 
Beynon, District Staff Officer, a t  their head, revolver in  hand, were 
s e n  to be rapidly ascending in single file the rough staircase (rnther 
than path) leading up  over the crest, while the remainder of the 
regiment and the King's Own Scottish Borderem followed close behind. 
This Indian file assault was magnificently carried out, and  altliougll as  
a matter of fact the enemy offered little or no resistance a t  t h e  last 
moment, they might for all the troops below knew have been a ~ ~ e m b l e d  
in large numbers behind the crest, and as soon as the artillery fire 
ceased, which it would necessarily do as the infantry approached the 
crest, they might have poured in such a fire as t o  render any approad1 
i n  single file a n  absolute impossibility. But  no such fear daunted 
the Gurkhas and the position was gallantly carried. Dargai village 
was so011 in flames, and its fortifications destroyed, and t h e  N a r i k  Suk 
hill, which dominates the D a ~ g a i  village and ridge, crowned. It 
about 12 noon when the Dargai crest was crowned; and t h e  enerny, not 
awaiting the  assault, had just begun to clear off when Brigadier-General 
Kempster's Column with Sir Power Palmer, was seen slowly advancing 
with enormous diEculty. The losses sustained by General Westnia- 
cott's Column in the direct attack were 2 killed and 1 4  wounded in the 
1-3rd Gurkhas, and 1 killed and 5 wounded in the King's Own Xcottish 
Borderers. 
So difficult was the country over which General KernpstePe force 
had had to advance, that it had been found necessary t o  send b h l r  to  
Shinawari every mule and retain only dhaoly-bearers and  stretclrers. 
General Kempster's Column joined General Westn~acott's Uolunir~ c~n 
Dargai height about 3-10 P.M., having had i n  the meantime t o  k t t t  off 
A n  attack of several thousands of the enemy. The advance i n  the 
face of this opposition was splendidly carried ont, and undoubtedly it 
was this turning movement which, though hidden by intervening heigl~ts 
from the view of General Westmacott, nevertl~eless made the? w;~y 
easy for the charge of his 3rd Gurkhas, the enemy having lost I~tfi~1.t ~ L K  
General Kempster swept slowly but irresistibly onwards. This  tti~riirtg 
movement in  the teeth of a powerful foe nloreover was so clcvt.1-ly 
executed that only two or three casualties (among the 1-211d (:llrkll:~s) 
occurred throughout the whole march to Dargai. But  Gcneri~l  lie nil^ 
ater's force had more work cut out for it before thg d;ty w w  ovcl; 
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Just as he  begah t o  make arrangements for r e t ~ ~ r n i n g  to Shina- 
w a r i  via Chagru Kotal, the retreating enemy receved reinforcements 
of about 8,000 Afridis from the Khanki Valley and thereupon balted 
a n d  faced aboat. The return to  Shinawari wid Chagru Kotal in the 
face of such overwhelming nambers, with darkness growing rapidly, 
was a most difficult and  dangerous operation: but so well conceived 
w e r e  General Kempster's dispostions, so admirable the manner in  
which the troops, both British and native, carried them out, and so great 
t h e  assistance afforded by  the mountain artillery both from Chagru 
K o t a l  and the Samana Suk, that  the enemy did not dare to press an 
a t t ack  home, and after Chagru Kotal the return to Shinawari was prac- 
tically unmolested. Rut  unfortunately during the preceding stage in  
t h e  retirement-in coming down the hill between Dargai and Chagru 
Kotal-the losses, with the enemy swarming on the heights above, 
w e r e  considerable: the Gordons had Major R. D. Jennings-Bramly 
killed and Lieutenant M. L. Pears and 14 men wounded, while the 15th 
S ikhs  had 3 killed and 11 wounded. These two corps were covering 
t h e  retirement and hence their heavy losses. The 3rd Sikhs had 
also 1 wounded and the 1-2nd Gurkhas 1 killed and 4 wounded. 
B u t ,  on the other hand, as already stated, the enemy had been so 
severely punished that  they had not the courage to attempt' to follow 
up the column when GeneralXemspter, following the lead of General 
Westmacott, marched back to Head-quarters, and not a shot was 
fired on the rear-guard, even in response to a farewell volley from 
the troops. 
A s  the abandonment of Dargai, after i t  had once been captured, 
h a s  been severely colnruented upon by some military critics, it is as 
well  to give here, for what they may be worth, the reasons suggested 
w h y  Sir  Power Palmer did cot  deem it advisable to retain possession of 
t h e  position. Very large numbers of Afridis, attracted by the sound of 
t h e  firing, were hurrying up from the Khanki Valley; added to which 
t h e  troops were without water, without food and withoutwarm clothes, 
a n d  nlust have suffered severely if t l ~ e y  had bivouacked for the night 
unfed and unprotected on the inclement heights. But seeing that to 
abandon the position meant that  i t  would have to be taken all over 
again two days later when the main advance of the expeditionary 
force was to take place, i t  was certainly very unfortunate that when 
captured on the 18th October i t  could not be retained. I t  is but  fair 
however to quote, even a t  the risk of repetition, tlie words of the 
Pioneer's Special Correspondent a t  Dargai :-cLGreat as the tactical 
and strategical advantage of such a retention would have been, clothing, 
firewood and supplies for tired troops a t  a height of over 6,000 feet 
are a n  absolute necessity, and if this was true in regard to the EuropeaIl 
troops, it applied with still greater force to  the sepoys." Retirement 
then on Shinawari ozd the Chagru Hotal was ordered, and the bravely- 
won heights of Darpai were abandoned for the time to the enemy 
who, though thorougt-ily beaten, were clever enough t o  perceive whitt 
a splendid stroke it would be to  return a t  once to  t,he occupation of th i s  
really impregnable position in  stronger force than ever, and so re-impose 
upon our troops the heavy task of once again scaling those awful slopes 
i n  the face of a deadly hailstorm of bullets. 
CHAPTEE IS. 
THE RE-CAPTURE O F  DARGAI-GALLLIXTRY OF THE OORDOKS. 
ON the 20th October General Yeatman-Biggs was instructed afresh 
by s i r  William Lockhart to advance with the 2nd Division, consisting 
of the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kenlpster and the 4th 
Brigade under Brigadier-General Westmacott, vici Chagru Kotal to 
Khorappa, in the Khanki Valley. I t  wits in tlle executiotl of this order 
that  the memorable capture of the Dargai heights was carried out for 
the second time. I n  the calm and critical reflection which has suc- 
ceeded the first outbursts of enthusiasm a t  this fine.feat of arnls, i t  has 
been questioned by some military men whether there was any real 
necessity to take Dargai a t  all ; or a t  least whether the tactical dis- 
advantage of allowing the enemy to remain in occupation of the crest 
could possibly have led to such a sad crop of casualties as the Gordon 
Highlanders, the Dorsetshires, the 2nd Gurkhas and the 3rd Sikhs 
suffered in attacking an all but impregnable position." The road 
from Shicnwari (Sir William Lockhnrt3s advance base in the Miranzai 
Valley) to Khorappa on the Khanki River runs through the valley of 
Chagru Kotal, and this valley is " absolutely dominated lJ (as some con- 
tend) or "overlooked from e distance " (as others prefer to describe it) 
on the west by the Dargai ridge and the Narik Suk. The musketry 
range so far as tribal nlolestation was concerned was certainly a very 
long one, varying from about 3,000 up to about 1,000 yards, and the 
argument which has been raised is that with a well-posted flank defence 
on the Samana Suk no mere musketry fire a t  such a range upon 
troops marching heedless of i t  through the valley below could have 
been so destructive as the point blank volleys which the enemy poured 
out a t  distances up to 300 yards when Dargai crest was assaulted. 
It will be rtmembered that when Dargai was captured, two days 
previously, the frontal attack by General Westmacott's Brigade had 
been more or less combined with a turning movement by General 
Kempster7s Brigade; but on the present occasion only n frontal attack 
from Chagru Kotal was m ~ d e ,  and that along ,zlmost the identical route 
which General Westn~acott had followed. Consequently the tribesmen 
holding the ridge were enabled, though fortunately they did not know 
* Sir William Lockhart's own opinion on this point will be found expressed in his 
Despatches, published nu an Appendix. 
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it, to give all their attention to this one slope which owing t o  the IT$- 
gedness of the ground could not be properly ascended i n  regular 
formation by assaulting parties, but had to be scrambled over as  t h e  
assailants best could. I n  the result the action was the severest ever 
fought on the north-west frontier since the Alvbela Campaign, nearly 
200 Officers and men being either killed or wounded within six hours.* 
Serious as the casualties were, they might have been s t i l l  heavier if 
the whole of the enemy had concentrated their undivided a t ten-  
tion on the holding of Dargai from the Chagru Kotal side. But  by a 
very fortunate circumstance it  so happened that they h a d  been led t o  
apprehend a repetition of Sir Power Palme?'s tactics of the 18tl1 October, 
and under this belief felt obliged to make preparations for a flank attack, 
thus weakening their powers of resistance against the f r o n t a l  attack- 
the only attack actually delivered. Major Bewicke-Copley and Mr. 
Donald, Political Officer, had told some pretended friendlies, who were 
really the enemy's spies, as a dead secret that an attack on t h e  right flank 
of Dargai village formed a certian part of General Yeatman-Biggs's 
plan of operations, and this of course ensured the " secret " be ing  carried 
t o  the tribal forces crowning Dargai. It was evident all th rough  t h e  
subsequent fighting that such a turning movement was seriousIy 
apprehended, as large nu~nbers of the foe were visible from t h e  Samana 
Suk awaitinlr attack far away on the right flank, where two days 
previously General Kempster's Brigade had appeared; and t h i s  division 
of forces greatly lightened the otherwise almost impossibIe task of 
taking the crest direct from Chagru Eotal. The tribesmen, however, 
were in a fine fighting mood and full of valour, for they h a d  miscon- 
strued the abandonment of Dargai after its capture on t h e  18th of 
October: frontier men habitually regard any movement which is no t  
i n  the nature of a direct advance as an acknowledgment of defeat. 
They had additional reason to be pliicky, for their aggregate strengtll o n  
this occasion was computed at  20,000, and they were almost  entircIy 
protected from our guns by rocks, which indeed was the reason wliy 
the position could not be captured otherwise than by a hand-to-ha114 
assault. 
General Yeatman-Biggs marched out of Shinawari a t  4-30 A.M. om 
the 20th October, and on finding the enemy in strength on D;trgi~i ridge, 
gave Brigadier-General Kempster the siruple but weiphtlv order t o  
%It will beseen from the Official Despatches publistled at tile end of t llils V o l ~ ~ z r ~ o  
that S I ~  W ~ l l ~ a m  Lockl~nrt crit~ciseq unfnvo~lrahly the l,~j:tios nclopted by G.encr~1 Y~.ntr~~~t , , .  
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" t a k e  the position." General Kenlpster a t  once attacked the ridge 
w i t h  the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas i n  advance, the Dorsetshire Regi- 
m e n t  in support, the Derbj shire Regiment (froru the First Division) in  
reserve, and the Gordon Highlanders with the maxim guns in rear. It 
w a s  not originally intended that the Gordons should take a leading 
p a r t  in the assault, and the task a t  first allotted to them was to 
assist the assaulting party by long-range volleys froru Manla Khan. 
F u r t l ~ e r  support was accorded to the advance by No. 8 Mountain 
Bat tery a t  1,800 yards, by the Northamptonshire Regiment, by No. 9 
Mountain Battery well posted on the Samana Suk, ancl by No. 1 Kohat 
Mountain Battery and the 3rd Sikhs (from the First Division). 
At 9-30 A.M. the enemy opened fire from the ridge, and at 10 A.M. 
o u r  guns responded, continuing a t  work almost incessantly up to 2 P.M. 
The guns on the Samana Suk had the exnct range, which was 3,300 yards, 
a u d  their shells were repeatedly seen bursting just over the Dargai 
crest.  A t  10-30 A.M. the infantry opened fire, and a few minutes 
l a t e r  the leading wing of the 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas succeeded in 
reaching a wooded spur half-way between Mama Khan and Dargai. 
Beyond this the enemy's fire was most deadly, and further advance 
was impossible until the artillery could inflict greater damage upon the 
enemy and shake their position. Attached to the 2nd Gurkhas and keep- 
ing pace with the foremost companies were Lieutenant Tillard and his 
scouts of the 1st Battalion 3rd Giirkhas, and these men played a 
prominent part a t  this stage. The upward route beyond the wooded spur 
sheltering the advanced wing of the 2nd Gurkhas ran across a bare 
slope about 100 yards in extent, on which the watchful enemy was 
prepared to direct an all-exterminating fire a t  about 300 yards range. 
Nothing daunted, however, Lieutenimt Tillard and his scouts and the 
lef t  wing of the 2nd Gurkhas, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Tmvers, 
Qtptain Norie (Adjutant) and Captains Mi-~cintyre and Bower (attached) 
das1led out froni shelter and made a desperate rush across the exposed 
slope for the next bit of cover. Every rifle froni the crest above was 
IKoIul~tly aimed at the clitring I)aud and 30 men fell dead or wounded, 
t,Ilei.r bodies of course l~aving to be left on the ground. Not to be 
clutdoIle, tlie right wing of the 2nd Gurkhas followed suit sllortly 
and it was here h a t  Major Judge, was sllot dead. The 
(;ur.kllas were llow protected by cover again; but for additional 
tfipops to ~.eiuforce them, now that the enemy realiued tlrat the ad- 
vauce over what was wit11 utern truth termed the "death-ZO~O" 
had seriously begun, waa doubly difficult and was for 10% vainly 
attempted, both by the Do~setuhires and the ~erbyshires .  Capta~n 
M. R. Arnold of the Dorsetshires was seen by the Gurkhas in 
front suddenly to spring up, and calling out heroically "Come on 
'El Company ! " he fell, dangerously wounded. Lieutenant Hew7itt 
of the same regimeut, undismayed by the slaughter he had witnessed, 
led a wllole coxnpnny forward and every man dropped in his tracks 
dead or wounded, he alone of the whole company getting across $0 
cover, his elbow being just grazed by a bullet. Occasionally after 
that single men from both the Derbyshires and the Dorsetshires still 
ran the terrible gauntlet ; but for either reginlent to advance in a 
body for the purpose of helping the 2nd Gurkhas to  deliver t h e  
final assault mas an impossiblity until the guns hacl played with better 
efict on the position, and until further strong reinforcements were 
available. l\.leanwhile the situation mas becorning serious. For more than 
two hours onlookers below and from the adjacent heights anxiously 
conten~plated the probability of a retirement, and all that such a n  
event \~oulcl mean ; and the later the hour grew the more urgent it 
became to bring tlle action to s speedy end by a successful coup de main.  
I t  mas then tllat the Gordon Highlanders and the 3rd Silihv were 
ordered up, and it was arranged that for three minutes before they 
advanced over the exposed slope every gun-there were 24 in  all- 
should pour a hot fire on to the ridge. A t  the proper signal a terrible 
fusillade was thundered out by the artillery, and when the mighty roar  
had subsided the Conlnisndant of the Gordon Highlanders, Colonel H. H. 
Mathias, turning with a glowing face to his regiment, addressed to them 
in an in~passioned voice, a speech that has since been echoed and re-echo- 
ed throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire, a speech 
that thrilled every man who heard it  :-"The General says the position 
must be taken at  all costs. THE GORDON HI~HLANDERS WILL TAKE 1T !" 
Cheering wildly, and with the pipers lustily playing the slogan, t h e  
brave Highlanders, hesitating not a single moment, dashed forward en 
mnsae across the fatal slope, led with splendid energy by the Colonel, t h e  
Adjutant and the Sergeant-Major at  the head of the regiment, and Major 
Downman a t  the head of the leading company. A single example will 
suffice to show how terribly deadly was the enemy's fire. Lieutenant 
Dingwall of the Oordons was hit on his revolver, the impact knocking 
l~irn down. Springing to his feet again he was hi t  on his ammunition 
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irnmecliately ~fterwards went through his coat, and the next moment 
he was twice hit on the knee. Lieutenant Lanlont was shot. dead; 
Major Macbeaa was dangerously wounded, and Major Donovan was 
twice hit on the helmet. TITO pipers were 1rGlled and three others 
wounded. One hero, Piper Findlater, was knocked over by a. Durn Durn 
bullet which shattered the bone of his leg, yet he sat, up on the ground 
and played on until a second bullet came and he could play no longer. 
For this fine exhibition of pluck the piper was subsequently awarded 
the Vict0ri.a Cross. 
A t  3 P.W. the Gordons had gainecl a sheltered position a t  the foot 
of the last cliff, and after recovering them3elves were ready to combine 
with the 2nd Gurkhas in climbing the precipitous path ahead' for the 
purpose of delivering the final assault. Led by their Officers a ~ ~ d  again. 
loudly cheering, the two regiments, with the few daring soldiers of the 
Derbyshire and Dorsetshire Regiments who had managed to get across 
the exposed slope, advanced indiscriminately in a procession : the Iixrrov 
path or saddle admitted of no other order. But the moral effect of the 
earlier advance across tire death-zone had been too much for the enemy, 
whose fire had already begun to slacken, arrd when a t  3-10 P.N. this final 
assault was made the beaten tribesmen would not face the onrushing 
procession, but turned tsiI andfled precipitately down the hilI. For six 
hours the enemy had offered a most stlibborn resistance, during the 
latter half of the time nrnh7guo Marte, and tho relief a t  this sudden and 
br~llinnt termination was intense. Eat  g e a t  as is the honor due to 
the Gordon Highhnders and the 2nd Gurkhas, ik hss to  be said i n  
fairness to bhe other as~aulting troops that until a few m~nutes 
before the Gordon Highlanders' advance the enemy's position had 
not yet been sufficiently shaken by artillery fire. Moreover, a t  the 
precise moment when the Gosdons rushed forward an overwhelming 
volley of shells was.poused on to the Dargai crest by the guns, which to 
some extent nlust have interfered with the enemy's fire. The personal 
gallantry of Colonel.Jhthias was subsequently rewardsd by the bestowal, 
of the Victoria Cross. 
The casualty list was a sadly heavy one, the nyrnber of killed and 
wounded aniounting altagether to 800, e.g., four Oficers and 34 men 
killed, and five Officers and 157 men wounded. The Officers killed were 
Captain C. B. Judge, 2nd Gurkhas; Lieutenant A. Lamont, Gordon 
Highlanders ; and Captain W. E. C, Smith, Derbyshire Regiment. The 
Officers wounded were : Captain J. (2. Robinson, 2nd Gurlrhas (danger- 
ously)*; Captain H. T. Arnold, Dorsetshire Regiment ; Major F. Macbean 
and Lieutenant E. Dingmall, Gordon Highlanders ; and Lieutenant 
G. E. White, 3rd Sikhs (all seriously) ; Colonel H. H. Mathias, Captain 
H. P. Uniacke, Lieutenant M. F. M. Meiklejohn, and Lieutenant G. S. a- 
Crawford, Gordon Highlanders (all slightly). The distribution of t h e  
casualties among thenon-commissioned officers and men was as follows :- 
Dorsetshire Regiment, 8 killed, 38 wounded ; Gordon Highlanders, 2 
killed and 35 wounded ; Derbyshire Regiment, 4 killed and 8 wounded ; 
2nd Gurkhas, 16 killed and 49 wounded ; 3rd Sikhs, 2 killed and 16 
wounded ; 3rd Gurkhas, 2 killed and 9 wounded. 
It may be mentioned here that the late Captain Charles Bellew 
Judge, of the 2nd (Prince of Wales's Own) Gurkha Regiment, was for- 
merly attached to the Leinster Regiment and was appointed to the Indian 
Staff Corps in 1881. H e  was Brigade Transport Officer in  the expedition 
against the Hazaras in  1888, being present a t  the battle of Eotkai, a n d  
for his gaIlantry on that  occasion was mentioned in despatches, H e  also 
served in the Manipur Expedition of 1891. The late Captain William 
i 
Edward Clifton Smith, of the Derbyshire Regiment, entered the army i n  
1889. H e  joined the 1st  Battalion, and on his return from employnlent 
with the Royal Niger Company was posted to the 2nd Battalion whicll 
had already beell in India since 1882. The late Lieutenant Alexander 
Lamont, of the Gordons, was born in  1872, and after being educated 
a t  Eton joined the Gordons three years and a half ago. H e  was the 
second son of Mr. James Lamont of Knockdow, Argyllshire, D. L., 
and formerly M. P. for the County of Bute. H e  came of a warlike race, 
many of his ancestors falling by land and sea, a t  Seringapatam, Trafalgar, 
and Waterloo. Major Forbes Macbean, who was wounded, served with 
the 92nd through the Afghan War of 1879-80, and participated in L o r d  
Roberts's march to Eandahar. H e  also took part in the Boer War of 
1881. Lieutenant Kenneth Dingwall (wounded) joined the 92nd in 1891, 
and served with the Chitral Relief Force in 1895, and was among t h e  
storming party who took the Malakand Pass in  that year. He received 
a medal and clasp for his services. 
AS for the enemy they mere completely driven from the hills, a n d  
retired i n  confusion down to the Khauki River, thus leaving the road 
through the Chagru Kotal open for the further advance to Kilorappa. 
C 
* Died three days later. 
I 
But i t  was too late in the day for the 2nd Division with its baggage 
n train to move forward, and General Yeatman-Biggs bivouacked for the I 
























The next morning the  Division marched on to Khorappa unopposed 
together with the Northamptons, the 36th Sikhs and No. 9 Mountain 
i 
j 
Battery Royal Artillery, and pitched camp abont a mile short of the 
Ehanki River. 
CRAPTER X. 
LIFTISG THE PURDAH FROM TIRAH. 
AFTER the re-capture of Dargai on the 20tlx October Sir William Lock- 
hart lost no time in pushing forward, his aim being to give the Afridis 
and Orakzai no breathing time. Accordingly on the morning following 
the action, the 2nd Division continued its march across Chagru Eotal  
i n  the direction of Khowpps. The King's Own Scottish Borderers, the  
Dorsetshires and the Shind Infantry were left behind a t  Dargai and 
about the kotnt  in case of any further hostile demonstration frorn the  
west. Sir William Lockhart himself, with the troops remaining on the  
Saniana, followed the Zhd Division down to Rhorappa, there to establish 
his heari-quarters within gunshot of the Khanki River, across which 
the main body of the enemy had retired. 
On the night of the 2lst October the new camp a t  Ehorappa was 
fired into from across the river by about 8,000 of the enemy, carrying 15 
standards ; but a few rounds from the guns put an end to the fusillade, 
which was rather fortunnte as there had not yet been time enough to 
prepare proper cover. On the night of 22nd there was more firing into 
camp, and again an the 23rd t o  a smaller extent, but the damage was 
principally among animals. The 25th was a very bad night. Firing 
into camp began about 6 P.M., and continmed more or less without inter- 
mission till l o p  M. Bullets were whistling everywhere, and there were 
some extraordinary escapes, but unfortunately also a great many casual- 
ties. The 1st  Division had sent a foraging party out tha& morning, a n d  
though they obtained a good deal of forage, the enemy lined the heights 
above them a s  they returned, and sonle thirteea casualties occurred. 
Later in the evening there were some 24 sniping casualties among the  
1st Division, and 10 among the 2nd Division. Captain F. F. Badcock 
(District Staff OfEcer, 56h Gurkhas), Field InteUigence QBcer, was h i t  
on the left elbow while sitting a t  dinner and his arm had unfortunately 
to be amputated. Curiously enough, Captain Bad~oclr was wounded on 
the same arm at the storming of Nilt Fort in the Hunea Nagar Ex- 
pedition where he sl~lawed great gallantry in  leading a party of t l ~ e  
5th Gurkhas after the gate of the fort had been blown in by Captain 
Aylmer. Lieutenant Croker (Munster Fusiliers), Orderly Officer t n  
BrigadierJ.2emt.d Eempster, was h i t  on the right shouldec, also whell 
at dinner, but  not seriously injured. Sir William Lockhart himself had 
a narrow escape, for barely had some gram bags been placed round his 
t e n t  as a protection, when two bullets whizzed through the canvas and 
w e r e  buried in the grain. On the morning of the 26th October a 
B r i t i s h  soldier and sixfollowers were found cut to pieces a few hundred 
Y a r d s  from the camp. They were so slashed about as to be quite unre- 
'cognisable, but  it was presumed they had been detained till late on the 
C h a g r u  Kotal road and had tried to get into camp after dark. The 
approximate number of troops in camp was :-British 6,400, natives 
31,200, followers 17,000, and the animals numbered 24,000. 
Tribal attention was plainly concentrated now on the defence of 
t h e  Sanlpagha Pass, for contrary to expectation no attacks had been 
m a d e  on the long Line of Communication from Kohat to Shinawari, 
t h e r e  had been on hostile demonstration in the direction of the ~ u r r a k  
V a l l e y ,  while on the Peshawar frontier General Hammond's Column had 
n o t  seen any great gathering beyond Bara. The Khyber also lay 
heglected,  and the Zakka Khel, who had been told off by the Afridi 
l e a d e r s  t o  watch the road from Jalnrud t.o Ali Musjid, had not ap- 
p a r e n t l y  mustered in force. The flower of the Afridi fighting men 
w e r e  assembled with the Orakzai to defend Tirah against the main 
a t t a c k ,  a t ~ d  small contingents only could be spared to guard the Bara 
a n d  Bazar Valleys against possible flank attacks. 
On the evening of the 27th October the order was issued for a 
f u r t h e r  advance from Khorappa, and a very welcome order it  was, for 
e v e r y o n e  was tired of the long wait at that place, and the camp, with 
its thousands of men and animals was not so salubrious a spot as t o  
i n v i t e  a longer stay. The water-supply wa& particularly bad: the 
o n l y  procurable water ran through a number of paddy-fields-through 
w h a t  in fact sooner or later promised to be a snipejheedand was 
n ~ u d d y  and dirty in consequence. 13ut so great had been the difficulties 
of  transport along the road from Shinawari to Khorappa, that it was 
o n l y  on the 27th that the Conlmissariat godowns were able to supply 
t h e  indents for three days' reserve rations for men and two day3 for 
fol lowers .  
The move on the 28th was only a short one, some four miles or 
less, to a place called Ghandaki, higher up the Khanlri Valley and iu the 
d i r e c t i o n  of the Sa~llpagha Pass. TO ensure that this move should llot 
b e  molested from the right flank, the Nortlrampton Regiment and 36th 
Sikhs, under C'olonel Chatyor, comnlanding the former regiment, w e r e  
yelit to seize a high hill overlooking the route and the new camp,  
on tlie top of which large numbers of the enemy had been vis ible  
the day before and on previous days, and from which doubtless n i a n y  
rnen had descended towards dusk to fire into the huge camp. Colonel  
Chaytor's two regiments moved off a t  5 A.M. and found the  hill unoccu-  
pied. The sudden s tar t  had very probably surprised the enemy, f o r  
there was every indication that  the hill had been recently occupied, 
and the column as i t  moved up was fired into from a n  adjoining emi- 
nence. A reconniissance was made later in the day t o  the foot of the 
Sampagl~a Psss itself. The enemy were seen in large numbers on  the 
surn~nit of the range and also on the spurs of the hills to  the east and 
west. Colonel Sage, commanding the 1st Gurkhas, was severe ly  
wounded during the reconnaissance, but there were no other casualties. 
The troops were now in a position to  deliver their attack upon the 
Snlpagha, and only awaited daybreak. The Afridis and Orakzai had 
natur.~lly a strong position, and their favourite method of defence, f ight-  
ing behind stone breast-works with a line of retreat open, was o n c e  
adopted. They evidently feared a turning movement, and their  dis- 
position was mainly designed to guard against this as much as  possible. 
Hence they had aangared the spurs to the right and left, so a s  t o  
being outflanked a t  the beginning of the action, in which case t h e  
pass ~ o u l d  have become untenable. The real plan of attack was, h o w -  
ever, very different from anything the eneiny expected, and consisted in  
the 2nd Brigade (General Gaselee'e) followed by the 4th Brigade (General  
Wrstmacott's) with the 3rd Brigade (General Eempster's) behind it 
making a direct attack ; while the 1st Brigade (General Hart's) sen t  o n e  
b&ttalion to cover the right flank, and another battalion to cover the 
left flank. The 3rd and remaining battallon of General Hart 's Bri- 
gade seized a hill opposite the pass as an artillery position, acted tts 
escort to  the guns, and held itself in readiness to support either of tile 
two battalions on the flanks which might require assistance. Tile re- 
maining battalion of this brigade (the 30th Punjab Infantry) was  at 
D a r p i .  
The 1st Brigade, followed by the artillery of the 1st a n d  2nd 
Divisions, left camp a t  5 A.M. on the 29th September and was followed 
by the other brigades a t  short intervals. The hill destined for the  fir-tit 
artillery position was seized without opposition by the Del-byshire 
Regilnellt of Brigadier-General Hart's Brigade, while the Devonshire 
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Regiment worked their way up by a village called Nazeno, guarding the 
right flank, and the 2-1st Gurkhas on the left flank made for Kandi 
Mishti. The two regiments on the flanks had very difficult ground to 
work over, and though they thoroughly accomplished the protectioll of 
the flanks of the main column, they necessarily took but little part in 
whatever fighting there was. A portion of the artillery-the whole six 
batteries of which were commanded by Brigadier-General Spragge- 
came into action about 7-30 AX., when the three batteries of the 1st 
Division under Lieutenant-Colonel Duthy, fired on a large sangar cover- 
ing the road to the pass, aud very effectually shelled it, while, as there 
was neither sufficient room nor objective for the other three batteries 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy, they remained in temporary reserve. 
The 2nd Erigade meanwhile began its advance in line of regiments : 
the 3rd Sikhs on the right, the Yorkshire Regiment on the right centre, 
the Queen's on the left centre, and the 2-4th Gurkhas on the left flank 
of all. All these regiments had very precipitous ground to work over, 
and perhaps some regiments encountered greater difficulty than others, 
but the Queen's (commanded by Major Eanford-Flood who, despite 
a wound in the arm received early in the advance, persisted in going on) 
were the first to crown the crest. The two regiments on the right of 
the line, uiz., the 3rd Sikhs and the Yorkshire Regiment, were then sent 
off to crown a hill on the right of the pass, from which some of the 
enemy were firing; while of the other two regiments the Queen's 
remained about the summit of the pass (which was taken about 9-45), 
and the 3-4th Gurkhas pressed up a hill to the left. This advance of 
the 2nd Brigade of General Symon's Division had been well prepared 
by the artillery. Brigadier-General Spragge, as soon as he saw that the 
2nd Brigade were advancing against the hill on which the large sangar 
was situated, and which formeda sort of " advanced post" to the enemy's 
position, a t  once sent on his other brigade of division of artillery, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Purdy, for the preparation of the infantry assault 
already described. This brigade division of artillery made beautiful 
practice against the main ridge, which the 2nd Brigade was assaulting. 
Although owing to the steep reverse slopes on which the enemy could 
shelter themselves, no great number of casualties resulted from the 
artillery fire, the physical effect of the guns in the actual destruction 
of rangarr, and the moral effect in that the enemy were prevented 
from lining the crest to oppose the infantry advance, were both un- 
dnubtcdly great, and here, as at Dargai, very greatly facilitated the 
infantry advance and diminished t,he infantry losses. As the 2nd 
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Brigade was seen to be nearing the crest of the main position, Bri- 
gadier-General Spragge sent forward No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery 
to  the top of the pass to assist i n  finally clearing the sangara. In 
rounding a corner in order to get this battery into action Captain 
De Butts wss killed: he was struck by a bullet in  the stomach, a n d  
death was almost instantaneous. Captain De Butts was a very well 
known nlountain battery officer; he commanded the same battery in 
the late Suakim Expedition, and was invalided home from there very ill 
indeed. H e  made however a wonderful recovery, and had only lately 
rejoined his battery. Two guns of this b a t t e r  under Lieutenant Edl- 
mann managed to get iato position near the top of the pass, and did 
excellent service, whilst two guns of No. 9 Mountain Battery Royal 
Artillery, which had also been pushed on came into action a t  t h e  
highest point of the road and managed to shell the last aangar held 
b y  the enemy a t  a range of 900 yards. The 3rd Sikhs and the York- 
shire Regiment, when they reached the top of the pass, were sent off, 
as already stated, to a hill on the  right, commanding a road over t h e  
pass; and the trained scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, supported 
b y  two companies of the Queen's, worked up a spur between t h e  
Yorkshire Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs, and "contained" or held back a 
large number of the enemy who were trying to get down to the pass. 
The 4th Brigade (Brigadier-General Westmacott's) had meanwhile been 
supporting the 2nd Brigade, and arrived on the crest, and the 36th 
Sikhs, assisted by long-range volleys from tEe Xing's Own Scottish 
Borderers and by the very accurate fire of two guns of No. 1 Mountain 
Battery Royal Artillery, crowned the crest. The losses in the 2nd 
Brigade in the taking of the Sampagha Pass were 1 killed and 14 
wounded, of which the Queen's lost 1 killed and 7 wounded. T h e  
total casualties in the whole force were about 24. The enemy on t h e  
whole had really offered but little resistancr, and whatever casualties 
they had, the killed and wounded were successfully removed. The 3 r d  
Brigade (Brigadier-General KempsteIjs) had pressed along hard a f t e r  
the 2nd Brigade, but despite all efforts arrived too late to  take any par t  
in the action, and was now sent on almost immediately down into t h e  
Mastura Valley. NO sooner had the troops reached the top of the pass 
than fires were seen a t  many of the villages down in the valley below 
on the road to the Arhanga Pass : the enemy, with a view to hindering 
the advance by creating difficulties of food supply, had fired the stock 
of fodder a t  many of the villages. So precipitate was their retreat, 
however, that the destruction of the fodder was far from successfully 
accomplished, and very ample quantities remained: The Afridis, except 
t h e  Kuki Hhels, did not assist a t  all in the defence of the Sampagha 
Pass; either because they deemed the attack on their own country so 
imminent that  they could spare no time to assist their allies, or because 
they had quarrelled with the Orakzai as to  the disposition of the force 
i n  the pass. 
The Same evening, after the capture of the pass, both diVisiolls 
of the Tipah Field Force moved down into the Mastura Valley where the 
orakzai in  times of peace have their permanent head-quarters. Un- 
fortunately the baggage of the troops, even great-coats and blankets, 
could not follow them in all cases thesame day, and many corps were 
without these end had to spend a bitterly cold night, and in the case 
of the Dorset Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders, not only without 
a n y  warmclothing but with nothing to eat, except what they had carried 
with them in their havresacks. Of course to pass two divisions with 
their obligatory mules even, i.e., without anything in the shape of tents 
and  heavier articles of equipment, along a bad mountain track on the 
same day on which anaction had been fought in  the morning (thus 
delaying the start of the baggage) was a n  obvious impossibility; and 
t h e  corps who were without their baggage were doubtless prepared for 
t h a t  eventuality. The two divisions remined the next day (the 30th) 
a t  the  Mastura Camp. The MastiIra is a fine wide valley, with numer- 
ous homesteads of solidly built two or three storied houses, with good 
outhouses, and with the usual towers and walled enclosures. A11 this 
day  the baggage began to slowly trickle i n  from the Sampaghit Pass, 
where the  block on the narrow road was enonnous ; and in the evening. 
t h e  block being hopelessfor that day, orders Tere issued postponing 
the  further advance of the troops and the attack on the Arhanga Pass 
until  the next day. 
The Arhanga Pass leads direct from the Mastura Valley into Maidan . 
t h e  summer home of the Afridis. The order of adyance was: 4th, 3rd, 
2nd and 1st Brigades in the sequence named, beginning at  6 A.M ; all 
baggage animals, except pakhal mules, following in rear of tlhe cloumn. 
Mr. Donald, the Political Officer with the 2nd Division, who has a mosf 
intimate knowledge of these tribesmen and their ways, ~redicted the 
night before the attack that  not more than about 500 men would hold 
t h e  pass, and his prediction proved absolutely correct. The enemy were 
very few indeed in number, and offered little if any resistance. The 
4 t h  Brigade threw forward a regiment, the King's Own Scottish 
Borderers, and seized a conical hill some 1,200 yards from the centre 0% 
the pass, and on to this hill Brigadier-General Spragge brought to play 
the three batteries of the 2nd Division, under ~ieutenant-Colonel Pu1"dy. 
The 3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Kempsteis) then made a denlon- 
strative movement to the left; while the 2nd Brigade (~rigadier-General 
C;aseleels), acconlpanied by General Symons, made a flank attack on the 
right with a view to seizing a hill commanding the pass from the east. 
The order of advance of this brigade-which practically took the  P s i -  
tion by itself, so weak was the resistance-was that the Yorkshire 
Regiment, with the trained scouts of the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas on their 
right, and the 2-4th Gurkhas were in first line, with the 3rd Sikhs i n  the 
second line and the Queen's in the third line. There was a greatrace up  
the hillside between the Yorkshire Regiment and the 2-4th Gurkhas ; 
the Ynrksllire Reginlent just winning on the post. The enemy fired 
very few shots, and the total casualties were only five; amongst whom 
was Captain Searle of the 36th Sikhs, wounded by a stray shot as his 
regiment was supporting the King's Own Scottish Borderers in the 4th 
Brigade. 
After the Arhanga Pass had been crossed the valleys of Maidan and 
Rajgul in Tirah, the summer quarters of the Afridis, lay before Sir 
William I~oCkhart, and these he now proceeded to enter, having lifted 
thep~crdnh from Tirah in four days from the time of leaving Khorappa 
in the Khanki TTdlley. The ease with which the Afridis had been 
ousted from positions vaunted as virtually impregnable, was the more 
gratifying, as the experience a t  the Chagru Eotal had been thought 
by sonie to foreshadow stubborn resistance throughout the campaign. 
Their impotence to bar the advance of such a force as the Qovernnient 
of India had sent against them, was now probably as clear to the 
tribesmen as to anybody else; and the only question was whether they 
would frankly accept a t  once the terms soon to be announced by Sir 
William Lockhart, or attempt to partially preserve their military pres- 
tige among the frontier tribes by avoiding a regular action and main- 
taining a guerilla warfare. The latter course they well knew could 
only bring severe punishment upon their country; but as there were 
at  least 30,000 tribesmen in arms, the more fiery of the tribal leaders 
could not be expected to see the necessity of submitting on t h e  spot 
without striking a further blow. 
We may take advantage of the long delay which once again occurred 
a t  Maidan in bringing up stores from the Samana base, in  order t o  take 












1 1 d  
=l?e 
em3 




himself. Tirah or Maidan Valley, which the two divisions of the Tirah 
Field Force reached on the night of the 31st October, lies in  a wide basin 
surrounded by steep hills, crowned in places on the nortll side with fir 
trees, but there are no forests of tree.9 either in the wlley or on the 
hills. The valley is quite open, with large areas of fairly flat ground 
with deep ndlahs between them; the whole valley is well cultivated 
and very fertile. There were numerous homesteads rather than villages 
everywhere : these homesteads generally consisted of a tower and two 
01' three double or three storied houses surrounded by smaller buildings 
and outhouses and with many walnut, peach, apricot, cherry and other 
trees round them. They were full of grain and fodder, though in 
some cases the fodder had been burnt before the troops arrived. But 
the numerous fowls, bowlsof aia, honey, walnuts and other comestibles 
found i n  the houses showed that the rapid advance of our troops had 
rather taken the Afridis by surprise. The water-supply was good ; the 
nights mere not so cold as in the Mastura Valley, just traversed, and 
the whole situation of the troops was greatly improved, from the point 
of view of camp comfort. Butumn was well advanced, but it  was 
easy to see that  in the spring or summer the country must be very 
beautiful. I n  the hot weather the central valley is no doubt densely 
populated: the banks of the streani were found to be honeycombed 
with cave-dwellings. I t  wits difficulty to ascertain how many Afridis 
stay during the winter in Maidan, probably not more than one-fifth of 
its sumnler inhabitants. I n  a warm winter, or if troubles were appre- 
hended towards Peshawar, no doubt more would remain. Regarded 
geographically, Tirah is thus described in Hecords of 3'rontier Ezpedi- 
tzolrs (Paget Mason) :-"Maidan is a circular valley or basin, about 
ten miles in diameter, surrounded by forest-covered mountains rising 
from 8,000 to 9,000 feet. The valley is well drained by three or four 
large watercourses : that to the west, where the Malikdin Khel hamlets 
stand, is known as the Shilober, which name is also applied to the entire 
stream afterthe others have joined it, niz., the Sherdara, occupied by the 
zakkH. Khels from the east : the Manakass, occupied by some fanlilies of 
the Jownki and Ashu Khel sections of the Adam Khels; and the 
KahudaLaa, occupied by the Kambar Khels. These converge from the 
Shi]ober Toi, which, leaving Rilaidan, enters a narrow rocky gorge three 
llliles long commanded by heights rising one thousand feet above i t  on 
eitller side. After emerging from this defile, the torrent flows through 
open coulltry for two or three nliles, then joins the Rajgul stream a t  
Dwatoi, after which the nilited stream receives the name of the 
River." Beyond Maidan lies the Rajgul Valley, of which we read :- 
" I t s  length is about ten miles and the breadth of the open Country 
lying on either side of the central stream about four t o  five miles where 
widest, i t s  elevation being  roba ably over 5,000 feet. Bajgul is inhabited 
by Kuki Khel Afridis, and their hamlets lie near the stream in t h e  
centre of the valley. Temporary sheds are erected by the shepherds 
among the pine forests which clothe the surrounding mountains. On 
the south Rajgul is separated from Maidan by a steep, rocky, well- 
wooded spur, 8,000 to 9,000 feet in elevation." 
While reserve supplies were being slowly ~ u s h e d  forward from 
Ehorappa, through difficult country overrun with daring Afridi 
skirmishers, a t  the tedious rate of about two days' supplies in twenty- 
four hours, there was for a long time no occurrence iu Tirah to give to 
the  expedition the outward semblance of activity. The road from t h e  
Arhanga Pass to  the Tirah Valley was a t  first very stony and precipi- 
tous, but the Bombay Sappers and Miners rapidly improved i t  ; a n d  
once down into the valley the path or paths were quite easy, and in 
time the whole road from Khorappa was made ~racticable for camels, 
The ordinary baggage moved through the Arhanga Pass more quickly 
than i t  had done over the Sampagha Pass, and every British reginlent got  
their great-coats and blankets on the night of the 31st October, that  is, 
the night of the arrival of the troops. Part  of the baggage belonging t o  
the 15th Sikhs, however, was caught by the enemy in the narrow defile 
on the Maidan side of the pass after dark : the tribesmen fired from t h e  
heights above, the mule drabies bolted, the escort of the 15th Sikhs with 
great presence of mind closed round the ammunition mules and effect- 
ively protected them, but some 71 Jeypore ponies and some 200 k i t s  
were carried off. Three drivers were shot dead in the dark, and t w o  
wounded. 
The next morning, November lst ,  Bagh, t h e  place where the great  
tribal j irgnhs are usually held, was reconnoitred. The enemy fired on 
the reconnoitring party but were driven off by a few shells. Captain 
MacLaren, King's Own Scottish Borderers, was elightly wounded, a n d  
the 1-3rd Gurkhas lost one sepoy killed and two,severely and one slightly 
wounded. The Afridis were seen a t  1 P.M. coming down in considerable 
numbers from the hills to the east of the camp with bullocks to carry 
off fodder and goods ; and the 2nd Brigade, with the Derajat &fountain 
Battery, moved out to stop their operations, returning to camp a t  5 P.M. 
Lieutenapt E. G .  Caffin, Yorkshire Regiment, was aeverely wounded in 
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this affair. A picket of the 36th Sikhs moving out to their post a t  
6 P.M. wereattacked, but they drove off the enemy: one sepoy wan 
wounded. The transport from the Ai-hanga Pass coming into camp 
about 7 P.M. was also attacked, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued ; and 
our casualties were::-2nd Royal West Surrey-killed 3; wounded 4 ; 
Northamptons-mounded 1; transport followers-wounded 3 ; Jeypore 
Transport Train ki2kd 1; wounded 3. Some baggage was lost. 
The main body of the Afridis seemed chiefly concerned in getting 
their families and flocks into a place of safety. For the moment the 
upper part of the Bara Valley lay open to them, and although this could 
only be a temporary refuge itwas the best they had to turn to without . 
entering Afghanistan in unwelcome numbers. Excluding the Adam 
Khels and a part of the Kuki Khels, who had not risen, there were pro- 
bably not less than 20,000 Afridis bearing arms ; counting old men, 
women and children, the whole Afridi population a t  the lowest estimate 
must number 50,000; winter was drawing near; and Sir William 
Lockhart, who was playing a driving game, hoped by properly combining 
the movements of his main column in Maidan with the movements of 
the Peshawar Column then a t  Bara Fort to make the position of the 
tribe one that must compel complete submission. It was considered 
quite unlikely that a huge tribal exodus into eastern Afghanistan would 
take place, though doubtless many separate families would flee towards 
this the only safe line of retreat left open. The conclusion generally 
drawn was that the Mridis would rally their scattered forces in the 
Bara Valley aod would then be driven esstvard, the scene of the opera- 
tions gradually shifting nearer to the Peshawar frontier so as  to play into 
the hands of the Peshawar Column which would advance from Bara for 
the purpose. There was a possible escape for the Afridis from the Bara 
Valley into the Bazar Valley which runs north of and parallel to it; 
indeed already the Bokar Pass coanecting the two valleys was thronged 
with the families and flocks of the ZaBka Khels, the Aka Khels and the 
Kambar Khels. But this evasion a t  the best could only prolong the 
&se, and i t  was thought that the warlike Afridis, after having been 
driven all the way from Chagru Xotal to Khorappa, from Khorappa to 
the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, and thence through Tirah into the 
Bars Valley would a t  last make an all-decisive stand. 
For  the moment the Afridis alone were engrossing attention, but  
I 
as may be  well supposed the Orakzai were not dropping out of the plan 
i' 
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of campaign, as heavy scores had yet to be settled with the beseigers of 
Gulistan and Saragheri. A reconnaissance in force was ordered down 
the Mastura Valley, which runs south of the Bars Valley to  discover 
what opposition the Orakzai were preparing to offer, and it was 
intended later on to look up Lhe Khnnki Valley also, still further south. 
But operations in these two directions could be deliberately undertaken 
by Sir Power Palnier with the strong body of troops forming the Line 
of Communication, a t  a later stage, after the base of Sir William 
Lockhart's main column had been transferred from Eohat  (v id  Shinawari 
and Khorappa) to  Pesliawar. 
CBAPTER XI.  
1 GUERILLA WARFARE-A FIEAVY CASUALTY LIST. 
HAVING removed their families to places beyond the inlrLzediate reach 
of our troops, the Afridis now began to grow extrenlely bold, and 
on  the 5th November they attacked the convoy with the headquarter 
k baggage from Kborappa as i t  was approitclling the Arhauga Pass. S Tiley also atti~ckecl a foraging party from the 2nd Division, killing a, Jamadar and one nlan of thel5th Siklis and wounding five others severely, 
l besides carrying off about 40 mules. The same night there was heavy 
f 
firin< for three hours into Maidan Camp. Lieutenant C. L. Ciffard of 
k t h e  Northanlptonshire Regiment was shot dead and Captain E. L. 
.i Sull iva~l  of the 36th Sikhs was severely wounded while walking about in 
t h e  mess tent Two nights later, Captain E. Y. Watson, Commissariat 
t Officer, 4th Brigade, was shot through the head by a stray bullet and 
i cliecl almost imnaediately. On the 7th N~vember, a Sunday, while the 
2nd Brigade were a t  church parade, a bullet was fired into the assembly 
a n d  nearly brought the service to an abrupt conclusion, as i t  only just 
missed the chaplain. Every tent and sleeping place in camp was now pro- 
k 
& vided with shelter from bullets, either by excavation or by making stone 
a n d  mud walls, and the messes were similarly protected. The 2nd 
Brigade went out foraging on the 8th, and owing to the precautions 
talcen by Brigadier-Gewral Gaselee, the enemy were kept a t  a distance 
a n d  there was only one casualty, in the 24th Gurkhas. Large quanti- 
t ies of grain were seized and mnch more had to be left behind. On tlm 
i 9 t h  November the 4tl1 Brigade destroyed niany of the towers and forti- 
b fiecl posts of the Zakka Khels, this tribe having defiantly refused to send i n  n jirgnh, having moreover been mainly responsible fo r  the heavy 
firing night &fter night into mmp. Uesultory brushes with the enemy 
c o r l t i a u e ~  to occur while the Tirah Reld Force remained a t  Maidan 
awaiting the compIetion d its reserve supplies, but they Ied to nothing 
of moment. 
one unfortunate event vhiclr occurred in the Kurram Valley a t  
I this period canllot be left unnoticed here, though it had' no immediate 
1 connection with anything then taking place in Tirah. Colonel 
f comma~lding the ILurrarn movable colu~un, taking advantage d 
suspension -of hostilities in  the neiglibourllood of Sadda, made a 
reconnaissance up the Rarrnana defile, which, though very successful in 
itself, was incidentally marred by a heavy and quite unriecessary loss of 
life. The reeonnaissa~lce, which was made in force, took place on the 6th 
Xovember, and a good surrey was made of a  ort ti on of the Massuzai 
country. The defile is seven miles long, and, according to all appear- 
ances, could be held by a tilollsand tribesmen with proper defensive 
preparations against almost any attacking force, as  the river bed is 
commanded from both sides within easy rifle range throughout. The 
enemy, however, were on this occasion conlpletely surprised, and did not 
even hold a stockade across the defile. About six miles from Sadda the 
road was found passable for cavalry, and the Ce,ntral India Horse went 
through in force and reached the village of Esor a t  11 o'clock. Here a 
lance belonging to a Duffadar of the 3rd Bengal Cavitlry, killed near camp 
in September xvas discovered, ancl also a quantity of arms, gunpowder 
and grain. The arm9 mere confiscated, but  nothing was destroyed. 
The retirement began at 1 P.M., when the enemy collected in consider- 
able force. The 5th Gurkhas, as year-guard. proceeded a nlile down the 
defile without trouble, but here a stoppage occurred o ~ i n g  to some 
delay in getting in a picket o i  the Rapurtllala Infantry from the heights 
above the right bank of t'he river. The Gurklias were detained an 
hour, and the enemy meanwhile advauced in strength with standards 
flying. A few casualties occurred, the Gurkhas losing one killed, one 
severely and two slightly wounded, the Kapurthala Infantry one slight- 
ly wounded, and the liurram Militia one dangerously and one slightly 
mounded. The enemy on their part lost heavily, and though the groilnd 
-as suited for the peculiar following-up tactics of the Pathan, they 
gradually fell back discomfited, the last five miles into camp being 
covered witllout a shot being fired. The Maxims and long-range volleys 
of the Royal Scots Fusiliers .iverbe very effective. So far tlie reconnais- 
sance, which had been conducted in a very able manner, had apparently 
been a complete success, and what was very in~portant  i t  had served to 
reveal the true state of this shorter route from the Kurram to the 
Khanki Valley. But, nnkno\-cn to everybody except the unfortunate 
troops concerned, a sad disaster had befallen the Kapurthala picket al- 
ready reSurred to. The picket consisted of thirty-five Silchs llnder 
Silbadnr, and their position on tha heights above the  right bank of 
river had apparently been chosen as i t  overlooked not only the  road 
along the river bed but also the Gao defile which joins the K~~~~~~ 
:defile a t  Jani ?Lob. Vhen the picket mas first signalled to withdraw 
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and join the main body, the message was acknowledged; but unfortu- 
nately the withdrawal was not begun forthwith, though the route by 
which the picket had ascended was a perfectly safe one, as none of the 
,enemy were near it, having in fact begun to retire up the defile. What 
was worse, the delay made in executing the order of withdrawal en- 
tirely escaped attention, and indeed i t  was eventually reported to Colonel 
I 
Hill  that  all units of his column were present. Thereafter the march of 
the  column to Stdda was resumed, and the five miles home were cover- 
ed in ignorance of the absence of the picket. Stranger still, 
present" was again reported to the OfIicer Commanding the Force in 
camp the next morning, and it  was actually not until late in the day 
tha t  Colonel Hill was informed tk t t  a Sub,~dar  and thirty-five men of 
t h e  K a p u r t h ~ l a  Infantry were " missing." Search parties were sent out, 
b u t  no trace of the party could be found, and all too late i t  was dis- 
covered that  only a few members of it  l~ad  actually rejoined the colnmn 
when i t  started back from Jani  Kot. What really happened to the ill- 
fated picket was only discovered later. The Subadar in command had 
apparently watched the running fight in the Karmana defile with the 
closest attention, and conceived the idea of sharing in it. The sepops 
were equally keen, and i t  is perhaps not to be wondered at  that a body 
of brave men, whose discipline is not of the hard-and-fast kind which 
obtains in  our own regiments, should have become excited when they 
saw a n  action taking place only a couple of miles or so alvay in which 
they had no prospect of participating. When the signal to  retire was 
received, the last hope of the picket of even a chance skirmish dis- 
appeared. Very reluctantly they began to descend. Theroute by which 
they had ascended was takenat first, but after it had been followed for 
some distance the Subadar and the more irnpetuous spirits decided to 
disobey the order signalled to them and to move down the ridge i n  a 
direction which would brit~g them into the defile nt a point considerably 
higher up than Jani Kot. The signallers and five men went on in the 
original direction and reached the main coluron in safety. So far as. 
could be madeoutthe Subadar's party soon got into very broken ground, 
among cliffs aud nul~ahs,  and eventually dropped into a narrowand diffi- 
cult ravine. If they had been able to follow this toits junction with the 
Karmana defile they would have come out abovethe Gurkha rear-guard, 
and would even then have been in a highly dangerous position. But  as 
they moved down the ravine they discovered that the way was barred, 
bhe jungle being on fire. Finding themqelves trapped they endeavoured 
. k retrace their steps and were observed bysome of thetribesmen. T.he " 
- 
-2asAkar thereupon halted in  its retirement, and the enemy turning back 
swarmed about the nu/lah, effectually cutting off all retreat. A s  heavy 
firing might have attracted the attention of the main body of the troops, 
the Massuzai and Chaukallnis contented themselves bj sitting 011 guard, 
and it was not until the moon rose that  they made their attdclc, l'olling 
Stones into the ravine and silooting down the whole party. Deplorable 
as the result must be held to be, there could be little doubt that i t  was 
directly due to  over-eagerness on the part of the little band of rnen and 
their leader to  give a good account of themselves. They wele brave to 
a fault, and they paid the penalty which sometimes attaches to ras'lness 
in the face of an enemy. After this aff<~ir, the attitude of the tribes- 
men east of Sadda became more hostile than ever, and the Massuzni 
were reinforced b j  a11 the Chamkanni clans. But  no actual fighting 
ensued, and we may once again leave the Kuri%am Valley, to follow 
events in  Maidan. 
On the 9th November, by way of preparing for an early forward 
movement, Sir William Lockhart ordered a reconnaissance in force from 
Maidan t o  the Saran Pass, which ledds into the Bara and Bazdr Valleys 
through the Sipah Afridis' country; and ag;iin the day's operations 
though in themselves entirely successful, were marred incidentally by 
an unlooked-for. disaster. The force which made the reco~~naissance t o  
Saran Sar was amixed brigade under the command of Brigadier-General 
Westmacott. Sir William Lockhart followed the column to the Saran 
Sar but  returned in advance of i t  and had reached camp some t,wo 
hours before the disaster in question occurred. The regiments forming 
the mixed brigade were the Northamptoas, the D o ~ e t s ,  the 15th Sikhs 
and the 36th Sikhs. After the cl est of the Saran Sar had been crowned 
the  troops started back with all speed, 11opi11g to corer the five miles to 
can~pbefore sunset. All went wellulltil mithin about a mile of the canip ; 
no sign of the enemy being visible. I t  WAS then dusk, and one company 
of the Northamptons, while marching alone down a nulloh, were 
ambuscaded by a party of tribesmen. The enemy would seem to have 
been lying close up t o  the route taken, and their fire a t  short range was 
terribly effective, s s  the regiment had 49 casualties, including th ree  
British Officers. The three other regiments were only sliglltly enfi;~ge& 
during the retirewent ; their losses being 3 killed and 15 wo:ln&d. 
The list of casualties for the day was as follows: British 0ficer~-Trill J :  
Lieutenant J. T. Waddell and 2nd-Lieutenant A. H. Mscintyre, North.. 
ayptonshire Begiment ; wounded : Lieutenants G. A. Trerkt (NorthmpJ. 
tonshire Regiment), 0 P. S. Ingham and A. A. Mercer ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ l ~ i ~ e  
Regiment .. ?dative OEicer-~c.ot;~,d+ r :-otie S ~ l h n d ~ ~ . ,  l.;tkl sikils. ~ , ~ ~ ~ l ;  
a n d  fiie : Pu'or.~;i~:~.olptonsllire K gillieut-17 b~iied uud 29 vvunllciec~ ; 
Dorsetshire Eegiment-2 killed and 6 wo~~r>cled ; 15 q. ~ l l i h ~  1 liiiled 
a n d  t: wounded; 36th Sikhs-3 wounded. Total of ;tll l a n k s - k i ~ i ~ d ,  72 ; 
wol~izdeti', 45. The anibuscade nlust either have been most carefully 
planned, or, as seenled more likely, the attacking party were lying con- 
cealed on the lookout for stragglers from camp, when they bec;~~ue 
aware of the regiment moving down the ravine, a r ~ d  c?ecidecl to pour in 
a few rapid volleys a t  close quarters before a c#~i~ntet--stt;tcic ould he 
made. The tribesnlerl chiefly concerned in the ;tttsck were again the 
Zakka Khels, a.midst whose villages in &laidan tlle Tirah Field Force 
was  then encamped. 
It was not very plain a t  first how the Northa~nptons came to find 
theniselves alone in a nullah cut off from their main body; and the 
la ter  details never entirely cleared up this point. The facts wh~ch  
ultirllately came to light are these. Ju clearing the way f o ~  tlie re- 
connaissance, in  the first instance, a commanding position mas captured 
by the Northamptons, who as advance-guard euveloped the west 
flank of the ridge which the enemy occupied. The position was t:,keU 
a t  11 A.M. with only 5 casualties. Sir Willram Lockllart and staff 
anivecl about 1-30 PM. and a t  2-15 the retirement was ordered. 
H e r e  the casualities began in earnest : for the enemy, follom7ing their 
favourite tactics of witllholding their attack until the withdrannl of 
our  troops, eniergecl suddenly from the woods, and the Northamptons 
who now formed the rear-guard ha? I man killed and 11 mourlded in 
qui te  a short time. The removal of the wounded became increasingly 
difficult, and the ground was too precipitous for stretchers. The 36th 
Sikhs were sent back up the hill to assist the Northamptons, who were 
seen to be seriously encumbered by their numerous killed and wonnded, 
and the foot of the hill was only reached a t  5 P.M. Up  to tliis point the 
Northamptons, though having m m y  casualties, had rlie~ely suffered the 
ordinary fortunes of rear-guard fighting. But  being now belated, and 
anxious (as one version suggested) t o  make up for lost time, they took a, 
~ h o r t  cut which, as it  cl~anced, lay through a nu~ lah  ambuscaded by the 
enerny, feeling secure from further molestation by reason of their near- 
aess  to camp. The march through the nullah, under a deadly shower 
of bullets, was conducted with wonderful coolness. Though powerless 
to retort upon the concealed enemy, and losing strength at  every step, 
unlucl<y band stuck bravely to  their wounded. -When caIlllj %'as ad 
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last reached a t  8 P.M. Lieutenant Macintyre, a Sergeant and eleven men 
of the regiment were reported missing, and were all found killed next 
morning. Sir William Lockhart a t  once ordered a nki1itnr.y court of 
enquiry,to he held regarding this very unfortunate agair, and after 
evidence had been recorded the papers were sent UP to Army Head- 
Quarters. 
Two days later the 2nd Brigade under ~ e n e r a l  Gaselee, with two 
mountain guns and one company of Sappers, paid a second visit to Sitl'an 
Sar to cornplete the survey, bring in forage and destroy the fortifica- 
tions of s l~ch Zakka Itchel villages 8s could be reached. This was all 
acconlplished satisfact,orily and without any serious misadventure; the 
defences of about 40 villnges being destroyed. Our casualties were : 
Second-Lieutenant Wright, 2nd Queen's, slightly wounded ; one man of 
the 2nd Queen's killed, and one sepoy of the 1-3rd Gurkhas slightly 
wounded. The enemy's loss was considerable, being a t  least 13 killed 
and 30 wounded by rifle fire, tvhile the artillery fire was also effective. 
While all this gllerillii fighting was in progress the Political Officers 
under Sir William Lockliart were endeavouring to arrange for the 
submission of the tribesmen. Letters were sent out to all the sectiona of 
the Afridis and Orakxai, intimating that if they would send in their j i r -  
gahs and promise submission, the terms of the Government would be made 
known to them. The Orakzai jirgaha. came in promptly itnd'were informed 
that  they wou!d be required to make a formal declaration of subniission to 
the Government, to restore all rifles and Governnlent property lo,,ted, t o  
surrender 500 of their own riflea, to pay a fine of Rs 30,000 and to give 
hostages for the fulfilment of such terms as  were not required to be 
carried out forthwith. They were further informed that can~pensation 
for danlage done to their buildings would be taken into consideration 
later on, when the relations of the Governnlent with the border tribes 
would be re-arranged. A fortnight's grace wa.s allowed the111 to comply 
with these terms, and the different clans departed severally to consider 
their courses. Before leaving, the,jirgclhs asked that the Government 
should apportion the fine among the various sections of the tribe, bu t  
after consultation with the Political Officers Sir William Lockhart de- 
cided that the entire demand should be divided equally between the Gar 
and Samil factions and that these should make all further internal dis: 
tribution themselves without assistance frorn the Government. As for 
the Afridis, most of their .jL.paha also came in, some a t  once and others 
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+but two Afridi clans refused to come in or to heal- any terms a t  all, 
defied the Government to L L  come on?' These were the Zakka Khels and 
the  Aka Khels. To the Afridij1fgcl.v which did come.in Sir X7illiam 
Lockliart returned ,a stem answer, declining to listen to anytliiqg. they 
had to say or to declare any terms to them until the two recalcitrant 
clans of their tribe had come in also, and warping them that unless 
.submission were voluntarily and quickly n l ~ d e  it would be vigorously 
enforced. The Zakka Khels, who alone of all the Afridi clans were 
really responsible for keeping hostilities so vigorously alive, have their 
settlements in the Baznr Valley and Khyber tracts during the winter, 
and move t o  Maidan and the upper part of the Bura Valley during the 
.summer, and are tlie most powerful of all the Afridi clans, mustering 
4,500 fighting men, mostly well armed. They are notoriously bloodthirsty 
and treacherous, and are dreaded even by their fellow tribesmen. I t  
was they who had planned and mainly ca r r i~d  out the attack on the 
Khyber  posts, andin all the tribal councils during the past few weeks 
they alone had formed the irreconcilable war party The Aka Khels 
a re  found during the winter to the south-west of Peshawar, near Akhor. 
Their fighting strength is 1,800 men, and their poverty prevents their 
possessing many breechloaders. I n  the summer they migrate to the 
Waran Valley, which lies due north of the Mastura Valley, within 
st.riking distance of the place where Sir William Lockhnrt's force 
then lay. Hy nature the Aka Khels are not a very bloodthirsty clan, 
but in  this instance they were dragged in tlie wake of the Zakka 
Khels, and  the fact that the Mullah Saiad Akbar belonged to the clan 
no doubt prompted them still more strongly to hold out a while for the 
sake of their i z z f c t .  The appearance of a brigade in the Wnran Valley, 
where the  Aka Khels were then strongly mustered, was therefore one 
of the first measures called for, and Brigadier-General Kempster was 
instructed to carry out this nlansuvre forthwith. 
A t  daybreak on the 13th November General Ke~upster's Brigade 
with No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No. 5 Bombay 
3fountain Battery, the 36th Sikhs and some companies of Sappers 
started out for the Waran Valley by the Seri Kandao Pass. Contrary 
t o  expectation the troops entered the valley pritctically without any 
opposition either during their advance or later in the day; the camp 
was not fired into during the night ; forage was obtained in large 
qualltities and without opposition, both on the 13th and 14tl1, and 
all appeal'ed quiet. Some very interesting letters were found 
in Saiad Akbar'a house-which was visited and destroyed during the 
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reconnaissance-amoilgst them one from the Had& Mullah, written in 
July or August. It said that  the Turks had completely defeated the 
Greeks, that the English had b ~ e n  turned out of Egypt and deprived of 
the use of the Suez Canal, that the Mohmands had defeated us, that our  
powerin Inclia was on the wane, and that  now was the time torise against 
us, as E n ~ l l s h  troops could not stand campaigning in the hot weather. On 
the 15th Noventber the force moved out to make a f ~ r t h e r  econnais- 
sance towards t h e  junction of the Waran and Mastura Valleys so as to  
have t h ~ s  point c~ccurately fixed in the survey of Tirah wliich was being 
made under the gene~dl supe~+~ntendence of Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich. 
Althollgh the Aka Khels on the previous two days had shown no active 
hostillby to the free mo\rement of our troops, due mil~tary precautions 
had been taken throiighout, and the wisdom of this caut~ousnesu was 
we11 exemplified on the 15th. No sooner had the advanced guard 
gut beyond the llmits of tbe camp, than a British flag of truce sent 
out in the d~lection of some -41ta Iiheln, who were seen coming out 
of their houses, I ifles in hand, n as fired on by Zdkka Khel tlibesmen 
posted on an z~djoining he~gbt ,  a Gurklin I-lavildar belng killed, and a 
sepoy wounded The reconnaiasAnce was plished furward, the tlibesrrlen 
keeping up a continuous fire, more espec~ally on the return of t h e  troops 
to camp. The casualt~es cluring t h i ~  d ~ y  were 1 killed and 6 wounded ; 
2 of the latter being Gordon Highlanders, who were shot  as they 
were golng to their picket post a t  duslr I t  appeared later on, from 
irlformation received by Colonel W~rbur ton ,  who acconlpanied General 
Kerupster, that the Znkkd Khels had entered the Waran Valley during 
the night of the 14th Novenlbrr and had tried to incite the Aka Khela 
to fight, in the hope that General Kempster would retaltate by wholesale 
destruction of villages, and so drive the Aka Ilhels into t h e  ranks of 
the  rrri.concilables The Aka Khels, however, held aloof on  the lSth, 
and consequently no damage was done to their houses, in spite of the 
shots tired by Zakka Khels. 
Orders had been sent to  Brigadier-General Kempster t o  return t o  
Maidan on the IBth, Sir William Lockhart's inteiitlon belrig t h a t  the first 
move from Ma~dan-to B~gh-sliould beg~n on the 17th with the 2 n d  
Bngade and tlie Divisional troops of the 1st D~vison. Brigad~rr-General 
Kanipater. accnrdirlgly issued ordeis to the effect that the baggage wit11 
sufficient escort was to move soon after daybreak ; and the road over tllc 
pass and for a great why on each slde had been so improved by t h e  
exertions of No. 4 Bombay and No. 4 Madras Sappers that  nearly alk 



















But as soon as the retirement of the troops bcgan, the enemy, Loth 
Zalrka Kllels aud Alra Khels, pressed boldly f o r w i ~ ~ d ,  and there e~lsuecl 
one of the severest rear-guard actions of the whole campaign. To 
describe in the exact order of occurrence all that took place is to incur 
some risk of confusing the narrative, for several bodies of troops, isolated 
fronl the nlain body, met wit11 independent adventures in  different parts 
of the field dnring different stages of the general action. But the 
following extended account of the fighting, while faithful enough in 
detail, will perhaps be found as little involved as any that could well be 
prepared of such an affair. 
A t  the outset the enemy were held back by  the I-2nd Gurlrhas, 
admirably handled by Lieutenant-Colonel Travers, t o  whom two con)- 
panies of the Dorsets afforded great itssistance. The 36th Silrhs had 
been sent oil to hold the pass for a time, and were eventually relieved 
by the 15th Sikhs; the two conlpanies of the Dorsets and the 1-2nd 
Gurkhas retiring over the pass, covered by the 15th Sikhs, who haiI 
parties out holding heights 011 each side of the pass. The 36th Sikhs had 
orders when relieved by the 15th Sikhs to take up a positisn further 
down the road and nearer Maidan, and to hold various positions on the 
high ground above the road, so as to cover the retirement of the 15th 
Sikhs. The Gurkhas had some very heavy fighting before they reached 
the pass-which they did not cross till 3 P.ar. or later-for the enemy's 
marksmanship was as usual excellent, and 3 men were Billed and 5 
mounded, despite the cleverness of the Gnrlrhas in availing themselves of 
cover. S~irgeon-Captain Selby, I.M.S., attached to the 1-2nd G ~ ~ r l i l ~ i ~ s ,  
showed great courage in tending the mounded under fire, a perilous 
duty unflinchingly performed. Lieutenant Wylie, a most popular Officer 
with all who knew him, who had only very lately been transferred 
for duty from the 2nd Battalion of his regiment a t  Samana to the 
1st Battalion with the Main Column, was shot through the head by a . 
stray bullet, Captain MacIntyre of his regiment carrying his dead 
comrade's body himself till a litter could be obtained. The Gurkhas, 
once they had crossed over the pass, nlet with no further casualties till 
they reached camp. Eut the 15th Sikhs, who had covered the Gurkhas' 
retirement and who were now in rear of every other regiment, had a 
far more stirring adventure awaiting them. As they began to draw in 
their pickets from the heights above the pass, the enemy pressed forward 
anew in great nulr~bers, and many losses were suffered before Colonel 
Abbott assembled most of his men (he had only five weak compaliiea) on 
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the sungays on the spur preparatory to  a retirement further down the 
hill. The enemy had by this time collected in a wood within 
40 yards of the  nlain sungar, and while Captain Lewarne was taking a 
company of t h e  15th Sikhs down from a post they had been occupyirlg 
a position further down the hill, a large number of swordsmen 
after him. Captain Lewarne very coolly halted and fronted t h e  coru- 
pany, fixed bayonets, and waited before opening fire till the swords*len 
were within 40 paces. A t  the same time a second party, under Lieute- 
nant  Vivian, perceiving the enemy's mancenvre, dashed gallantly u p  t o  
Captain Lewarne to aid him in checking it. On this occasion the Afr id i  
losses were undoubted, for the charging tribesmen nlelted away before 
the Sikh fire, and the company reached the poilit i t  was making f o r  
without further molestation. The fire on the main body of t h e  1 5 t h  
Sikhs with Colonel Abbott in the large sungar west of the wood was very  
heavy indeed; and a t  length Colonel Abbott deemed i t  advisable t o  
apprise Brigadier-General Kempster by signal that  his retirement was  
being greatly delayed by the presence of wounded Sikhs in the  sungat. 
whom it would be extremely difficult to carry away under a heavy fire. 
Brigadier-General Kempster a t  once issued orders for two companies of 
the Dorsets and five companies of the 36th Sikhs to return towards t h e  
15th Sikhs and assist the retirement. Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, 
Commanding the 36th Sikhs, was a t  that time riding with one of his 
companies nearest thd pass, while Captain Custance was in  command of 
I 
another company of the 36th Sikhs holding a hill further away to t h e  
right. Before receiving General Kempster's order Colonel Haughton, as 
soon as he  was informed of the difficulty in which the 16th Sikhs were 
immersed, a t  once, and of his own initiative, started awaywith t11e single 
company near him, and left Major Des Vmuu, his second-in-comnlarrd, t o  
bring on the remaining three companies and the two companies of t h e  
Dorset Regiment. Captain Custance with his isolated comparly however* 
was the first to  reinforce Colonel Abbott, the time being then about  4-15 
P.M. The enemy were firingwithvery great precision from the  wood, a n d  
t o  show one's head above the sungars was to risk having a bullet througll 
it. Colonel Abbott had already been wounded bx a shot from a jhezai1, 
apparently loaded with pieces of telegraph wire, which struck Iliru. in 
the face, inflicting a serious though happily not a dangerous wound. 
Captain Custance, while reconnoitring for a good positio~i f o r  l ~ i x  
company, received two bullets through the helmet and was tlicrl s I ~ ~ t  
through the thigh, and both he and Colonel Abbott were LcillK 
carried dowl. the hill in stretchers when Colonel Itaughton arrived 011 
the Scene. Major Des VEUX, before following his Colonel, had awaited 
the arrival of three other very weak companies of the 36th Sikhs, 
and  with these he had also brought a company of the Dorset Regi- 
ment under Captain Hi~mmond, with Lieutenant Cowie and Lieutenant 
Crooke, Suffolk Regiment (attached to the Dorsets for duty), as his 
subalterns. Soon afterwards Lieutenant Hales, East Yorkshire Regi- 
ment  (attached to the Dorsets), also came up with half a company. 
I n  making his way to reinforce Colonel Haughton Major Des Vceux 
decided to take the company of the Dorset Regiment under Captain 
I3ammond on wit.11 him, and to leave the other half-company, of which 
Lieutenant Crooke was in command, to hold a house close by above the 
road, Lieutenant Hales also remaining on the spot with his half-company. 
The  object in  leaving a company of the Dorset Regiment to hold the 
houses was to give a point d'appui for the troops in  rear further up the 
' pass. Major Des Vceux then hurried on with the remaining companies 
of the 36th Sikhs to catch up Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, so that  
eventually the latter had near him-though not all concentrated in the 
same place, but in different positions on the spur west of the wood-10 
companies Sikhs and half-company Dorsets. 11; should be remarked here 
t h a t  although for the sake of simplicity the narrative is forced to speak 
of "companies" they were only companies in  name, or the nucleus 
of companies. The half company under Captain ~ a m m o n d ,  Dorset 
Regiment, for instance, had only 16 men, and the Sikh companies, 
especially those of the 15.th Sikhs, only numbered from 20 to 30 men 
each, so that in all probability Lieutenant-Colonel Eaughton had not 
more than 200 men in all under his command, especially after he had 
sent on the wounded ahead. A s  a matter of fact, most of the regiments 
i n  General Kempster's Brigade were very short of men a t  that time, for 
this brigade had borne the brunt of the losses, and many men had been 
invalided. Moreover, there were men absent on baggage duty and 
enlployed in conveying the wounded back to camp. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Haughton's force was a t  this stage in two portions, the greater part 
holding the sungar close to the wood and a smaller part a sungar further 
down the spur. Soon after Colonel Haughton's arrival the fire from the 
wood, which had hitherto been intense, began to slacken. Apparently 
tllis was due to the tribesmen leaving the wood and working round by 
t h e  north to try and cut in on the line of retreat further down the hill- 
any case, as the fire had begun to slacken and it  was rapidly getti]% 
dal,k, 2nd as the wounded had all been sent on and the su??gars held were 
untenable for the night, Colonel Haughton ordered a gradual retirement. 
The party in  the  westerlllllost sungar covered t l ~ e  retiremellb of the other 
party from the sungar nearest the wood, and the march was made to the 
foot of the hill without furtlier loss. Heye in the darkness the troops 
were reformed, each Officer calling to  a certain company to rally 
round him, and  search had to be nlade for a path, as i t  was considered 
advisable t o  remain on the spur on high ground rather than follow the 
real road down the nullah. A t  this monlent a heavy fire was opened 
on the force from in front, in flank, and i n  rear. To have continued 
the march under this fire would have involved heavy loss and possibly 
disaster. To have renlained stationary would have been to submit 
hdplessly to being shot clown. I n  this critical situation Colonel 
Haughton did not for a lllolvenfJ!ose his presence of mind. H e  observed, 
as well as i t  was possible i n  the dwkness, that  the fire came principally 
from some houses about 300 yards distant, and with splendid decision 
he ordered the troops to  fix bayonets and turn the enemy out of 
the houses. Equally decisive was the response of the troops. The 
Dorsets with a cheer, and the Sikhs shouting their war-cry, advanced u p  
the cultivated terraces against the houses, which by the way had been 
set on fire that  morning, the mud walls only remaining. The enemy 
replied with defiant shouts, and waited till their assailants were mithin 
10 paces before opening a very heavy fire. Luckily, and probably owing 
to the ground being in steps, the Afridi fire was too high, and only one 
man of the 15th Silrhs, a Subadar, was hit and badly wounded. Of three 
principal houses the 15th Sikhs occupied the northernmost house, the 
Dorsets the centre, and the 36th Sikhs under Colonel Haughton tlle 
southern home. Lieutenant Munn, the Adjutant of the 36th Sikhs, ran 
one tribesman through with his sword on reaching the pIateau or spur 
on which the houses stood : and a few others were shot. E u t  there was 
now great danger of the separated parties firing on one another, and the  
'<cease fire" was accordingly sounded. The 15th Silths and the Dorsets 
then moved down to the building held by Colonel Haughton. All t h e  
bnildings mere still too hot, after having been burnt, to allow of their 
being entered, and the troops were placed in a sort of semi-circle with 
the  main building behind tliem. There were no nlaterials for malring 
barricades and sunyurs, and before the troops could be got into position 
and lie flat on the ground a very heavy fire was poured in on them, 
killing Captain Lewarne, 15th Silrhs, wounding Lieutenant Munn, 
36th Sikhs, and killing 3 sepoys and wounding 5 others. After tllis a 
desultory fire was kept up by the tlsibesn~en outside till the moo11 begall 
to rise. 
Meanwhile major Des Vceux with Iris small force fo~md hi'rnself 
cut off from his Colonel. I n  the attack on the villages he had taken two 
con~psnies and selected for assault a house further to the south. Captain 
Hammond, temporarily separated from his own company in tho 
darkness, accompanied him. When the house had been seized, it  was 
found to be untenable and a move was made to another house. This 
building, though it had been burnt, had cooled don~n, and the party of 
about two weak companies a t  once set to work to make a breastwork 
with clods of burnt earth and pieces of timber. Major Des Vceux 
was not attacked in force, thmgh the enemy hovered rol~nd for hours, 
shouting that they would serve the defenders as they had served the 
defenders of Saragheri, and even throwing stones over the walls of burnt 
houses behind. Communication was established with Coloncl Haugh- 
ton's force by whistle, and the sentry hadorders to fire an occasional shot 
to show the enemy our troops were on the alert and not short of am- 
munition. The night was miserably cold, especially for Colonel Haugh- 
ton's men, as they had not even a house to  go into, and neither party had 
great-coats or blankets. Colonel Haughton himself went out and re- 
connoitred under a heavy fire before daybreak, and finding that there 
mas no very intricate ground between himself and Major Des Vceux, 
started off to join him, the wounded being earried en charpoys found in 
t h e  houses. The enemy tired, but the dim light did not admit of 
accurate aim, and the retirement was well covered by Lieutenant 
Cowie with the Dorsets. When the w11oYe force had been concentrated 
a move was made towards camp, and the  troops seat out by General 
Kelnpster to relieve Colonel Haughton were met about 8 A.M. Thus 
ended one of the most exciting rear -pard  actions in  the whore Tirah 
C a m p n i p  But one painfuI episde renlains to  be related. 
It had fared very badly with the two half-companies of the Do~sets  
left behind by Major Des Wceux on the pass the previous night to cover 
the  intended retirement of Colonel Haughton's little force, especially 
with the half-company under Lieutenant Crooke. A t  the outset the 
two half-conipanies, some 35 to 40 men in all, with Lieutenants Crookc 
and Hales, occupied a house and some sungnrs, a strong position, a little 
above the road. It will be remembered that Lieutellant Crooke had 
been told by Major Des Vceux that he was to hold on to the houses what- 
ever might happen in order to cover the retirelllent of the Sikhs from 
the  pass. It was dark, and men were heard moving down the road 
in the nullah below. These were challenged and it is said they replied 
tl1c.y were Sllzhs. This point will probably never be cleared up for both 
Lieutenant Crooltc and  Lieutcnnnt TIales are clead, and the mrn nrttl pnr- 
Bibly also the Nan-~onrllris~iuned Oficers, who all cotltc fro111 h 1 , l d r i ~ ~  
cantonnrents are urlacyuninted with Hiridusts~ii, i ~ ~ i ~ l  the f:rct (pi tire c l~ ,d-  
lenging is not clearly establislrrd. I n  :illy case, Lieutcn;illt C~'c~c,lir, a very 
ci~pable Officer and of great espcricnce, believed t h l ~ t  tlrt. Illen l.wlow 
lrim were tllc 15th and  36th Sikhs, and in t h a t  e r r o ~ ~ c u u s  l ~ v l i i ~ f  11e let'- 
bnbly gave the order t o  retire-his l ~ a l f - c o u r ~ ~ ; ~ ~ l y  oil o io ~ i i l e  of tlrt. h l , u r  
nearest the  nu l lnh ,  the  other lkalf-conryi~ny furtiler a\traLy. As ;L 11r:~tter uf 
f ~ c t  he nlen whom he had clritlleliged were Afridis, a n d  tlrcy c,ullr 011 
Lieutenant Croolie's half-con~pariy, killing lii111 and (3 111en. U ' U I I I I ~ ~ I I ~  
7 others. Private Vickery of this half-colrrpn~iy, who hat1 previuusly 
distinguished h~lnself by trying to save a wuuniled lrlau u11der :L heary 
fire a t  Dargai was one of the wounded. He was sliot tlhrougli the foot 
and  was then attacked by three swordsmen. Hle sliot the  first, b;ljonot- 
ted the second, losing his bayonet in  tlle man's budy, and then clubbing Elis 
rifle knocked the third man's brains out. Finally he returned to camp 
brillging with him a wounded comrade. Lieuten#tnt Crookek lr l~lf-  
company, which suti'ercd so severely, belonged to C'aptniri 11Iari111iond's 
company of the Uorset Regiment whic11 trad atyorded souh great 
assistance to tlie Nortliarnptu~l Reyinrcnt on the 9th Uctol~rr,  bj. llelpir~g 
to cover tlieir retlreillent, and, assisted I J ~  tlre 36th Sikhs, to carry it1 
their wounded. 
A few words reniain to be said about the main I)c~ity of Eriy;dier- 
General Iiempster's force. Tliese troops h:~d held or1 ;LS 1cl11g its ~ ~ t l \ s ~ l , l c  
t o  the foot of tlie hill the previous evening in tlrc Iiol~vi uf I~cill; itlrle to 
cover the  retirement of tlre l5tl1 aiid 36th Sil;lis :~14d the ~ E V U  11;~lf-COIII- 
p n i e s  of the Dorset Regirlrent; but as  d;rrk~leus cit111e on, : L I I ( ~  i t  E V ~ S  
impossible, for the artillery especially, t o  see tu fire, LSrigi~(lir.r-!;r.~ru~rl 
Kempster ordered tlie retisenlent to be contirriied, urlrl ci~1111) was rt~:icI~- 
e d  about 8 P.M. Arrangements were a t  ollce 111r~de for  a. fi~lce to 
be sent out a,t daybreak towards the 1~;iss. All tllrougl~ tlrt. 1iig11t ~ i ~ i g l ~ t  
nlen of the  Uorset Regiment, a great Inany of tl1t.111 wo~rutled, xt r . ;~~gl+*t l  
into carnp, but  tlie half-company whicli LicuLc.n;~~~t I i i l l c~  hiiti c.rr~~siriii~~tl- 
ed was brought in.tact by tlrc Srrgci~nt.  ?'Ire l)c~tliabs 11f I,il'l~tl~liiblltH 
Crooke and Hales and nine men were ~ C I I I I I ~  C I ~ I S ~ *  t lrg(ltli<~ i i ~  i~ ?i1~1kz1'(, 
and tlre funeral of the two Officers ;nlil nine 11rt.11 tc,ok ~ i l : b r . c f i  (111 t l r c b  
evening of tho l 7 t l ~  Novclt~ber ill une 11:ti't of t110 G ~ I I I ~ J ~  " I i l , '  ( ' ; t~~ t : t i~ l  
Lewarne and Lieuten:~nt Wylic wcrc buried tojit~tl~ts~. ill irllctt2tr.t. pitrt. 
It was a sad ending to what lrad otherwise. been n very h~trtc.r?xnful c.rpc.tli- 
tion, but one and all wllo spent the riiyl~t in tlrc cnpturccl 11utldt:~ WL.I,(: 
UI 
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unanimous on one point-however niuch tlieir testimony on nlaili points 
owing to tlie darkness was in conflict-that Lieutenant-Colonel Haugll- 
ton's coolness, excellent tactical arrangements, and presence of mind, from 
the  moment he arrived with his small reinforcements at  the pass till the 
relieving tloops were met next day, completely outmatched the enemy 
and prevented what .migllt under the leadership of a less cool and able 
conlnlander have been a n  actual disaster. A s  it was, every man of the 
Dorsets, 15th or 36th Sikhs, who took part in tlie bayonet charge on the 
houses, had good reason to be proud of his performance. 
Our casualty list for the whole affair was a long one, and included 
4 Officers killed and 3 wounded: the total for all ranks being 33 
killed and 36 wounded. The full return is as follows:-Dorsets-killed: 
Lieutenant G. D. Crooke (Suffolk Regiment), Lieutenant Hales (East 
Yorkshire), both attached to the Dorsets, and 10 men; wounded: 8 men. 
15 th  Sikhs-killed: Captain Lewarne and 10 men ; zuounded: Colonel 
Abbott (slightly) and 13 men. 36th Sikhs-killed : 6 men; zooonded: 
Captain Custance, Lieutenant Munn and 7 men. 2nd Gurkhas-kzlled: 
Lieutenant Wylie and 3 nien ; ~uounded : 4 men. No. 5 ~ o n l b a y  Moun- 
tain Battery-zvou?zded : one man. 
THE PLdx O F  Cb31PAIOX FURTHER DEVELOPED. 
0s the 18th of Noven~ber Sir William Lockhart was a t  last able t o  
lllake a mol-e from Maidan, and he turned his face to the north-east i n  
the direction of Bagll. There were several reasons why i t  was consider- 
ed desirable to move from Maidan: the troops had exhausted ~learly all  
tile grain and forage in the vicinity of the camp; a move to Bagh threat- 
ened other sections of the s f r i d i  tribe, notably the Malikdin and Kuki  
Ii11~ls (for from Eagh a path exists into the Rajgul valley by following 
tllr Shalojba stream to Dwatoi); and the moral effect of our troops 
encamping round Bagh which bears a sonlewhst sacred cl~aracter, would 
also have a wholesome effect in convincing the enemy generally of our  
pover to more and encamp anywhere. P a r t  of the 1st Division (Major- 
General Synlons') began the move on the 18th November, the force 
consisting of the 2nd Brigade and tlie Divisional troops. The distance 
to Bngh from Mt~idan is about 3 miles, and the attitude of the  
tribesmen as the troops aclvanced on Bagh was at  first undecided, as  
they were seeaingly under the impression that the nlovemelit was in 
connection wit11 either foraging or reconnaisance, and that i t  would be 
followed by the usual retirement to Naidan in the evening. As soon, 
however, as i t  was perceived tliat tlie intention of General Syrnons was 
to camp a t  Bag11 the enemy's resistance became very strong, and some 
portion of the troops were under fire for nearIy eleven hours, i.e., from 
about 7 A.M. to 6 P.M., the enemy firing front the surrounding heights i n  
tllree-quarters of a circle. The fire was particularly heavy from a hill 
noratl1-west of the camp; and this eminence had to be heavily shelled b y  
the artillery and then attacked by the Queen's and the 3rd Sikhs before 
the force could occupy it. The assaulting troops having capturcd it, 
Captain Parker's Battery, No. 2 Dernjttt, came into action on the  hill and  
made excellent practice against scattered parties of tribesmen on sur- 
rounding hills; but so bold were the enemy that a certain number crept 
up to within 500 yards of the battery, and the Battery Officers had some 
very narrow escapes. Captain Parker was shot through the clothes 
without the bullet hurting him; one subaltern had his ear grazed by 
anotller bullet and anotlier Elad the knot of his sword shot away. To 
the west and north-west of the camp tlle euemy were holding sumc 
towers and houses and were keeping up  a very gslli~lg fire, and they had 
t o  be dislodged from their positions by single conlpanies uf the York- 
shire Regiment, who were most galiantly led,-noktbly so by 2nd-Lie11- 
tenant Edwards, who with a section of 13 men advanced aud turned 
the  enemy out of a house onhis front in the most gsllctllt manner, losit~g 
t h e  Colour-Sergeant of the company and one man. The total losses 
incurred before the eneniy could be expelled from all the position'i 
they had been holding and pickets plsced on such of then1 as it was 
deemed desirable to hold for the night, were 5 men killed and 2 3  
wounded. Undaunted by temporary reverses, the eneniy as soon it.; 
darkness came on crept in  between the picket posts and opened a most 
galling fire, atid a t  one time a concerted volley was fired straight a t  
Major-General Symoas' head-quarters, the bullets fortunately all being 
too high. So excellently had the troops entrenched themselves thab 
there wer8e no casualties from this night firing, though sotne animals 
were hit. The Gurkha scouts of the 5th Gurkhas did excellent service 
during the 18th November, killing several of the enemy and Inany more 
were seen being carried awaji wounded. 
On the 19th the troops under Major-General Sylnons were empIoy- 
ed in still further fortifying tlie picket posts. All the spare anitnctls 
were sent back to Camp Mnidan to assist in removing some 10,OM 
maunds of stores belonging to the 4th Advancecl DepGL at Maidan, and 
so excellent was the work done by the Comn~issa~~iat and Transport 
Officers a t  Maidan that the whole of these stores were removed to  Bagh 
by  12 noon on the 20th. On the 19th, too, the 4th Erigade, with most of 
the Divisional troops of the 2nd Division, Najor-General Yeittman-Eigga, 
and Divisional Staff, accompa,nied b? Sir WiIIiam Lockllart with the 
Head-quarter Staff, moved to 13ag11, letving Brigadier-Gcner:~I Kemp- 
ster's Brigade and some of the llivisio~lal troops behind. to cover the 
remowl of the 4th Advanced DepBt stores to Bag11 and to follow on 
when all was clear. There was a good deal of firing into camp s t  Bagh 
on the 19th, but Camp Maidan was left conlpletelp alone by the enemy, 
though every preparation had been made by Brigadier-General Ken~p-  
ster to meet an attack. The temperat~lre at  Camp Bagh, although 
the ground lies a t  a lower altitude than Camp Maidan, was con- 
sidembly colder, for the minimum tempel7ature on trhe 19th was 21" 
and the maximum 113", and after that date the cold glv~a,tly increased 
in severity so much so tbat on the night of the 33bh '31" of frost \=:ere 
recorded. 
( 20% ) 
On the 20t;h Noveniber a t  about 10 o'clock in tho xllorl~ing tile 
Zakka Khels made a determine4 effort t o  cu t  off the  tail of a convoy 
proceeding up  towards the Arhanga Pass. No. 4 Conlpany Rlsdras 
Sappers were working not very far  from the  scene of the occurrence, 
and Major Kelly, Commanding the Boyal Engineers, 2nd Division, 
directed the company to cease work and move off to  the scene of attack. ? 
So promptly did the company act under Captain Wright's coninmnd 
t h a t  the enemy were driven up the valley towards the Arli:t~iga, I'ass, 
where, as  good luck would have it, a half-battalion Gordon Highln~~derx 
under Major Downman weye awted.  Two companies of this regiment, 
moving separately, hurried down two spurs lying on either ~ i d e  of t h e  
ravine, and the  enemy were thus caught between two fires, their losses 
being estimated a t  something like 40. Unfor tua~te Iy  a sowar of the  
12th Bengal Cavalry who was with the convoy, and four drabies had 
been killed before the Madras Sappers could arrive to  their assist- 
ance. The same day a great number d towers and fortified houses, 
from the ndghhurhaod  of which foraging parties 11;~cl been fired on and 
from which sniping into camp had taken place, were destroyed, and this  
and the further destruction of towers and fortified poits south of thc 
camp next day, had a most salutary effect, f u r  tliere wi~h little u r  n a  
Om. the 21st November B~igadier-General Ke~npi-ute~.'~ 1Srjq:lilf: wit14 
the remainder of the troops of the 2nd Ihvicii{~ll,  ~~at)vc:d t o  C~LIIIP B:~gll. 
A s  the last of the 3rd Brig~cle troops n1archt.d off' ~.'IY)III ( ' ' L I I I ~ ~  hI:~i(f:i~i, 
the  enemy, who had been watdiing tho niovrn~c*l~t ftr~rll nc.i~k~ltc~lirit~,~ 
hills, swooped down on the  site of the  o l k l  r:innl), ~*\utrtina I~itdlc?r ;LIIIX 
thither i n  the hope app%rrr~tly of finilirig ~ o ~ ~ t ~ t l t i n g  (f YILIIE~* I~4t 1 ) ~ -  
hind, but  they were doonled to disnpr,~ointmer~t, i t ~ ~ < l .  ;L f{.w xIit.llw fro~rr 
some guns in $he rear-gu;~ril, withira l';tng(! of wl~ic,il t2112y Jtitd i r l c . i t ~ t -  
tiously ventured, troubled the111 conxidcutbl~, n l ~ c b r . ~ * ; r f f  t.r9 t l i v  11ji~r1~1t of 
t h e  3rd Brijiscle w,~s  practic;~lly ~lll~nolt~st.utf, hft~:irrwhilt~ fill. L'tnci ttri. 
gade, Brigadier-Generl~lGatlt?Tee's, hitit vim-c:tl o r ~ t  furtt~ Iiccll r t b r y  r*;tr.ly 
that  morning and had set  AIY. to sorile (,7) or 'irk towr1r.i rbr;rl l<rc~l~liolvd 
houses south of Camp Bag-h. 
There being no defir~ite prospect of tlie Xi~likn KIrc'ln tlrrrlrirnfi ,~ilrl,- 
mission the ternls cif the ~ic~vr~rlrr l l t~t~t  \v.vebt*~+ lr+!w at. ]:tilt ;~r12it)lktii*f'$i to
four AEridi jiryahs vvhicli 11acl been iu caurp ;tw;bi!iltg thtd d t '< .I~~\ ,&ti~t~ fa 
a b o u t  a fortnight. These terms were: the surrender of all stolen pro- 
perty,  a fine of Rs.50,000, and the handing in of 800 breech-loading rifles. 
The fourjirgahs in attendance represented the Malikdin, Adam,Kambar 
and A k a  Khels : to the other tribes proclaniations announcing the terms 
were sent out by the Political 0ficer.s. 
On the 22nd November a most adventurous and, as i t  proved, 
successful reconnaissance was made to Dwatoi or Diva, Toi , s ignify ing two 
rivers), a t  the junction of the Rajgul and Shaloba streams. Brigadier- 
Genera l  Westmacott commanded the for@, which Sir William Lockhart, 
Brigadier-General Nicholson, and some of the Officers of the headquarter 
staff accompanied. The column was composed of the Kings Own 
Scott ish Bolderers, the Yorkshire Regiment, the 36th Silrhs, the 1-211d 
and 1-3rd Gurkhas, the 28th Bonlbay Pioneers, two companies of Sappers, 
(No. 4 Madras and No. 4 Bombay) and two batteries Tne route taken 
was a difficult one, and goes for the most part along the bed of the 
Shaloba stream, thruugh a deep and narrow gorge ; the track crossing 
and recrossing the stream, which is knee deep in places. Wet to the 
wais t s  as they were, and with no food beyond what they carried in 
the i r  havresacks, the troops spent amost trying night out in the bitter 
cold at Dwatoi without even their blankets and great-mats: Sir Willii~m 
Lockhart  himself had no great-coat or bedding that night. Although 
the tribesmen on either side of the pass were held off as far as was 
possible by the Yorkshire Regiment on the right flank and the 1-2nd 
Gurkhas  on the left flank, the enemy were nevertheless able by 
occupying subsidiary spurs from the main line of hills on both sides to 
keep up a well aimed fire on the troops and animals moving dong  the 
ravine below, and they also sniped a good deal a t  the pickets placed 
round  the canzp a t  night, the total casualties on the 22nd being 2 killed 
and 15 wounded. Of these casualties, two- were Officers, one being 
Lieutenant Jones of the Yorkslzire Regimnt, killed, and 2nd-Lieutenant 
W a t s o n  of the same regiment, dangerously wounded. I t  appeared that 
as the Yorkskire Regiment were moving along the crest of the hills on 
the r i g h t  flank of the line of march, Lieutenant Jones saw a few men on 
a spw below b i a g  at the troops in the ravine and took t h e e  men with 
him to t ry  and turn them oust. The enemy were 80 well concealed, 
however, that although he approached very near indeed to where they 
were thought to be, their exact whereabouts could not be discovered : 
and Lieutenant Jones then most courageously, leaving his men where 
they  were, \.vent off by himself to  t ry  and get round the enemy's 
flank. Eve11 this mnnsu'r.re did not avail him, and he shouted One 
of his men to come round to llinl : but  before the m,Ln reached him he 
was seen to jurllp on to a I-ocl; and empty his revolver, and then fall back 
woullded. H e  had succeeded in uneartlling the foe, but  1123 daring cost 
hi111 his life. A section of his company hnrrie\l down to his assistance 
and 2nd-Lieutenant 1V:itson. who conl~nanclcd, under a heavy fire 
proceeded to get the wounded Officer into a stretcher, di\resting hinlself 
of his coat to serve as  a pillow. By the time this was done Lieutenant 
Watson hi~nuelf was most dangerously wounded. The bullet broke a 
rib, having entered his left side and come out between the shoulders; 
fortunately without actually hitting any vital part. A Lance-Corporal 
with hirn was shot dead. These however were the only casualties in 
the yorksllire Regiment that day; though the regiment met with a 
good deal of opposition. The completion of the reconnaissance without 
further loss on the 21nd and the equal success of the return journey on 
the 24th were undoubtedly due to the skilful manner in  which the 
t~*oops were handled and to the facility with which the men had adapted 
thenlselves to the peculiar condition; demanded in walbfdre against 
skilled t~arksmen and skirinishers like tile Afridis. The Yorkshire 
Regiment, which left camp before daybreak on the 2 h d ,  had such 
extreniely difficult ground to traverse t l ~ a t  their baggage mules could 
not accompany them, and their baggage had to be conveyed up t o  them 
by hand on the 23rd, by v l~ ich  time they had been 36 hours without 
great-coats, blauliets or food other than that which they had brought in 
their hawesacks. The 1-2nd Gur1~h:~s performed equslly good service 
on the left flanlr with that rendered by the PorkshireRegiment on the 
right, and had three men wounded. The grouncl they had to traverse 
was also very difficult, and instead of there being one continuous crest 
on which they could move smoothly along, the range of hills is broken 
up into a series of knolls wit21 cleep ravines between them, so tha t  the 
Gurkhas were contiilually ascending and descending over very rugged 
ground. A curious incident occurred durinq this portion of the march. 
A s  the Gurkhas mere advancing ou. the 22nd November the leading 
scouts shot an Afridi who was trying to drive off some cattle, and when 
the man's body mas found a little Afridi baby was discovered by his side. 
It devolved on the Mess President of the regiment, who computed the 
baby's age to be 18 months, to arrange for its nourisllment and nursing. 
.For the former essential he provxed fro111 the scanty mess stores some 
Swiss milk, and for the latter a Kohati follolver was found who, being 
next door in blsod to an Afridi, was promoted to the post of nurse, The 
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-question of the disposal of the bab!- on the if.ttl1, xvll~n tlic v'turn jrlur- 
ney  to Bagh mas to be made, became ratiler emharrxscin:. : L I K ~  the hfrss 
President decided to restore the infant to its kinsfolk. -Sccordingly, 
as  the house was being passed where this curions napti11.e wa.i made, the 
baby was deposited on the threshold in full view of the -\fridi% who as 
usual were pressing on the retirement. 
As has been said, the Main Colunln effected nlost successful 
retirement to Bagh from Dwatoi on the 24th Norember, the brullt of 
covering which fell on the 36th S ~ k h s  was adnlirably performed. The 
enemy a t  first pressed on the retirement strongly, and so boldly at  one 
juucture that they actually esssyed to cut in between a couipany of the 
38th Silrhs and drive off some hospital pollies which were being 'kept 
back to carry any slig!ltly wounded men. Another company of the 
36th Sikhs, however, charged down on thest adventurous spirits, who 
a s  a result had several killed and iive or six of their fire-arms captured. 
The column moving along the ravine were all back in camp before 
dusk; having sufiered losses to the extent of 17, of which the 36th Sikhs 
had  2 killed and 13  wounded, including Captain Venour, 5th Punjab 
Infantry, attached to the 36th Sikhs, slightly wounded. Oning to the 
very late arrival of the baggage on the "3rd a, thorough reconnaisrance 
of Rajgul Valley and the entrance to the Dtra Valley could not be 
made, but enough of it was seen to show that the route from D\r:ttoi 
onwards through the B ~ r a  Valley is considerably easier than that 
from Bagh to Dwatoi. Thus ended what under the circunistances w;ls 
pronounced one of the most successful rec~nnaissances yet carried out in 
Afridi-land. It is worth mentioning here that  %\*hen the 3rd Brigade 
1eftMaidan on the 21st November, the 15th Sikhs had been obliged 
under orders from Sir William Lockhnrt to part conlpany vith the 
brigade and march back to the advance base a t  Shinamari. Before their 
departure Sir William Lockhart issued a most complimentary order in 
to this gallant corps, stating that it  was only because the regiment 
was reduced by wounds and disease that he had decided to send it 
back to  the Line of Con~munication. He further said that the regiment 
had nobly upheld the grrarld traditiol~s of the Sikhs and of the 15th Siitha 
in particular. place of the regiment in the 3rd Brigade was taken 
by  the 2nd Punjab Infantry. 
N~~ that Rajgul Valley had been invaded it could fairly be said 
- that  the wllale of Tipah had been overrun by our troops, nrilo nloreover 
had stendily applied thenlselves for many to destroying the 
and fortified enclosures of the obstinate &kka Khels. There was now 
apparently no further object to be gained by remgning in Tirah and 
wintering in the cold uplands, as the tribsemen, with their homesteads 
in ruins and their supplies eaten up, vould of necessity lllove down to 
the Bar& and Bazar Vallevs, even if not driven thither by the troops. 
I n  fact many of then1 had already left Tirah, and those who remained in 
Rajgul were proballly regretting they did not make their escape before 
our troops apl&ared at  Dwatoi. The time had consequently come 
for changing the base of operations from Shinawari to Peshawar, and 
this transfer was begun forthwith by removing all heavy baggage back 
to Shinawari. The troops being then more lightly equipped were enabled 
to operate with greater freedom, while the milder climate in the Bara 
Valley wtiuld permit uf their bivouacking without serious hardship. 
General Hammund's colunln also made ready to move a t  short notice. 
But before Sir Villiam Loekhart began this movement in concert 
with the Pesh:1\var Column, it mas desirable first of all to settle up 
accounts in  the Kurmru Valley, or at all events to make quite sure that  
Colon~rl Hill, Comrnttnding the Iiurram Movable Column, was master 
o i  the situation in that quarter. Captain Ross-Keppel, Political Officer 
in the Kurran~, had a few days previously sent out the following declara- 
tiall of terms to the Kflanki Khel Chamkannis :-To pay a fine of 
Rs 1,000, to surrender 30 breech-loading rifles, and to restore all Govern- 
ment property lor~ted. On the 19th November the Chamkannis sent in  
their reply, deliberately rejecting the Government terms, and defying 
Colonel RilI to enforce them. On learning of this, Sir William Lock- 
hart pronlptly orderedan advance into the Chamkanni and Wtssuzai 
country, by w ; ~ y  of the Lozaka Psss, the movement to be made in concert 
with an advance of the Kurram Coiunln up the Kharmana defile. Owing 
hoverer to the more ilnportant operations undertaken in the neighbour- 
hood of Bagh, as already described, i t  was not until the 26th November 
that the 2nd Brigtcle of the Tirdh Field Force was free to start for the 
LozaknPass. On the 27th November Sir W~lliata Lockhart himself, with 
more tloops and accompanied by Brigadier-General Nicholson, Chief 
of the Staff, followed the 2nd Brigade into Kurram. The whole 
column wds placed under the imrliediate command of Brigadier-General 
Gaselee, and consisted of the West Surrey, the 3rd Sikhs, the 2-4th 
Gurkhas the 28th Bonlbay Pioneers, No. 1 Kohat MountainBattery, 
X o .  ri Bombay Slountain Battery and No. 3 and No. 4 Companies Bo* 
b y  S p p e ~ .  The troops following behlnd with Sir William Lockhart 
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Were NO. 2 Derajat  Mountain Battery, the Yorkshire Regiment, the 
2-2nd Gurkhas  and tBe half battalion Scots Fusiliers. Brigadier-Geneml 
Gaselee met wi th  no serious opposition when he crossed the Loz~ka Pass 
o n  the 28th November. The enemy occupied a sungar at the top of a hill 
Qn the line of advance, and a company of the Queen's Reginlent under - Lieutenant Engledue speedily dislodged them, losing only one man killed. 
The  other casualties were seven sepoys wounded. After the neigh- 
bouring viIlagev had been destroyed by way of reprisal, the advance was 
continued, a n d  on the morning of December 1st Sir Villiam Lockhart 
a n d  Colonel Hill  met a t  Lowarimela, about a mile east of Esor (the 
scene of t h e  unfortunate reconnaissance which three meeks previously 
had ended in the disaster to the Kapurthala picket). There was a t  this 
period much sniping into camp a t  night time, and on the 29th Novem- 
ber  Sir  P r a t a b  Singh, Extra Aide-de-camp to Sir William Lockhart, 
was wounded in the hand. Sir William Lockhart, in reporting the inci- 
dent  t o  A r m y  Head-Quai-ters, remarked:-" He (Sir Pratab Sin@> had 
his  hand bound up by his servant and said notlring on the sllbject. 
This plucky behaviour on Sir Pratab Singh's paart is only what might be 
expected of a man of his race and soldierly instincts." 
After  the iueeting of the two columns at Lowarimela the Kurram 
column u n d e r  Colonel Hill marched towards Thabi, the chief village of 
the Khanki  Khel  Chamkannis with orders to barn and destroy all tillages 
on the way. The force was divided into two columns : KO. 1 Column 
under Colonel Money, Central India Horse, consisting of the 24 th  Gur- 
khas, a half-company of the Bomhy Sappers and Miners, Ho. 1 Kohat 
Mountain Battery, 150 carbines of the Central India Horse, dismounted, 
and one field troop Central India Horse; and No. 2 Column under Colo- 
nel Gordon, consisting of the 6th Bengal Cavalry a ~ d  the 12th Bengal 
Infantry, 2 Maxim guns, the Scots Fusihers, 150 carbines of the 6th 
Bengal Cavalry dismounted, the Kapu~thala Infantry, and the 1-5th 
Gurkhas. The  1-5th and 24th Gurkha scoutscovered the advance of both 
1 columns o n  the left fl,bnk. No. 1 Column advanced upon Thabi from 
t the south and No. 2 Column from the west. The latter arrived at  some 
1 outlying hamlets about one mile south and west of Thabi a t  9-50 A.M., 
b and the advanced guard calne under the fire of some sharpshooters occu- 
pying the hills beyond; but the two Maxim guns took up an excellent 
position in some scrub jungle on a knoll and kept the euemy's fire under. 
The Engineer party with a strong escort then proceeded to burn and 
destroy the hamlets. Signalling communication was now established + 
with So. 1 Column, and orders were sent by Colv~lel Hill, t v l l ~  
\v~rs ~ ~ i t h  hat colr~nln to proceed right up the defile to T h a b i  and join 
l~ands v i t h  him; he being h e n  within one mile of a n d  overlooking 
Thabi. C'olonelGordo~~ at  once issued orders for the l-Bt,h Gurkllas 
to proceed, foliamed by the  maxi^^ guns, tlle 6th Bellgal Cavalry, t h e  
Kapurthala Infantry and t,he 13th Bengal Infnntry. T h e  defile w a s  
very narrow, in some places not more than 50 yards across, with p re -  
cipitous clitis on either hand rising to 800 or 1,000 feet above the  bed  
of the river. Ou debouclling f r . 0 1 ~  the defile at Thabi t h e  head of t h e  
column turned to the south to join Colonel Money, whereupon t h e  
enemy, following their invariable plan, appeared on the  high ground  
over  he ravine al!d com;aenced a lleavy fire. The 1-5th Gurkhas a n d  
the 6th Bengal Cavalry at once extended to cover the withdrawal of t h o  
remainder of tlieiorce through the ravine, and while t h i s  was being 
done Lieutenant Xichmond Eattye of the 6th Bengsl Cavalry w a s  
kiiletl. A little later the two companies of the 1-5th Gurkhas and t h e  
6th Bengal C'a~ralry, after dalouciliug from the defile, came under a 
trying fire from the enemy's sl~al,psllouters on the opposite hill. T h e  
enemy had excellent cover amoug Lrees wit11 the adclitional advantage 
of being posted above the Gurkhas and the cavalry, who were on 
the edges of rice terraces which formed the side of t h e  slope up 
\vhich they had to retire to join Colonel Money's Column. I t  mas dur ing  
this period and among these troops that most of the casualties of t h e  
day occurred. On the rear of the colunlll reaching Colonel Hill  t h e  
6th Bengal Cavalry and 14th Qnrkhas retired without f u r t h e r  molesta- 
tion, their return march being covered by the Gorkhas (scouts a n d  
24th)  together with the mountain battery of No. 1 Column, and they 
arrived back in camp at  Lowarimela about 7-30 P.X. Dur ing  the gene- 
ral retirement the totill casualties of KO. 2 Columll had been-killed: 
Lieutenant R. M. Battye, 6th Bengal Cavalry, 2 sepoys 1-5 th  Gurkhas, 
3 sepoys 12thBengal Infantry, and 1 sepoyKupurtl~aIaInfai~try; seue t e l y  
wounded : Lieutenant Villiers Stuart, 1-5th Gurkhas, a l so  wounded, 1 
Native Officer and 5 sowars 6th Bengal Cavalry, 2 sepoys 1-8th Gurlrhas, 
3 sepops 12th Bellgal Infantry, 2 sepogs Kapurthala In fan t ry  ; and 1 
follower killed. With reference to the death of Lieutenant Battye, tile 
P i o n s e ~  wrote :-"It is now almost a tradition with the Bst tyev tha t  all 
shall die on the battlefield; but one nray nevertheless regret the  deat;h 
early in life of yet another of this gallarlt family. Richmond Batbye 
vias a young Officer of on1j7 eight years' service, eager, acbive, alert anld 
conscientious in tile discharge of his duties, of a sound understanding 
and full of a generous entliusiasrn for his proiasaion. Ilr iriid acted as 
correspondent of the Ptoneer. with the Kurram Colun~n for some ti~lnr 
back, and his letters and telegrams gave abundant evidence of the in- 
terest he took in his work." 
While Colonel Hill  was engaged in punishing the Vharlnkarlnir, 
General Gaselee had the less troublesome task of muvinq agtinst t i i t :  
Blassuzai. This clan made their submission a t  once, and as tliry readiiy 
paid up 67 breech-loaders, including 4 of the Kapurthsla Infantry nii1r.a 
captured on the 7th November, and nearly all t l~eir share of the Orak~ai 
fine, their villages for the most part were spared. 
It is worth adding here that the Chamkannis do not really beilnly 
either t o  the Afridi or the Orakzai tribe. They are a distinct race atad 
b u t  little is known as  to their origin. Mr. Oliver in Arrosa the Roder  
refers to  the more powerful mountaineers onthe upper slopes of tlne Safrd 
K o h  and then goes on to say : " The petty settlement of Cbamkanniu, 
dropped in amongst them, deserves a passing word of notice-a people 
described by Bellew as originating in a heretical sect of Persian Islarnites, 
driven out  of their own country by constant persecution on accourit of 
their  peculiar religious ceremonies and in~moral proceedings. Orre of 
t h e  stories against them is not altogether without a sarour of the 
' Love-feast' of more modern sects in England ; and consisted in  putting 
~ u t  the lights a t  a stage of the religious perforniances in which Luth 
sexes joined indiscriminately, The Persians called i t  chiragh-kuxh ( l i t ~ i ~ p -  
extinguisher) and the  Pathans or-mur (fire-extinguisher.) ; but the Cham- 
kannis have turned over a new leaf and becotne orthoclux &Iilallun~edatis." 
According to Scott, it is supposed that the Chamkallnis held nlost uf the 
best land in the Kharmana Valley, but were pushed back by the Mzauu- 
zai Orakzai into the wilder and colder tracts to the west. The Xmsuzai, 
in  fact, claim proprietary rights over the whole Kharmana basin, WJ 
square miles in area; but neither the Chamkannis nor the ~haotlkanris, 
a pastoral race in the upper part of the district, ordinarily have any 
clealiugs with them. During the disturbances on the Kohat-Jiurrsaru 
border Chamkannis and Massuzai had made common cause agaillst the 
British Government, though Chikkai-the " Umra Khan " of the district 
--had remaiced loyal to his promise not to  Lake part in hostilities and 
had kept together a following sufficiently great to prevent his enemies 
from molesting him. 
Unlike the Massuzai the Chamkannis were not yet conquered ; tho 




increase their ire. Accordingly, by way of further cl~astisement, Sir 
William Lockhart sent Colonel Hill  to Thabi again on the 2nd Decem- 
ber, and the enemy turned out in great force to oppose him, but were 
beaten off a t  the point of the bayonet. The colunin on this occasion 
consisted of a wing of the Queen's, the Kohat Mountain Battery, a wing 
of the 3rd Sikhs, the 2-4th Gurkhas, 200 Inen of the 5th Gurkhas, and 
Gurkha scouts. The work of destruction was this time completely 
carried out in the face of strong opposition, the heights overlooking 
Tha t i  on the west having first to be stormed by the Gurkha scouts led 
by Captain Lucas. Many of the enemy were killed : ~ n d  wounded, some 
30 bodies being left behind. Our casualties were : Major Vansittart, 
5th Gurkhas, slightly wounded ; killed: 2 men of the 5th Gurkhas; 
wounded : 2 men of the 3rd Sikhs. 
The power of the Chamkannis, sucli as i t  was, having by this second 
operation been thoroughly broken, Sir William Lockhart was able to  
leave Colonel Hill in  secure command of the Kurram country and turn 
his own attention once again to the Tirah Afridis. I n  returning 
with his column to the main body of his troops in the Maidan Valley he 
did not follow the direct route over the Lozaka Pass by which he had 
moved into the Kurmm Valley, but  struck out south-east, entering 
the Khanki and blastura Valleys a t  their upper extremities and sweep- 
ing through the principal settlements of the Orakzai. No opposition 
was encountered. The Orakzai mere conipletely cowed and hastened 
to comply with all the terms previously inlposed Lpon them, deliver- 
ing up to Mr. Donald, the Political Oficer, 317 rifles and 28,250 
Government rupees. Sir William Lockhart, having thcs fully accom- 
plished his object in making the detour, returned to Maidan by way 
of the Ghingakh Pass and reached Bagh on the 6th December. 
THE PLAN OF ChJlPAIGN CONPLETED. 
W ~ J X ~ O U T  a n y  further delay the combined movement into the Bara 
Valley of the  Main Column in Maidan and the Peshawar Columu a t  
Bars  was now begun, the village of Barkai being the common objective, 
where t h e  two colunius were to join hands. Sir William Lockhart's 
Column did not make the march en manse: the 2nd Division under Gene- 
ral Peatman-Biggs with the Divisional troops and staff being taken 
by Sir  William Lockhart himself through the Rajgnl Valley vib Dwatoi, 
while t h e  1s t  Division under General Symons, after being further 
divided, proceeded in two brigades, the one under Brigadier-General 
H a r t  through the Waran Valley and the other under Brigadier-General 
Gaselee through the Mastura Valley. 
It will be  convenient to follow first the march through Rajgul of 
General Yeatman-Biggs's Division with Sir Willianl Lockhart-a march 
which has been severely criticised. The tactical difficulties besetting the 
route from Bag11 to Dwatoi had been in a great measure removed by the 
fact t h a t  the  Malikdin Khels, who had partially complied with our terms, 
had been told that  their houses, which are large and solid and amply 
stocked with grain and forage, would. be spared if our progress down 
the valley was unopposed, and who therefore not only kept the peace 
themselves, but  probably prevented other hill men from breaking it. 
Their neutrality was a most important factor, for although'of course no 
military precautions were neglected by  either column, nothing could 
have prevented large losses of men and animals had the Malikdin Ehels 
been resolutely hostile. As regards the road itself, Major Kelly, R.E., 
with the 28th Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company Madras and one com- 
pany Bombay Sappers had been a t  work on it;  and by the time the 
3rd Brigade marched forward on the 8th December, the track, though 
still difficult, had been greatly improved, and in the result out of the 
transport of the whole 2nd Division only 15 animals were lost On the 
road; though the number of dead ponies and mules which hltd fallen 
into the bed of the stream from the rocks above during the reconnais- 
sance nyade by  General Westmacott's Column to Dwatoi on the 22nd 
November, offered striking evidence of what the difficulty of the road 
h e n  before the Sappers ancl Pioneers got to vork on it. 
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The head-quarters of the 4th Brigade (General Westmacott's), which 
?eft Bagh a t  daybreak on the 7th December, arrived a t  Dwatoi about 
I1 A.M. The 3rd Gurkhas had exceptionally heavy work all day, and 
some of them were on picket duty the same night and were employed 
again on the 8th December, so that a proportion of them were on duty 
for nearly 36 hours. There was some slight opposition when the leading 
troops reached Dwatoi, which was easily brushed aside, the total I 
casualties that day being 2 killed and 2 wounded; but the pickets 9 
guarding the heights round the camp were fired a t  during the night of 
the 7th December and attempts were made to rush them, the brunt of 
the attacks being borne by the King's Own Scottish Borderers. On 
the 8th December No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, 
about 100 rifles of the 36th Sikhs, and about the same number of the 
3rd Gurkhas and the 5th Gurkha scouts were employed to seize a hill 
held by the enemy whence the pickets had been fired on and command- 
ing the entrance to Rajgul Valley. This hill was taken in gallant style 
by the infantry: Lieutenant West with the Gurkhas and Lieutenant 
Van Someren with the 36th Sikhs distinguishing themselves by their 
gallant behaviour and skilful leading. The enemy was very quickly 
dislodged with a loss on o u r  side of 1 killed and 4 mouncled; the 
enemy suffering considerably. 
The 3rd Brigade (General Kempster's) began its march from Bagln 
on the 8th December about 7-30 A.M., and hardly had the last troops 
begun to evacuate the camp a t  Bagh when unarmed men of the Malik- 
din Khels with women and children, and showing every sign of being 
famine-stricken, rushed into the camp with the hope of picking up food 
and grain, a rather forlorn expectation. The 3rd Brigade commissariat 
godowns had marched on ahead with the 4th Brigade the previous day; 
but had halted about half-way to Dwatoi, and the advance of the re- 
mainder of Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade was much delayed in 
consequence; so much so that when night fell the head of the brigade had 
only covered about four miles and had then to halt for the night. The 
rear portion of the brigade, comprising two field hospitals, was on the 
march from 8 A.M. to 9 P.M., and then could only advance about three 
miles,. so great was the congestion of traffic on the narrow path ahead ; 
and the last baggage did not get into camp, about three miles from 
'Bag;h, till very nearly 11 P.X.  The day was cold and raw, without any 
sun till about 2 P.M, and then only fitful gleams broke the gloom; and 
the long standing about, with feet wet and cold from fording snd 
', 
re-fording the icy streani was very trying to the men, mucli more so than 
if they had been on the march throughout. The 3rd Brigade resunled 
its march fairly early next day (the gth), the last of the troops reaching 
camp about 4 P.M. There were no casualties in the 3rd Brigade either 
on the 8th or 9th December. 
On the 9th December some troops, mainly of the 4th Brigade 
(Brigadier-General Westmacott's), uiz., two companies of the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers, the 3rd Gurkhas, the scouts of the 5th Gurkhas, two com- 
panies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, four conipanies of the 28th Bombay 
Pioneers, two compauies King's Own Scottish Borderers, two companies 
36th Sikhs, No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery and No. 5 Bombay 
Mountain Battery, all under the command of Brigadier-General West- 
macott, accompanied by Sir William Lockhart, moved up the Rajgul 
Valley and destroyed all the houses in  the centre of the valley, some 
60 in number, inflicting considerable loss on the enemy. This destruc- 
tion of villages had been provoked by the renewed hostility of the Kuki 
Khels, who inhabit the Rajgul Valley. This clan had apparently 
abandoned their intention of submitting the moment the troops appeared 
a t  their door, for they had opposed the advance even a t  Dwatoi and of 
course resisted still more strongly any further progress up  their valley. 
So admirably, however, were the troops handled by  Brigadier-General 
Westmacott, that the casualties numbered only four: while on the other 
hand immense damage was done to the Kuki  E h e l  property, 
On the 10th December the movement down the Bara Valley began. 
The 4th Brigade with Divisional Staff and Sir William Lockhart march- 
ed first, followed by Brigadier-General Kempster's Brigade some two 
hours later. The 4th Brigade marched about eight miles that day to a 
camp at  Shundana, and Brigadier-General Eemspter's Brigade marched 
about five miles to a camp near Karana. The day was miserably cold, 
without sun, and the stream, which was very chilly, had to be constantly 
forded and re-forded. The enemy began to fire from long ranges the 
moment the troops prepared to move off, shooting one man of the Royal 
Scots Fusiliers dead in the ranks as the company was falling in on the 
camping ground. The Bara Valley a t  its upper end is wide and the 
going was easy, for no rain had fallen, and movements across the culti- 
vated country and dry rice-fields were quite practicable. The casualties 
in Brigadier-General Westmacott's Brigade that day numbered seven, 
and in the 3rd Brigade f ive  not including Lieutenant F. Fowke, of the 
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norsets, severeIy wounded on picket duty in the evening. AbO'lt 
Q P.M. that  night a cold drizzling rain began to fall and occasioned great 
discolllfort t o  those who mere sleeping on the ground, and  who had 
not  dug trenches. The rain in fact came as a most unpleasant and 
uncomfortable surprise: i t  had threatened so long that the soldiers 
begun to think it would not really come after all. 
It had been intended that  the 3rd Brigade should s tar t  early next 
day (the 11th) a t  7-30 A.M., catch up  the 4th Brigade, a n d  that  the 
whole division should continue the march united. But the next morn- 
ing  was very dark indeed, the followers were benumbed with cold, rain 
was still falling steadily, and the ground was deep i n  mud. All these 
circumstances unfortunately delayed the start, and moreover there was 
1 
n o  company of Sappers and Miners with General Kempster'a Brigade, 
I besides which the means of getting down from the camping ground, 
which was on high ground, to  the river-bed below, were very inade- 
I quate, and so slippery were the descents that  animals were falling about, 
1 on all sides, and i t  was nearly 11 A.M,  before the last animals were 
i drawn off the hill. To add to all these troubles, the 4th Brigade for 
1 reasons which have yet to transpire, did not picket the heights on the 
flanks of the 3rd Brigade, as the latter had expected them to do, and  in 
consequence these heights had to be captured and crowned by troops 
of the 3rd Brigade which greatly delayed the advance. The enemy 
pressed the rear-guard and flanks of the baggage from the first, the 
1 mist which prevailed enabling them to creep close up unobserved ; the 
I ground except in the stony bed of stream was heavy and yielding and 
I quite unlike that  traversed the previous day, and the cold and  wet 
1 combined with the constant fording of the stream seemed to deprive 
t h e  mule-drivers and followers of their senses and to leave them with 
one idea only, viz., to  press along as  fast as  possible, quite regardless 
of how their animals or their loads were getting on, and  to es- 
cape the enemy's bullets constantly flying over their heads. Some 
extraordinary scenes ensued. Brigadier-General Kempster called seve- 
ra l  halts in order t o  close up the transport and rear-guard, and  to 
send out fresh troops to  guard the flanks of the line of march; and 
every endeavour was made t o  keep the transport in  the river-bed and  to 
prevent the mule-drivers taking short cuts across country and  so getting 
I entangled i n  heavy ground or  in  deep-water channels. The moment, 
I 
i however, the  head of the colunnl moved on, the wave of transport 
swept on af ter  i t  like a pent-up stream suddenly released, spreading 
i 
I 
oa t  so~netimes to a front of half a ntile or more; every mxn pushing 
blindly forward, all anxious to avoid fording the river, in places knee- 
deep, and all acting on the principle of " each man for himself and the 
devil take the hindmost." Twenty times the number of Transport 
Officers present could not have controlled this seething mass: it  was an 
indescribable jumble, sometimes all jostled together on a front of 100 
yards and sometimes all s p r e ~ d  out to a width of over 800 yards. 
Those who took short cuts across country, despite every endeavour on 
the part of the Transport OfIicers to stop them, seemed to be gaining 
ground a t  first, and others madly followed them; so that everywhere 
were animals either bogged, or slipped up in ditches with their loads 
under them; or with the chain broken between them and the leading 
animal : while the d~abi, all unconscious or reckless of everything else, 
provided he had only the leading animal of his three following him, 
pressed on blindly. Where soldiers, British or native, were with the 
animals, the situation was of course different, and the dvabi could then 
be stopped, though usually only by main force ; but whatever baggage 
had no special escort or guard with it  ran very little chance of reach- 
ing the next camp intact. Where the going was fairly easy, and the 
transport was on a broad front, i t  moved a t  a most extraordinary pace, 
certainly not less than four miles an hour ; so eager presumably were 
the drivers to get in to the next camp and settle down to a fire, for 
the rain was still falling incessantly, and every follower must have 
been wet to  the skin. About 5 P.M. the head of the main column of 
General Kempster's Brigade arrived in sight of the 4th Brigade Camp; 
and he had the option of either going on and joining that brigade 
or halting where he was for the night. As the other camp, however, 
seemed near and as the mass of his transport mas reported close up, 
Brigadier-General Kempster decided to push on. This had the dis- 
advantage that i t  still further lengthened an already very long march; 
but, on the other hand, the 3rd Brigade had now been following the 4th 
Brigade for four days in succession and fighting a continuous rear-guard 
action during the last two days, and if General Kempster could now 
overhaul General Westmacott the order of march might be re\-ersed, the 
flanking and picket duties would be lessened and the men enabled to 
get more rest. Whether or not these were the reasons which actually 
influenced Brigadier-General Kenipster's decision, the fact remains that 
the order was given to press on and gain the 4th Brigade Camp, an order 
~sible  to  those very welcome to the leading troops, but hopelessly impo- ' 
in  rear. The aclditional march was easily accomplished by the troops of 
the advance-guard and main column of the 3rd Brigade, most of whom 
arrived in camp just before dusk ; but  the transport and rear-guard had 
stiH to come. Darkness now came on rapidly, the rain continued, the  
road to camp was difficult to  see, and many of the d ~ a b i s  tupidly made 
a bee-line for the lights of the camp. Those drabis who took this rash 
course were leading most of the animals and loads which >ventually 
got lost; for the ground, which was easy a t  the start, was afterwards 
intersected with deep water-courses nearer the camp, and an animal 
once involved was not to be easily extricated. Many drivers deserted 
their animals, and many followers disappeared into houses in search 
of wood, kc.; while some kahars either broached a keg of rum or 
found one already broached and  got hopelessly drunk: three of those 
who got to camp dying from the effects of intoxication, and others lying 
about helpless in  the camp. Heavy firing could be heard just outside 
camp; and between 7 and 8 P.M. a party of Gordon Highlanders with 
Surgeon-Major Beevor, who had been escorting and carrying some 
wounded whom the dhoolie bearers had deserted, arrived i n  camp. So 
fatigued were the men who were carrying their wounded comrades, 
t h a t  Surgeon-Major Beevor himself had helped to carry one man's 
stretcher, or rather the bottom of the dhoolie used as a stretcher. A t  
that  moment several or' the enemy had crept up in the dark to within 
I 
20 yards and fired a t  the party; and heavy firing had continued f o r  
some minutes, but fortunately no damage was done, and t l ~ e  gallant 
Medical Oficer, who had lent such valuable moral and physical assis- 
tance, brought all the wounded up  to his hospital without further hurt.  
Major Downman, Gordon Highlanders, who was the senior Officer with 
the  last portion of the rear-guard, (consisting of one company of the  
Dorset Regiment, one company of the Gordons, half a company of the  
2nd Punjab Infantry, and about three companies of the 1-2ndGurkhas,) 
as he was retiring and while still some two miles from camp, came upon 
a large number of transport animals entangled in ditches with their 
drivers benumbed with cold. Meanwhile the enemy began to press 
closely on the rear and flanks. To go on to camp unless the  aninlals 
were left where they were was impossible, and Major Downman with 
t presence of mind and judgment decided on seizing some houses and  
holding them for the night. Once in those houses the enemy's attacks 
I were very easily repulsed, and shelter was gained from the ever falling 
I 
rain, which continued till 9 P.X. that  night, and then to everyone's in- 
tense relief finally stopped. 
To contenlplate a resumption of the march early next day from 
Sber Khel, where most of the troops of the 2nd Division were now en- 
camped, a s  had been previously intended, was clearly out of the question 
SO far as the 3 rd  Brigade were concerned, since 400 men were still some 
three n~i les  behind on rear-guard duty and probably encumbered with 
wounded, niany animals and followers were missing, and many followers 
were lying about like logs hopelessly drunk. A t  an early hour Bri- 
gadier-General Kempster went out with two battalions and a battery to 
help t o  bring in Major Downman's troops, on whom the enemy had 
niade continual attacks a t  daybreak, k~l l ing one and wounding three of 
the Gordons i n  a single volley. The troops came in by 11 A.M. without 
further losses. The casualties in the 3rd Brigade on the 11th and the 
early morning of the 12th amounted altogether to between 30 and 40 : 
and incl~rded Captain Norie, 1-2nd Gurkhas, very severely wounded 
(his arm was afterwards amputated) ; Lieutenant Williams, Ek~mpshire 
Regiment, Transport Officer, severely wounded; and 4 men killed and 
11 wounded i n  the Gordons, and 2 killed and 9 mounded in the 1-2nd 
Gurkhas. Retween 100 and 750 transport animals with their loads were 
missing, besides many followers, and one unit alone had lost as many as 
50 animals. No. 24 British Field Hospital, under Surgeon-Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bourke, only lost three animals altogether, despite the fact that 
a unit like this has a llluch fewer number of Non-Commissioned Officers 
and men i n  proportion to the animals than any other unit. The 
Medical Officer i n  charge of this hospital had taken extraordinary 
pains to make i n  efficient; and not only did the wounded under all 
circumstances receive every attention and constant food and care, but 
the disciplinary and transport arrangements were equally excellent- 
doe to the fact that  Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke personally 
superintended everything. Surgeon-Major Beevor, previously referred 
to in connection with his gallant conduct in  helping to carry the 
wounded men on the night of the l l t h ,  was attached to this hospital. 
H e  had come out to India for a year from England, where he was one 
of the Medical Officers attached to the Brigade of Guards, in order to 
experiment with the RBntgen rays, and the help he was able to render 
to his brother Medicial Officers and the benefits he conferred on wounrled 
nlen were enormous. A11 day on the 12th December Surgeon-Major 
Beevor and Surgeon-Captain Marder, the third Medical Officer with this 
llospital, were dl.easing tlle wounded, for no sooner had one case been 
dealt with than anotlicr was brought in. 
On the morning of the 12th December the sun shone out b r i g l l t l ~  
again, and seldom has its warmth been more appreciated. Everywhere 
wet clothes and blankets were spread out to dry;  and soldiers, British 
and native, basked in the genial rays. There had been no such day of 
sunshine since the  2nd December, but though the sun was warm, there 
was a very cold wind. All the afternoon and evening there was continnal 
firing into camp, and some followers and animals were hit, one Afridi 
with a Lee-Metford rifle being particularly aggressive. 
On the 13th December the march from Sher Khel was resumed, 
the  idea being to move rather more than half-way to Barkai. The 
Sappers had greatly improved the roads out of camp, and the 3rd 
Brigade moved off a t  7-30 A.M. ; the 4th Brigade, Brigadier-Gener.1~1 
Westmacott's bringing up the rear. 011 this occasion, unlike the  rn~rcl l  
of the lo thand  11th December, the front brigade performed t h e  task of 
picketing the heights on the flanks of the rear brigade, and thus greatly 
facilitated the progress of the latter. The leading brigade met with 
practically no opposition, but the 4th Brigade had perhaps the  heaviest 
rear-guard fighting that had hitherto occurred in the  campaign, not even 
excluding the operations related in the preceding chapter. The enemy 
began to fire before the troops had left camp, and five animals in the 
King's Own Scottish Borderers were killed whilst loading up  ; itnd a11 
equal number in the 3rd Gurkhas. The latter reginlent acted its rear- 
guard a t  first, the Xing's Own Scottish Borderers being on one f la~lk ; ~ n d  
the 36th Sikhs on the other; whilst the half-battalion Royal S c v t ~  Fusi- 
liers moved behind the last of the baggage. Brigadier-General Wrst- 
mscott personally superintended the fighting all  through the day, 
remaining always with the rearmost troops, and the  ultimate success of 
the day was largely due t o  this. The enemy showed great l~oltlnt~ss 
and followed across the river ; but  the King's Own Scottish 13ordel+er.w 
and the 3rd Gurkhas were lining the banks above; and t h e  Afridix 
came under a hei~vy cross fire while in  the water, and a180 unt1r.r t l l ~  
fire of a machine gun, and their losses were very hesvy. Tile ro;~<l is 
along the bed of the river for about three miles, to CL plr~cti citlltbtl 
Gali Khel, and then leaves the strearn up a very steep ;~sci.rlt on Gltcr 
left bank and passes through undulating country coveted with  sc:rlr't, 
jungle; with very high hills on the left flank, which were s1,ly c ~ . o w n ~ * ~ I  
and held by flanking detachments from Brigadier-Generi~l Rt:rrrl'.qt,et;8 
Brigade. The enemy's intention in crossing the river was evi<Ierrtly to 
t ry  and get a t  the left flank of the .baggitge. A n  atternpt llatl Lean 
niade to keep the 3rd Brigade and 4th Brigade baggage separate; 
a whole regiment being behind the 3rd Brigade baggage a t  start. 
ing and a half-battalion a t  the head of the 4th Brigade. A11 this 
was in vain, however, for the river-bed was very wide, and the heavy 
firing i n  rear made the mule-drivers press on regardless of con- 
sequences, regiments, roads or even mules. One driver actually 
tried to  take his mules over a high stone wall ; the leading mule 
scrambled over, the other two hung b ~ c k ,  the coupling chain broke, but 
the mule-driver went on with the one mule, probably thankful enough 
t h a t  he had a stone wall between himself and the flying bullets. About 
 P.M. the head of tho 3rd Brigade halted and encamped, having marched 
some seven or eight miles ; and as the 4th Brigade were hotly engaged 
and could not make such a long march, the Divisional Staff tried to stop 
the  4th Brigade baggage travelling beyond a camp two miles further 
back ; but much of i t  came into the 3rd Brigade camp near Sher 
Karnar. The 4th Brigade hospital baggage especially had got far 
t o  the front ; and when dusk fell all the hospitals in the division, or 
what could be collected of them, had congregated together. The fol- 
lowers had largely absented themselves; men an followers, though all 
warned before starting to carry full water bottles, as no water might 
be  obtainable, had in many cases neglected to take this precaution 
and no water was obtainable ; and even palckal mules in some cases 
came in empty. 
To return to the 4th Brigade. The enemy continued to press very 
heavily after the river-bed had been left, and casualties were frequent ; 
each casualty taking away several men from the fighting line, for from the 
12th December till the arrival a t  Barkai, kahars and dhohlie-bearers had 
t o  be almost entirely replaced by fighting men, and especially so on the 
14th December. The force a t  General Westmacott's disposal wits becom- 
ing much reduced, and he had towards dusk only some 200 of the 
Northanlpton Regiment and about 150 each of the King's Own Scottish 
Borderers, the 36th Sikhs, the 3rd Gurkhas and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
Seeing how far the 4th Brigade Camp was, he decided to halt for the night 
on a convenient ridge, and hardly had he halted than the enenly made 
a rush. Bayonets were fixed and the rush repelled with loss, but  
Lieutenant West of the 3rd Gurlrhas was shot dead, and many casual- 
ties occurred. The enemy continued firing on the pickets till about 
9 P.M., and the troops had no water beyond the little remaining in their 
bottles; their kits were on ahead and they had the prospect of continued 
fighting next day. The losses during this ~llemorable day were 
about 70; and in addition to Lieutenant West, killed, Captain Bateman- 
Champain of the same regiment was slightly wounded, and Captain 
Short, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and Lieutenant Sellar, Xing's Own Scottist1 
Borderers, were severely wounded. The wounded from the previous day 
had a most trying time, but all-Captain Norie with his amputated a rm 
conspicuously-bore their sufferings most patiently. 
The march to Barkai was resumed and completed next day, the  
wounded in both brigades being carried almost entirely by their com- 
rades, and the head of the 3rd Brigade was soon in contact with the  
advanced troops of General Hammond's Column which had already 
arrived a t  Barkai from Bara. All the 3rd Brigade got into camp in 
good time ; but the 4th Brigade had continuous fighting till they were 
out of the scrub jungle, and they got into their camp just before dusk, 
with a further loss of about 10. From the time the brigade left 
Camp Sher Ehel on December 13th, and despite the enemy's constant 
endeavours to get round the flanks and attack the baggage, there was 
practically no loss a t  all of baggage or animals; and the general opinion 
seemed to be that the troops had been most admirably handled by Brigit- 
dier-General Westmacott during the two days' continuous rear-guarsd 
fighting. A rest was now ordered and never had troops better deserved 
it than those of the 3rd and 4th Brigades ; and though the division 
had lost 166 between Bagh and Swai Kot, they had the  satisfaction of 
knowing that in the last few days a t  ally rate the enemy's losses had 
much exceeded their own. 
Having seen the  completion of the march of the 2nd Division, 
under General Peatman-Biggs, through the Rajgul and Bara Valleys 
to  Barkai, we have now to follow the less chequered progress of the  1st 
Division under Genera1 Symons, through the Mastura and Waran Valley, 
to  the same objective. The whole division marched down the Mastura 
River as far as Hissar without meeting with any opposition, t h e  1st  
Brigade under Brigadier-General Har t  being in front and the 2nd 
Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee following a t  a distance of a 
day's march. On the loth December extremely successful operations 
were carried out in the Waran Valley against the Alra Khel Afridis 
by way of reprisals for their recent attaclr on General Kempster's rear- 
guard (described in the previous chapter). On a reconnaissance made 
by Captain E. W. S. K. Maconchy, 4th Sikhs, orders were issued on  
the evening of the 9th for the 1st Brigade and DiviRinnal troops t,n 
cross the range between the Mastura and Waran Valley earIy next 
morning. The Aka Ehels were completely surprised, and the whole 
of the towers and walled houses in the Waran Valley for a length of 
three miles mere burnt or blown up. General Hart  commanded the 
troops in the valley 90 skilfully that the enemy had no chance. Major- 
General Symons and St;tff assisted for four and-a-half hours in passing 
the troops over the hills, and then watched the proceedings from the 
heights. The Mullah Saiad Akbar's towers and village were levelled 
to the ground; the damage to these buildings pre~-iously inflicted by 
General Kempster, having all been repaired. The Afridis were bold and 
fired a great deal, but mere prevented from closing a t  any point. The 
troops in retirement passed through each other, and the successive lines 
prevented the enenly approaching within effzctive mnge. During the 
day the Zakka Khels from the vest joined the Aka Khels, andused Lee- 
Metford rifles. The troops were all back in their new camp by 7 P.M. 
I t  had been an arduous day, and extra rations and rum were issued 
to all. The two mountdin batteries were particularly well handled, and 
their accurate fire was most effective. Our casualties were one Havildar 
of the Nabha Imperial Service Infantry killed, and two privates of the 
Derbyshire Regiment, one Ber~gal Sapper, one sepoy of the Nabha 
Infantry, and one transport driver wounded. The Nabha Regiment were 
greatly delighted a t  having been in action for the first time. The regi- 
ment was well handled by Captain Cox, and by its Commandant Sirdar 
Sher Singh, who was a lion under fire. 
Later in the day the 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General 
Hart, and the Divisional troops of the 1st Division, all under the con]- 
mand of General Syn~ons, marched right up to the southern end of the 
Sapri Pass, where a halt v e s  called for the night. The Sapri Pass lead- 
ing from the Mastura to the Bara Valley is a defile of 11 miles in length 
which had never been crossed by any European and was quite unknown. 
The path the vhole way through was commanded" in such a manner 
as to require but a few of the enemy to make the passage of a force 
very difficult and dangerous, if not impossible. Fortunately the enemy 
failed to take advantage of the position. After a reconnaissance all the 
companies of Sappers and Miners with the division and a regiment of 
Pioneers were set to work on the path, as without this preparation 
the passage, though it looked fairly easy from a distance, could never 
have been made by the baggage transport. For  the first two miles of the 
' 
~ l e n  the %went, mnq graclnitl enoncrh and the track a wide, well-vorn one ; 
but the Iast half mile up to the top was extremely difficult. Boulders of 
rockhad to be blasted and a zigzag road made to the top, which was about 
YO0 feet above the can~p  on the Mastura River. The hills were beautifully 
wooded throughout on the south side, principally with the evergreell 
holly ilex. But  the thick weather during the day's halt a t  Mastura did 
not permit of survey operations. The troops started before daybreak 011 
the 11th December, and when at  dawn the clouds lifted, the view down 
the pass showing the snom-covered heights between the steep, dark 
wooded slopes mas very fine indeed. The descent for a short distance 
from the top of the pass on the north side was easy, but soon the gorge 
became more contracted and rocky; and the advance had to be delayed 
from time to time to allow of the Sapper companies in front blasting tho 
rocks to clear a path for laden nlules. The drup in elevation from t h e  
top of the pass to Sapri itself mas about 2,300 feet. With a mass of 
transport animals carrying supplies for the force, the long line stretch- 
ed along the entire road from end to end, a distance of 11 miles, and 
it was 5 P.N, before the last of the force was able to make a start. The 
rear-guard of the 30th Punjab Infantry had to bivouac on the top of the  
pass, and the transport that could be passed along down the descent was 
collected and parlied a t  Khwaja Iihidda, the first place where there was 
water and a little open space. General Har t  had bonfires l i t  a t  short 
intervals the whole way down the road, wood luckily being plentiful, 
and by the light of these fires the animals were passed along during the 
dark hours of the night. This mas the most cnrious feature of the  
crossing, and was perhaps unique in the passage of any military force 
through a long defile and over a difficult mountain range. From 
Ehwaja Khidda, the path continued down the rocky bed of a mountain 
stream, and here and t,here the way for mules had again to be made b y  
blasting and clearing a passage over difficult places. General Symons 
with half of the force having reached Sapri by nightfall encamped there 
for the night, while Brigadier-General H a r t  with such troops as could 
not get beyond Khwaja Khidda when darkness fell bivouacked there, 
the  remainder of his force coming on by the light of the fires, o r  
bivouacking where they were. The bivouac a t  Khwaja Khidda was 
fired into during the night and a man of the Derbyshire wounded, and  
the rifle of another smashed. I n  the morning when the march through 
the defile was continued, some of the enemy fired into the line of 
transport wending its way down and a . nlule uras killed. There were ' 
also two casualties among the followers. Under the circumstances i t  
was renlarkt~ble that more c1am:tge was not done. At  Sapri the troops 
had to camp in rice-fields sodden with the rain, these being the only 
spaces where i t  was possible to get level ground to camp on. Luckily 
Xapri is a t  a much lower level than the camp a t  the Mastura end of 
the pass, and the temperature proportion;~tely warmer. The defile the 
whole way down was most picturesque. 
On the morning of the 12th December General Symons continued 
his march mith the troops that had reached Sapri the previous even- 
ing, Brigadier-General Har t  following with those that had remained in 
the pass. The road from Sapri, after passing some fields, ran through 
a very narrow rocky gorge. Rocks had again to be blasted by the 
Sappers, who, to the front as usual on this march, had begun this work 
on arrival the previous evening. After crossing a stream, the track 
ascended on to higher ground to the left, and passing round some low 
spurs brought the troops along a level and easy road to the new camp 
ground near Swai Kot  just beyond Barkai. The march was a short 
one, about four miles, and a t  the end of i t  General Symons joined hands 
mith Brigadier-General Hammond. Brigadier-General Hart  with the 
remainder of the 1st Brigade arrived the same evening, the rear-guard 
arriving about 10 P.M. General Symons had reason to congratulate 
himself and his Division a t  the very successful crossing of his large and 
hampered force over one of the most difficult passes in the whole 
trans-frontier country. 
On arrival a t  Mamani, General Symons received orders to proceed 
a t  once to Bara. This sudden move was one of necessity. The 2nd 
Division with Sir William Loclrhart liad not yet appeared on the scene, 
but it was expected to  arrive next day, and with General Hammond's 
force it would have been difficult to feed more than the three brigades 
which, besides General Symons's Division, would then be collected a t  a 
place where supplies had to be brought from India. Shol.tly after these 
orders were received i t  was brought to notice that  the rnarch of the 1st 
Division down the road would block the path by which a single file of 
mules brought up the daily convoy with supplies. On this General 
Symons made inquiries regarding a road reported to be used by the 
Afridis. A reconnoitring party was sent out, and the Sappers and 
Miners were set to work to make the path down and up tlle steep banks 
of the Mastura River passable for mules. The Sappers began operations 
very early next morning, long before dawn, by the light of the moon ; 
and later in  the morning, half the 1st Brigade and Divisional troops 
were started on a new and nnlinown road, prepared to pass the night in 
bivouac if unable to get through in the day. By the assistance of the 
Sappers and Pioneers, however, the difficult part of the road was passed. 
The path became easier and finally led out on to  the plain that extends 
down to Bara. General Symons thus had the satisfaction on arrival a t  
Ilam Gudr, only two and-a-half miles from Bara, of being able to 
telegraph tha t  he had practically discovered a new road from Bara to 
Mamanai and had niade i t  as fit for camels as was the road which 
General Hammond had followed over the Gandao Pass. 
It now only remains for us, in connection with the general concentra- 
tion a t  Barkai, to dispose of the Peskawar Column which, under General 
Hammond, hadmarched in from Bara; and before this not very eventful 
movement is alluded to a brief retrospect of the doings of the Peshawar 
Column from the time i t  was constituted may be conveniently introduced. 
The constant fighting in Tirah had so completely absorbed public atten- 
tion that  the  very existence of a brigade a t  Peshawar had been almost 
forgotten. As a matter of fact nothing had occurred to direct more than 
passing attention to this force, as the task origi~lally assigned t o  the 
column had been to play a waiting game on Sir  Williani Lockhart's Main 
Column in Tirahand in the mealltime to prevent local raids on the I 
Peshawar border. But  the long staj- a t  Peshawar and Bara, though 
necessarily uneventful in the absence of concerted hostilities, proved to 
be no picnic for the troops. The British Cavalry with General Hammond 
i n  particular had a most trying time, not so much from sniping by 
straggling tribesinen-though they did not escape this experience and 
its attendant losses-as from the feverish climate of the Peshawar Valley 
during autumn. I n  the two squadrons of the 11th Hussars every Officer, 
and all the rank-and-file with four exceptions only, had suffered from 
fever. Some Inen had been unlucky enough to have three or four 
attacks, and the squadrons on arriving a t  Barkai were still thoroughly 
fever-stricken. The medical returns for the 4th Dragoon Guards were 
nearly as bad as  those of the 11 th Hussars. In  fact even the unfortunate 
division in the Tochi had not fared much worse in this respect than had 
the Peshawar Column. But  in  addition to much sickness the coIurnn 
had also to  report a t  least one regrettable episode in connection with 
the work of reconnoitring: due to the fact that  the tribesmen, though 
careful not to  expose themselves, were always very alert and allowed no 
opportunity to pass by of displaying their deadly marksmanship. On 
Sunday, October loth, a troop under Captain F. T. Jones of the 4th 
Dragoon Qaards mas sent to reconnoitre the Bara Valley, and Captain 
"C 
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Jones, leaving his troop at  the mouth of the Samghakhi, trotted through 
the pass with his advance party, consisting of Corporal Walton, one 
trooper and a mounted Khyber Rifle. A s  they reached the end a party 
of the enemy fired a volley a t  about 30 yards distance, killing on the spot 
C2lptain Jones, Corporal Walton and two horses. The enemy bolted be- 
fore the  troop could get a single shot a t  them. Information was immedi- 
ately sent in to Colonel Sulivan, Con~nmnding a t  Jamrud, wlzo ordered out 
two gnns of "ICii Battery Royal Horse Artillery under Lieutenant Nairn, 
one squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain Sellar, two 
companies of the Sussex Regiment under Major Donne, and two corn- 
pnnies of the K.hyber Rifles under Captain Barton; the whole being 
comnlanded by Major Littledale, 4th Dragoon Guards. Although this 
force searcbed the whole of the neighbouring valley and the adjacent 
hills, they could find no sign of the enemy, and eventually returned 
t o  canip about 2 P.M. The two bodies were brought in by Sergeant 
Clarke and his party. Captain Jones was hit in two places and Corporal 
Walton in four.. I t  is scarcely worth while to recount other unfor- 
tunate incidents of a less serious nature, but it  will he easily credited 
fronl what has already been said tliat the troops were highly deligllted 
when a t  last the order came for them to move up the Bars Valley 
and they were thus given a possibIe chance of getting into action. , 
A s  for General E-Ian~mond's march to Barkai, owing to the entire absence 
of opposition, there were no incidents calling for mention except those 
connected with the difficulty of getting the baggage through the valley, 
-a purely physical difficulty not enhanced as i n  the case of General 
Yeatman-Biggs's Division, by fierce hostilities. On the 15th December 
the  column, after regretfully learning that, owing to the flight of the 
enemy, no en~ployment could be found for them in the BaraValley, 
r ~ t u r n e d  from Barkai to Jamrud, pending a new projected movement, 
this time up  the Bazar Valley into which the tribesmen had apparently 
retreated. 
W e  left Sir William Lockhart with General Yeatman-Biggs's 
Division on the last stage of his eveutful march to Barkai, but as in 
t]le c;lse of G1.eneral Synions's Division and General Hanlmond's Column 
tile stny of the troops a t  Barksi Camp was a short one, for the Bara 
Villlry was by this time clear of large bodies of the enemy, besides 
wllic\:ll tllo poverty of the surrounding country ancl its inability to 
support a large force, with the consequellt necessity of running daily 
convoys mi th  supplies from Esra, rendered it inexpedient to  estabbsb a 
winter ca111p in this inliospitable region. Accordingly a nlorc \vns ~ n : ~ d c  
sfor British territory, and by the 17th December the division found ilhc.lf i 
conlfortably ensconced a t  Bars, where there were already g:~t , l~( ' l '~d t11($ 
I 




Thus the original plan of campaign was a t  an end, and tllc TVIIOIC of 
i 
the Tirah Field Force was hack in British territory wit11 i ts  t:~sli- the 
task of subjugating the Orakzai and Afridis-only l):trtially accolli1)- 
lished. Without  n doubt the Orakzai had bee11 brought to  their knrw 
but  the more warlike of the Afi-idi clans like the Zikka I i l l ~ l  wcl*c iLR 
fiercely defiant as  ever. 
It unfortunately happened a t  this period that  General Yeatmnn- 
Biggs, who liad been in ill-health for some weelis past, b u t  who llad 
nevertl~eless courageously persisted in carrying on the whole of liis 
diEcult and responsible duties, was a t  last obliged, owing t o  increasing 
weakness, to  give up the struggle and to relinquish the Commancl of the 
2nd Division of the Tirsh Field Force. The Commander-in-Chief 11,zd 
arranged that  the gallant General should retu1.n to  Calcutta and I*rsrn!lc 
the less exacting Coi~illlaiid of the Presidency Illstrict, but 1,. t h i ~  t i ~ , l c  
he xvas already too ill to  niove back, and after t rc~rc~l l inq :I.; f,ir : ~ s  
Pesllawar he completely broke down and had to call a Ilxlt. It  pror.1~~1 
to be " tlze lor~g halt." Day by day a3 he lay a t  Pes l~awa~.  11is C * O I J C ~ I ~ ~ O I I  
grew worse until it became first critical and then hopclrss, nnil o ~ l  f 1 1 c l  
4th January the late Comnlander of the 2nd Divisioil of t l ~ e  'l'ir:t11 
Field Force breathed his last. Those around him understood tl~cti f ( ~ r  
the first time how much he had suffered from broken l~e: t l t l~ all :~l , ) r~q,  
and how for many u7eeks his indomitable spirit llad t r i~~rn~)l lcd,  ovcxin tlic 
frailty of his body. The following General Order was is.yuc.il in (',~,Ic.~rtt:~, 
January 70th :-"The Conlmandel-in-Chief has i t  in commsr~tl fro111 tltc 
Viceroy and Covenlor-General in India to cxpresr t o  t l t ~  A I ' I J I ~  I l i ~  
Excellency's deep reglet a t  the loss which i t  hns H I I S ~ I L ~ I I ~ ~ C ~  in t11(~ cir~:~t l~ 
of Nlr~jor-General Arthur Godolplli~l Ye:~tn~u~~-Bigfs ,  ('.IS., ,irltrl llin I t i q l i  
al~p~eciiation of tlie services r*cndered to thc: State I)y t l ~ ; ~ t ,  Olfit.t.1). 'i')~,, 
record of General Yeatrnan-Giggs'a services cob ers :r lrc>t.iotl ( i f  :i: ..I, 
d u ~ i n g  wliich he was enil~loyed in t l lc  f o l l o w i r ~ ~  (';LllJi);Llgl)~ i)llcl It,l]i- 
t a ly  ex~)edltlons :-The operations 21g:~inst tllc r t~ l I t~ lY i l l  
Cliina, 1863; t h e  South African War, 1879, dul i11~  w l ~ i ~ l ~  Ire c,orrlrll;bntl- 
ed one of tlle parties sent in pursuit clf Ketchawayo, and #uLtlctlut.ntly 
served as Staff Olffcer of the Lydenbnrg Colulnn against Sekukuni ; the 
Egyptian Campaign of 1882. In  August, 1897, General Yeatman-Biggs 
was entrusted wit11 the command of the troops in the ICohat and Kur- 
ram Valleys, then threatened by a formidable conlbination of the 
Afridi and Orakzai tribes, and he condncterl tlie operations on the 
ULlan Pass, as well as those on the Samana, which ended with the 
defeat of the tribesmen and t,he relief of Gulistan. On the formation 
of the Tirah Expeditionary Force he was appointed to the Comn~ancl of 
tlic 2nd Division, which he held until a few days before his death. The 
Conlnlander-in-Chief sliares the regret which will be felt by the Arnly 
at  the premature death of this gnllaitt and disti~lguished Officer." 
Sir Power Palmer, who had hitherto commanded the Line of 
Corui-uunication, was appointed to succeed General Yeatman-Biggs in the 
Colll~~idnd of the 2nd IXvision, Tirah Field Force. The vacbnt post of 
Comnlandant of the Line of Communication was not filled up, as owing 
to the change of base from Shinawari to Peshawar i t  had now become 
an easy and simple matter for each General of Division to mandge his 
o v n  transport and supply. The Gwalior and Jeypore transport trains, 
which throughout the Tirah Campaign had been of the greatest service 
continued in use. 
Orders were now issued for the bre:tliing up of tlie Reserve Brigade 
a t  Rawalpindi, commanded by Brigadier-General RFacgregor ; as the 
necessity or supposed necessity for maintaining i t  no longer existed. 
The brigade consisted of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infaatry, the 
Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 1st Baluch Battalion, the 2nd lniantry 
(Hyderabdd Contingent) and the Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers ; 
but of these the Baluchis had already been despatched to Mombasa, 
while the Hyderabad Contingent Infailtry had gone to Peshawar. The 
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry was now ordered to join General 
ICempster's Brigade, (relieving the Dorsets,) and the Yorkshire Light 
Inf i~ntry was sent to General Westmitcott's Brigade (relieving the 
Northamptons). 
THE RE-OCCUPATION O F  THE KHYBER AND THE EXPEDITION INTO TIIIC 
BAZAR VALLEY. 
IT was now decided to re-occupy the Khyber Pass, and for this pnrpose 
General Symons's Division and General HammondJs C ~ l u m n  were ordrr- 
ed to concentrate at Jamrud. Mo great tribal rising in the l i t ~ g b e r  v7as 
expected, ilnd, in any case, once Ali Musjid w , ~ s  eized, the Zalilta Iillels, 
who alone of a l l  the Afridi clans seriously nlenaced the pass, would not 
presumably be able to do much mischief. I n  concert with this man- 
wuvre the new plan of canipaign also included the despatch of a puni- 
tive force into the Bamr Valley, tlae winter quarters of the Z ~ k k a  
Khels. 
On the 17th December the Peshawar Colurnn marched into Jamrud, 
followed by General Hart's Brigade (with General Symous) the same 
day and by General Gaselee's Brigade the nes t  day. At  this period, f o r  
no avoidable fault of its own, the Devonsl~ire Regimer~t nYas recnlled 
from the front, and General Symons issued a Divisional Order in wllicll 
he said : " I n  losing the 1st Ehttalion l3evonshire Regiluent f~o111 the 
1st Division the Major-General Commanding desires to recvrd 11is gt.eat 
appreciat,ion of the good services througllout the can1p;~iyn of tl~iv 
particularly efficient battalion. I t  is returning to cantoriment~ solely 00 
the recommendation of the Medical Oficers, and on account of tile scmty 
numbers to which it  has now been reduced owing to fever and S ~ C ~ < I I ( ~ P S  
previously contracted in the Peshawar Valley. It hns heen a creat 
pleasure to Major-General Symons to have this extremely well-be1l:~veil 
and good fighting West Country Regiment in his Conimal~cl." 
The morning after his arrival a t  Janlrud, Dcceruber 1Htl1, ( ~ I ' I I P I ' : L ~  
Hammond, wlth an escort of a few troops :tnd two c o t l ~ l ~ i ~ n i ~ ' i  of the 
Khyber Rifles under Captain Barton, and acconlpanir.d lty C ( ~ ~ l 0 1 l l ' ~  ~ IH~~LIIL  
Khan, Political Officer in  the Khyber, v i ~ i t e d  Fort . ~ I : I I I ~ ~ P .  Xot a, 
soul was seen in the pass, and All Musjid, of which a g ~ ~ ~ ~ t l  view wit+ 
obtained at  a distance of abclut three n~iles, a11pc.al.ed to l)a ilihrit*rtetl. 
The road through the pass was ia very good corldiL~on. TIII. tclc~gr;~ktlr 
posts, witti one or two exceptions, were stantling, 1>11C wit11 IIO u!il.e 
attached. Fort Mmde itself and other fortified posts ncarcr Jtrrnrud 
had been dismantled and burnt, and the walls in some cdnex breached. 
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This reconnaissance being entirely favourable, preparations were 
made for the advance up011 the Khyber, and on tlie 23nd December the 
Peshawar Colurnn received orders to inarch out next morning. The 
advanced guard started about 7 A.M. and proceeded in road formation 
as far  as Fort Maude, up to wllich point the hills on the flanks h,~d been 
previously crowned by Captain Barton's Kli>-her Rifles. After lenTing 
Fort  Maude the 9th Gurkhas, who acted as advanccd gilard to the 
column, took up the duty of sending out flankinq pRrties and occnpied 
all inlportant points r~g i l t  up to Ali Musjid. About two mi!es beyond 
Fort  Maude the vlllage of Lala Cheena was passed on the left, lying 
peacefully in  the sunslline in  ~ t s  r~verside position, but deserted by 
its inhabitdnta. A short way further on theadvanced gu~rdentered the 
t ~ u e  gorge of the Kliyber, which Lonlmences a t  All blusjid ; and pasing 
below the isolated conical hill on whlch the Fort stands, halted. A 
company of the 9th Gurkhas was sent up to occupy the Fort till the 
arrival of the 45th Sikhs, who were on rear-giidrd, and the Staff 0Ecers 
proceeded to lay out the canip on the low spurs and the flat round 
bordering the river on the east of the Fort. Not a rndn was seen nor a 
shot fired the whole day. Once the camp was marked out, the units 
soon got their tents up, and the ordinary routine of camp life was once 
more in full swing. 
Consiclerable damage hacl been done to Fort 41i illusjid, but the 
outer walls were not so seriously dam~ged as had appeared at first srght : 
the breaches in the front wall as seen from below being those made in 
the original wall, which hail never been rebuilt, Ly our guns in 1878. 
Inside, however, everything was dismantled, all the \~oodwork burnt, 
all the roofs fallen in, and nothing left standing but blackened crumb- 
ling walls. I n  one room the concrete floor had been picked up to 
uncover an old well-shaped excavation, which had, previous to our occu- 
pation of the Khyber, been used as a magazine. I t  had been covered ID 
by us because a child had accidentally fallen in and been killed, but the 
wily Afridi, evideutly thinking i t  was likely to contain sometlling of 
value had gone for i t  a t  once, only to find i t  empty. Besides the Fort, 
there are circular blockl~ouses on the colnmanding points near a t  hand ; 
these are entered from the outside by a ladder, whlch leads on to a p l ~ t -  
form raised some four feet from the level of tllegrouncl, and the walls are 
looplioled a t  a convenient height above the platform. These blockhouses 
had also been dismantled and the doors and platfornls burnt, so that 
the pickets sent up to occupy them found the loopholes out of all reach, 
and had to  bivouac outside. 
011 t l ~ c  24th ljecen~ber the 1st and 2nd Brigades arrived at  Ali 
Mnsjid from Jnmrud, and went into camp on tlle low ground about 
Lxln Cli~eena. This was a busy day for tile Pesllawar C'olumn : there 
were parties out in four different directions. A wing of the Innis- 
k' ' 1111ngs \vent out to cruxn the Leights for the incoming brigacles ; a 
lying of the Osfo~ds went out to form a covering party to'the 34th 
Pioneers w l ~ o  lvere engaged in opening out the roads that the two 
brigades mere to take nest morning ; a party of 100 s Inen from each 
regiment x-ith the Sappers :tnd >liners went out to blow up the Lala 
Cheena towers and bring: in noocl and forage ; and a fourth party 
of tmo conlpc~nies of the 9th Gurkhas vent  out wit11 Csptain Barto11 
to reconnoitre the hills on the right of the road to the Alaclli Pass, 
with a ~ i e m  to finding a way by which General Esmmond's Colunln 
could move nest d q ,  so as to cover tlie riqht flank of the 1st B~igade  
in its projected advance into t l ~ e  Bazar Valley. 
On Cl~ristmas Day, the 1 ~ t  and 2nd Brigades commenced their puni-  
t i re  expedition into the Bazar Te~lley-the 811d Brigade, on the left, 
15-ent by the C!hura K a ~ ~ d a o  Pass, and tllc 1st Brigade, on the right, by 
tl~t?-Aiacl~i I'ass. Sir Williaril Locli1:art accomp~nied the 2ncl Brigacle. A 
force from the Pesllan-ar Colulnn, coll@isting of FI wing of the Oxfords, 
four guns NO. 3 Llouz~taiu Battery Ru?-,xl Artillery, five con~panies 
S ; ~ ~ ~ ~ w s a a l ~ d  SIiners, four coiupanies of tlie 9th Gurkhas and the 45th 
Silihs, held tlie liills on the itig!lt :tnd gaarcled that  flank for tlieni as  far 
as t,he pass. The 45th Sikhs fonnd some 30 men on the extreme right 
and drove ~ l ~ e r u  o$ but not without loss, for one inail was n~ortally 
mounded, and two others were severely and one slightly wounded. 
~ e n e r a l  Raxnmond himself pushed on to the pass with the Sappers arid 
Miners and blew up the towers of Alachi village. A few shots were 
fired here, but  without inflicting ally damage. Meanwhile the 1st  
Brigade had hardly got two miles from camp; i t  was then 4 P.M., t he  
transport ahead was badly blocked, and the troops were obliged to  
spend a cheerless Christmas night in the hills, cold and exposed. 
After seeing the 1st Division well started on its way to tile 
Bazar Valley, General Hammond marched his column on Decembel. 
36th to Lxndi Kohl ,  a distance of 10 miles, which he covered without 
meeting any opposition. AS a t  Ali Muslid, the whole place Ilad becn dis- 
nlnntled inside. Walls had been left standing, bu t  every bit of woodwork 
had been removed o r  burnt. The house of Captain Barton, late Poljtical 
Ofticerirl the Ehyber, mas a wreck; all his property, ~uuch  of it very 
P 
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valuable, had of course been removed, and everything portable had been 
carried off. The caravan serni and the blockhouse hncl been treated in a 
siniilar manner, nothing but bare walls being left. I n  subsequently de- 
stroying villages the column came across many small bits of Captain Bar- 
ton's property, such as boolis, letters, and stray articles of furniture, but 
notlling of value was recovered, except his turn-turn, which was found 
in a nullah, placed there no doubt by the original thief, who wished to 
avoid recognition. Ernpty ammunition boxes mere also found, but  
practically all the Khyber villages were empty; household goods, cattle, 
aqricultural iu~plen~ents and such like having been t ~ k e n  away to 
unknown fastnesses in the high hills, or hidden in caves. 
When the Peshawar Column fii,st arrired a t  Landi Kotal f l ~ e  
attitude of the Kllyber Zaklra Xhels was uncertain. They had been 
offered terms, which were that they should pay up half the rifles taken 
by them in the late attack on the Forts, in addition to the half of those 
demanded as a fine (154 rifles) and should give hostages for tlie pay- 
ment of the other half, and that they should pay the sum of nine 
tilousand rupees as a money fine; and they had been given till the 28th 
I)ecember to accept or refuse our terms. The Shinwaris had a t  once 
acceptcd the terms offered them and were tlierefore not to be reckoned 
with, and C.tptain Barton took advantage of their compliance to make 
tlienl picket the hills to the north of canip and safeguard i t  by ddy and 
night fro111 that direction, and also to picket daily the high ridge under 
which the road runs through the Saddu Khel country. Pending the 
final reply from the Zakka IClzels, General Hanlmond set forth on the 
27th December with the 57th Field Battery Royal Artillery, four guns 
No. 3 l\;lo~mtain Battery Boyal Artillery and the 9th Qurlrhas, to 
reconnoitre the Bori Pass, which runs between the Khyber and the Bazar 
Valley and fro111 which General Symonds Division was expected to 
emerge on its return from the Bazar Valley. This movenlent necessitated 
passing close to t h e  Saddu Khel villages, and the nzalilis sent word 
that they did not want to  fight, but if the troops approached their 
villages, they Elad 400 nlen there and would resist. General Hammond's 
only reply was to send back for first reserve ammunition, to deploy the 
Gurkhas into line, and bring up the field battery. Two companies of 
the Gurkhas were then estencled and sent round to flank tlle villages, 
commanding heights were occupied and the force advanced through the 
villages and u p  the pass unmolested. The road to the pass runs through 
8 defile in the hills, a t  first fairly open, but the valley soon contracts 
and is flanked by high, craggy, isolated peaks so placed as to render it 
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impossible to efficiently command the flanks. A t  a distance of about 
I three miles from tbe pass the walley still further contracts, i~ncl tlie path 
runs tl~rough a gorge about one hundred and fifty yarrls in lel~:tll, so 
narrow as to  be impassable for a laden mule, arid between pl-euipitous 
roclts about 100 feet high. The route is in  fact impracticable, nur can 
it be improved. 
The next day, December 28th, was wet and cold, and t l ~ c  troops 
dicl not niove out. The tribes liad not come in, bu t  on the contrxry 11;td 
added to their list of offences by shooting a sepoj. of the 9th Qrrrlillns 
during the night, close outside the entrenchments, and by carrying off 
a b o ~ t  five miles of telegrzph wire and breaking down tlie prrstu. 011 
the 29th, therefore, tlie force moved out, partly to forage, partly to 
punish the tribes for their presumption, and partly to guard o\itgoiiig 
and inconling convoys ; and operations of this nature continuetl to form 
the regular programme of morlr for many days afterwards. Every day 
villages were destroyed, and more forage seized, hut not witl~out loss, for 
the Zakka Kliels were well armed and were good shots, with ;~llaccurate 
knowledge of the country, and of the range of evelay prnnrinent object. 
Tlley sniped a t  the troops alnlost irtcessantly and illso clcstruyrd the  i 
telegraph lines with such persistence that  all attempts a t  repairs lii~d to 
1 
be given up for the time being. 
On the 30th December the Oxfordshire Regiltlent, ~ 1 1 o  wvel.e out on 
convoy duty, met with a serious nlis~dventure. After sceing the dal; 
through arld completing the day's work, four companies of the OsR~rds, 
who were crowning the Eurchest lleigl~ts towards Ali Musjitl a~l t l  11:id to 
form tlie rear-guard to the retirement, beci~nle s e ~  iously C ~ L I ~ L ~ I : ~  with 
the enemy. About 5-30 P.M. Genela1 Emmond itt tile ca1l11) ;it Ltrrttli 
Kotal receiv~d ;L report that the rear-guard was l~arcl preshecl a r ~ t l  in nc~ec2 
of reinforcements. The troops in camp were at  once hpreacl o~xt srr~ai,tly 
and h u ~ r i e d  to the scene of action. T!le 3-4th Piorleers wt.1-c: ~ i l l ~ t  to 
occclpy the villages on the right, and (+ellera1 Eiit~~ln~ortd wit 11 I,11t? 
pushed on, occupying points on the fl,~nka nx 11($ ;~clv:~rtc~~d. 
H e  fonnd the Oxfords, as well as 20 men of tlle I~niinhilling~ i ~ r l t l  c,iir 
conlpany of the 9th Gurlthas (who Ilacl bee11 left on t l i~~~li i l lg  I eigltt~ 
to  co-operate with the retilement) llolding tlitee vill;~gc~x All iil'il~g 
had ceased, and under cover of the reinforcerncnt.~ wlricl~ htg lrntl Ll+cjllg1r$ 
General Hari~mond withrllew the Oxforcls and t h o  O ~ i ~ k h n x  f ~ . t r r t i  tlle 
I 
villages, retiring off the hills. I t  appeared that the O x f o ~ * d ~  wlie11 51.st 
attacked had taken cover in a deep nullah which proved to he alw 
exposed to the enemy's Ere. The dhoolie-bearers thereupon bolted, and as 
i t  was found impossible to get away the killed and wounded it became 
necessary to occupy the villages till reinforcements arrived from Landi 
Kotal. The casualties in  the Oxfordshire Regiment were :-killed : one 
Sergea~it, one Lance-Corporal, and one private; wounded: Lieutenant- 
Colonel F .  H. Plowden, Commanding; severely wounded : Captain C.  Parr, 
Lieutenant R. C. R. Owen, Sergeant-Major Den~psay ; nzortally wounded : 
four Sergeants and six privates. Not only were the dead and wounded 
carried safely baok to camp, but  all rifles, ammunition and accoutrementn 
were brought in, so that  nothing fell into the hands of the enemy. 
On New Year's Day most of the troops were again employed in 
blowing up towers and in foraging. The Zakka Khels, awakening a t  
last to the daily seizure of their bhoosa, took the extreme measure of 
setting fire to the bhoosa stocks, andafter this date little or no forage was 
found in any of the villages. The same day General Eammond, covered 
by a wing of the lnniskillings and Oxfords, went up the Tsera Nullall 
to  examine some caves nightly occupied by the enemy. Eousehold goods 
were found in the caves, and while the troops were engaged in clearing 
the caves and destroying the goods some shots were fired a t  General 
Hammond and the group of Officers standing with him. Several bullets 
fell quite close, and one hit Lieutenant El. U. Eammond, R.A., General 
Hammond's Orderly Officer. Some shots were also fired at t h e  troops 
when retiring. The day's casualties were :--zoounded : Lieutenant 
Hammond ; seaerely wouaded : one Sergeant, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 
one sepoy, 34th Pioneers, and one follower. 
It had been intended to surprise the villagers on the morning of the 
3rd January; 200 of the 9th Gurlrhas were to start out into the hills 
early and get into position over the Bori Pass by daylight while the 
rest of the troops demonstrated over the villages at  the mouth of the 
pass. The effect would heve been to drive the enemy up t h e  pass, 
whence the Gurkhas would have driven them back, and further loss 
would have been inflicted on any line of retreat they might have taken. 
The Gurlchax started a t  4 A.M., but the weather was so inclement with 
rain, sleet and snow, that the whole movement. was counterrnanded. 
Later the same day Major Hickman of the 34th Pioneers, who was in 
eornrnand of a picket p r t y  guarding the road between Ali Musjid an$ 
Landi IiotaI, was shot through. the heart by a stray bullet fired from 
a distance of 800 yards. 
On January 5th aforaging party went out as usual but  failed to find 
any sign of the enemy, and not a single shotwas fired, the tribesnien 
having apparently crossed over the hills into the Bazar Valley. The 
blowing up of their villages was a far greater loss to the Khyber Zskki~ 
Khels than to those of the Bara and Bazar Valleys, for the Khyber nlen 
stay i n  t h e  pass all the year round, do not migrate, and have no other 
homes except caves in the hills. They must have been suffering con- 
siderable distress, for it was now very cold, the thermometer a t  night 
time registering 13 degrees of frost. 
The story of the re-occupation of the Khyber is now conlplete, and 
in leaving the Peshawar Column in possession of Landi Kotal and Ali 
Musjid it has only to be mentioned that  from this date the " Peshawar 
Column" nominally ceased to exist, the force under General Harnmond 
till then so styled being re-named the '' 5th Brigade of the Tirah Field 
Force." 
W e  now return t o  General Symons's Division, which we left in the 
Khyber a t  the nlouth of two passes leading into the Eazar Valley, pre- 
pared t o  strike another blow a t  the Zakka Rhels and their villages of 
refuge. Before the advance was continued the In~perial Service Troops 
with the Division, who throughout the Tirah Campaign liad ,zcqnitted 
thenlselves with very great credit, received orders to  return to tlleir. 
respective States, as their work was over; and General Symons in part- 
ing with them issued the following complinlentary order :-" The General 
Oficer Commanding the 1st Division, desires to record his appreciation 
of the good services nnd soldier-like demeanour of thefie corps. Their 
discipline and good behaviour have been beyond reproach, and quite 
equal throughout tlie campaign to that  of the best of our native troops. 
General Sy~nolls i n  the name of the  whole Division bega to thank them 
for their incessi~nt and hard work, always cheerfully pcrforn~ed. The 
Major-General's especial approbation is due to Comnlandant Si~rdar 
Sher Singh, Commanding the Nabha Regiment, and to Commaud;~llt 
Sardar Meter Khan, Cornmanding tlie Msler Kotl;t Snppe~ti. TII~~HLL 
Officers have displayed zeal, intelligence, and good cl~ialitieri of conr- 
niand. The 1st Division will miss their services, and tliey all leave with 
congratulations and good wiuhos." 
It was a great disappointnient to the troops nllder Crknerrtl Sgnrons 
not to  find the enemy in  force in the B ~ z a r  Vsllcy, ax the rttc3r1 of the 1 x t  
Division were anxious to avenge tlie recent losses of the %r id  Diviuiun 
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during the march from Dwatoi to Barkai. The Zakka Rhels had the 
whole of the upper part of the Bara Valley once againopen to them, and 
they discreetly left Bazar to the care of small bodies of men. Cheena is 
t h e  only village of importance in the valley, and the enemy did not con- 
sider i t  worth while fighting for. Their cave-dwellings along the Bazar 
River could not be destroyed. During this little expedition the troops 
were for the most part admirably handled; but the Alachi route proved 
difficult, and a battalion of infantry withcommissariat stores had to be 
left all night on the pass : fortunately it was not attacked. General 
Gaselee's Brigade alone went as far as Cheena, which was destroyed, while 
General Hart's Brigade halted a t  Eurg ready for action in case the Zakka 
Ehels  should show themselves in great strength. The tribesmen however 
never numbered Illore than 200 men in any one spot. On the 27th 
General Har t  remained a t  Burg, whilst part of his force went on to the 
Bazar Valley to  meet Sir William Lockhart, and to picket the left bank 
so as to assist in  protecting General Gaselee's Column returning from 
Cheena. The rear-guard of the 2nd Brigade was followed up as usual, 
bu t  when the Afridis met the pickets of the 1st Brigade they transferred 
their attention to the latter. The Royal Sussev Regiment, who were 
on this picket duty, were engaged warnlly for 26 hours, and when they 
retired on Burg the enemy followed then1 close into camp. The regiment 
lost 3 killed and 3 wounded. Lieutenant St. de V. A. Julius was also 
slightly wounded. A private in the Royal Sussex behaved with great 
gallantry. He was shot through the leg and severely wounded, butafter 
this he helped a wounded comrade away, and assisted in carrying the 
dltoolie all the way back to the camp. He then weut to his company's 
bivouac to get some food and then to the hospital to  have his wound 
dressed. 
On the morning of the 28th December a t  a quarter to five o'clock 
General Har t  started in the darkness and rain to surprise and surround 
the Karamna villages as it was reported that the tribesmen had returned. 
A11 the villages were surrounded before daylight, but the Zakka Ehels 
llad been too sharp and had flown. The subsequent withdrawal of the 
force from Eurg up a steep ravine was an extremely difficult operation. 
The pickets on the hill tops reported the enemy in force on the south 
of the camp ; and the rear-guard, consisting of the Royal Sussex and the 
21st Madras Pioneers, the latter in the rear, were heavily engaged for 
several hours, The great difficulty was to get the pickets down safely: 
there were ten of them all pinnaclecl on the step rocky hills, and Colonel 
C. H. W. Cafe, who commanded the rear-guard, managed the  operation 
admirably. The more distant picliets were brought down end  passed up 
the ravine, and the others followed in their turn. The Africlis followcrl 
closely and persistently, and approached within 100 yards of the Madras 
Pioneers, thus giving our men a much better chance than usual, and many 
were seen t o  fall. Our losses were two men of the Royal Sussex severely 
wounded, one sepoy of the 21st Madras Pioneers Idled, four seve1"el.v 
and one slightly wounded. All the valuable towers in Burg :ind 
Karan~na  were blown up, and in carrying out this duty a distressing 
accident occurred whereby Lieutenant C.  R. Tonge, R.E., and a sappel. 
of No. 4 Conlpany Bombay Sappers, were accidentally killed. One of 
the  charges under a tower exploded, and Lieutenant Tonge, thinking 
that  the other fuse had failed, went up t o  the tower, whe11 the second 
charge went off. 
OntEle 29th December the 1st Brigadel~nder Brigadier-General Hart,  
acconlpanied by General Symons, returned to Ali Musjid. Tlie with- 
drawal was closely and boldly fol!om~ed by the Afrid~s, who in places got 
quite near, being much aided by clouds on the hills. They followed the  
rear-guard for six miles, and shot well. Our casualties were : six men of 
the Derbysl~ire Regiment sevcrely wounded, and three other men 
slightly wounded ; one rifleman of the 2-1st Gurkhas dangerously 
wounded. Several of the casualties occurred in withdrawil~g the pickets 
from the hills round Rararnna Camp. They were all  c \w~tual \y 
passed through the strong rear-gnard placed in position a t  tlle exit of 
the camp. The baggage was all sent on ahead and tlle operation of t h e  
withdrawal was skilfully executed, the troops supporting each o t l ~ e r  
admirably. Brigadier-General Havt himself came i11 with the l a ~ t  corn- 
pany. The transport did very well; not one load being l u ~ t .  G~11er:~l 
Gaselee's Brigade marched by another route to Jamrud. They ;~lso hail 
12 or 13 casua1t;ies en route. 
The next  few weelrs were uneventful, and towarcls the end of 
January it seemed as if the efforts of the Political 0fIicel.s were liki:ly tc, 
be crowned with success. Even the Zakka Khels merPe kt~owri t u  ~ J C  
debating for the first time whether i t  would not he wiser to C;~)IIIP  t~ 
terms, than risk another invasion in the spring. Tlie news, idLc.r*cfor.c*, 
which reached India on the 30th January that out troops 11i~d xl~ct lv i t l~  
a serious reverse was wl~olly unexpected. As it a f te rw:~rd~  c~~~rrgcbtl, 
the operations wllich led up to this unfortunate busir~css Iiad L ~ * ~ I L  
earefully planned befolehand and cvery oifort had bee11 rriade to  keela 
the proposed movement of troops secret. News had been received t h a t  
the Afridis had driven their cattle and camels to graze on the Kajurai 
Plain, which is due east of Fort Bara and is enclosed on the northern, 
western and southern sides by spurs which run down from the main 
range of hills separating the Bara and Bazar Valleys. It was accord- 
ingly resolved to capture the Afridi herds and herdsmen. For  this 
purpose four columns, one from each brigade, were formed, and ordered 
to move concentrically so as  to cut off the tribesmen's line of retreat 
westwards. The points from which the columns moved on the morning 
of the 29th January were Ali Musjid, Jamrud, Bara Fort  and Mamani. 
General Symons reported that  the Ali Musjid and Jamrud Columns 
had seen nothing of the enemy, though they had marched over twenty 
miles. The Bara Column which presumably moved straight across the 
Kajurai Plain, had also nothing of interest to report. The column, 
however, further to  the west, drawn from General Westmacott's Brigade, 
and consisting of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, four 
companies of the 36th Sikhs and two guns of No. 5 Bombay Mountain 
Battery, with Colonel Seppings of the King's Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry i n  command had a very different experience. Little opposi- 
tion was experienced i n  the advance, but  when the retirement began 
through a narrow defile known as the Shin Eamar  Pass the enemy 
appeared i n  considerable numbers and pressed hard upon the small 
column. It was the old story of a small force completely a t  the mercy 
of skilful marksmen securely planted on both sides of a narrow gorge. 
Too few in numbers to clear the hills, their only course was to retire as  
best they could, though men were dropped in their tracks a t  every step 
and the column was e v e r j  moment becoming more and more hampered 
with the wounded. Fortunately i t  mas found possible to send a message 
to General Westmacott, who turned out with 200 of the King's Own 
Scottish Borderers, 100 Gurkhas and two guns. H e  found the  little 
column retiring in  good order, but very sIowly. Promptly grasping the 
situation he brought his guns into action from the hills a t  the mouth of 
the gorge on the enemy's left, and turned the direction of the retirement 
through his troops. When the whole had passed through he retired 
slowly, reaching camp a t  7-30 P.M., and being the last man himself to  get 
in. Even as it was our losses were extremely heavy, and our dead had 
to be left on the field. The casualty list comprised 1 British Qfficers- 
killed ; Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, Lieutenent Turing, 36th Sikhs ; 
Lieutenants Walker, Dowdall and Hughes, King's Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry; wounded: Major Earle, Captinn Marrable and Lieutenant 
Hall of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. The rank and file of 
the Yorkshires also suffered heavily, losing 22 killed and 17 wounded ; 
the 36th Sikhs lost 3 men killed. On the 31st January General West- 
macott advanced again to the Shin Eamar Pass for the purpose of 
bringing in the dead, and 22 bodies were recovered. His force consisted 
of 400 of the  Gordon Highlanders, 300 Sikhs, 300 2nd Gurkhas, 400 
3rd Gurkhas, 250 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 400 King's 
Own Scottish Borderers, and No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. 
Little opposition was made to the advance, the few casualties taking 
place as the force retired. One gunner was killed, one gunner and one 
man of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, one Gurkha, and one 
bhisti were wounded. Surgeon-Captain M. Dick and Lieutenant Browne, 
30th Sikhs, were slightly wounded, 
So ended what was certainly one of the most unfortunate episodes of 
the  campaign. The loss of thr  Colonel of the 36th Sikhs in particular 
was deeply regretted throughout the army. On more than one occasion 
since the operations against the Afridis began, ColoneI Haughton's quick 
resolve, magnificent courage, and inspiring leadership had saved a 
critical situation, and he was idolised by every soldier in his regiment. 
PART V. 
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PART V. 
TWO MINOR EXPEDITIONS. 
i 
I 
\ GHA PTER I. 
THE UTMAN KHEL EXWDITIOX. 
WHILE in the early part of November Sir William Lockhart was engaged 
in punishing the Afridis in the Maidan Valley, the Malakand Field 
Force, which under Sir Bindon Elond had co-operated with General 
Elles's Force in subjugating the Mohrnands and the Mamunds, was enjoy- 
i n g  a well-earned rest and awaiting fresh employment. After the health 
of t h e  force had been thoroughly recruited, i t  was thought desirable in 
t h e  absence of any other work to give some portion of the two brigades 
a ten days' pron~enade through the Utman Khel country, west of the 
Malakand. The Utnia Khels had informally expressed their willing- 
riess to  comply, as far as possible, with the terms imposed upon them by 
Major Deane, and the troops visiting their villages were not likely to 
meet with resistance. A certain number of rifles and othcr arms had 
I to  be  collected, and the mere presence of a strong brigade would, i t  was 
rightly expected, prove sufficient to remind the tribesmen of their 
obligations. Preparations for the expedition were accordingly begun 
a t  Jalala in the Peshawar District, and the Guides Cavalry and Infantry 
were ordered to rejoin the Malakand Field Force. Sir Bindon Blood's 
plan was to detach a strong brigade to visit the Utman Khels, and yet 
have a sufficient force left to keep a close watch upon the still suspected 
Buner border. 
The Utman Khels are not an important tribe, as their fighting 
strength is put a t  only 1,200 or 1,500 men, but they have been notorious 
evildoers on the frontier for many years past. Years ago they attacked 
the  gangs of labourers employed on the Swat River Canal and cut up a 
number of unarmed coolies, an offence for which they were never I 
tlloroughly punished. They shared in the attack on the Malakand, but 
I 
withdrew in haste when the relieving force arrived. The nortllern 
section of the clan living beyond the Panjkorn wcre denlt with by 
Major Deane, Political Officer, after the opeittztion?r in the 31:~lllurltl 
Valley; and it .was the soutllertl sections th :~ t  had ~ I O W  trt Lc vinitrrl. 
They had hesitated for weeks, tl~inking, perliicps that all 11riliti~l.y 
operations were a t  an end;  but the instant Sir 13ind(ln IJl(~t~l'x tror,p?r 
started, their jirgah hastened to n ~ a l ~ e  fornial xubxuissio~i. Their uljc.ct 
was, of course, to  prevent our troops entering their country; but  it  W:LS 
important that  the  Totai Valley and the passes leading into i t  frolti the 
Swat Valley, Dargai and the Pesl~awar District sl~uuld be thurouglkiy 
explored. 
Colonel A. J. F. Reid was given the corninand of the cxpetlitionary 
force, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-C?eneral, and the force it-  
self consisted of the following troops :-The Buffs, No. 8 ~Mountaiu 
Battery, one squadron 10th B e n g ~ l  Lancers, the 21st Punjab Infantry, 
the 35th Sikhs, No. 5 Company Qneen's Own Sappers and Miners, C: " 
and "D"  Sections No. I British Field Hospital, " A " and ' l  B" Sections 
No. 35 Native Field Hospital, and No. 50 Native Field Hospital. 
The following Officers were appointed to the staff of the column :-Coni- 
manding, Brigadier-General Reid ; Deputy Assistant Adjutnl~t-Cener:~], 
Captain A. R. Dunsterville, East Surrey Regirllent ; Deputy Assist:~nt 
Quarter-Master-Generwl, Major L. Herbert, Central Indiit Hurse; Ortlcrly 
Officer, Lieutenant H .  A. Vallings, 29th Punjab Infantry; Extra Orde1.1~ 
Officer, Lieutenant W. S. Fraaer, 19th Be~igal Lancers; Field Enyiaeer, 
Captain H. J. Sherwood, Royal Engineers ; Intelligence Ofticel,, Lierlte- 
nant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengnl Lancers ; Conlnii.;sa,riiit Offic.~~; 
Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps ; Transport Officer; T~ie~~t.en:irtl It. S. 
Weston, Manchester Regiment ; Provost-M:~rxh:tl, L i e r ~ t e r l t ~ ~ ~ t  If. 1':.
Cotterill, Royal West Surrey Regiment ; SignaIlirig Officel; Licaul t1rl:~rlk 
W. H. Trevor, The Buffs ; Senior Medical Officer, 8111-gcc~n-liit~r1teri:~rit- 
Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian Medical Service ; :tnd Seniur Yet t~r i~ l i~ry  
Officer, Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Willinnln, Arriiy Vcterini~t:y 
Department. Co-operating with General neicl wax a HIII:LII f,)r('(~ t * o ~ i -  
sisting of the 16th Bellgat Tnfantry ancl on(? xc~ctior~ of NO. :il Nt~tivct 
Field Hospital, under the conlmand of Lieutcn~t~t-UoIo~icl A.  : I lol i t i~l i i~~'~.  
The expedition started out from Jalala on Xovet~ibcr 2:'11tl,  it^ rlvr;. 
tination being the Totai Valley, about three ~ilnrcllex ilistiu~t. 'fl;tr;~i~iIcot 
was reached on the  24th, and the Utmar~ Khul jirgnhs w11icl1 h:ttl ~i~ust,t>r. 
edat Kot, were so anxious to prcvellt tllcir c;ulultly Lcitrg ci~tci*ail I I ~  tha 
troops that, as already stated, they sent word on ahead that they were 
prepared to niake submission. General Hill's reply \Tas that he would 
meet thejirgah a t  K o t  in  tlre Totai Valley. To R o t  he accordingly 
marched that day, crossing over the Bhar Pass en route. The road over 
tlie pass, although i t  had been considerably improved the day before 
by No. 5 Conlpany Queen's Own Sappers and Miners and by working * 
parties from all COI-ps, proved very difticult for laden camels. The bag-  
? gage, however, was all got over with the loss of a few camels, and reached 
the carup late in the evening. Shortly after passing Bhar on the west side 
of the pass the valley aidens considerably, and is very green and full of 
cultivation. The villagers of Lower Totili shnwed a n  unmistakable 
wish to be friendly. Jirgnhs from Lower and Upper Totai and Agrah 
auet General Reid on arrival a t  Eot,  and were told what the Government 
terms were, namely,-(1) The surrender of 300 guns and all breech- 
loaders ; (2) survey of the country ; (3) formal subnsission to the Political 
Agent a t  Malaksnd ; (4) forage for the force ; and (5) road-making a s  
required-an important matter, as the column had 600 camels i n  its 
carriage equipment. All the clans accepted the terms unconditionally, 
except the Agrah j~rgah,  who, as they showed some hesitancy, were told 
that the force would exact complianae with the terms a t  Agrah. The 
force halted on November 25th a t  Kot  in order that the two routes t o  
Agrah might be reconnoitred. That over the Khels Pass was found 
i~llpracticable for camels, and it was decided to use the route vid 
Xilipatai which, however, also required m ~ i c l ~  work to make i t  pnssable. 
Bargolai was seen to be in a wide cultivated plain among the hills, a n d  
the reconnaissance was made to within two irriles of Agrah Pass. 
Groups of people were seen here and there, but no shot was fired. 
A t  8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th November the force left K o t  
and  marched to Silipatai, about five miles, the road following the bed of 
the stream in a deep gorge the whole way. I t  wns necessary to  cover 
the march of the column by parties on the hillsides marching parallel 
to the column. Progress was necessarily slow, but the rear-guard reach- 
ed  the camp a t   P.M. witlaout any mishap. No. 5 Company Sappers a n d  
Miners, covered by the 21st Punjab Infantry, proceeded towards Bar- 
golai and made the road passable for camels up to 19 miles from t h a t  
plxce. The reconnaissances from this point to Bargolai proved the road 
to be quite practicable for the remainder of tlie way. The villagers of 
.1Dheri, Silipatai and Bargolai were very submissive, bringing in supplies. 
Groups of men were seen on the Agrah Pass and the surrounding hill% 
and were raid to be the Agrah ,ji.yah lvho 11ad colne to their boundary t o  
te1rJt.r their sub~nissiorl to  General Reid a t  tha t  place. The force 
lsivotracked a t  night on terraced l~illsides near Bedani village half a 
mile south-erst of Siliptai. The surrounding villages were warned tha t  
tlre penalty for an)- sniping into camp would be exacted from them 
auci tile>- cruwned a11 the heights in the neighbonrl~ood with pickets. 
Xrst da>-, Sorenlber 2;th, the force niarched from Silipatai t o  
E~r:,.ol:ii, the road 11:tving been made passable for camels by the Queen's 
01vn Sappers and 3Tinera. Bargolai is a t  the extremity of the long nar- 
r t , ~  y q e  that leads fro? Xot, about eight miles long, and the column 
birt~a~aekrd in a pear-sl~apcd valley with a considerable amount of 
cultir;~ti l~n,  lrills rising to three or four thousand feet all around. A 
r~w~nn;ti.s~nce up the dgrah Pass showed the road to be impassable for 
cnnltriz, nni l  ( J I ~ Y  fair for rnules. 
On the ?St11 Xovenlber General Reid with 500 rifles of the 21st 
Ponjab Inl;~~ltr>-, 350 of the Buffs, 930 of the 35th Sikhs, four guns of 
KO. Y Bengal Xuuntair! Batter>-, and half of No. 5 Conlpany Queen's Own 
S:1p1fizrs arid Uiners as a flying column, v i t h  mule transport only, march- 
ed f r ~ t ~  Eiwgolai over the Xgrah Pass and bivouacked on a low spur in 
tEe centre of the valley which gives the pass its name. NO opposition 
TV;LS xnet with, the grain and fodder demanded were brought in at  once 
atnd the rifles were surrendered the next day. The valley or rather 
gruq)  of va l le~s  were all under cultivation, the wheat crops being a few 
inches lnigh. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the  28th the advanced 
pickets reported the presence of a gathering of about 500 men carrying 
a few st:~nd;~rds on the right bank of the Swat River, about five miles 
aw;t~-. Tiley appeared to be Shainozai, but they showed no signs of 
intending to cross the river. There are rope bridges over the river a t  
this p i n t ,  but crossing is a slow operation and to get  back hurriedly is 
iruyttlqsible, so the (supposed) Shamozai contented thelnselves with 
w,~tcliing General Reid's movements. The night of the 28th passed 
qnietiy, and nest morning a reconnaissance under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Faitlifoll went out to the Inzari Pass, which was visible about three 
miles off. 
The reconnaissance under Colonel Faithfull t o  the Inzari Pass 
showed the road over the pws to be a very fair one, and quite passable 
fur rnules. The ascent for the last 200 yards is very steep. The recon- 
m k a n c e  puslied beyond tlle p a s  enabliug the Government Surveyor 
( 2.13 ) 
to  complete his sketch to the point reached from tlle Mahkand side i n  
August last. The view froru the top of Inzari ,was mag~lificent. T h e  
hill dr'ops almost perpendicularly to  where the Panjkora and S w a t  
Rivers join, and  in the distance tlie snow peaks of the Lowari Range were  
visible. General Reid accompanied tlie reconnaissance in person, and the 
party returned a t  5 P.M. By this time all . the arms demanded had b e e n  
surrendered, and the district lrsving made complete submission orders  
were issued for the force to return to Bargolai next day. The n i g h t  
passed quietly, and the Flying Column left Agrali at  8 A.M., all being i n  
Bargolai Camp by 11-30. The remsinig arms required from Bargolai 
having been surrendered, the force took its departure from Bilrgolai on 
the  1st December and marched to Kot. 
As the Kanawari j i rgah ,  which had been granted leave to meeh 
General Reid on his arrival, had not conle in  and had not sent in t h e  
arn.ms required of them, i t  was decided to visit their villages and enforce 
sub~iss ion .  The villages lie high up in the hills to the west of t h e  
site of General =eid9s Camp and about 3,000 feet above it. The r o a d  
was very bad andvery steep and progress was slow. About half-way up, 
the representatives of the villages were met hurrying down to General 
Reid with all  tha t  was required of them in the way of weapons, but as 
they had neglected to attend a t  the prescribed t imethe force continued 
i ts  =arch on the villages and the arms were accepted there. One of t h e  
principal naaliks, however, having refused to appear or tender any s u b -  
mission, the fortifications of his dwelling were destroyed. A survey w a s  
made of the heights overlooking the Panjkora River and the force then 
returned to camp, arriving a t  4-30 P.N., having been out 11 hours. 
The Utman Ehe l  Expedition was now a t  an end, its object hav ing  
been fully accomplished without the necessity of any fighting ; and t h e  
column under General Hill broke up. I n  his despatches to the Adjutant-  
General in India  Sir Bindon Blood wrote:-" You will observe that t h e  
objects in  view of which the operations reported on were undertaken, 
mere fully and  expeditiously attained, and that  no hitcll or cont~,eteuzps 
of any sort occurred. I venture to thinli that  much credit is due t o  
Colonel Reid for the perfect manner in which he arranged and carr ied 
. out the movement of his force and overcame the conisderable physical 
difficulties which he encountered ; and I fully endorse the favourable 
renlarks he makes regarding liis troops and staff. I would further ex- 
press an opinion tlrat Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro also carried o u t  
what he had to do wit11 tact alicl judguent ; and I have tlie l~onour 
( 244 1 a 
accordingly to recomrnendbotli these Officers, together with nllo 
served under them, to the favoilrabIe notice of Iris Exccl le~ir .~ the (l,lI1,. 
mander-in-Chief. I n  nlaliing the necessnry prelinlinaly : L I ~ I . ; L I > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I + ~ I I ~ ~  
for t l ~ e  opel-ations under reference, I was n1llch auaisted I,y i l l f o ~ . n l i ~ t i ~ , ~ ~  
and advice received froxi Mr. Merli, Civil Service, the C k ( > ~ ~ l ~ l l i . ~ ~ i o ~ ~ ~ s ~  
Peshawar, from BIajor Dean?, C.S.I., tlle puliticitl A g ~ t  ~ t  tfle 
Malakand, from Mr. C. Bunbury, Civil Service, 1)cl~l ty ('u1111nir.itr~~~~~ 
of Peshawar, and also from Mr. Stui~rt Waterficld, Z'l11lji~1) i't,li,-t*, J\,],~, I 
was specially appointed Assistant Political Officer fur  tliu opcr;rti<,llu:J 
CBAPTZlr' I% 
'PEE EXPEDITIO~ AGAI&ST TnE BUNERTBLS. 
AFTER the return a t  the end of December of the Tirah Field Force 
t o  British ferritory, the Government turned their attention to the 
Bunerwal.; with whom a long outstandiug account had to be settled. 
T h e  tribesmen of Buner had shown an extrelxe spirit of hostility during 
t h e  attack on the Malakand in July ancl again a t  Landski when Sir 
Bindon Blood's Force was advancing into Upper Swat. An ultimatum 
w a s  now sent to the tribe calling upon them to comply with the following 
te rms  within a week :-(I) A representative jir'yc~h to  make complete 
submission a t  Mardan ; (2) the restoration of all Government property ; 
(3) the surrender of 600 guns, including GO Enfield rifles stolen on 
t h e  Rustam border ; and (4) the payn~e~l t  of fine of a Rs.11,500. The 
following terms mere simultaneously announced t o  the Chanlldwals, 
w h o  inhabit the small valley southdeast of Buner : the surrender 
of 100 guns, a fine of Rs.1,500 and the handing in of 100 swords and 
s tandards from Eoga ancl Nawagai.* The terms for the Caduns, who 
live south-east of the Chamlawals, were not for the moment announced, 
but like their neiglzbours the Khudu Khel, they were expected to  
voluntarily make submission. !Die Pl~arnlawals and Gaduns, like the 
Bunermals, had both sent contingents to  fight a t  Malakand and in the 
S w a t  Valley, 
Formal notice was given that in the event uf non-compliance with 
t h e  Government's terms a column commanded by Sir Bindon Blood 
would be sent to invade Buner and exact submission by force of arms. 
The troops selected for the expedition were :-1st Brigade (General 
Meiklejohn's), the Eoyal West gent, Regiment, the Highland Lighfi 
I n f a n t r y  and the 20th and 31st Punjab Infantry ; 2nd Brigade (General 
Jeffreys's), the Eavt Kent, the Guides Infantry, and the 16th and 21st 
P u n j a b  Infantry ; Divisional troops : four squadrons of Cavalry, 10th 
F i e l d  Battery, Nos. 7 and 8 Mountain Bntteries, No. 5 Company Queen's 
O w n  Sappers and Miners and No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and 
lners. M' 
*'lh~s village has to  be dlst,lngu~shed horn tho place oi the samc nutlie 111 Dc4]our. 
The following staff mas appointed :-Commanding, s i r  Bindon 
Blood ; Aide-de-camp, Lord Pincastle ; Orderly Officer, Lieutenant 
TT. S. Fraser, 19th Rengal Lancers ; Assistzlnt ~djutant-General,  Major  
H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders ; AssisGint &uartelt-Master-Genernl, 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. &I:tsters, Central India Horse; Deputy Assis- 
tant Quarter->faster-General, Intelligence Departmmt, Captain F. W. S. 
Stanton, R.A.; Superintendent, Army Signalling, Captain E. V. 0. 
Hewitt, Royal West Kent Regiment ; Chief Cornzui~sd~iat Officer, Major  
H. Wharry ; Brigade Tra~~spor t  Officer, Captain C. G. R .  Thackwell ; 
Assistsnt to Chief Comn~issariat Oflicer, Captain R. C. Lye, 23rd Pioneers ; 
Assistant t o  Brigade Transport Officer, Lieutenant E. F. Macnaghten, 
16th Lancers ; Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel J. c. C*. 
Carnlichael ; Senior Veterinary Officer, Veterinary-Cdptai11 N. T. W. 
Miinn ; Conimanding R o ~ i ~ l  Artillery, Colonel W. Aitkeii ; Adjutant, 
Royal Artillery, Captain H Rouse ; Commanding Royal Engineers, Colo- 
nel W. Peacocke ; Adjutant, Royal Engineers, Captail1 H. G. Sherwood ; 
Field Engineers, hhjor R. Blunt and M. C. Barton ; Cl~aplain, Rev. 
L. Klugh ; Survey Oficer, Captain C. L. Robertson, Royal Engineers ; 
Superintendent of Telegmplis, Lieutenant W. Robertson, Royal Engi- 
neers ; Field Intelligence OEcers, Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry, 
and Lieutenant A. C. M. Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers ; Commissariat, 
Officer, Advanced DepBL, Captain W. E. F. Bu~lton, S.C.; Transport 
Officer, Lieutenant R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment ; Brigade Corn- 
lnissariat Officer of the Rustani Column, Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan ; 
Ordnance Officer, Captain L. Q. Wittkins, Royal Artillery ; Section 
C o m m ~ n d ~ n t ,  Captain C. E. Belli-Biva~, 7th Eombny Lancers. The Field 
Post31 Staff consisted of Mr. H. C. Sheridan (Senior Postal Superinten- 
dent), Mr. A. D. Appleby, and Mr. M. N. Cama. Mr. Sheridan, by the  
way, had acted in a similar capacity with the Malakand Field Force and 
the Mohmand Field Force. I n  the former he had been assisted b y  Mr. 
Appleby and Mr. G. M. Nicholl ; and iu the latter by Mr. C. J. Stowell 
and Mr. Nicholl. 
Ist Brigade : Commanding, Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn ; 
Orderly Officer, Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards ; Deputy  
Assistant Adjutant-General, Major E. A. P. Hobday ; Deputy Assistant 
Quarter-Master-General, Captain G F. H. Dillon ; Assistant Superinten- 
dent, Army Signalling, Lieutenant J. W. O'Dowda, Royal West K e n t  
Reginlent ; Provost Marshal, 2nd-Lieutenant S. Morton, 24th Punjnb  
Infantry ; Brigade Commissariat OBicer, Captain C. IZ. Beville ; Brigade 
Transport Officer, Captain J. M. Camilleri ; Regimental Commissariat 
and Transport OEcer, Lieutenant J. Duncan, Royal Scots Fusiliers ; 
Veterinary-Lieutenant W. A. Macdougall, Army Veterinary Depart- 
ment. 
2nd Brigade : Commanding, Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys; Order- 
ly  Officer, Lieutenant J. Byron ; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-GeneraI, 
Captain A. B. Dunsterville ; Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General, 
Major H. C. Powell, 8-1st Gurkhas ; Assistant Superintendent, Army 
Signalling, Lieutenant W. H. Trevor, East Kent  Regiment, ; Provost 
Marshal, Captain W. E. Banbury, 25th Madras Infantry ;Brigade Com- 
missariat Officer, Captain G. A. Hswkins ; Brigade Transport Officer, 
Captain D. Balrer, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers ; Regimental Con~missariat 
and Transport Officer, Lieutenant G.C. Brooke, Border Regiment ; Veter- 
inary Officer, Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, Army Veterinary 
Departnient. 
I t  was not a t  all easy to predict what course the Bunerwals would 
adopt. There were those who believed tha t  as their Swati neighbours 
had submitted the men of Buner also would give in, seeing that  they 
could not well arrange for a great tribal combination : but others argued 
that,  like tlie Swatis when the Chitral Expedition began, they would 
make one stand in the passes for their name's sake and thereafter open 
negotiations. The military authorities were fully prepared for either 
contingency. The pass by which i t  was decided to enter Buner in  the 
event of the tribesmen withholding submission is known as the Tangi or 
Tangao ; i t  is imluediately beyond Sanghao where Sir  Bindon Elood, on 
receiving the order to advance, concentrated his two brigades in readi- 
ness. The receipt of the Governn~ent's ultimatum by the Bunerwals was 
followed by  a summons from the Buner jirgah to the tribesmen to watch 
t h e  passes and be prepared to defend them ; the Shaszai sections being 
detaiied t o  the Tangso Pass, the Malizai sections to  the Malendir and 
the Chanllawals a.nd Hindustani fanatics to  the Ambela Pass. The 
Upper Swatis and Yusufzai sections north of Buner refused to join t h e  
Bunerwals. These defensive arrangerllents having been made, a reply 
was sent in  to the Deputy Commissioner of Mardan intimating that the 
Bunerwals had decided not to con~ply with the Government's terms. 
The  concentration of the force a t  Sanghao was completed on tlie 6th 
January, and a t  once Sir Bindon 131ood in person, acconlpanied by the 
Brigadiers and the Officers Comnlanding the regiments, went out to 
ey:inlillc. the T ' L T I ~ ~ O  P,ISY and decide on the plan of attack. The enemy 
1vr1.1. seen in I:uyc n ~ l ~ ~ ~ b e r s  cro\~niug the crest of the hills on the north 
of the gu,rge 1r:tding t u  the pass, and 011 the top of the pass itself, which 
is about 3,FW feet above sea level. As the camp was at  an elevation of 
about -7,000 feet the rise to the pass vas about 1,800 feet, accomplished 
in about ontimile of rand, the hills on both sides of the gorge being 
verF steep. 
The Snppers and Xiners, covered by the 20th Punjab Infantry, 
were b11s~- all 11,~y iulproring the entrance to the gorge, whilst the Buners 
were enerqetieall- but ineffectually loosening large rocks from the crest 
of the liil!s in the hope of crusl~ing theworking partiesbeneath. About 
30 standard.; were risible on the hill top and the enemy were estimated 
at :LEIOU t I,( ICJ~ ), xuostly Sabrzai, who received the reconnaissance by 
firin:_. :L few q u n s  :tt intervals a t  long ranges. After the Sappers had 
lirloclietl off work it wis still very uncertain whether the mules would 
bt. :ihle togtht a,cer the pass nest day after the fight, but 500 coolies 
were t.n$tqeil tu c,irlq up tictual necessities for the troops should i t  be 
i~ullposhible ti) get the mules Up. 
Tltc as>atilt on the T;~naao Pass was successfully delivered on the 
7th .J:trlt~:~~'y. Tlie dispositions for the attack were as follows:-20th 
Punjxl) I n f ' s ~ l t r ~  to execute turning movement, scaling the hill to 
the n ~ ~ r t h  i ~ f  the c;rmp solne one and-a-half miles from tlie pass ; the 
Royal Ves t  Kent, the Highland Liqht Infantry, and the 2lst Punjab 
Inf:~nt~.y, followed by the 16th Bengal ~~~~~~~~~y, to make the frontal 
attack ; tlie 10th Field Bat'tery on a low spur a t  the mouth of the gorge, 
nrlcl two nlonntnin batteries on an eminence to the south of it. The 
Buffs nnd the 3rd Bumbay Light Irtfdntry escorted the guns and the 
former estended s long up the higli hills to the south, being over- 
looked by high impassable cliffs. Tlie 30th Punjab Infantry left camp 
altl,out S -\.~r., the batteries and escort a little later, and the remainder 
of tllr troops a t  8-30 The 10th Field Battery opened a t  9 A.M., and 
throagl~out he day fired some 460ronnds at  langes from 2,200 to 2,600 
yards. No. 8 Bellgal &fountain Battery opened at  9 A.M., and No. 7 
British Nou~itain Battery at  10-15. A large numbers of standards, 
about 28, lined the crest, but few of the enemy were visible a t  any time. 
The >fountain Eattery ranges were 1,650 yards to 9,050. The frontal 
att:~ck was sent forward about 13 noon, about which time tlle320th 
Prlnjab Infantry were heard heavily engaged e t l 1  tile enemy. ~l~~ latter 
~ppcar.ed to  hsve few guns, but kept up a hot fire with what they h a d  
I When the frontal attack got somewhat up the steep slopes, the enemy 
I also tried rolling stones down on the advancing troops, but ineffectually. 
i The shooting of the guns was remarkably accurate, and prevented the 
enemy from collecting. A party of five Buners started for a ghnzi rush, 
but only one kept it  up and he was quickly shot. About 1-30 the 
20th Punjab Infantry had surmounted the high peak, capturing some 
standards, and began to descend along the crest to the pass under 
1 a dropping fire. Shortly after this all the standdrds were one by one 
! 
carried away from the crest, and the opposition practically ceased. The 
i crest was crowned by 2 o'clock. One man of the Highland Light 
\ Infantry was dangerously wounded. The operations throughout were 
conducted with great skill and were materially assisted by the long- 
i range volleys of the Buffs, who were firing from 1,100 to 1,400 yards. The Political Officer's report on the operations stated that the tribal 
gathering on the Tangao Pass consisted of Salarzai, Asherzai and 
Gadizai, numbering in all about 2,000; and that their losses for the day 
amounted to about 20 killed and 60 wounded. 
After the capture of the pass Sir Bindon Blood went up to the top 
and found the road very difficut for mules. These animals, which had 
been loaded aboiit 11 A.M. and had been pushed forlvnrd some may up 
the gorge, were therefore sent back to the camp, but the blankets and I 
great-coats for the troops had followed them on coolies. The descent 
1 i from the pass 011 the other side was found to be sudden and steep. The valley to the village of Kingargali is from 400 to 800 yards wide, and the village lies on the border of a level and well-cultivated plain about 2,500 yards from the top of the pass. The two companies of Sappers 1 f 
were a t  work on the road until dark, and bivouacked there for the 
night. 
Meanwhile the 1st Brigade went on and occupied the village of 
Kingargali, reaching i t  about 3-30 P.M. The village was found deserted, 
but with plenty of grain and fodder in it. A quiet night was passed, 
i there being no sniping. 
Next day more work wits done on the road, 
I 
and some 25u mules were passed up  with rations for the brigade a t  
Kingargali, but the road was still difficult in  parts and very trying to 
i aden mules, being steep and narrow. , 
While Sir Bindon Blood was carrying out the main advance from 
I 
Sangao a small column acting under his instructions and consisting of 
! 
.p the Guides Infantry, the 31st Punjab Infantry, three squadrons of 
- 4  
the 10th Bengal Lancers, and a party of Sappers, the whole under 
the immediatecomniand of Colonel Adams, V.C., marched out from 
Rustam partly to reconnoitre the Rustam passes into Buner and partly 
to distract the attention of the Bunerwals from Sir Bindon Blood's 
advance and divide their forces. On the 6th January Colonel A d a m  
began work by sending three reconnoitring parties towards the Pirsai, 
Malandri and Ambela Passes. All three ~ a r t i e s  reported that  the  
passes were held, and a t  Pirsai the enemy fired on the cavalry. The 
infantry of the C O ~ U ~ L I  left Bustam a t  4 P.M. 011 t h e  6th January, bivou- 
acking near Pirsai village, The night was coldand frosty. A t  daybreak 
on the 7th the infantry left Pirsai, the Guides In fmtry  covering the 
advance of the 3 l s t  Punjab Infantry; and the enemy bolted after a 
slight resistance. They were evidently quite taken by surprise, i t~ld had 
not time to collect contingents from Malandri Pass, where Hindustani 
fanatics guarded the road. The cavalry followed a t  noon. After arrival 
on the Pirsai Pass Colonel McRae with six companies of the Guides a ~ l d  
four companies of the 31st Punjab Infantry pushed on to the village of 
Chowbanda on the Buner side. There was no opposition, and all the 
inhabitants had fled. Colonel Adams, Guides Cavalry, reconnoitred four 
miles on to the village of Kai, and the cavalry after crossing the pass 
tried to effect a junction with the mitin body of the Buner force under 
Sir  Bindon Blood, but  as it  was nearly dusk Colonel Bdams decided 
to return and bivouac with the infantry. Next day the column joined 
hands with the main body. 
The Salarzai and Asherzai sections of the Bunerwals now hurriedly 
sent in tlleir,jirgahs to  Sir Bindon Blood's camp and were clearly reduced 
to a very subnlissive mood. A few days later other clans followed 
suit, and by the middle of January the object of the expedition was 
completely accomplished without any further fighting. The power of 
the Bunerwals, like that of the Swatis, the Moh~nands and the Bajouris, 
was1 for the time being a t  least, thoroughly broken, their fighting prestige 
destroyed, their strongest defences shown to be futilo, their arms takeq 
away, and their country explored. 
[ THE END.] 

A P P E N D I X  I. 
THE R'E.WARDS FOR MAIZAR, 
THE following rewards to the native troops engaged on the Maizar action 
were notified in the Gazette of I~tdicz :- 
Subadar Narayan Singh, ~ s t  Silihs, is admitted to the 2nd class of the 
Order of British India with the title of Bahadur. 
The admissions to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit are as follows :- 
Havildar Nihal Singh commanded his sub-section with great coolness, 
firing blank cartridges when the supply of shell was exhausted, so a s  to induce 
the enemy to think the gun was still in action, and helped to carry the carriage 
back to the relief line. 
Naick Shara Ali kept his gun in action under great difficulties. The 
gun and carriage twice turned over baclrwards, and twice the lanyard broke, 
but he continued to load and fire after getting a spare lanyard from Havildar 
Nihal Singh. 
Salutri Kevval helped to carry Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., out of action, 
and dressed his wound, under a heavy fire. 
Driver Havildar Rur  Singh carried the body of Lieutenant F. A. Cruick- 
shank, R.A., out of action, and gave great assistance in sending the wounded to 
the rear and saddling up the mules under fire. 
Gunner Jawala Singh helped to carry the carriage of No. 3 Sub-division 
to the relief line, and then returned to help in carrying Lieutenant Cruickshank's 
body. 
Gunner Diwan Singh, after finishing his duties in limbering up, picked 
up Gunner Chet S~ngh ,  who was lying stunned, and carried him out of action. 
1st Sikh I+zfafnlztuy. 
Havildar Maha Singh, Sepoy Tara Singh, Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Jalandhar. 
These three men brought Colonel Bunny, when mortally wounded, out of action 
under a very heavy fire. 
Havildar Mahomed Ralrsh, Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Khoja Nahomed, Sepoy 
Isar Singh, Sepoy Habibulah. These four men carried Surgeon-Captain Cassidy 
out of action under a heavy fire. Seopy Khoja Mahomed was also subsequently 
very prominent in the firing line, and Sepoy Isar Sing11 helped to bring away 
the reserve ammunition under a heavy fire. 
Naick Lachman Singh was in charge of the reserve ammunition which 
was stacked in the valley when the firing commenced. Though under heavy 
fire he remained by the boxes, opening two, ready for issue, and subsequently 
helped to carry the reserve ammunition away. 
Sepoy Sheo S i~ igh  elped to bring away the reserve ammunition, return- 
ing twice under a heavy fire, each time bringing away a box. H e  was subse- 
quently twice wounded. 
The action of these men in bringing away the reserve ammunition enabled 
fire to be  kept up throughout the retirement, and probable was the means 
of enabling the escort to secure its retreat. 
B Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Shah Sowar helped to carry Captain J. F. Browne, 
R.A., out of action when wounded, and kept off some Waziris, who came close 
up, by his steady firing. He then again helped to carry Captain Browne when 
the enemy fell back. 
Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Sundar Singh helped to bring Lieutenant Higgin- 
son out of action, when wounded, under a heavy fire, and remained with him 
the rest of the day, taking him back from the entrance of the lane to the kotal 
under a heavy Ere. 
1st  Puwjab Iqzfantry. 
Bugler BeIa Singh assisted in saving and distributing the reserve ammuni- 
tion, and was also one of the defenders of the garden wall, where he fought 
hravely with a rifle he had taken from one of the killed. 
Sepoy (Lance-Naick) Ishar Singh behaved with great gallantry at  the  
garden wall, where he bayoneted two men, and much encouraged his men by 
his example and tenacity, only retiring when actually ordered to do so. 
Sepoy Allayar Khan carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne, when wounded, 
to the kotal, where the second stand was made. 
Naick Assa Singh helped Lieutenant Seton-Browne during the subse- 
quent retirement, though they were hard pressed by the enemy and under heavy 
fire. Without his aid Lieutenant Seton-Browne could not have played the 
part he did in the conduct of the retirement. 
Sepoy Nurdad shot down several of the enemy a t  very close quarters, 
and subsequently led a gallant counter-charge against them, repulsing them, 
but being himself very severely wounded. 
The Governor-General in Council is also pleased to notify that had the 
undermentioned non-commissioned officers and men survived, the distinction of 
the 3rd class of the Order of Merit would have been conferred upon them in 
consideration of their conspicuous gallantry and heroic devotion to duty on the  
occasion referred to. Their widows are admitted to the pension of the 3rd class 
of the Order of Merit, with effect from the date of their death. 
No. 6 (Bombay) Moutztain Battwy. 
Havildar Umardin and Lance-Naick Utam Chand. 
1st Sikh Infalltry. 
Lance-Naicks-Atr Singh, Kesar Singh, and Achar Singh. Sepoys- 
bhankar Khan, Mahomed Khan, and Roshan Khan. 
1st Pulzjal Infawtry. 
Naick Bur Singh, Lance-Naick Khanaya Singh, Sepoy Indar Singh. 
The promotion to the 2nd class of the Order of Merit is also sanctioned of 
Havildar (now Jemadar) Hussaiu Shah, 1st Sikh Infantry, for consp~cuous gal- 
lantry on the same occasion, in having helped to carry Surgeon-Captain Cassidy 
out of action under a heavy fire. 
The Governor-General in Council is further pleased to sanction the adrnis- 
sion to the 3rd class of the Order of Merit of Langri (Cook) Jhanda Singh, 1st 
Sikh Infantry, for conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion, in having, when 
Lance-Naick Atr Singh was killed, run out and brought in the box of ammuni- 








I came close 
-owne when 
tnt Higgin- 
ed with him 
to the kotal 
Je ammuni- 
he fought 
itry at the 
?is men by 
30. 
I wounded, i 





a t  had the 
stinction of 
In them in 
luty on the 










A P P E N D I X  11, 
THE TOCHI FIELD FORCE. 
THE following General Order gives the exact details of the above Force :- 
The Governor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force, as 
detailed below, to exact reparation for the treacherous and unprovoked attack 
on the escort of the Political Officer, Tochi, on the 10th June 1897. The force 
will be styled the Tochi Field Force : 
Formatio~r of Force.-The force will be composed as follows :- 
~ s t  Bvigade. 
2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. 
1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force. 
1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force. 
33rd (Punjabi-Mahornedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 
Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Pulljab Frontier Force. 
6 Guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force, 
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, 
z Sections, No. z British Field Hospital. 
No, 28 Native Field Hospital. 
z Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital. 
2lzd Brigadd. 
3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade. 
14th Sikh (The Ferozepore) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 
6th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry. 
25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry. 
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force. 
4 Guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. 
2 Sections, No, 2 British Field Hospital. 
No. 30 Native Field Hospital, 
2 Sections, No. 29 Native Field Hospital, 
C and D Sections. No, 32 Native Field Hospital, are detailed for the Line 
of Communications, and Section No. I, Field Veterinary Hospital, for the Base. 
Corvtmalzds and Staff.-The following Ofiicers are detailed for the staff of 
the force :- 
Ge~zeral O@cer Co'outzmza?cditcg the Major-General G.  Corrie Bird, C.B. 
Force, 
A ide-decamp ... ... Captain H. M. Twynant, East Lanca- 
shire Regiment. 
Ovdorly Ofjicev ... ... Captain S. W Scarse-Dickms, H.LII. 
Assistarzt Adjuta~zt-Gc?zeral ... Major J. Wilcocks, D.s.o., Leinster 
Regiment. 
Assistarzt Quavter-Masterr-GctzeraI ... Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Niizan, 
18th Bengal Lancers. 
Dd,btt& Assistngtf Qzd(lrte~-Mastcr- Major G. V .  Kernball, R.A. 
Ge>zeml (I~zfell&c~2ce). 
Field I~ztell&ye~zce Oficer . .. Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th 
Punjab Infantry. 
Superifzte~zdeizt, Army S&ralling .., Captain G, W. Rawlins, 12th Ben@ 
Cavalry. 
Pri?zct$al Medical Oflcer ... ... Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew, D.s.0-7 
A.M.S. 
Field Ezgirzeer ... ... Major T. Digby, RIE.  
Assistalzf Field E~zgilzeev ... ... Captain A, L. Schreiber, R.E. 
Assista~zt Field E~z,ailzcer ... ... Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn, R.E. 
Field Paymaster ... ... Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Ac- 
counts Department. 
O~dszalzee Oflcer ... Major C, H. L. F. Wilson, R.A. 
Chief Comnzissariat 0flcEj' ... Major G. Wingate, Assistant Commis- 
sary-General. 
Assistagzt lo Chief Commissariat Lieutenant J .  L. Rose, 2nd Battalion, 
OfSice~. . 1st Gurkhas. 
Divisional Tralzsport Oficer ... Captain H. James, Assistant Commis- 
sary-General. 
A s s i ~ t f l ~ t  to Divisio~znl Tra~zsfiort Lieutenant E. C. Hagg, 18th Hussars. 
0fic.y. 
2tzspect~n.g Veten7zary OfSicer ... Veterinary-Major G. T. R. Rayment, 
A.V.D. 
Survey oficer ... ... Lieutenant F. W,  Pirne, 1 s c. 
P~ovost-Marshal .. . ... Captain P. Malcolm, 2nd Battalion, 4th 
Gurkhas. 
1st Brigade Sta... 
Commanding ... ... Colonel C. C. Egerton, c.B., n.s.o., 
A.-D.-C. with the temporary rank of 
Brigadier-General. 
Orderly O f l c ~ r  ... ... Captain A. Grant, 2nd Battalion, 4th 
Gurkhas. 
Deputy AsststagztA~z.~ta+zt-Gerzed ... Captain EX. P. Watkis, gist Punjab In- 
fantry. 
Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West 
Ge~zeroZ. Kent Regiment. 
Brkade Commissariat O#cw ... Lieutenant E.  C. R. Annesly, Deputy 
Assistant Commissary-General. 
Brzgade Transport Oficer ... Captain M. S. Welby, 18th Hussars. 
i 
Lieutenant H. W. R. Senior, 20th 
Punjab Infantry. 
Regimelztal, Commissariat ngzd Tralzs- Lieutenant T.  S. Cox, I I th Bengol 
port OBcers. Lancers. 
Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 2nd Battalioxr, 
1st Gurkhas. 
Veterinary Oficer ... ... Veterinary-Lieutenant F. W. Hunt, 
A.V.D. 
2nd Brigade Stof .  
Comnzagzding ... ... Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, c.n. 
Orderly Oflcer ... ... Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers. 
Deputy Assistant AdJutant-Getzeval ... Captain J .  McN. Walter, Dcvonhhire 
Regiment. 
Deprcty Assista?zt Qwarter-Master- Major H. M.  Grover, 2nd Puujab Cavalry. 
GelzeraZ. 




t i .  R;~yrner~t, 
Bvzgade T~arzspour 0 f l c . e ~  .. . Captain P. W. D. Brocltman, 5th Bengal 
Infantry. 
Lieutenant N. J. H. Powell, ~ 3 r d  
A.V.D. 
A P P E N D I X  I I I .  
THE TOCHI VALLEY DESPATCHES* 
-- 
THE following i s  ex t r ac t ed  f r o m  t h e  Gazette ofz , ldh :- 
The Governor-General  i n  Council is  pleased to direct the  publication of a 
letter from the  A d j u t a n t - ~ e n e r a l  submitting a despatch from ~ a j o r - G e n e l - ~ l  
Bird, Commanding t h e  Toch i  F i e ld  Force, describing the of t h a t  frjrc'' 
from June to N o v e m b e r  last .  T h e  Field Force has, under Major-General Birtl, 
fully carried Out the objects of t h e  expedition, and the Governor-General I n  
Council, in concur rence  with t h e  Commander-in-Chief, desires to expres s  llis 
higll appreciation o f  t h e  discipline,  resolution, and patient endurance d i sp l ayed  
by all ranks u n d e r  t h e  s e v e r e  t r ia ls  to which they have been exposed. 
The Adjutant-General i n  h i s  letter says :-The force has accomplished t h e  
object for which i t  w a s  detailed,  and the tribesmen have submitted to  t h e  t e r m s  
imposed by the  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  India. Although practically unopposed b y  t h e  
enemy the duties devolving o n  t h e  troops have been of an unusually twiny:  
nature, owing to t h e  unhea l th ines s  of the climate, Amidst much sickness. 
tvhich hns resulted i n  a h e a v y  death-roll, the good discipline, endurance,  a n d  
soldierly qualities o f  all r a n k s  h a v e  been most marked, and are, in t h e  opiniurl 
of the Commander-in-Chief, deserving of high commendation. H i s  E x c e l l e n c ~  
would draw a t tent ion  t o  t h e  excellent work which the Medical Depa r tmen t  i s  
reported to have  performed d u r i n g  the operations, and to t h e  good service  
rendered by t h e  o t h e r  d e p a r t m e n t s  of the force, and by the Officers w h o s e  
names Rre rnentioned i n  t h e  despatch.  I am desired to add that t he  Commander-  
in-Chief considers t h a t  m u c h  credit  is due to Major-General B i rd  for the 
manner in which he has conducted  the operations committed t o  his charge. 
Major-General Corrie-Bird, i n  the course of his despatch, says  :-On 30th 
October the 3rd  Bat ta l ion  Rifle Brigade, which had been in this Valley fou r  
months, left B a n n u  for  India.  Th i s  fine corps had been t h e  victim o f  an 
epidemic of d y s e n t e r y  a n d  e n t e r i c  fever, and had lost three Officers a n d  75 
non-commiesioned officers a n d  men ,  besides a very large percentage of OAiecrx 
and men invalided or lef t  b e h i n d  i n  the field hospitals. I cannot b e a r  t o o  h i g h  
testimony to  t h e  d isc ip l ine  w h i c h  cheerfully endured, and t h e  p luck tvhich  
combated the s c o u r g e  d u r i n g  a long and trying season, and  t h e  battaliorr 
carried away w i t h  i t  the r e g r e t s  of the  whole force at the losses t h e y  lxnii 
sustained. The losses b y  disease have, I regret to say, beenvery heavy. Thrtut. 
British Oficers a n d  o v e r  100 Bri t i sh  soldiers have died from sickness, bc-sides 
50 native soldiers and m a n y  followers. Great numbers have been invalided or 
are still in hospital. T h e  t r o o p s  notwithstanding these trials have  xvorkcrt 
and d o n e  t h e i r  d u t y  splendidly, and I thoroughly endorse t h e  lriph 
opirlior~ formed o f  t h e m  b y  the General  Officers Commanding the  Brigades,  and  
would here place o n  record  my h igh  appreciation of their discipline a n d  sol- 
dierly qualities. 
I submit f o r  tbe favourable  consideration of the Commander-in-Chief 
names of the fo l lowing Officers :-Lieutenant-Colonel J, E. Nixon, Ass is tnr l~ ,  
Qunrtermabtcr-General ; Major  Wilcocks, D. S. O., Leinster Kegimcrlt, 
Assistant ndjutant-General  ; Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate, Chief Commissuriae 
0fftc.r ; Captairr a. James,  Capta in  Clements and Major Will iamson, Sur- 
gmrl.colonel C a r e w ,  ~urgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Simmonds, Surgeoa-~8jn?ior 
( vii 
Hudson, Surgeon-Captain Mamby, Major Kemball, Deputy Assistant Quarter- 
master-General, Intelligence Branch ; Major Digby, Conimanding Royal 
Engineers ; Captain ~Ialcolm, 4th Gurkhas, Provost-Marshal ; Captain Rawlins, 
12th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent, Army Signalling ; Lieutenant Cockerill, 
28th Punjab Infantry, Field Intelligence Officer.. The Officers of the Personal 
Staff:- Captain Twynam, Captain Scarse-Dickens, Highland Light Infantry, and 
Lieutenant Talbot, Royal Horse Artillery ; Brigadier-General Symons, 
Brigadier-General Egerton, Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, 33rd Punjab Infantry ; Lieutenant-Colonel Coats, 
25th Punjab Infantry, and Major Pollock, 1st Sikhs. 
Of t h e  Officers specially brought to notice by the General officerscornmind- 
ing the Brigades, the following are mentioned :-Major FVintour, Deputy 
Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Captain Watkis, Deputy Assistant Adjutant- 
General ; Major Grover, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Captain 
Walter, Devonshire Regiment ; Lieutenant-Colonel Cunninghame, 1st Punjab 
Cavalry, Road Commandant. 
Major-General Bird adds :-I desire to  record my recognition of the assis- 
tance afforded me by Major 6. T. Younghusband, who has been Chief Political 
OEcer  of the  expedition throughout. I trust his services may receieve a 
suitable recognition. My thanks are  also due to the other Civil Officers, Mr. 
Lorrimer and Mr, Kettlewell. For the good work done by the Telegraph 
Department, I would record my special thanks. A new line w a s  constructed 
from Bannu to Datta Khel most expeditiously by Lieutenant Green, Royal 
Engineers. I would commend the  work done by the Postal Department under 
Mr. Van Someren. 
( viii ) 
APPENDIX IV. 
THE MALAKAND A N D  SWAT VALLEY 
DESPATCHES. 
WE take the follo\ving extracts from the despatches which appeared in the 
Gu;etto of i):din :- 
xu. 727-F.-FieId operations-lfalakand, dated Simla, 15th September 1897. 
Frorw Jfn/bu-Gr,zcunl G. de C .  MORTON, c.B., Adjuta)zt-Gelzeual in India, to 
t.4~ Sccr~fnuy to tlze Gove~wne~zt oJ l+~dia ,  Milila~y Depnutwelrt. 
I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, 
for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying report 
from Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., giving details of what 
occurred at the Malakand from the 26th July to the 1st August 1897, on which 
latter date Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., took over command of the 
liIalakand Field Force. 
2. The Commander-in-Chief desires to draw attention to the success with 
ahicli the first sudden attack of the tribesmen was promptly met and repulsed, 
while he considers that the subsequent arrangements made to hold the position 
reflect great credit on Brigadier-General Meiklejohn and the force under his 
command. 
3. Sir George White wishes to express his entire concurrence with the 
remarks of Brigadier-General Meiklejohn as regards the admirable behaviour 
of the troops during the defence of the Malakand, For five consecutive nights 
large numbers of the enemy, led on by their Mullahs, and strongly imbued 
with a spirit of fanaticism, attacked the position with determination, during 
which time the troops had no rest or sleep, Each successive attack was met 
and repulsed with steadiness and success. 
4. The incident mentioned when an advanced post in the line of defence 
was held by a party of a native officer and 25 men of the 3Ist Punjab Infantry 
cannot pass unnoticed, The small party detailed for this duty gallantly 
maintained their position for 6i hours, and resisted what is described as a most 
determined attack, until at length the Serai they were holding was set on fire 
and rendered untenable. Out of the party of 26 men detailed for the duty, rg 
were either killed or wounded, which in itself testifies to the gallant stand they 
made. 
5. His Excellency also wishes to express his admiration of the manner 
in which the Corps of Guides marched at very short notice from Mardan, a 
distance of 32 miles. Despite the intense heat they had gone through, the corps 
arrived in such a soldier-like conditiop that, on reaching the Malakand, the 
Infantry of the Guides at once took up the position allotted to them in the line 
of defence, and were under arms and fighting throughout the same and ensuing 
nights. Nor can Sir George White omit a reference to the march of the 35th 
Sikhs and the 37th Dogras, under Colonel Reid, which re$ments proceeded to 
reinforce the Malakand Brigade as rapidly as possible. The march was carried 
out under the most trying conditions and in exceptionally sultry weather, but 
all ranks pushed on to reinforce their comrades, notwithstanding that they left 
18 of their number dead from heat apoplexy en route, aloss which His Excellency 
deeply deplores. 
Sir George White has also heard with the deepest regret of the death of 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry, Major W. W. Taylor, 45th 
Sikhs, Lieutenant L. Manley and the non-commissioned officers and men 
mentioned in the report. 
In conclusinn, the Commander-in-Chief desires to recommend to the 
favourable consideration of the Government of India Brigadier-General 
W. H. Meiklejohn and the Officers mentioned by him in his report. 
Brigadier General Meiklejohn, in a despatch, deals with the attacks from 
July 26th to August I st. He says :- 
Of the behaviour of the troops of all ranks, I cannot speak too highly. 
The courage with which they have faced overwhelming odds mght after nlght, 
the endurance with which they have stood and fought with next to no sleep for 
five days and five nights, has been beyond all praise. The trlal has been a very 
severe one, and I trust that His Excellency w ~ l l  agree that they have come out 
of it honourably. 
All have done well, but I should like to bring before His Excellency for 
favourable consideration the following names of Officers and men :- 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, on the first alarm being sounded on the night 
of the 26th July, took prompt action in reinforcing the outpost line held by his 1 
regiment, and later was of great assistance in directing the defence of the central 
enclosure till he was severely wounded. i 
Captain H. F. Holland showed great courage in assisting to drive a number 
of the enemy out of the central enclosure and was severely wounded in doing so. 
I 
I would specially wish to mention Lieutenant S. H. Climo, who commanded d 
the 24th Punjab Infantry after Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb and Captain Holland 
had been wounded. This Officer has shown soldierly qualities and ability of I 
the highest order. H e  has commanded the regiment with dash and enterprise 
and shown a spirit and example which have been followed by all ranks. I trust 
His Excellency will be pleased to  favourably notice Lieutenant Climo, who has 1 
proved himself an Officer who will do well in any position and is well worthy 
of promotion. I 
Lieutenant A. K. Rawlins has behaved well all through. I would recommend 
him to His Excellency for the plucky way in which he went to the fort on the 
I 
1 
night of the 26th July to bring down reinforcements, and again for the dash he 
showed in leading his men on the 27th and 28th, of whlch Lieutenant Climo 
Q 
speaks most highly. 
Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 22nd Punjab Infantry, temporarily attached 
1 
to the 24th Punjab Infantry, has behaved exceedingly well, and is the subject 
i 
h 
of a separate recommendation. B 
MaJ'or M. I. Gibbs commanded the regiment in the absence of Major 
O'Bryen with skill and in every way to my satisfaction. 
Lieutenant H. B. Ford, Acting Adjutant, grst Punjab Infantry, rendered 
valuable assistance in helping to bring in a wounded sepoy during the with- 
drawal from North Camp. He also behaved with courage in resisting an attack 




Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo, attached to 3rst Punjab Infantry, rendered 
valuable aervice on the night of the 28th in saving Lieutenant H. B. Ford from 
bleeding to death. Lieutenant Ford was wounded and a branch of an artery 
was cut. There were no means of securing the artery, and Surgeon-Lieutenant 
Hugo for two hours stopped the bleeding by compressing the artery with his 
fingers. Had he  not had the strength to do so, Lieutenant Ford must have 
died. Early in the morning thinking that the enemy had effected an entrance 
into Camp, Surgeon-Lieutenant J. Hugo picked up Lieutenant Ford with one 
arm, and, still holdillg the artery with the fingers of the other hand, carried 
him to a place of safety. 
45th Raltray's Sikhs. 
Colonel H. Sawyer was away on leave when hostilities broke out, but he 
returned on the 29th and took over command of the regiment from Lieutenant- 
Colonel McRae, and from that time rendered me every assistance. 
I would specially bring to the notice of His Excellency the commander- 
in-Chief the name of Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. McRae, who commanded the 
regiment on the 26th, 27th and 28th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge 
at the top of the Buddhist Road on the night of the 26th and the gallant way 
in which he held it undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that 
side. For this, and for the able way in which he commanded the regiment 
during the first three days of the fighting, I would commend him to His 
Excellency's favourable consideration. 
Also Lieutenant R. M. Barff, Officiating Adjutant of the regiment, who, 
Lieutenant-Colonel McRae reports, behaved with great courage and rendered 
him valuable assistance. 
The Guides. 
I also wish to bring the name of Lieutenaut-Colonel R. B. Adams of the 
Guides to His ~xce1lknc~'s notice. The prompt way in which the corps 
mobilised and their grand march reflect great credit on him and the corps. 
Since arrival at the Malakand on the 27th July and till the morning of the 
1st August, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was in command of the Lower Camp, 
i.e., that occupied by central and left position, and in the execution of this 
command, and the arrangements he made for improving the defences he gave 
me every satisfaction. I have also to express my appreciation of the way in 
which he conducted the cavalry reconnaissance on the 1st August on which 
occasion his horse was shot under him. 
Great credit is due to Lieutenant P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, who was in command 
of the Guides Infantry, for bringing up the regiment from Mardan to Malakarld 
in such good condition after their trying march. 
Captain G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., behaved with great courage and coolness 
during the reconnaissance of the 1st August, and though severely wounded by a 
sword cut on the head, he  remained on the ground and continued to lead his 
men. 
Lieutenant H. L. S. Maclean also behaved with courage, and displayed 
an excellent example on the night of the 28th July, when he was severely 
wounded. 
I ~ t h  Begzgal Lancers. 
Major S. B. Beatson commanded the Squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers, 
which arrived at Malakand on the ~ 9 t h ~  and led them with great skill and dash 
on the occasion of the reconnaissamce on the 1st August. 
Lieutenant F. A. Wynter was the only Officer with No. 8 Bengal Moun- 
tain Battery from the 26th till the 30th July, and he commanded it during 
that tirne, when all the severest of the fighting was going on, with great ability, 
and has proved himself a good soldier. I should like especially to mention him 
for His Excellency's consideration. The Battery did excellent work all through. 
NO. 5 Compatzy, Quee~z's Owtz Madras Sappcvs alzd Mirrevs. 
Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E., commanded the company from the 7th 
July till the 1st August to my entire satisfaction. His services in strengthening 
the defences were invaluable. 
Lieutenant F. W. Watling, R.E., was in command of the company in the 
absence of Captain Johnson on the 26th, and commanded it well until he was 
wounded in gallantly trying to resist a charge of the enemy. After Lieutenant 
Watling was wounded the command for the remainder of the night of the 26th 
and till Lieutenant Winsloe returned on the 27th devolved on Lieutenant 
E. N. Manley, K.E. He performed his duties with great credit, and afterwards 
was of great assistance, by his zeal and his exertions, to Lieutenant Winsloe. 
Medical Staf. 
Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Smyth was most zealous and 
performed his duties to my satisfaction. He volunteered to perform the duties 
of Provost-Marshal, and did so for a short time during the illness of Lieutenant 
H. E. Cotterill. 
The arrangements made by Surgeon-Major S. Hassan, Senior Medical 
Officer, 38th Native Field Hospital, and the indefatigable attention and care 
with which he  devoted himself to the wounded deserve great praise. The list 
of casualties is large, and Surgeon-Major Hassan has been untiring in his exer- 
tions for thek'relief. I hope His Excellency will think fit to consider his 
services favourably. 
Surgeon-Captain T. A. 0. Langston, 38th Native Field Hospital, rendered 
valuable assistance in attending to the wounded under a heavy fire on the 
night of the 26th and each following night, and behaved with courage and 
devotion in carrying out his duties under very exceptional circumstances. 
Surgeon-Lieutenant W. Corr has worked night and day in the hospitals in 
trying to alleviate thesufferings of the wounded, and has most ably and effi- 
ciently aided Surgeon-Major Hassan. 
Sr&de Sinjf. 
Major L. Herbert, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master- 
General, was of the greatest assistance to me by the zeal and energy with which 
he performed his duties from the moment the news of the approach of the 
enemy was received till he was severely wounded while standing next to me 
in the enclosure of the Sappers and Miners' Camp on the night of the 26th. 
Since being wounded, he has carried on all his office duties on his bed. I would 
wish to commend his gallant conduct for the favourable consideration of the 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Although Major H. A. Deane is in no way under my authority, I feel I am 
under a great obligation to him for the valuable assistance he rendered me 
with his advice and for volunteering to put himself at  my disposal with the 
object of carrying on the active duties of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General 
when Major Herbert was wounded. He was indefatigable in assisting me in 
every way he could, and I am anxious to put on record my grateful appreciation 
of' the services he rendered me. 
The above list of names may appear to be somewhat long; but I would 
point out that the fighting was almost constant for a weelr, and was of such a 
close nature as to demand incessant exertion from every Officer i11 the force and 
to elicit constant acts of courage and gallant example which cannot be over- 
looked. 
( xii ) 
I would not like to close this despatch without paying a tribute t o  t h e  
memory of a fine soldier and charming companion whose death the whole force  
deplores. 
Major W. W. Taylor had behaved with the greatest galIantry and d a s h  in 
meeting the enemy's first charge with Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, and h a d  h e  
lived he would undoubtedly have distinguished himself in  his career. H i s  
loss is a heavy one to his regiment and to the Service, and there is no o n e  i n  
tile Brigade who does not mourn him as a friend. 
I have also to deplore the death of Honorary Lieutenant L. Manley, a s  m y  
Commissariat Officer. who had rendered me great assistance: and w h o  d i e d  
fighting manfully. His loss is a very serious one to the Brigade. 
I attach separately for favourable consideration a list of Native Officers, 
non-commissioned officers and men who have done especially good service, s o m e  
of whom I have therein recommended for the Order of Merit. 
I trust these recommendations will meet with the favourable consideration 
of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. 
MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. 
Return of casualties bz action at Malakand from z6thJul'y to 1st August 
I 697 inclusive. 
SUMMARY. 
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No. 728-F -Fiela Operations. -Malakand, dated Simla, 15th September 1897. 
From Major-Geneva2 G, de C. MORTON, c.B., Adjutafzt-General ivz  Ipzdia, 
to the Secretary to the Gouerrzment of I*fn'ia, Mzlitary Department. 
In continuation of my letter No. 727-F., dated 15th September 1897, I 
have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward h e r e w i t h  
despatches from Major-General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., describing the operat ions 
at the Malakand and in the Swat Valley from the 1st t o  3rd August 1897, in- 
cluding the detence and relief of Chakdara. 
2. In submitting these reports 1 3 s  Excellency desires to express h i s  
approbation of Sir B. Blood's energy, of the sound dispositions made by him a n d  
of the able way in which he was supported by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, 
Colonel Reid, and all ranks under his command. 
3, The advance from the Malakand to the relief of Chakdara was car r ied  
out with skill and judgment The troops, in spite of the  exertions and h a r d -  
ships they had undergone during the past week, advanced with great e n e r g y  
and drove the enemy disheartened and panic-striclren in all directions into the 
plain, where they were pursued by the cavalry and still further dispersed. 
4. The separate report on the defence of Chakdara speaks for itself, b u t  
Sir George White wishes to record his admiration of the manner in which t h i s  
small garrison successfully held their own for six nights and days against over- 
whelming numbers. H e  would also specially refer to the patient courage a n d  
endurance oE the followers, both at the Malakand and Chalcdara, during the 
operations from the 26th July to the 2nd August. 
5. Among many other brave acts performed during the defence, Sir G e o r g e  
White desires to draw special attention to the gallantry and devotion of the 
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signallers who, isolated as they wcre in the signal tower under very trying cir- 
cumstances, without water to drink, and at times under a heavy fire, continued 
to perform their duties in a most soldier-like manner. 
That the morale of the sinall garrison of Chalrdara was in no degree shaken 
by the severe strain to which they had been subjected is evident from the brilliant 
sortie which was made by the party under command of Lieutenant Rattray on 
the arrival of the Relieving Force. 
His Excellency desires to commend the services of Major-General Sir 
B. Blood, and those mentioned by him in the operations under reference, to 
the special consideration of the Government of India. 
Sir Bindon-Blood closes his despatch describing his relief of Chakdara in 
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The complete and comparatively easy success of these operations, which I 
have been privileged to direct, was, chiefly and in the first place, due to the 
steadfast courage and conduct of our native soldlers under the gallant leading 
of their British Officers. Not a little was also due to the patient courage of our 
mule-drivers and other followers, who behaved in the somewhat exciting cir- 
cumstances of the early morning of the 2nd August, as if they were parading 
for a peaceful march in the plains of India. Their confidence in us was some- 
thing touching, especially when we  consider the scenes they had witnessed for 
nearly a week, the heavy and continuous firing at short range which had gone 
on round two-thirds of our position-up to an hour or two before the start of the 
relieving column, and the constant sight at no great distance of hordes of 
wild barbarians thirsting for their blood. These circumstances were calculated 
to unpleasantly affect the steadiest nerves, and the way in which all sorts 
and conditions of our native soldiers and followers came out of the trial is a 
source of keen satisfaction to all of us. Truly these men deserve to bear the 
good old motto Nec asperat terrelzt. 
In operations such as those connected with the relief of Chakdara Fort, it 
is very difficult to select individuals for reward with fairness, and I would accord- 
ingly suggest that, if possible, in this case some distribution of rewards should 
be made to the native ranks at proportionate rates per unit to be allotted in 
each unit by the British Officers acting as a sort of committee. 
I have the honour to invite the special attention of His Excellency the 
Commander-m-Chief in India to the good services of the following officers during 
the operations described above, uiz ;- 
Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., carried out his duties 
in command of the force which relieved Chakdara Fort with great gallantry and 
judgment. 
Colonel A. J. F Reid, officiating Colonel on the St&, Malakand Brigade, 
afforded me valuable assistance by carrying out the re-arrangement of the 
defensive posts at the Malakand on the 1st August after the Relieving Force had 
been drawn from them and in making the preparations for Colonel T. H. 
Goldney's attack on the 2nd. 
Colonel T. H. Goldney, 30th Sikhs, disposed and led the troops on tht: 
rnornillg of the 2nd in the successful attaclr on the hill since named after him 
in a most judicious and satisfactory manner. 
Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A., was most energetic and iudefatigable in 
assisting Colonel A. J. F. Reid and me in carrying out the multifarious work 




( xiv ) 
Brigadier-General h1eiI;lejohn reports favourably on the following Officers 
xvho Lvere under his command during the operations above detailed, v b  :- 
Captait~ G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Pathans, who acted a s  Staff Officer to t h e  
Relieving Force, sho\ved great readiness and resource, and his assistance w a s  of 
t h e  utmost value. 
1-ieutenants C .  R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon Guards, Orderly Officer, and  
E. Christiail, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Signalling Officer, carried out their duties 
mos t  satisfactorily. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. B, Adams, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, command- 
ed tlne Cavalry (four squadrons) with the Relieving Force, in the most gallant 
and judicious manner. 
The following Officerscommanding Units and Detachments of the Relieving 
Force a re  stated by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to have carried out their 
duties in a thoroughly capable and -.atisfactory manner, via :- 
Colonel W. A. Sawyer, 45th Sikhs. 
Major Stuart-Beatson, 1 I th  Bengal Lancers. 
hlnjor J. 6. Ranisay, 24th Punjab Infantry. 
Captain A. H. C. Birch, K.A. (8th Bengal Mountain Battery.) 
1.ieuten:nnt G. de H. Smith, 2nd Regiment, Central India Horse, attached 
tu Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Cavalry). 
Lieutenant A. R. Winsloe, R.E. (No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Sappers and 
Xiners?. 
Lici~tenailt. F. C. Eliott-Lockhart, Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Infantry). 
Sur,qco~l-Captain H. F. Whitchurch, V.C., attended to the wounded under 
fire throughout the fighting. 
T h e  follo\ving Officers under Colonel T. H. Goldney's command led their  
dct;ishments under my own observation with gallantry and judgment, via :- 
Lieuteriant-Colonel L. J. E. Bradshaw, 35th Silrhs. 
Captain L. C. H. Stainforth, 38th L)ogras. 
Jernadar Nawab, who commanded two guns of No. 8 Bengal Mountain 
I3attery in support of Colonel Goldney's attack, attracted my favourable notice 
by his smartness, quickrless and thorough knowledge of his work. 
I would also wish to bring to His Excellency's notice the good work done 
by Slajur El. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Major 
I£. \\-hurry, D.S.O., Chief Commissariat Ofiicer, and Captain A. B. Dunster- 
ville, 1st  Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, my Aide-de-camp, the only Officers 
of the Divisional Staff of my force who had arrived at the Malakand on the and 
August. l'hese Ofiicers worked very hard and were of great use to me. 
Xajor I-I. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir and Swat, w a  not in  any  
way under my orders during the operations above described, but, notwithstand- 
ing, I hope, I may be permitted to express the obligatioxls under which I lie to 
flim for valuable information and general assistance which h e  gave me. 
MALAKAND FIELD FORCE, 
R-dm-,r of castr(iJiies action at relief of Chakdara osz zlzd ~~~~~t 
SUMMARY. 
A'olz-co~~lzissio~aed OfjFcers npzd &felts 
Killed .+. ... ... ... 
Wourlded ... ... 5 ... ... ... ... 2s 
Stait' Ofiiccr to the: 
is ass i s ta~ ice  was IJ!' 
derly 819ioer, and 
*d uut  tllcir dutieb 
~ t s  of t h e  Helicrinq 
: cnt.r.ied uut rtleir 
- 
; O w n  Snppers and. 
Guides (Infnrrtry). 
ie wourxded uttdcr 
2 g i u d  wrjrk t i 1  trre 
nt-Gcl~trral ; 1l;ijr~i. 
ail1 A. I;. iJtlrtstc:r- 
, rho ortly CPili$:c~.- 
~lakzrrid r u t  titc a i d  
Uhl. to tllC. 
k, \Viih X I C I ~  i$l 
but, ~~irtrvttlist;tritl* 
tier xvFiiclr 1 I I C  :u 
gave r~rc. 
No. 729-F.--Field Operations--Malakand! dated Simla, 15th September 1897. 
From Major-Ge9zeral G. d e  C. MORTON, c.B., Ad'tagtt-Ge~rcral i j z  ltzdia, to 
the Secvetavy to the Goverlzv~ejzt of I?zdia, Il/liliiary Departme?zt. 
I n  continuation of my letter No. 728-F., dated 15th September 1897, I 
Lave the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit for the 
,information of the Government of India the accompanying despatch from Major- 
General Sir B. Blood, K.C.B., Commanding the Malakand Field Force, giving 
a n  account of the  operations of the force under his command from the 4th to 
26th August 1897 inclusive. 
2. His Excellency has much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the  
Government of India the admirable manner in which Sir B. Blood has exercised 
his command and the skilful way in which that Officer handled his troops at the 
action of Landaki on the 17th August, when he dislodged the enemy from an 
v t remely  strong natural position. 
3, Sir  George White deeply regrets the loss of Lieutenants R. T. Greaves, 
Lancashire Fusiliers, and H. L. S. MacLean of the Queen's Own Corps of 
Guides ; and he also desires to record his admiration of gallantry displayed on 
the  occasion of their death by Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Queen's Own 
Corps of Guides, Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers, and the Native 
Officers and non-commissioned officers and men of the Queen's Own Corps of 
Guides who accompanied them, and whose conduct will form the subject of a 
separate cominunication. 
4. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the opinions expressed in 
paragraphs 31 and 35 of the  report, and favourably commends to the notice of 
the  Government of India the Officers therein mentioned. 
Sir  Bindon Blood in his despatch says :- 
I would wish to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities 
exhibited by all ranks of the special force which I led into Upper Swat. They 
fought the action at Landaki in a brilliant manner, working over high hills 
under a burning sun with the greatest alacrity and showing everywhere the 
greatest keenness to close with the enemy. They carried out admirably the 
trying duties necessitated by marching in hot weather with a transport train 
of more than 2,000 mules, and they endured with perfect cheerfulness the dis- 
comforts of several nights' bivouac in heavy rain. The Officers of the Divisional 
Staff and of my personal staff who were with me, Brigadier-General W. H. 
Meilrlejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and his staff and the several heads of departments 
and Commanding Officers of Divisional Troops, all carried out their duties in  
a n  entirely satisfactory manner. 
Major H. A. Deane, Political Agent and his Assistant Lieutenant A. B. 
Minchin gave valuable assistance in collecting intelligence and supplies. 
While the operations above described were in progress a diversion was 
made towards the southern border of the Buner country from Mardan by 
the 1st Reserve Brigade, which, on its head-quarters leaving Mardan, came under 
my command as the 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force. 
A force under Brigadier-General J. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G., was concen- 
trated on the 17th August at Rustam, 18 miles north-east of Mardan and about 
four miles from the Buner border, with the object of acting a s  a containing 
force, and so  preventing the sections of the Bunerwals who had not already 
committed themselves against us from joining in opposition to our advance 
into Upper Swat. 
The presence of this force had the desired effect, and Brigadier-General 
Wodehouse and his staff made good use of the time they spent at Rustam in 
acquiring valuable information about several of the passes in the neighbourhood. 
Brigadier-General Wodehouse states that throughout the operations of his 
force, which involved considerable fatigue and exposure to heat and rain, the 
spirit of his troops left nothing to be desired. He makes special mention of the 
work of No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners, under Captain C. E. 
Baddeley, K.E. H e  also reports very favourably on the assistance given him by 
Lieutenant C .  P. Down, Assistant Commissioner, and has expressed to me a high 
opinion of that Officer's abilities and acquirements, particularly of his proficiency 
in the local vernacular. 
THE BUNER DESPATCH. 
Sir Bindon Blood's despatch on the Bunerwnl expedition was published in 
the Gnaetfe of ltzdia with the following comments :- 
The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by the 
Commander-in-Chief regarding the skill with which the operations of the field 
force were conducted by Sir Bindon Blood, and the discipline and good conduct 
displayed by the troops throughout these short but successful operations. 
The Adjutant-General in a covering letter wrote :-The celerity with which 
the successful result was attained is undoubtedly due to the skilful dispositions 
made by the commander of the force, and to the enterprise, judgment and vigour 
with which the operations were carried out, particularly in the attack and 
capture of the Tangao Pass. His Excellency now commends to the notice of 
the Government the services of Sir Bindon Blood and of the Brigadiers and 
others mentioned in the despatch. The discipline and conduct of the troops, 
British and native, have been all that could be desired, and reflect the greatest 
credit on all ranks. 
Sir Bindon Blood in his despatch mentioned between sixty and seventy 
Officers. He remarked:-The 1st and 2nd Brigades were most ably and 
efficiently commanded by General Meiklejohn and General Jeffreys respectively, 
and he recommends these Officers strongly to the consideration of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. The only casualty during the operations was a private of the 
Highland Light Infantry, mortally wounded. 
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I n  a letter from the Government of India it is said that the Governor- 
General in Council concurs in the Commander-in-Chief's expression of approval 
of the general conduct of these operations, and of the skill and resource shown by 
THE despatches froin Major-General S i r  1ii:ldon Eloocl and JIzijor-l;cr;er:il E. 1:. 
Elles dealing with the operations of the I?Iaisl;and and Jloh~na~itl Field I.*al.ce; in 
Septemberand October, were published in the Gnz~~t ieof l~zci ia  of the jrd Decem- 
ber. , 
T h e  Adjutant-General, in a covering. letter to Sir Rindon RlnoCs dcspatrh, 
says  :-The Commander-in-Chief considcrs that F3ripr?dicr-C~z.i:~1';ll I-'. I). 
J e f f re~~s ' s  disposition of the troops u l~der  his corumnnd on the 16th Scptc:nbc.r 
showed that that Officer had greatly underestimated the fishtin< puwer of the 
Mamunds as regards both numbers and strength of positit~n. His E:;cellcrlcy 
has, however, much pleasure in endorsing Sir Bindon Rlooll's conlmend.dic?n of 
the  subsequent operations of this Brigadc. Sir George liT\Tbite desires tnc to cx- 
press his approval of the general conduct of tile operations c:crried out under 
S i r  Bindon Blood's directions, and of the rescurce and appreciation of the situa- 
tion h e  evinced when confronted with unexpected difficulties. I l e  also concurs 
the terms in which Sir Bindon Blood speaks of the services rendered by 
Brigadier-Generals Meiklejohn and Wodeliouse, the latter of whom was severely 
wounded in the night attack on the grd Brigade, on the 20th Septembttr. The 
gallantry and discipline of the troops were, in Sir Georxe \Vliitr's opiriion, 
conspicuous throughout the operations ; especially so in the night attnclij made 
by the enemy on the 1qt11, 16th and 20th September, as \re11 as dnrinz the 
trying incidents of the 16th September and in the attack on the vil1:c~cs of 
Agrah and Gat on  the goth September. Tlle valuable recnnn:iismnces mode by 
t h e  I ~ t h  Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson \\.hen cstahlish~n,q cotlnecti~rrl 
with Major-General Elles's force, and the skiliul handlin,o of the cavalr? nt' the 
Corps of Guides by Lieutenant-Colonel K. H. Adarns on the 50th Septenabcr 
appear to the Commander-in-Chief to be specially \\-orthy of cominrndation. 
H i s  Excellency has much pleasure in endorsing the favourable terms in which 
S i r  Bindon Blood has mentioned Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was responsible for 
a great portion of the line of communications and for the efiicient supply of 
troops at  the front ; as  well a s  in commending to the farourable notice of the 
Government the Staff, Departmental and Regimental Officers named in the 
despatch. The  advance made in knou-ledge of their special duties evinced b ~ r  
the  Transport Officers during the operations now reported on, and the attention 
that  has  been paid to the care and treatment of Transport animals, are, in Sir 
George White's opinion, most satisfactory and creditable. In conclusion, the 
Commander-in-Chief desires to bring to the notice of the Government the services 
rendered by Major-General G. d e  C. Morton, Adjutant-Genera!, and Major- 
General A. R. Badcock, Quarter-Master-General in India, in the performance of 
the  onerous duties which devolved upon them in connection with these 
operations. 
Sir Bindon Blood. His Excellency in Council also shares with the Comtnander- 
in-Chief his appreciation of the gallantry and discipline displayed by all  ranks 
throughout the operations. 
SIR BINDON BLOOD'S DESPATCH. 
Sir Bindon Blood gives the follocviag reasons for separating his t'v0 
brigades on the march to co-operate with Major-General Elles in the nlohmand 
country :- 
Some little delay being necessitated by political arrange~nents with the 
Jandoul Chiefs and others, the disposition of the force on the 12th ~ e p t e ~ u b e r  
had altered to the following :- 
3rd Brigade, Watelai, three miles south-west of Khai- on the left bank of 
the Chaharmung stream. 
2nd Brigade, Gosam. 
1st Brigade, two battalions and the 10th Field Battery at Panjkora and 
Serai, the remainder on the Line. 
Divisional Head-quarters, with the 3rd Brigade at Watelai. 
On the ~ g t h ,  the 3rd Brigade halted, the 2nd Brigade moved to a point 
close to south-west of Khar, and I personally examined the Rambat Pass, find- 
ing that the country to the south of it was very deficient in water and fbmge. 
This being so, I directed Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., commanding 
the m d  Brigade, to encamp on the rqth, north of Markhanai: to improve the 
Kambat Pass, to cross it into Butkor on the 15ch with two battalions, a coin- 
pany of Sappers and Miners, a squadron, and five days' supplies, and t o  send 
the remainder of his brigade on the same day, under Colcnel T. H. Goldx~ey, 
55th Sikhs, to join me at Nawagai, to which place I intended to march on tl~c 
14th with the 3rd Brigade. I further directed Brigadier-General Jeffreys to 
move his special force through Butlior as quiclily as possible to Danish Kol. 
where I promised to join hiin or send him further instructions. Both br-igades 
carried with them rations for men up to the 23rd September ; and I had 
arranged to drop my communications with the Malakand and draw m y  next 
supplies from Shabkadar, where the Mohmand Field Force, under Major-General 
E. R. Elles, C.B., was waiting to march on the 15th to join me in the Mohmand 
country, south of Nawagai. 
The movements detailed in the foregoing paragraph were duly carried out 
by the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, so far as the 14th was concerlled ; the 3rd Brigade, 
with Divisional Head-quarters. being encamped on the evenillg of that day about 
a mile south of the village of Nawagai, while Brigadier.Genera1 Jeffreys, with 
three battalions, a mountain battery and a squadron was on the right bank of 
the Chaharmung stream, north of Markhanai, having detached the Hulrs and the 
4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, to the crest of the Rambat Pass to 
prepare it for the passage of his special force next morning. 
At about 8 P.M. on the lqth, while it was still quite dark, before the nloorl 
rose, Brigadier-General Jeffreys's cilmp was suddenly assailed by a heavy 
musketry fire from the ravines close by. The attack was continued. with little 
intermission for six hours, being directed at first chiefly against the faces of the 
camp held by the Guides under Major F. ('ampbell and the 35th Sikhs unrier 
Colorlel T. H. Goldney, and afterwards against that defended by the 30th 
Dogras under Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Vivian. The enemy showed no inclina- 
tion to come to close quarters, and ultimately drew off about 2 A.M., doul~t less  
having in view the desirableness of getting beyond reach of cavalry befc.>r:lre 
daylight. This, however, they did not succeed in doing, as they were over- 
taken in the. Mamund Valley about 8 A.M. on the rgrh by Captain E. H. Cds 
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nnd his squatiron o i  tllc 14th Bengal Lancers, who killrcl 21 of them and dis- 
persed the [rest. 
I regret to say that two British ORcers were killed * and one danzerously 
wounded .I. in this affair. The other casualties * Captain W. '' To'nkins and were :-Killed-tx\,o native soldiers and two Lieutenaor A.  \V. Bazley. 
+ A, Harington, follo~vers ; woztrrdtd -- one native officer, five 
other native ranks and two followers : ninetv- 
eight horses and transport animals mere also killed or wounded. 
Meanwhile, on my arrival a t  Nawagai on tho 14th September, I found the 
Khan disposed to be iriendly, and to do all in his power to provide such sup- 
plies as  w e  required. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Bedmanai 
Pass  with a small gathering which was  said to be increasing in numbers ; but 
the tribes inhabiting tile Mittai and neighbouring valleys seemed somewhat 
half-hearted about opposing us. T h e  tribes south of the Rambat Pass also sent 
to  disclaim hostile intentions ; but, notwithstanding this, some of their men 
joined in the night attack of the 14th-15th on Brigadier-General Jeffreys's 
camp. 
Early in the morning of the 16th I received a brief report by heliograph of 
the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys's camp the night before, and at once 
sent  him orders to concentrate his force and proceed to the punishment of the 
tribes concerned. Later in the day I received a fuller report of what had 
happened, together with information from Brigadier-General Jeffreys that he 
had received my orders and was concentrating his brigade at  Inayat Kili in the 
Mamund Valley, with a view to carrying them out. Hehad ascertained that the 
attack on his camp had been made by a small gathering of Mamunds, who had 
been reinforced by some of Umra I<han's followers from Zazi, a village in the 
Mamund Valley, and by a few men from the neighbouring tribes. 
Naturally the night attack of the  14th-rsth, with the consequent turning 
aside into the Manlund Valley of Brigadier- 
$ 3 Battalions. 
I Mountair, Battery. 
General Jeffreys's Brigade, made a corisiderable 
3 Squaurons. change in the aspcct of affairs in South Bajour 
I Company of Sappers. and the Mohmand country ; and the strategical 
situation which had now developed itself was 
interesting. I found myself a t  Nawagai mith a brigade of all arms $ in a 
strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the 
Bedmanai Pass,-a not very difficult defile, some six or eight miles in length, the 
mouth of which is about seven miles south-west in a straight line from the site 
of my camp,-itself about o n e  mile south of Na~vagai village The intervening 
ground is a plain of which the western halt is cut up by ravines, while the 
rest i s  favourable for cavalry. East of and behind me lay the road to the camp 
of  the  2nd Brigade at Inagat Kili running for about six miles through a nrt- 
work of deep ravines, and then for the  remaining six or  seven over a plain. 
I was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering in their position 
with sufficient amount of odds in my favour, while I did not think it advisable 
to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys,-first, 
5 4 Battalions. 
I klountain Eattery. 
because h e  was strong $ enough already for 
I Squadron. immediate requirements ; secondly, because it 
I Company of Sappers. would have been most unwise to have retired 
through the ravines above mentioned in h c e  of 
the Mullah's gathering ; thirdly, because I expected that one of Major-General 
Elles's Brigades would join me in the Nawagai Valley on the 17th or the 
18th at  latest, and finally, because my support was necessary to keep the Khan 
of Nawagai with us,-as, if I had cleserted him, he would have been compelled 
b y  the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them, which would have been 
a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajour. Accordingly, I deter- 
mined to stay where I was until Major-General Elles's advance should make 
it possible to dispose effectually of the  Mullah's gathering, and to clear cut the 
Bedmanai Pass and the Mittai and neighbcuring valleys with completeness, 
The most interesting part of Sir Bindon Blood's despatch is t h a t  which 
deals with the action of September 16th. I t  mag be well to give it in  full, Sir  
U;rldcn Blood says :- 
A: ab9ut 6-30 on the morning of the 16th September Brigadier-General 
 fir^^ ri;oved out his camp a t  Inayat Kili with the greater portion of 
llis ti;rce ill tllree co!umns, to deal xvith the villages of the Mamunds. T h e  right 
ci:lllmn urlder ~ i ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ t . ~ o l o n e l  F. G. Vivian, ;Yth Dogras, consisting of six 
ccrnlparliej 311d a detachnlent of Sappers was directed along the eastern side of 
the 31nlnuild Valley on the villages of Shinkot, Chingai, 1)amadolah a n d  Baclaln 
Kili ; the central column under Colonel T. H. Goldney, 35th Sikhs, consistirlg 
of >ix companies, four guns. one squadron, and a detachment of Sappers ,  was 
directed against the villages of AIinar, Hazarnao and Badalai ; while the  left 
culumn under Major F. Campbell of the Guides was composed of five companies 
ai;d a detachment of Snppers, and was directed along the right bank of the 
\Vatt.lai ravine parallel to the centre column. The right column under 
C:~;luriel Vivian having advanced by the route ordered as far as Damadolall, 
i;,un<? that place too strongly held to be reasonably attempted without artillery, 
and returnrd thence to camp arriving at  4 P.M., with two men slightly 
v.o:~ndcd. The centre column under Colonel Goldney, advanced some s i x  miles 
up :?ie v;z!ley wittiour seeing anything of the enemy, who were first reported 
at  Eiida~n Kili to mhiuli place a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel 
A. E. 0:n:nanney was sentto dislodge them. The remainder of the column pushed 
on, and at  about 10-30 A.31. two companies of the 35th Sikhs whicll led the  
advn::ce occupied a knoll near Shahi Tar~gi upwards of nine miles from camp. 
i n  :ills riiorrlnent. however, the tnro companies advanced too far from their 
siippor:s and as  the enemy promptly attacked them in force they w e r e  com- 
pelled to retire about a rniie with the loss of one British Officer and o n e  sepoy 
killed and >isteen non-commissioned oflicers and sepoys \vounded. Soon  after- 
wards, the Bufs  under Colonel Ommanney coming up, the knoll w a s  again 
occilpied without much opposition, being the firthest point reached by the 
coiulnii during this advance. The guns came into action, first on t h e  spur 
11orth of Badalai and aftrl.mards on the north of Chingai (11) ; t h e y  were 
covered in the first position by two companies of the 35th Sikhs posted to 
their right, arid on their moving towards the second position one-and-a-half 
of :hese compailics unrler Captain W. I. Ryder were ordered to cover t h e  move- 
tilent by climbing to the top o f a  high ridge to their right and then advancing 
zlc~:ig it toxvsrds the north. Owing to subsequent orders not reaching him, 
C:l!ltniri Rydrr  Iverit further. In the earlier part of the d a ~ ~  the  left column 
)>:id ~.ernained far behind, being fully occupied for some considerable t i ~ n e  in 
dralii:g witli tile n:~merous villages met with along the road shortly after 
leavirig cainp. Towards g A.X. it was called up by General Jeffrtys, a s  the 
enemy bcgan to appear in force on his left near .@ah and it joined the 
centre cc>luinn about noon. At about 2-30 P.RI., as  soon as the fi3rtified villages 
or' Chingai ( I I j  arid Shahi Tangi had been dismar~tled, General Jeffreys ordered 
the troops to return to camp ; Captain Kyder was still on the high ridge above 
Chinxai ill), along which he attempted to retire in a direction ~vhich diverged 
from the line of the retreat of the main body of the force. Soon after the 
rtt:irement commenced n message was received from him stating that h e  was 
hard Pressed and could not rejoin the main body, whereupon General Jeffreys 
ordered lrlajor Campbell with six comp:lnies of the Guides InfantrJ, t o  go to 
his assistance which they did about 4 P.M., 8 short time being taken up  in 
assemblirrg the companies which were in extended order. The fact of this move- 
nlcll! having to be undertaken so late in the afteriioon was a most unfortunate 
occurrence, since General jerireys had to wait until the safety of the  id^^ 
2nd Captain Ryder's detachment was assured ; and the ,-onsequent delay at 
that time of the day made it impossible for him to reach camp before dark. 
'lhi. Guides, under Major Campbell. most successfully and gallantly relieved 
and brougfit of Captain Rgder's detachment, which had suffered heavy losses, 
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The combined detachments did not, however, succeed in rejoining General 
Jeffre~s, being prevented by nightfall and a thunderstorm which came on about 
the same time. Ultimately they made their way to camp without further loss, 
arriving about g P.M. &leanwhile, as soon as the safety of Captain Ryder's 
detachment was certain, General Jeffreys continued his retirement towards 
the camp. S o  long as daylight lasted the enemy kept at  a 'respectful distance 
from him, but as it got dark they got bold and the ground being broken and 
difficult they were able to bring a hot fire to bear on the troohs, while a heavy 
thunderstorm ~vhich came on at dusk greatly increased the dificulties of the 
1 situation. Ultimately, however, by about 8-30 P.M. all the troops had arrived 
in camp except General Jeffreys, four guns of NO. 8 (Bengnl) Mountain Bat- 
tery, a small party of Sappers and a few men of the Buffs and the 35th Sikhs 
I who got separated from the rest in the darkness. Abo~it dusk General Jeffreys, 
U then about three miles and a half from camp, decided to occupy a neighbour- 
f ing village called Bilot for the night, chiefly with a view to sheltering the 
a battery mules with him from the enemy's sharpshooters, and while he was  
engaged in arranging this the thunderstorm before referred to came on causing 
sudden and complete darkness. In  the consequent confusion the troops got 
separated and only the detachments above detailed remained with General 
Jeffreys. H e  proceeded to occupy and entrench an angle of the village, part 
of which was burning, while the rest was soon occupied by the enemy, who 
fired on the General and his detachment from behind walls at a few yards' 
range, inflicting serious losses on m+n and animals. This state of things con- 
tinued, in spite of several gallant attempts to clear the village which were led 
by Lieutenants Watson and Colvin, R.E., until the arrival about midnight 
of Major J. F. Worlledge, 55th Sikhs, with two companies of Guides and two 
of his own regiment. After this the enemy were easily driven off, and gave no 
further annoyance during the night. Major Worlledge had left camp about 
5-30 P.M. in obedience to an order from General Jeffreys, aild on joining the  
General about dark had been sent to find and support the Guides under Major 
Campbell. Failing to fiud the Guides in  the dark, Major Worllcdge tried to 
retrace his steps to the General but only succeeded in finding him after the  
moon rose about midnight, although he had been close to him for some time 
previousljr without knowing. it. General Jetrreys ultimately reached camp at 
I 8 A.M. on the 17tl1, some of the troops there having been sent out to his assist- 
ance and returning with him. 
After detailing the losses, 151  killed and wounded, Sir Bindon Blood con- 
tinues :--The behaviour of the troops throughout this trying day was very 
good. The steadiness and discipline shown by the  Buffs under Colonel Om- 
manney were admirable, while General Jeffreys has specially commended the  
gallantry with which the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell brought off 
Captain Kyder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their 
backs under a heavy fire. H e  has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's 
favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. B. 
I-Iodson and Lieutenant H. W. Codrington of the Guides who commanded t h e  
companies of the battalion which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; 
the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher who made a most determined though 
unsuccessful attempt to takz medical aid to the wounded of Captain R~rder's 
detachment through a hot fire ; of Surgeon-Lieutenant E. L. Perry ; of Jema- 
dar Sikandar Khan of the Guides, and of several lion-commissioned oflicers 
and sepoys of the same corps. General Jeffi-eys has also described in very 
favourable terms the gallant and valuable work done on this day by Captain 
E. I-I. Cole and his squadron of the I l th  Bengal Lancers. He has commended 
the conduct of Captain Kyder and Lieutenant 0. G. Gunning, 35th Sikhs, who 
were both wounded, and of Jemadar Djarayan Singh, Havildar Ram Singh and 
Sepoy I<arram Singh of the same regiment. H e  has also brought to notice a 
gallant act o< Captain Birch and his trumpeter Juvan in rescuing a wounded 
sepoy of the 35th Sikhs, a s  well as  the distinguished gallantry of Jemadars 
Nalvab and Ishar Sing11 and several non-commissioned officers and men of  tile 
same battery. General Jeffreys further refers in the strongest terms of com- 
mendation to the gallant conduct of Lieutenants Watson and Colvin, R.E., and  
of the handful of men of the Buffs and No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers, w h o  
spent the  nights of the 16th and 17th with him in the village of Bijot. T h e  
conduct oi these Officers and men in entering the  village several times in t h e  
dark, in the face of a heavy fire directed upon them at close quarters, seems de- 
serving of the highest recognition, and I have consequently made a special 
communication to you on it. General Jeffreys has also commended the gallant 
conduct of his Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Major Hamilton ; and finally 
h e  has praised the courage and resolution of Lieutenant Churchil! of the  4 th  
Hussars, correspondent of the Pio,zeev newspaper with the force, who made 
himself useful at a critical moment. 
Sir  Hindon Blood, in closing his despatch, pays a high tribute to t h e  
work done by the cavalry. T h e  health of the troops was generallv good ; 
only seven British and five native soldiers and eight followers died ii-om disease 
between September 6th and October 27th. T h e  Officers mentioned in t h e  de- 
spatch include ail the heads of departments, the genera! staff, Major Deane a n d  
Mr. Davis, Political Officers. The commissariat, transport and medical arrange- 
ments a r e  all said to have been excellent. The  te!egraph arrangements w e r e  
we!l carried out by Lieutenant W. Robertson, K.E., under the direction of 
Mr. C. E Pitman, while the postal service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan w a s  also 
satisfactory: 
Sir  Bindon Blood adds :-It will have been gathered from the foregoing 
narrative that the three brigades of the  force mere ably commanded b y  
Brigadier-Generals Meil;lejohn, Jeffreys and Wodehouse, ~ v h o  mere efficiently 
seconded by their staffs. The  line of com~nunications and base were also most 
efficiently managed by Colonel Reid and by Lieutenant-Colonel V. A. Schalch, 
Base Commandant, and their respective. staffs. 
A description is given of the movements about Kawagai, and the  account 
of the night attack on the camp on September zoth, closes in the followil~g 
words :- 
T h e  steadiness of the troops during this somewhat trying action mas qui te  
perfect, and tlir safety of the camp was never in the slightest degree doubtful, 
although the enemy's swordsmen were so determined that many of them w e r e  
shot down close to the entrenchment. T h e  fire discipline of the infantry w a s  
shown to b e  excellent, especially that of the 1st Battalion, Queen's (under  
Lieutenant-Colonel Coiliils,) who a re  in all respects an example of w h a t  a 
battalion of infantry should be. T h e  s tar  shells fired by the mountain 
battery were  most useful, and shrapnel and case were also fired at  different 
times with g r ta t  etrect, all under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, 
C.B., commanding the Royal Artillery with my force. In  short, the affair 
was  a most satisfactory one, a s  proving the  admirable discipline, confidence 
and steady shootiug of our troops, a s  well a s  the efficiency of the  simple 
defensive arrangements which had been made. 
$ T h e  following comments a r e  made on the operations 1n the Watelai  
Valley :- 
I I t  \vill have been observed, of course, that there was much more difiiculty 
in deallne w t h  the hlamunds than was experienced 1~1th the Swatis, t h e  
Masazai Noilmands, or w ~ t h  the  Mamund's neighbours, the Salarzai a n d  
Shamo~ai .  
Nuch of this difficulty was due  to the fact that our invasion of the hfamund 
Valley was not preceded by a decisive action lilce that a t  the Malakand on  t h e  
2nd August, a t  Ladakai on the 17th August, a t  Nawagai on the night of t h e  
20th September, or, as in the  case of t h e  Salarzai and Shamozai, by such aa 
object-lesson as our operations against the Marnunds themselves. 
ficers and men of the 
-ongest terms of com- 
lnd Colviil, R.E., and 
Bengal Sappers, who 
gillage of Hijot. The 
' Several times in the 
je quarters, seems de- 
=ntly made a special 
~ n ~ m ~ n d e d  th  gallant 
Samilton ; and finally 
Churchill of the 4th 
the force, who made 
high tribute to the 
vas generally good ; 
"s died from disease 
mentioned in the de- 
Major Deane and 
and medical arrange- 
arrangements were 
der the direction of 
:. Sheridan was also 
from the foregoing 
bly commanded by 
rho were efficiently 
base were also most 
lone1 V. A. Schalch, 
gai, and the account 
'es in the followiltg 
ng action was quite 
:st degree doubtful, 
"any of them were 
3f the infantry was 
'n, Queen's (under 
:xarnple of what a 
by the mountain 
I fired at different 
:olonel W. Aitken, 
1 short, the affair 
tipline, confidence 
~y of the simple 
r in the Watelai 
I C ~  more difficulty 
the Swatis, the 
:he Salarzai and 
In of the Mamund 
: Ma1al:and on the 
the night of the 
lozai, by such an 
3s. 
( xxiii 1 
Besides this, however, the special physical features of the Mamund Valley 
gave the tribe great advantages, which they utilised with considerable tactical 
skill. I t  will be seen that the  valley consists of a broad and gently sloping 
plateau, cut u p  by ravines, especially towards the top, and with hills rising 
somewhat suddenly on all sides. This plateau is well cultivated for rain crops, 
but is practically waterless at this season ; the only good water above a point 
near I n a ~ a t  Kili being in the ravines on the sides of the hills where many of 
the most important villages are consequently situated, those on the level depend- 
ing for their water-supply on tanks or, in one or two cases, on doubtful wells. 
Thus, as  soon as the lower villzges had been dealt with, which was done 
without opposition, it was necessary for our troops to attack those on the 
sides of the hills. on ground very difficult for assailants and extremely favour- 
able for defenders. 
The tribesmen were further much assisted by the circumstances that a 
great part of their best lands lie in  Afghanistan, on tlie no~th-western side of 
the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan frontier in that 
direction. Thus, much of their property was beyond our reach, while they 
had a secure refuge to which they could send their movables from our side of 
the  frontier and betake themselves if pressed. They showed commendable 
sltill and patience in adhering to the only tactics 
"There was an exception at which could give them any measure of success, 
'grab September. and Gat On the 3oth always retiringH before our troops so long a s  
they advanced, and then following them up in 
sltirmishing order as far as  the  open ground on their withdrawal to their 
camp, whiLh had to remain low down the valley on account of the difficulty 
about water higher up. The morc credit is  due to the  Mamunds for holding 
out so well, a s  they suffered 1' severely in every 
t It is noxv known that 2 2 0  of encsunter with us, besides undergoing much loss 
tlie tnnes were k~ l l ed ,  hesldes 
about tneir who ot property and destruction of their defences 
came to help them. whose speedy reconstruction, though costly and 
difficult for them, is necessary to their existence. 
~ ~ t h  in the ~~~~~~i and Mamund Valleys a considerable number of 
Mart ini-~enly and ot\ler rifles were used against u s  with apparently unlimited 
supplies of ammunition. 
The  conduct and discipline of the troops in the operations under reference 
was  in the highest degree satisfactory. The operations, which extended over 
seven weeksl were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage, 
while the rations though abundant and excellent in all respects, were neces- 
sarily ope11 to the  objection of sameness. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, 
the troops remained uniformly cheerful, especially when active hostilities were 
going on. 
The despatch closes with the following remarks :- 
I have already alluded to the steadiness and gallant bearing of the  infantry 
in the several engagements that took place during the operations under refer- 
ence, and I would now wish to invite attention to the invaluable nature of the  
services rendered by the cavalry. At Nawagai three squadrons of the 11th 
Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson, swept the country everywhere 
that cavalry could go, carrying out reconnaissances, protecting signalling 
parties, and watching every movement of the enemy. In the Mamund 
Valley a squadron of the same regiment, under Captain E. H. Cole, tool; part: 
in  every engagement that occurred while they were there, establishing such 
a reputation that the enemy even when in greatly superior numbers never 
dared to face 'them in the open. Afterwards when Captain Cole and his men 
left the Mamund Valley, the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, 
being in greater strength, acted still more effectually in the same manner, 
showing tactical skill of a high order, combined with conspicuous gallantry. 
A very interesting featnre of the operations was the presence of field 
artillerJ- in the RIamund and Salarzai Valleys, where, although active oberations 
did not go 011 after their arrival, their presence produced a great effect, while 
it was amply prorcd that they could have been brought into most useful action 
with comparative ease. 
The health of the force \\,as remarkahl~  ~ o o d  throughout, only seven 
British and five native soldiers and eight follo.ivers having died from disease 
hetxveen the 6th September and 27th October, out of n forcc (including Corn- 
tnunications and Base Hospirals') which, for near1.v a month of that time, 
included three brigades of infantry, besides a considerable ~roport ion of the  
other arms. 
The Commissariat arrangements under Major H. Wharry, D.S.O., were 
most successful. The rations were always abundant and of urliformly good 
quality; and I may here observe that in iive previous campaigns I have never 
seen the supply of bread anything like so continuously good as it has been 
throughout the operations of the hlala1;and Field Force. No doubt the excel- 
lence of the Commissariat arrangements has had a great deal to do with the 
good state of health of the troops vc~hich I have remarked upon. 
The transport was most efficient throughout the operations under refer- 
ence. and its management under the direction of Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, 
Divisional TI-ansport Officer, xvho was most ably and ene.getically assisted by 
'iTeterina~Captain H. T. W. Mann, Senior Veterinary Officer, was most SUC- 
cessful. I n  proof of this I will cite a report just made to me by  Brigadier- 
General JefrreSs, commanding the 2nd Brigade of my force, that this morning, 
on inspecting 1,265 mules attached to his brigade, which have just returned 
from seven weeks in the field, he found fourteen sore backs and four animals 
ott~envise unfit for worl;, or  a total of only IS disabled animals in all. 
The medical service was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. Some 
difficulties arose on the transfer of Officers and materials to the Tirah Expedi- 
tionary Force on its formation, especially as  large convoys of sick and wouiided 
were on the line of this force at the time, but these difficulties were successfully 
overcome by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, who was in charge of the Line, and matters 
were ultimately restored to smooth working on the arrival of Surgeon-Colonel 
J. C. G .  Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, who is now Principal Medical 
Officer of the Force. 
The  tele.graph arrangements were well carried out by Lieutenant W. 
Robertson, R.E., under the direction of Mr. C. E. Pitman. C.I.E. The postal 
service under Mr. H. C. Sheridan was also satisfactory. 
The working of the several departments of the Head-quarters Staff was  
most satisfactory and successful. The heads of departments were :- 
Major H. H. Burney, Gordon Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Masters, 2nd Regiment. Central India I-Iorse, Assist- 
ant Quarter-Master-General. 
Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., R.A., Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- 
General (Intelligence). 
Captain E. W. M. Norie, Middlesex Regiment, Superintendent, Army 
Signalling. 
Surgeon-Colonel J. C. G. Carmichael, Indian Medical Service, Principal 
Medical Officer. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Aitken, C.B., R.A., Commanding Royal Artillery. 
Colonel J. E. Broadbent, R.E., Conmanding Royal Engineers-relieved 
early in October by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Peacocke, C.N.G., K.E. 
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Captain W. W. Coolrson, R.A., Ordnance Officer. 
Major H. Whar& D.S.O., Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer. 
Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Staff Corps, Divisional Transport Officer. 
Veterinary-Captain H. T. W. Mann (wounded in action, 20th September), ' 
Army Veterinary Department, Senior Veterinary Officer. 
Captain C.  L. Robertson, R.E., Survey Officer. 
Captain C. G. F. Edwards, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Provost-Marshal. 
The Rev. L. Klogh, Chaplain. 
Lieutenant W. Robertson, R.E., in charge of Telegraphs. 
I am under great obligations to my personal staff-Captain A. B. Dunster- 
ville, 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment, Aide-de-camp ; Captain A. R. 
Dick, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle 16th (The 
Queen's) Lancers. 
It will have been gathered from the foregoing narrative that the three 
brigades of the force were ably commanded by Brigadier-Generals W. H. 
Meiklejohn, 1st Brigade, P. D. Jeffreys, (wounded in action, 16th September). 
2nd Brigade, and J. H. Wodehouse (wounded in action, 20th September), 3rd 
Brigade, who were efficiently seconded by their staffs. The Line of Communica. 
tions and the Base were also most efficiently managed by Colonel A. J. F. Reid, 
and by Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Schalch, 11th Bengal Infantry, the Base 
Commandant, and their respective staffs, 
In my final report on the conclusion of the operations of the force, I 
shall havethe honour to bring the services of the OFficers above briefly referred 
to more fully to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. 
Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., Political Agent, Dir, Chitral and Swat, was in 
separate and independent charge of the political arrangements connected with 
the operations I have described as far as Nawagai. He accompanied my head- 
quarters to Gosam, where I left him on the 12th September, and rejoined me at 
Inayat Kili on the 4th October. He gave much assistance in arranging for the 
collection of local supplies. 
Mr. W. S. Davis was my Political Officer throughout the.operations beyond 
Nawagai and in the Marnund Valley prior to Major Deane's return to my 
head-quarters on the 4th October. H e  carried out his duties to my complete 
satisfaction. His native assistant, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan, also made 
himself very useful. 
MAJOR-GENERAL E LES'S DESPATCH. 
Major-General Elles in a despatch, dated October I 3th, gives a very clear 
account of the operations in the Mohmand country. The despatch contains the 
following remarks :- 
The expedition proved productive of little fighting, but the splendid force 
under my command would, I believe, have made little of any possible opposi- 
, tion. I cannot speak too highly of the 20th Punjab Infantry and z ~ s t  Gurkhas, 
on whom the brunt of the work fell. I would wish for no better regiments for 
hill fighting under their respective commanders. The work done during the 
expedition by the 28th Bombay Pioneers and No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers 
and Miners, is worthy of the highest commendation. The 28th Pioneers also 
did excellent work in reserve to the 1st Brigade in the attack at  Bedmmai, and 
at  Jarobi covered the retirement showing high soldierly qualities in both 
instances. The main difficulties to contend with were the passes, over which 
roads had always to be made, and anxiety regarding water as in the western 
Mohmand country; the supply is almost entirely from tanks, the dams of whirh 
had been cut by the Mohmands, and they often 'only rontained a little dirty 
water. 
I 
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The Imperial Service Troops under my command proved their fitness to 
fight in the first line and were utilised exactly the same as the regular nat ive 
troops. The cavalry escorts of the Patiala and Jodhpore Cavalry did g o o d  
reconnaissance work on more than one occasion and came under fire. T h e  
1st Patiala Regiment was employed under Lieutenant-Colonel Graves in t h e  
operations in the Mittai and Suran Valleys, and covered the retirement of t h e  
brigade under fire; their good service was brought to my notice by the General  
Oficer Commanding the 3rd Brigade. The Nabha Regiment, owing to its hav- 
ing been added to  my force late in September, had to be kept on the Line of 
Communications. 
I trust the objects of the expedition were fully carried out, thanks to the 
fine body of troops I had the honour of commanding and to the hearty co-opera- 
tion of my staff and of all ranks in the Force. 
The follo\ving subsidiary despatch was published in the Gaseffe of I~zdia by 
General Elles in connection with the Mohmand Field Force in continuation of 
the despatch of 13th October 1897 :-I bring to the notice of the Commander- 
in-Chief the names of the following for good services during the Mohmand EX- 
pedition :-Xr. Merk, Civil Service, rendered very valuable services as Political 
Oificer. The prompt settlement obtained was entirely due to his knowledge of  
the tribes, his perfect command of their language, which enabled him to d e a l  
directly with the jirgnks, and his firmness in dealing with the jirgahs. His 
judicious selection of subordinates greatly contributed to the success of t h e  
expedition. My movements were almost entirely based on the i~iformation 
obtained by him regarding distances and water. I am under the greatest  
obligations to Mr. Merk for the manner in which he conducted the political 
business throughout. Lieutenant Waterfield, Assistant Political Officer, carried 
out his work very firmly and in great harmony with the Military Officers a t  the 
various posts. Captain Cox, in charge of the Imperial Service Troops, t h e  
Patiala and n'abha Regiments, carried on all the work connected with t h e m  
with great smoothness, and was most zealous in his work. Major Bythell, 
Royal Engineers, Survey Officer, did excellent work under difficulty, march- 
ing daily, and was most keen and energetic. Mr. Stowell carried out all the 
~ o s t a l  arrangements entirely to my satisfaction. Everything was carried on 
most creditably by him arid his subordinates. Mr. Pike, Assistant Superinten- 
dent of Telegraphs, ably assisted by his subordinate, Mr. J. C. Murphy, laid the 
telegraph line rapidly and well. The telegraph work was most satisfactory, 
all concerned working very willingly. 
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THE TIRAH FIELD FORCE. 
Geflerd oveject-The general object of this expedition is to exact reparation 
for the unprovoked aggression of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes on the Pesha- 
war and Icohat borders, for their attacks on our frontier posts, and for the 
damage to life and property which has thus been inflicted on British subjects 
and on those in the British service. 
It is believed that this object can best be attained by the invasion of Tirah, 
the summer home of the Afridis and Orakzais, which has never before been 
entered by a British force. 
Fomatio~z of the Force.-The Force which will be styled the '(Tirah 
Expeditionary Force " will be distributed for operations as  follo\vs :- 
( a )  A main column of two Divisions, each consisting of two Infantry 
Brigades and certain Divisional Troops, will advance on Tirah from 
the neighbourhood of the Samana Range. 
( 8 )  The Line of Communication of the main column between Kohat and 
Tirah (including the posts on the Samana Range) will be held by a 
forceconsisting of one Native Cavalry Re&nent and four Native 
Infantry Battalions. 
(c) A mixed brigade, to be styled the " Peshawar Column " will operate, 
as may be required, from Peshawar. 
(d )  A force, which will be designated the I' Kurram Movable Columno' 
will be formed in support on the Hangu-Parachinar line, for employ- 
ment as circumstances may require. 
(e) A mixed brigade will be formed at Kawalpindi as a Reserve. 
Cowlposition of tke Force.-These forces will be composed as follows:- 
THE MAIN COLUMN. 
FIRST DIVISION. 
Fivst Brigade.-2nd Battalion the Derbyshire Regiment, 1st Rattalion the 
Devonshire Regiment, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 30th (Punjab) 
.Regiment of Bengal Infantry, No. 6 British Field Hospital, and No. 34 Native 
Field Hospital. 
Second I3vigade.-2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment, 1st Battalion 
Royal West Surrey Regiment, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 
3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, Sections A. and B. 
of No. 8 British Field Hospital, Sections A. and C. of No. 14 British Field 
Hospital and No. 31 Native Field Hospital. 
Diwisio?ral T~c~ps.-No. x Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, No. z 
(Derajat) Mountain Battery, No. r (Kohat) Mountain Battery, z Squadrons 18th 
Regiment of Bengal Lancers, 28th Regiment of Bombay Infantry (Pioneers), 
No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, No. 4 Company Bombay Sappers 
and Miners, one Printing Section from the Bombay Sappers and Miners, the 
Nabha Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry, the Maler Kotla Imperial Service 
Sappers, Section A. of No. 13 British Field Hospital, and No. 6 j Native Field 
gosPitaL 
SECOND IVISION. 
Third Brkuade.- 1st Battalion the Gordon Highlanders, 1st Battalion the 
Dorsetshire Regiment, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 15th (The 
Ludhiana Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, No. 24 British Fleld Hospital and 
No. 44 Native Field Hospital. 
Fourth Bvrgade.-2nd Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st  
Battalion the Northamptonshire Repiment, 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha ( ~ i f l e ?  
Regiment. 36th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, Sections C. and D. of NO- 
9 British Field Hospital, Sections A. and B, of No. 23 British Field Hospital and  
No. 48 Native Field Hospital. 
Divisio~zal Troops.-No. 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, NO. g Moun- 
tain Battery Royal Artillerv, No 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, Machine Gun 
Detachment, 16th Lancers, twoSquadrone 18th Regiment of Bengal Lancers. 
~ 1 s t  Regiment of Madras Infantry (Pioneers), No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers 
and Miners, one Printing Section from the Madras Sappers and Miners, t he  
Jhind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry, the Sirmur Imperial Service 
Sappers, Section B. of No. I 3 British Field Hospital and No. 43 Native Field 
Hospital. 
LINE OF COMMUNICATION. 
No. x Kashmir Mountain Battery, zznd (Punjab) Regiment of BengaL 
Infantry, and Battalion 2nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 30th (Garhwal Rifleb 
Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 2nd Regiment of Pun,jab Infantry, Punjab 
Frontier Force, 3rd Regiment of Bengal Cavalry, No I Company Bengaf 
Sappers and Miners, No. 42 Native Field Hospltal, No. 52 Native Field: 
Hospital, the Jeypore Imperial Service Transport Corps, the Gwalior Imperiax 
Service Transport Corps. Ordnance Field Park, Engineer Field Park, Britisf-t 
General Hospital of 500 beds at Rawalpindi, Native General Hospital of 50Q 
beds at  Rawalpindi, 'NO. I Field Medical Store Depbt. (For First Division)- 
No. 2 Field Medical Store DepBt. (For Second Division). No 5 Vete r ina~  Field 
Hospital, No. I I British Field Hospital, No. 25 British Field Hospital, NO. 47 
Native Field Hospital, and No 64 Native Field Hospltal. 
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN. 
Second Battalion the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion t h e  
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Maxim Gun Detachment, 1st Battalion Devonshire 
Regiment, 9th Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 34th Pioneers, qgtlr 
(Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 57th Field Battery RoyaL 
Artillery, NO. 3 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, 9th Regiment of BengaP 
Lancers, No. 5 Company, Hengal Sappers and Miners, No. 5 British Field 
Hospital, NO. 45 Native Field Hospital, A. and B. Sections, No. 54 Native Field 
Hospital, British General Hospital of 250 beds at Nowshera * and Native 
General Hospital of 500 beds at Nowshera." 
THE KUKRAM MOVABLE COLUMN. 
Twelfth Regiment of Bengal Infantry, the Kapurthala Regiment of Imperia'P! 
Service Infantry, 4 Guns 3rd Field Battery Royal Artillery, 6th Regiment o f  
Bengal Cavalry, one Regiment of Central India Horse, Section D. of No. rj 
British Field Hospital, No. 62 Native Field Hospital, Section B. of No. 4& 
Native Field Hospital and Native General Hospital of zoo beds at Kohat. 
THE RAWALPINDI RESERVE BRIGADE. 
Second Battalion the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Battaliorr 
the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 27th Keigment (1st Baluch Battaliom 
of Bombay (Light) Infantry, 2nd Regiment of Infantry Hyderabad Contingent, - 
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Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers, No. I Z  British Field Hospital and No, 53 
Native Field Hospital. 
All units which will be concentrated at Peshawar, except suchas are 
detailed for the Peshawar Column, will march from Peshawar to Kohat through 
the Kohat Pass under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the 
Forces, Punjab, under instructions which will be given from Army Head- 
Quarters. The General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary Force will direct 
all movements at and beyond Kohat. and he will also direct all movements of 
the Peshawar Column beyond Peshawar. 
Kohat will be the Base of Operations for the First and Second Divisicns and 
the Kurram Movable Column, but the Line of Communication will commence at 
and include Iiushalgarh. Kohat and Kushalgarh will, for the time being, be 
dissevered from the Punjab Command. 
Peshawar will be the Base of Operations for the Peshawar Column, but 
will remain in the Punjab Command. 
COlLlMANDS AND STAFF. 
ARMY STAFF. 
Lieutenant-Genevol Commaading the General Sir W .  S. A. Lockhart, K,C.B., 
FOYC~.  K.C.S.1. 
Aide-de-camp . . . ... Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, 18th Bengal 
Lancers. 
Aide-de-Camp ... ... 2nd-Lieutenant J. H. A. Annesley, 18th 
Hussars. 
Ordeuly Ojicev ... .., Lieutenant G. R,  de. H. Smith, Central 
India Horse. 
Ordeuly Oflcev .,. ... 2nd-Lieutenant E. H. E. Collen, Royal 
Artillery. 
Depub A4ittta~tt-Geneua1, Chef  of Brigadier-General W.G. Nicholson, C.B. 
the Staff. 
Assistant A@fita~zt-GeneunE ... Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Barrow, 
i th  Bengal Infantry. 
Assistant Quarter-Master-Getzeval ... Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, R.E. 
Deputy dsszstatrt A~utant-GelzeraZ ... Captain J .  A. L. Haldane, Gordon High- 
landers. 
Assistant Quarter-Master-GetteraZ for Colonel G. H More-Molyneux, Assist- 
Zniellzgen ce. ant Quarter Xaster-General. 
Deputy Assistanl Quarter-Moster-Gene. Captain E. W .  S. K. Maconchy, D.S.~,, 
ral for Intell&ence. 4th Sikhs. 
Field Intelligence Ofleer ... Captain F. F. Badcock, D.s.o., 1st Bat- 
talion 5th Gurkhas. 
Pvincrpal Medical Oficer (with the Surgeon-Cclonel G. Thomson, c.B., 
tevzpova>y rank of Suvgeo?r-Major- Indian Medical Service. 
General). 
Secretavy lo Pri+an)al Medical Oficeu Surgeon-Major W .  A. Morris, Army 
Medical Staff 
Buignn'iev-General, Conz~zaadzrtg Royal Brigadier-General C, H. Spragge, R.A, 
Avtrllery. 
Brigade-Majov, Royal Artillery ... Captain C, de C. Hantilton, R.A. 
Ovdr~ly Ofice); Royal Arttilevy . Major H F Mercer, R.A. 
Brigadtev-Gejreual Comma~zdt~rg Royal Brevet-Colonel J E. Broadbent, R.E. 
Engtneers. (with the temporary rank of Briga- 
dier-General). 
Bri~ade-Majou, Royal Estgizeers ... Captain S. L. Craster, R,E. 
Ovdevly O@cer, Royal Engzstee~s ... Lieutenant H. B~ddulph R . E .  
Supennte~rdent, Avvny Siglralltng ... Major G. J. K. Logan-Home, 1st Bed- 
fordsklre Regiment. 
Head-Quartel-s Co,trmaridrzltt ... Captain R. E. Grimston, 6th Bengal - 
Cavalry. 
Assistatzt Iudpe-Advocate-Gerzeral ... Captain F. J. S. Lowry, 29th Bombay - - 
Pnizn$aZ Provost-Marshal 
Chief Og*d?zatzce O#cer . .. 
Commissariat Tnnsport Officer 
Itzspecti>zg re'eferittavy OfFcer 
Compfroller of Military Accourzts 
.Field Pay-Master ... 
Chief Szrrvey Ojftice~ ... 
Infantry. 
... Lieutenant-Colonel E. Balfe, Deputy 
Judge-Advocate-General. ... Colonel C. H. Scott. R.A. ... Captain G. W. Palin, Assistant Com- 
missary-General. ... Veterinary-Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. 
Glover, ... Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. LeG. Ander- 
son, Comptroller of Military Accounts, 
Punjab command. 
... Captain P. G. Shewell, Military Accounts 
Department. 
... Brevet-Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, 
K.C.I.E., C.B., R.E. 
< 
First Divisiote. 
Conlmatzditz.~ (with the local ratzk of Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B. 
Mnjol; Ge&val). 
A ide-de- Cavnp ... ... Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers. 
Lieutenant. . J. M, Wikeley, 17th 
Bengal Cavalry. 
Extya Order& Oficercs .. . ... Lieutenant G. H. Badcock, 7th 
Bengal Cavalry. 
dssistaizt Adjutant-Getzeral ... Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Muir, c.I.E., 
I 7th Bengal Cavalry. 
Assistaltt Quavter-Master Ge9zevaE ... Major E. A. G. Gosset, 2nd D e r b ~ s h i r e  
Regiment. 
Depzdty Assisfa~zt Quarter-Master- Captain A. N~cholls, 2nd Punjab In- 
Getzeval for I~zfellige~zm. fantry. 
k e l d  Itzlelligegice Oficer ... ... Lieutenant C. E. E. F. K. Macquoid, 
1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent. 
$n'ncipal M8dical Oficer ... ... Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend, Army 
Medical Staff. 
kieutetzant-Colottel Cohmandilcg Royal Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Duthy, R.A. 
Artllery. 
kdjwtarzt, Royal Artillevy ... captain W. K. McLeod, R.A. 
pivisiofzal Ora'3zntzce Oficer .,. Captain A. R. Braid, R A. 
Contnzajzdijzg Royal Eszgitzeevs ... Lieutenant-Colonel H. H .  Hart, R.E. 
Adjutatzf Royal Engi~ieers ... Captain 0. M. R. Thackwell, R.E. 
Field Enginrev ... Major J. A. Ferrier, D.s.o., R.E. 
Assistant Field Engitzeer ... Lieutenant J. F. N. Carmichael, R.E. 
Assistant Field Engineer ... Lieutenant W, H Runbury, R.E. 
~ i s i s t a n f  SupevitztetrL,zt, Army Captain H. T.  Kenny, 2nd Bombay 
S&tzalling. Lancers. 
Pvovost-Marshnl . . . ... Captain H. W. G. Graham. D.s.o., qth , - 
Lancers. 
Commissary-Getzeral .- ... ColonelL. W. Christopher, Commissary- 
General. 
Assistatzf to Commtssary-Getzed ... Captain H. S. G. Hall, Assistant Com- 
missary-General. 
Chid Tratzspovt O@ca. ... Major H. Mansfield, Assistant Commis-. 
sary-General. 
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Assistatgl to Chief Tralzsport Oficer, Captain T. H .  Smith, 12th Bengal 
Cavalry. 
Pri~zcipal Cliaplailt ... ... The Rev. Saunders Dyer, n~.4 , ,  F.S.A. 
Chuvch of E?zgla~zd Ctrnplai7z ... The Rev. R. &I. Kirwan, n r . ~  
I 
Rorilalz Cati~ohc Chnplnztt ... The Rev Father N. J. Winkley. 
'B 
Dtvzsrotzal Cou~~wzissnrzat Ofjcer ... Major W. R. Yield~ng, c I.E. ,  D.s.o., 
Assistant Commissary-General. 
1 




Dzvtszo~zal Trarzsport OfJicer ... Captain F. C. W. Rideout, Assistant 1i 
Commissary-General t 
Assistn;zt to Dzvisio?zal Tra~zsport Captain A. 'CV. V. Plunkett, 2nd Bat- 
Oficer. talion the Manchester Regiment. ti 
Fzrst Brfgade (Fzrst Dzvtszotz). 
Cornma+zdilzg ... ... Brigadier-General R. C. Hart, v.c., c B. 
i 
I 
... Captaln C. 0. Swanston, 18th Bengal \ Orderly O ~ ~ C E Y  ... 
Lancers. I 
Dept~ty Assista?zt Aqutalzt-Gelzc~al ... Captain A. G. H. Kemball, 1st Batta- i 
lion. 5th Gurkhas. 
Deputy Assistatrt Quarter-Mnslr- Captain H .  R. B. Donne, 1st Norfolk 
Ge~ieral Regiment. 
Brigade Coiutmbsartat Oficer ... Captain A. Mullaly, Deputy Assistant 
Commissary-General. 
I 
Asszsta>zt to BrGade Commissariat Lieutenant H .  I. N~cholls, 1st Bedford- 
Ojjicev. shire Regiment. 
Bvzgade T~a?zsport OfSicer ... Capta~n E. de V. Wintle, 15th Bengal 
Lancers. 
Veteritzary Ojjcev ... Veterinary-Lieutenant W. J. Tatam. I .. . 
Seco2zd Brzgade (First Dzviszo~z). 
Comma~zn'ilzg ... ... Brigadier-General A. Gaselee, c.B., A.-D:-c. 
Orderly Ojjcer ... ... Lieutenant A. N. D Fagan, 1st Lancers, 
Hyderabad Contingent. 
Deputy Assistant Adjutaltt-Gelzeual, Major W. Aldworth, D.s.o., 1st Bedford- 
shire Regiment. 
Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- Major A. A. Barrett, and Battalion, 5th 
Geueral. Gurkhas. 
Brigade Commissariat Oficer ... Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Deputy 
Assistant Cornmissary-General. 
Asststa~zt to Brigade Commtssavictt Captain W. de la  P. Gough, 16th Lancers. 
Oficer. 
Brigade Trarzspovt OfJicev ... Lieutenant H. Macandrew, 5th Bengal 
Cavalry. 
Veleriltary OfJicev ... ... Veterinary-Lieutenant W. F. Shore. 
Secolzd Division. 
Commam.ir~zg ... ... Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, C.B. 
Aide-de- Camp ... ... Captain E. St. A. Wake, 10th Bengal 
Lancers. 
Orderly Ofleer ... ... Captain R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars. 
Order& Oficev ... ... Hony.-Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Maha- 
raja Sir Nripendra Narayan, Bahadur, 
of Cooch Behar, G,c.I.E., 6th Bengal 
Cavalry. 
Assistatzt Adjutalzt-Geueral ... Lieutenant-Colonel R. K. Ridgeway, v,c. 
Assistant Qunrtey-Muster-GelzeraZ ... Major C. P. Triscott, D.s.o., R.A. 
Dejuty Assistafzt Quarter-Masfeu- Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley, 
Geuevaljor Zntelligetzce. King's Royal Rifle Corps. 
( xxsii 1 
r"'r'.."~i I~ltt*Ii'zgrr~;~c~ OFcfr . . . ... Captain H. F. Waltcrs, 24th (Bnluch- 
istan) Regiment of Bombay Infantry. 
IP>:r~c@n: .1?cdjcnI O ' C C Y  ... ... Surgeon-Colonel G. McB. Davis, D.s.o., 
Indian Medical Service. 
L~~r~$i~m;rt.Colot~el Co,;l7fzatzditzg Royal Lieutenant-Colonel R. Purdy, R.A. 
-4) Zii/@Q~ 
Ac+ttnnr, Royal A v t i l l ~ v ~ f  
D.;;,G:l;,z(rl Ovd>?ntrcc O j i c ~ v  
Q'.-.a~z:~:tz~~n"irtgg Ro-yzl E ~ f g i ~ l r e l g  
,i+{jaitrr;zt. Rct~nI E?zgirzeevs 
Fidd ~ ~ Z J ~ ~ P I P P Y  ... 
rlssisfirrzt Fitid Etzgiittev 
As;.ist:znt Field E>zgi>rca- 
i t  Szcpr7.ilitrliciel2t,~~i~~fc~zde?zt, -. .52g"':?iii~zg. 
P;r;;.rr~!-.WarsItnI ... 
E':r:d TPTNSIOT Chest Office), 
... Captain H. D. Grier, R.A. 
... Captain H. F. Head, R.A. ... Lieutenant-Colonel C .  B. Wilkieson, R.E. 
... Captain T. Fraser, R.E. .,. Captain F. H. Kelly, R.F. ... Lieutenant W. A. Stokes, R.E. 
... Lieutenant C. B. L. Greenstreet, R.E. 
A n ~ y  Captain G. C. Rigby, 1st Wiltshire Kegi- 
ment. ... Captain W. C. Knight, 4th Bengal Cavnlry. ... Lieutenant W. M. Gritnley, 20th Pu r~ jab  
Infantry. 
C:i:trrh 03f Esrg?a~zd C/znplaif~ ... The Rev. H. IV. Nelson, B.A. 
1Pt:ar:~x Cntkol~c Chaplni~z ... The Rev. Father Vanden DeysseI. 
Ci:~trcd~ t?fSco!luttd(nttn~/ledto Gordo7zs) The Rev. D. H. Gillan, M.A., E.D. 
fi:ri.~~Js~~~S~otla~zdjatfa~Iz~df~K.O.S.B'~,) The Rev. W. Thomson, M.A.  
l! h!~:vtz>s C%opiaist ... The Rev. J. J. Findlater. 
Dr'z~is:t~ttzl Co,;,r>tissavint OFcev .., Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. P. Reilly, 
Assistant Commissary-General. 
Ass:ilzuf fo Dizrisio~znl Coi~zunissclvint Lieutenant A. D. Macpherson, 2nd Pun- 
i.I#n.v jab Cavalry. 
I)i:&vo,raL Traltspoi-l O@cev ... Major H. L. Hutchins, Assistant Com- 
missary-General. 
AS.?~S:~PI~ to Diaisiotlrrl Tvalzsport Ofl- Major H. R. W. Lumsden, 3rd Bengal 
C&T. Infan try. 
S Z C P ~ ~ E ~ ~  OBer ... ... Mr. E. A. Wainwright, Survey of 
India Department. 
Thid Bl-ikade (Seco7zd Divisiotz). 
Consr;m~zdisi,a (EyifJz f / l l  tcnqpovavy C~lone l  F. J. Kempster, D.s.o.,A.-D.-c. 
u ~ : h  of Rrigndzcu- GcrrevaL). 
Orcier[v Ofiiccr .. . ... Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Royal 
Munster Fusiliers. 
Dcptrfy Assisfnrtf Arljl~2'a7zt-GevaZt Major H .  St. Leger Wood, 1st Dorset- 
shire Regiment. 
T+b~ifv Assis2a?zt Qzrarfcr-Master- Major H .  S. Massy, 19th Bengal Lancers. 
(;i.>,~rnl 
D ~ t g c ~ c l f i  Coinrrzissal-iaf Oficev ... Lieutenant D. H, Dral;e-Brockman, 
D.A.C.-G. 
A s s k f ~ z n t  to Brtgade Co~nzzissariat Lieutenant 3'. W. Birch. 29th Punjab 
O@ter Infantry. 
Bngtzdt, Tyorzsporl Oflcev ... Lieutenant R. A, N. Tytler, 1st Gordotl 
H~ghlanders. 
$ E:i.n~a,y Cficm ... ... Veterinary-Lieutenant C. Rose. 
Fozrvfh Bvrkade Secorzd (Divisio~z), 
Coi?rr:~a?tding ... ... Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, c.B., 
D.S.O. 
nyifer(v oficer ... ... Lieutenant R C. Wellesley, Royal 
Horse Artillery. Bflpa" AAss fa~t t  Adjnhttt-Ge?zet.al ... Captain W .  P. Blood, 1st Royal Irish 
Fusiliers 
J d s ~ i - ~ f a f l f  Qzia~ie~*-dIasfo~- Capbin F. J, M. Ediyar,-lc. 3rd Bombay 
G P I W ~ I ~ I ,  Light Cavalry. 
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Br&ade Coi~zn~issariat OfFcer ... Captain E. Y. Watson, Deputy Assistant 
Commissary-Gener.il. 
Assistant to Br~&zde  Comjtzissariat Lieutenant N .  G. Fraser, 4th Bombay 
O'cer .  Cavalry. 
B~,zkade Traltsjort Ofjicer ... Captain W .  H. Armstrcng, 1st East 
Yorkshire Regiment. 
Vetcvlizary O@CEY ... ... Velerinary-Lieutenart F. W. Wilson. 
Gelzenal 0 j j j . c ~ ~  Con~~~za~zcEt~ag ... Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, 
K.C.B. 
AiZe-e-L- Ca?+zp . . . ... Lieutenant F. C. Galloway, R.A 
01,deuly OJ5cev . .,. ... Lieutenant H. 0. P a n ,  7th Bengal In- 
fantry. 
Assistmat ~c i ju ta l z t  asid Quarter- Captain (temporary Major) J. W, G. 
ilil~zs&cr~-Gej~~ral. Tulloch, 24th Bombay Infantry. 
Dcputy iissist~zlzt Adjutant a d  Quay- Captain I .  Phillips, 1st Battalion, 5th 
t~i~-~l fnsfer-Gr~~ernl .  Gurkhas. 
Pri?zcipal Medical O$ccv (wilk the Brigade.Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. 
tervt,hovaty ~asl f i  of Sui~eo>z-Colu?zcI). E. S a ~ n d e r s ,  Army Medical Staff. 
Sc+zio+ Oidxa?zce Ojicer ... .,. Captain 'L'datlrins, R.A, 
Sectio~z Con~~~a~zlZUilt ... ... Captain 0. U. S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal 
Lancrrs. 
Sectio+z Coi.fimarrcEn?tt ... ... Captain St.'G. L Steel, end Bengal 
Lancers. 
Sectio~z Cow~maltda$zt ... ... Caplaill F. de B. Young, 6th Bengal 
Cavalry. 
Lieutetra+rt - Cololzcl Commanding Royal Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Thurburn, R. E. 
Kngiszcers. 
Adjzitaizt, Royal E~zgitzeers ... Captain H. V. Biggs, R.E. 
Field Eg~ehzecr ... ... Captain C. H: Cowie, K.E. 
~ s s i s t a s z  Field Es~gh~ecr ... .. . ~i&tenan t  H. S. ~ o g e r s ,  a . ~ .  
Assista,lt FieliZ Eizgilze~r. .  .. Lieutenant K. P. T. Hawksley, R.E. 
Assista~zt Field E?rgilzeer. .. ... Lieutenant A. E. Turner, ILE. 
Provost Marshal . . ... Major L. S. Peyton, 14th Bzng-a1 Lancers. 
Chief Comvvrissa~iat OJJicer .,. Lieutenant-Colo~~el C. &I. Keighley, 
D.s.o., Assistant Colnmissary-General. 
Chief T ~ a m ) o r t  OOfJcr, L .  of C. ... Major C .  V W. iYilliarnson, Assistant 
Commissary-General. 
CIZMYC~I of E~zgZ~z+zd chap lair^ ... The Rev. W. Pritch1:tt Sha~v .  
Y c t e ~ i ~ l a y  I9rspecto~ . . . ... Veterinary-Captain F. W. Forsdylte. 
Sta f f  at  the Base. 
Base Comla?a~zda+zt ... ... Colonel W. J. Vousden, v c., Indian 
Staff Corps. 
DcI)7~fy Assisfa*tt AcQ'utant ai?dQz$ar- Major A. J .  W. Allen, 1st East Kent 
tev-Master Gclie~,al. Regiment. ' 
Comnaa~zdant, British Troops Dejdt .. Maior .-\. de B. V. Paget, 2nd Battalion 
Durham Light Infantry. 
Adjwtaszt az~d  Quarter-Master, British Capt~ in  A. F. Rundock, 2nd Battalion 
Troops Dep6t. South Lancashire Regiment. 
Cowz,t~alzdaz~t, Native Troops Depdts ... Captain S. M. Edwardes, D.s.o., 2nd 
Bombay 1ntBnti-y (Grenadiers). 
Base Ord~za>icc OfJicer ... ... Captain h'l. W. S. Pasley, R.A. 
OfSiccv ilz Chalxe of E~zgitzcer Field Captain.U. W .  Evans, R . E .  
Park 
Base Conzrvlissariat OfJicer ... Major H.  K. Blarrett, Assistant Com- 
missary-General 
Captain W. H. D. Rich, Assistant 
Commissary-General. 
Lieutenant F. W. H Forteath, De- 
puty Assistant Commissary-Gene- 
i 
- 
Depa~tnieafaE Assista,tls to Base Cosn- ral. 
nrissariat Oflcer. Lieutenant L. H. Marriott, Deputy 
Assistant Commissary-General. 
Lieutenar~t H. G. P. Beville, Deputy 
1 Assistant Commissary-General. 
Dcpavtnrenfnl A s s i s t a ~ f  (for Trans- Captain H .  N. Hilliard, Deputy Assist- 
bod) to the Base Corn~zissariat ant Commissary-General. 
/Captain W. P. M. Pollock, 18th H u s -  
sars. 
Captain H. Smyth, 1st Battalion 
Cheshire Regiment. 
Regimental Assistants to Base Cont- Lieutenant T. E. Bayley,  20th Hus- 
w~issariat Ofiicer. sars. 
Lieutenant C. G. E. Ewar t ,  5th Bell- 
I Li,",",L,","::pN. D a v i s ,  3rd Infantry 
I Hyderabad Contingent. 
THE PESHAWAR COLUMN. 
Coitrnrat~rlin~ ... . . . Brigadier-General A. G .  Hammond, 
c.B., D.s.o., v.c., A.-D.-C. 
Ordrr5 Oflcer . . . ... Lieutenant H. D. Hammond, R.A. 
Assistant .-f+~taj:f alzd Qziartcr-Mas- Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel F. S Gwat- 
fer- Gencral. kin, 13th Bengal Lancers.  
DepzrQ~ Assisfaftt Afi fapzf  and Q~las-- Major C. T. Becker, 2nd King's O w n  
!er-1>!aster-Ge~z~ra1. Scottish Borderers. 
Firid I~tteili~e~zce Oficw ... ... Captam F. H. Hoghton,  1st Bombay ., 
kfantry (Grenadiers). 
Prifznj5nl &fedital Olpccr ... ... Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenantcolonel R. 
G. Thomsett, Army Medical Staff. 
Liezitewagzf-Cololzel Con~malzdi>zp Roval Lieutenant-Colonel W .  M.M. Smith, R.A. 
'2 J 
Artillery. 
A+utant, Royal ArfilZery .. ... Captain F. R. Drake, R.A. 
Bm,bad@ Ord~ra~tce OBcer .. . ... MajorT. E. Rowan, =.A. 
Field E~tgzizeev ... ... ... Major E. C. Spilsbury, R.E. 
Assistant Field E~tgilz~er ... Lieutenant C. B. Farwell, R.E. 
Assistant Stiperinfe~tdent, Army Sip. Lieutenant C. E. Cobb, 1st Battalion 
na6litrg. East Yorkshire Regiment.  
Brigade Conzmissariat O#cw ... Lieutenant H. H. Jones, Deputy Assist- 
ant Commissary-General. 
Assistant to Brigade Commissariat Lieutenant V .  R. Pigott, 1st Battalion 
ofice+. Cheshire Regiment. 
Brigade Transpovi Ojicer ... Lieutenant C. Charlton, Royal Horse 
Artillery.* 
Vfeuikary Ojicer -.. ... Veterinary-Lieutenant I?. U. Carr. 
THE KURRAM MOVEABLE COLUMN. 
Comma~ding  (witJz rank a~zd  pay of Colonel W. Hill, Indian Staff Corps. 
Colo?td olz the Staf) .  
Order& 0fice-r ... ... Captain H. 0. C. Hume, 1st Battalion 
Border Regiment. 
Depufy Assistanf Adjutant-Gertwal ... Major E. F. H. McSwiney, D.s.o., 1st 
Lancers, Hyderabad Contineent. 
Lientemnt P. Holland Pryor, 13th Benqal Lancers, took over the appointmen: of 
BrigadeTransport Officer on October 18th. 1897, two days before theCulsmn left: Peshawar 
IM held it throughout ttt; remaining opera~ions. 
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I 
I Deptify Assistarzt Qztarfer-Maskr- Captain C. P. Scudamore, D.s.o., 1st 
i General. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
Principal Medical Officer ... Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. 1 R. Murphy, D.s.o., Indian Medical Service. Bvkade Ordna9zce Oficer ... Lieutenant D. R. Poulter, R.A. 
Field Engilzeev ... ... Captain J.A. Gibbon, R.E. 
i Assistalrt Field Enmizeer . . . Lieutenant E. A, Tandy, R E. Asststant ~*@e%ztende~zt, Amy Lieutenant C. R. Scott-Elliot, 4th Mad- 
Sig?zallilzg. ras Pioneers. 
Bvigade Commissariat OfjScer ... Captain C. F. T. Murray, Assistant 
Commissary-General. 
Assistant to Brkade Com~zissariat Captain P. H .  Rogers, 2nd Yorkshire 
Oficer. Light Infantry. 
Bripade Transpout Officer ... Captain H. W. Colquhoun, 24th Mad- 
ras Infantry. 
Veterinavy Officer ... ... Veterinary-Lieutenant W.  N. Wright. 
Commanding ... . . . Brigadier-General C.R. Macgregor, D.S.O. 
Orderly Oscer . . . ... 2nd-Lieutenant E. W, C. Ridgeway, 29th 
Punjab Infantry. 
Dejuty Assistant Adjutant-General ... Major Sir  R. A. W. Colleton., Bart., 1st 
Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master- Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers. 
General. 
Brtgade Commissariat Oficer ... Lieutenant E. G. Vaughan, Deputy 
Assistant Commissary-General. 




Brkade Transport OfSicer ... Lieutenant K. E. Nangle, 3rd Infantry, 
Hyderabad Contingent. 
Veterinary Oficer ... ... Veterinary-Lieutenant W, S. Anthony. 
T H E  S A M A N A  A N D  MURRAM V A L L E Y  
DESPATCHES. 
:.,, h t i h r  1 1 ,  n t l ta:lIr .  ~svcr t~or -Genera l  in Council is pleased to direct the pub- 
3 ,  ,*, th,. .u. j  t.d letter from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting 
a : p .  , t r  y,j r-c;elrcral A. G. Yeatman-Riggs. C.B.. Commanding 
? ,. 1; , a I -sf !.,+I ~ - f i . e ,  de5criblng the operations which took place On t h e  
,*a,. a;;d In the liurram Valley in August and September last. 
J i.? (;,,; t.rlc r-Gc.i:eral in Council concurs with His Excellency the  Corn- 
m ,, er-  ,;-" !:.: in Irrz npptecint~on of the conduct of these operations, and of 
t3.c t r  I,& r t a : l i  trtr jps e1i:agrd. 
1) (;< .* rnnr-C~.nrr~l  in Council desires e-specially to express his admira- 
t :. t + *i,e 1 :r3:r,ii,t dcferlcr of Fort Gulistan by the 36th Slkhs, and of the  post 
L r *,artc rr bv .i !,arty of tuen ty  men gf. the same regiment under the com- 
1- a c 1 12 izll i.,r ILhar Slngh, who d ~ e d  fiqhting to thelast, displayinga hero~c,  
3 a 1  *e, r:  niaa~b h.t> Irer.tr been surpassed In the annals of the Indlan Army. 
TIIP. CO~~NA~~DEII-IN-CHII:F'S CODIIIIENTS. 
Ial r-l;enrral G. de C. Blorton, c.%', Adjutant-General in India, in for- 
a s ~ r ~ ? ~ ~ ;  zbar desprtches from the Commander-in-Chief to t h e  Government of 
Isidt'8. %*ii * :-- 
It:- I.xre!le.ney is ef opinion that the operations in question were we11 
p?,~nncii and ckilit:l:lly carried out. The march to  the relief of Gullstan w a s  
~*- - i i  :a:rtl unc3.r verJr trying circ~mstances, owlng to the heat and to a great  
st i a ~  :v c d  rax,n:rr m I O P ~ ~ C ,  but the force successfully dccomplished its object 
P !!is the *ante gallontry and cheerfiilnezs as have been evinced on every occa- 
*iu311 lJ\ cue t ruo~s.  Jut-log- the various operations whlch have recently taken 
place cn :hc Kurth-\Vest Frontier. 
I h e  rnnam~der-in-Chief wishes to draw attention to the admirable con- 
all,t-t i i  x i  s:c.xdlnr\s of the 36th S ~ k h s ,  under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
& I  tugi ~ L I , .  tiurlr~g the attack on the  varlous posts held by that regiment on the 
bdiZXd.~A i*rG#3ye. 
.tr Sd:nc.*r, tbcsmall  garrison made asortie and gallantly captured a stand- 
ard 1.9 ti,c elarmy. while the briltiant defence of Fort Gulistan by the detach- 
mc.2.t liiiJer she cornn:;rnd of Major Des Vaeux, reflects the grestest on 
\r%t L\lhc*.r and the garrison of the post. 
3 he Gor-e~nmeot of India will, HIS Excellency is ass~~red ,  appreciate fully 
in:+d manner in which the late Havildar Kala Singh led the sortie from 
@uEs-lan Fort, and also the conduct of Havildar Sundar Slngh, who assisted 
Sara ~mmradcs at a critical moment 
-1he Cofnmlnder-in-Chief deeply regrets the loss of the garrison of sara- 
%flr*rrv a Imst OeId 21 men of the  36th Lilkhs, and h e  \vishes to his 
d a ~ r @ l i ~ n  of the heroism shown by those gallant soldiers. Fighting against 
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over~vhe lmin~  numbers they died at  their post, thus p r o v i n ~  their loyalty and 
devotion to their Sovereign, while upholding to the last the traditional bravery 
of the Sikh nation. 
The creditable manner in which the attack of the enemy on the post a t  
Sadda was repulsed is due, in His  Excellency's opinion, not only to the steadi- 
ness and good discipline of the garrison, bnt also to the satisfactory arrange- 
ments for the protection of his camp which were made by Colonel G, L .  R. 
Richardson, C.I.E. 
In conclusion, the Commander-in-Chief recommends to the favourable 
consideration of Government t h e  services of Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, 
C.B., and those mentioned by him i~ his despatch. Among thenames brought 
specially to notice is that of Miss Teresa McGrath, whose heroism is described 
in terms which His Excellency cordially endorses. 
GENERAL WOLSELEY'S COMJIENDATION. 
1-ieutenant-General Sir G. B. Wolseley, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces, 
Punjab, sent the despatches to the Adjutant-General. In doing so he said :- 
These operations seem to have been well planned and carried out. The 
heroic defence of S a r a ~ h e r i  s, in my opinion, worthy of thehigbest praise, and 
I deeply lament the loss of the garrison. 
I fully endorse the Major-General's commendation on the defence of Fort 
Gulistan and the behaviour of all ranks. Major Des V e u x  proved himself a 
gallant and skilful leader, and the Major-Geueral's remarks on this Officer's 
conduct appear to be fully deserved. 
I have niuch pleasure in recommending for the Order of Merit all the non: 
commissioned oEccrs and men the Major-General has brought to notice. 
THE ATTACKS ON HANGU ANDTHE SAMANA POSTS. 
Major-General A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, Commanding the Kohat Field Force, 
writing from Fort Lockhart, the ~ 1 s t  September, says:- 
I have the honour to report, for the information of His ExceHency the 
Commander-in-Chief, that news was received hy me from reliable sources at 
Hangu on the 8th instant, to the effect that the Afridis had decided to come 
and assist the Orakzai in attacks on Hangu and on the Samana posts on 
Friday, the 10th instant. 
Having on  the same day received reports that the necessary amount of 
transport and supplies for ~ u t t i n g  thirty 
4 wuns 9th Field days' supplies into the Samana posts had 
~at tzry,  ' ~ o ~ a l  Ar- been collected, I gave orders to  s tar t  that 
tillery. 
T o b a ~ ; t o n ~ ~  
night with a column, strength as pe r  mar- 
Eengal Cavalry. gin. The amnlunition supply had, ten days 
I squadron, 3rd previously, been sent up by me to the 
Punjab Cavalry. 
companies, Royal Iri,h Regi- Samana, making up the total number of 
ment, 300. rounds to four hundred per rifle, 36th Sikhs. 
I -2nd Gurkhas, 500. 
I-3rd Gurkhas, 500. Concentrating at Pat Darband at  1.30 
2nd Punjab Infantry, 500. 
Ilalf.company No. .+ Company, A.er. on the 9th instant, the I-2nd Gurlthas 
Eombay Sappers and Rl~ners. moved up the road as  advanced guard, and 
Sec No. 8 British Field Hospital. occupied the plateau on which Dhar i s  
~ e c :  No. 42: Native Field Hospital. situated before daylight. At 4 A.M. the 
remainder of the column started. No enemy, 
were reported in and the rohd mas found too bad for guns ; S O  I sent the 
cavalry and artillery back to Hangu, and the convoy proceeded up the road, 
arriving at  Fort Lockhart about mid-day. 
On the 10th I sent the half-company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners 
to  improve the defences of Gulistan. 
( xxxriii 1 
rlc 7-3" p \'. ~Inior Reivicke-Copley reported that he  had seen clouds of 
rm, nJrth of the Sampagha Pass, and that the Afridis were coming over t h e  
p r-. 
!].maring thzt the --hole of the Afridi lashkav had arrived at Khorappa 
dms-i r r  the njqht. 1 sent a few scouts of the I-3rd Gurkhas down the spurs to- 
rr.trtiu me Kharlki Vallev, to ascertain if the information was correct, a s  
K%:>-appz cannot be seen from the Samana plateau. These scouts were sup- 
;* rt-. l bi. the I-3rd Gurkhas and two companies of the 2nd Battalion of t he  
R ,y.il IrnlE~ Reziment. 
&?at ro A.w., large numbers of the enemy could be seen marching down 
the Khinki V.illey. I at once recalled the troops by heliograph. Just before 
rrselr:nq time order to retire the I--,rd Gurkhas fired a few long-range volleys 
into a p r r y  of the enemy, and three were seen to drop. At I P.M. Major 
SBrrr~.-ki*-Ctrplev reported to me from Crag Picket that 22 standards and about 
lo,oiscr mzn had passed down the valley. 
Ba seemed probable that the tribesmen intended to carry out their threat  
b ~ P ~ t : ~ ~ ~ l k i i ~ ~  W : L I ~ U ,  or perhaps Shabu Khel, a small post guarding the Khanki 
Vadlev. nbr,rinr four mlles north-west of the point where it is  crossed by the  
KL*t;.it-Maslqm road. 
T*:k pmt had been reinforced by me with one company of the Royal Irish 
arid 6; rnfles of the 15th Sikhs, under command of Major Forster, Royal Ir ish 
Reqrment. 
I ordered the 2nd Punjab Infantry to seize Gogra HilI, supported by the 
r-2nd (;riskb.~s. 
Tho Co:nmnndant of the Border Militia Police, Mr. D. Donald, informed 
th.aa a large number of the enemy were making for the Darband Kotal, and 
BrZcer Commandrng the I-2nd Gurkhas reported to me (7 P.M.) that seven 
~ t h * c i ~ i - * ~ J s  and a considerable number of tr~besmen were retrac~ng their steps up 
the valley. 
*convoy with two days' supplies had been ordered out from Hangu to 
me at tile Pat Darband Kotal, where I found them when I advanced 
*lth the rernalnder of the column. The supplies had been sent up on 51 camels, 
no mules were available. 
The advanced guard and main column halted for the night a t  g P.M. on  
the hill. A few shots were fired at the rear-guard from Gogra Hill, and t h e  
whole of the sarwass, except one, bolted, and the camels, being !eft without 
drivers and without nose-strings, stampeded. The rear-guard, consisting of a 
vvrng 0% the I-3rd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pulley, and two com- 
panies of the I-2nd Gurkhas, under Captain Robinson, withstood several 
determined attacks, and did their utmost to save the convoy. At midnight I 
sent out two cvmpanies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Elsmie 
atmmpnled by Captain Scudamore, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-Generd, 
to ass~st  in bunging the camels in. All but two were found to have thrown 
their loads, so it was useless, and by 2 A.m. the rear-guard had taken up the 
p"3";tion assigned to them in the bivouac. The enemy consisted of Sheikhans, 
Hshtb,  Xalla Khels and Ali Khels, and they admit to their losses being over 
lW kiiled and wounded. A leading malik of the Sheikhans was wounded 
five l a d i n g  Malla Khels killed. 
When morning broke (~nth'l, I sent out Colonel Lawrence Royal Irish 
Repiment, wjth two companies of his Battalion and five combanies of each 
d the rernnlnmg corps, to endeavour to recover the camels and stores, but only 
thbtmn -+Is were recovered, and of these only two had loads. The Royal 
fr* f"nd iang-range volleys to keep the tribesmen at a respectful distance. 
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On the return of Colonel Lawrence's reconnaissance, I set the column once 
more in motioil towards Lakka, as being the best position from which both 
Hangu and Shahu Khel could be protected. I arrived there at I P.M., but, 
finding no water, and having lost our food, I issued orders to commence t h e  
march to Hangu at 3 p.m. A t  3-30 P.X. I received a message by heiio from 
Fort Lockhart that Saragheri was  hard pressed, and at 4-30 P.M. i t  was helioed 
that Saragheri had fallen, and that Gulistan was  hard pressed. 
Four riflemen of the I-2nd Gurkhas who had been reported missing t h e  
previous evening, rejoined, having made their way by the Darband Ilotal. 
The  troops, after their hard day without food o r  water, had earred a rest, 
but about 3-30 P.M. on the x3th, a letter was brought to me from Major Des 
Vceux, 36th Sikhs, Commanding at Gulistan, urgently asking fq; help. 1 
immediately despatched two guns of the 9th Field Battery and the ; d  Bengal 
Cavalry with their signallers to gallop along the road a t  the foot of the hills a s  
far towards Gulistan as they could go, and sent a wire to Doaba to despatch 
two more guns of the 9th Field Battery and the squadron of the 3rd Punjab 
Cavalry to join in the demonstration. 
The  guns from Hangu were accompanied by Mr. L). Donald who knows 
the  country well, and he was  able to show them a position from which they 
could fire a few rounds to encourage the garrison, and Major Middletou, com- 
manding the 3rd Brngal Cavalry, sent througl~ by helio, just before sunset, a 
message to assure the garrison that they would be relieved by mid-day on the 
14th. 
The  four guns of the Drrajat Mountain Battery had reached Hangu the 
previous day, having marched 35 miles in under thirteen hours, so  they were 
added to our column, and w e  set out at midnight for Lakka. 
At 4 A.M., on the 14th instant, I arrived at Lakka, and sent on two com- 
panies of the I-3rd Gurkhas to occupy the hill on which w e  had bivouacked on 
the night of the I lth. 
At 5 A.M. we mdrched for Gulistan. On arrival opposite Tsalai (7 A . M )  
the advanced guard of the r-3rd Gurkhas was assailed with a heavy fire. I 
brought up the guns and shelled the enemy's marksmen out of Tsalai tower at 
a range of goo yards, and a t  once ordered the I-3rd Gurkhas to attack the 
enemy's position on Gogra, the  I-2nd Gurkhas following in support. Gogra 
Hill was quickly taken under cover of the fire of the guns, and one company of 
the Royal Irish fired long-range volleys at the Orakzai retreatingdown the 
Sarmela spur. The strength of the enemy was  estimated at about 4,000. 
The  2nd Punjab Infantry pressed on followed by the guns, and the 
Gurkhas held the position until they had passed through. 
As w e  neared Sangar the garrison of that post displayed a white standard 
which they had captured from the enemy. Sangar and Dhar had been attacked 
all night, but a sortie had been made from the first-named as soon as our 
guns opened fire, and Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, commanding the  36th 
Sikhs, had joined the party with 12 men of the Ro.val Irish and 35 Sikhs, and 
had poured long-range volleys into the foe as  they retreated down the Sarmela. 
At 10 A.M. I reached Fort Lockhart and reconnoitred the enemy's position 
from a bastion of the Fort, and found about 8,000 to lo,ooo Afridis holdinga 
str0n.g position, which was sliilfully occupied wi th  lines of satzgavs on Sara- 
gherl ndge. 
I ordered up the puns, and by 10-30 A.M., they were playing on the  
enemy's position with shrapnel, whilst the 36th Silrhs from Fort Lockhart ad- 
vanced to turn the Afridi right, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry made a frontal 
attack on their position, supported by the two Gurkha battalions as  they ar- 
rived on the ground. The Afridis did not wait for the infantry, but fled from 
their position and made for the Khat~lti Valley. I pressed on with ali possible 
~ p e e d ,  as I did not 1tno:v whether Gulistan was holding out or not. Ori reach- 
irig the hiqh around overlooking Gulistan, I found that the Fort was invested 
by about 6,0011 Or;il;znis, but they did not wait for theattack of the 2nd Punjab 
Infantry and 36th Sikhs, which was made under an accurate fire of the guns 
of the mountain battery, and by 8 p.nr. they were in full retreat down the 
Khandartang spur and Gulistan was relieved, after having been hard pressed 
by s,.mey,ooo to 8.000 Afridis and Orakzais since the 12th instant. 'The 
enemy's caszalties are reported over 400 killed. 
I wish to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief 
for special recognition the -names of- 
Major C. H. Des Vmus, 36th Sikhs, who was the life and soul of the 
defrnct: of Gulistan. He did ail that could be done, with the slender means a t  
his disposal, to frustrate each device of the enemy, whose attack was a most 
determined one. with riflemen ready, on ridges and terraces within fifteen yards 
of the Fort, to  open a heavy fire on any one who exposed hilnsrlf in tile slight- 
est  degree. His judcment in pern~itting the sortie was, in my opinion, good, 
as  the success attending it encouraged the garrison and made the enemy move 
away from the walls. 
Second-Lieutenant H. R. E. Pratt, 36th Sikhs, who, though suffering from 
dysentery, mas always ready for any emergency, and is very highly spoken of 
be Major Des Vceux. 
Surgeon-Captain C. R. Prall, Indian Medical Service, whose care of t h e  
wounded was unremitting, and who was often under heavy fire. 
Miss Teresa McGrath, who had been previously attached to the hospital 
by my orders, \vho rendered most valuable assistxnce to the Medical Officer. 
Her conduct is spolien of most enthusiastically by all ranks. 
' 
No. 75 5,  Havildar Sundar Singh, 36th Sikhs, who is repnrced to have been 
conspicuous for his gallantry throughout the siege, and who, of his own accord, 
sprang over the mall of the horn-work, carrying with him those who happened 
to be near him, to the succour of his comrades who had made a sortie to cap- 
ture a standard, and were in imminent peril of being killed to a man. 
Havildar Bishen Singh, 36th Sikhs, who was in ccmmand at Sangar, and 
kept the enemy a t  bay against heavy odds, who led a successful sortie, captur- 
ing a standard. 
The  rank and file named belom, who took part in the sortie made by the 
36th Sikhs from Gulistan :-No. 807, Lance-Naick Sadu Singh. No 1078, 
Sepoy Attar  Singh Eo. 1046, Sepog Sajin Singh. No. 1380, Sepoy Bakram 
Singh. No. 1603, Sepoy Chajja Siogh. No. 1369, Sepoy Badan Singh. No. 1597, 
Sepoy Phuman Singh. No. 1741: Sepoy Thamnn Singh. No. 1066, Se ;~oy  
Sawan Singh. No. 1600, Sepoy Ghuna Singh. )\lo. 1588, Scpoy Bhagvvan 
Singh. No. 1589, Sepoy Harnam Singh. No. 180, Sepoy Rur Singh. No. 368, 
Sepoy Slier Singh. No. 1632, Sepoy Raila Sinzh. No. 1123, Sepoy Kala Singh. 
No. 1177. Lance-Naick Uewa Singh. No. 81 j, Lance-Naick Harnam Singh. 
No. 939, Lance-Naick Jiwan Singh. No. r 167, Sepoy Mihan Singh. No. 823, 
Sepoy Mehma Singh. No. 118- Sepoy Hira Singh. No. rgjg ,  Sepoy Nabha 
Singh. No. 1338, Sepoy ~ c w a i ; r  Singh. No. 907, Sepoy Basawa Singh (since 
dead). Fo ,  1146, Sepoy Ghulla Singh. Pu'o. 1854, Sepoy Jicvan Singh. 
. No. 2,509, Rifleman Dhanbir Sahai, I-2nd Gurkhas, for helping in a 
wounded naick of the same battalion on the night of the 11-12th instant, under 
heavy fire. 
I should also have brought forward the names of Havildar Kala Singh, 
36th Sikhs, who volunteered to command the sortie from Gulistan, and Sepcy 
Gnrmukh Singh, 36th Sikhs, for special recognition, but the former has, I 
regret to say, succumbed LO hismounds, and the latter was last seen signalling 
from Saragheri just before the enemy swarmed in. I trust that in the cases 
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of those brave soldiers who lost their lives a t  Saragheri and Gulistan, their 
wives and families may be  considered for. pension a s  if they had survived to 
receive the rewards they so justly deserved. 
My thanks are due to the various members'of my staff, Majors Bewicke- 
Copley, King's Royal Rifles, and E. F. H. McSwiney, D.S.O., 1st Lancers, 
I-Iyderabad Contingent, and Captains C. P. Scudamore, L).S.O., Royal Scots 
Fusiliers, and E. St. A. Wake,  10th Bengal Lancers, who, without even the 
organisation cf a Brigade Staff to help them, performed the duties of Divisional 
Staff to a force larger.than a division, scattered over a wide area, to  my entire 
satisfaction. Ny thanks are  also due t~ His  Highness the Maharaja of Cooch 
Behar, G.C.I.E., Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, 6th Bengal Cavalry, who 
accompanied me throughout a s  Orderly Officer, and to  Brigade-Surgron-Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel W. R.  hlurphy, D.S.O., Indian Medical Service, Captain 
'2. F. T. Murray, Staff Corps, Cornrnissariat Department, and Captain P. H. 
Rogers, Yorkshire Light Infantry, Transport Officer, who organised their 
respective departments under circumstances O F  exceptional difficulty. 
I wish also to favourably mention the follocving Officers :-Colonel W. W. 
Lawrence, Royal Irish Regiment, Commanding the  Column. Lieutenant- 
Colonel E. A. Travers, Commanding the I-2nd Gurkhas. Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. Pulley, Commanding the I-3rd Gurkhas. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Haughton, 
36th Sikhs, Commanding on the Samana. Lieutenant-Colooel K. R. N. Sturt, 
Commanding the 2nd Punjab Infantry. Major 13. J. C. Doran, Koyal lrish 
Regiment, Staff OFficer to t h e  Column. Captain J. I. Parker, R.A., Com- 
manding No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. Captain J. G. Robinson, I-2nd 
Gurkhas, for coolness and gallautry on the occasion of the rear-guard actioo, 
12th instant. Lieutenant A. M. S. Elsrnie, Adjutant, 2nd Punjab Infantry, 
for coolness displayed in assisting to bring in the camels on the  night of 
11.12th instant. Lieutenant G. W. M. West ,  I-3rd Gurkhas, for conspicuous 
gallantry on the occasion of the  rear-guard action, IT-12th instant. Jemadar 
Narakbir Gurung, I-3rd Gurkhas, for conspicuous gallantry on  the occasion of 
t h e  rear-guard action, 11-12th instant. 
I am also indebted to Mr. D. Donald, Commandant, Border Militia Police, 
whose unrivalled knowledge of t h e  country and people has been of t h e  great- 
est service to me. 
THE ATTACK ON SADDA. 
Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, writing from Fort Lockhart on  the  30th 
September, says :- 
I have the honour to report, for t h e  information of His  Excellency the  
Commander-in-Chief in  India, tha t  the camp a t  Sadda was attacked o n  the 
night of the 16th and 17th September. 
Colonel G. L. R. Richardson, C.I.E.. Commanding the  Flying Column, had 
established himself in  a well intrenched camp and  high ground overlooking 
Sadda. About 10.10 p.nr. on the 16th, a las/~knr, consisting of Wassuzais and 
Chamkannis, numbering about 2,000, collected in the  Khurmandarra and 
attacked a picket of the  5 th  13unjab Infantry about a hundred yards outside 
the south-east corner of the camp. T h e  picket had to  abandon their sn7zgnv 
and retire into camp, losing the Havildar in  s o  doing. The  moon was obscure 
by passing clouds, and the noiseof the  water  rushing in the ?tzilla/z prevented 
the patrols of the 5th Punjab Infantry a n d  1-5th Gurkhas hearing o r  seeing 
the approaching enemy. 
The enemy's attack was pushed to within twenty or  thirty yards of t h e  
stone wall with which the camp was  surrounded with a certain amount of 
resolution up to midnight, after which it slackerled off considerably, I n  no  
case did the enemy come to close quarters, though two standards were  broughr 
tlp to within fifty yards of the camp. They seemed to have lost heart a t  the 
last moment in the face of the  steady fire which was brougGt to bear on them 
( xlii ) 
The  expenditure of ammunition was as follows :- 
6 Rounds. 
15th Sikhs ... ... ... ... 525 
. 15th Punjab Infantry ... ... ... ... 1,200 
I-5th Gurkhas ... ... ... ... 373 
Total ... 2,098 
The  usual casualty returns have heell already forwarded. 
FURTIIER OPERATIONS ON TI-IE SARIANA. 
On the same day Major-General Yeatman-Biggs reporied : - 
I have the honour to report that on the 27th August last, a large gathering 
of Orakzai appeared on the Samaoa Sulr, and heavy firing was heard in the 
direction of Shinawari, tvhich was held by the Border Police. This was  
reported to me at Kohat. 
Reconnaissances were made from Gulistan towards the Samana Sulr, and 
from Hangu to Shinawari. 
The  enemy was found to be about 4,000 in number, strongly posted on the 
Samana Suk. In  this reconnaissance, I regret to say, Lieutenant A. K. Blair, 
36th Sikhs, was mounded in the chest. Reinforcements were sent from Fort 
Lockhart, but soon after their arrival a t  Gulistan information was received 
that the enemy's Irrs/~ba~ was assembling to the east of Fort Lrclihart, s o  
Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, 36th Sikhs, Commanding on the  Samana, decid- 
ed to return to Fort Loclihart. 
The Officer Commanding the reconnaissance made by a squadron of t h e  
18th Bengal Lancers to Shinawari, returned the same day to Hangu, and re- 
ported all well. This was the second reconnaissance made from Hangu to 
Shinawari (a distance of over twenty miles) within the last few days. 
T h e  follo~oing day the enemy were discovered to be holding the Chagru 
Kotal as well as the Samana Suk on the west  of the Samana Range, and the 
Sarmela spur on the east end of the range. and during the day they burnt the 
posts of Gogra and Tsalai, which had been evacuated by the Border Police. 
In order t a  anticipate the enemy, should a second attack be made on  
Shinawari, I ordered two companies of Gurkhas to march to reinforce the 
garrison there. One squadron of cavalry accompanied them, with orders to 
return to Hangu as soon as the Gurkhas had reached the post. Reliable 
reports were received on the morning of the 29th August that Shinaxvari had 
been evacuated by the Border Police, and the post burnt by the tribesmen the 
previous evening, so the troops err 7-oute to reinforce thegarrison, were recalled. 
The Orakzai held a&-gah this day, and decided that ihe Ali Khel, Mamuzai, 
Alsherzai and Aka Khel should attack Gulistan on Friday, September jrd, 
whilst the Mishti, Sheikhan RIalla Khel and Kabia Khel attacked Hangu. 
During the night of the 29th the post of Sangar was fired into, and a sepoy 
of the Border Police deserted from the adjacent post of Dhar with his rifle and 
ammunition. This psot was therecore reinforced by one Kative Officer and 37 
sepoys of the 26th Sikhs, so that all posts on the Samana should be held by 
Sikhs. 
The  three follo?ving days the enemy remained on the east  and west ends 
of the Samana, but made no further move. 
On the 3rd Septeniber a bhisti from Dhar was murdered by the enemy, 
and his three mules stolen. Mr. D. Donald, Commandant of the Border Police, 
proceeded to Dhar to make inquiries into the circumstances, and h e  and his 
escort were fired on. 
! 
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As tribesmen were reported to be advancing on Gulistan and Saragheri 
in force, these posts were reinforced from Fort Lockhart. Towards evening the 
enemy, in cons~derable force, took up a position in and about Picquet Hi11 '400 
yards west of Gulistan, and set fire to the thorn hedge whlch had been placed 
as an obstacle a few yards outside the horn-work of the place. T h e  fire was 
extinguished by volunteers, whose names have been brought to notice by me 
in a separate letter. At  8 P.M. the bonfire, which had been previously pre- 
pared between the horn-work and  Picquet Hill, was 11t by volunteers, whose 
narnes have also been mentioned in the despatch of the 2Ist  September, 
The enemy kept up  a hot fire until midnight when they retired. 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Haughton and Lieutenant and Adjutant R C.  Munn, 
of the 36th Sikhs, strove hard, with their httle handful of men from Fort Lock- 
hart, to succour the many small posts scattered over the Samana Range that 
were beset on all sides by overwhelming numbers of the enemy. 
The expenditure of ammunition between the 27th August and the 3rd 
September on the Samana was- 
Ritles ... ... ... ... ... 4.10 
Rounds expended ... ..- ... ... 3,649 
I have not considered it necessary to attach any sketch, a s  the whole ground 
is so well known, and has already been mapped by the Survey Department. 
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APPENDIX VITT, 
T~~ following notification and despatch :I!*. t + l l , i  rr  f:, 114 I! r-  f , t r . t ' r  f f ,"rirt'i'r " 
The Right Hon'bIe the Goverr~or-C;c*~~t~r:rl 1st 1 1 i11t< 11 : i ~ b , r h r  8 : t t : x s n  i i 
gublicatlon of the subjolnrd Icttcl~ t t r r l r r  tilib .ht!:lvs.aizl 4 1 r . 6  * :  rl juj I t ,  : I . : ,  t ,  t 
mlttlog a despatch from Generdl Sir W. 5, A. 1.1 t Ll. li t. 'ii.~ . l l  . i<.{ ,\ i 
descrlbIng the opperations of the Tlrall k:xp~t~iI~i!r ia.ily I r s t  ca, iri ria It c ibrl, 
the 31s' October 1x97. 
~i~ ~ ~ ~ k ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~  the  Governor-Gencl-:tl in C<*$rt:r 31 t ' sJ l ! i ' i l l>  \vi!!i !ti., b:rrsr.l- 
lency the Commander-in-Chief in his :rpgreri.rlii::l r "1 l i i * .  . t ! d  ! I IV .!lrtl  jilb2gs!it.r)$ 
shown by General Sir William Loekll.lrt i r t  h l r l s  r'r k i f ! % : i l  I f t i r f s  r + ~ ~ c j , a t ~ e . t i . . <  
recorded in his despatch, and also of r!w g;~llaiil ;irisl > i  !s:l*.i i: ii..j~.i'+,aiiil!. Elie 
Officers, Non.Commissioned Oficers and rncri tnki ir .r .  1 1 1 . ~  ~ : ~ + l ~ ~ ~ r i . i r i d .  
His Excellency in Council, while cirt.~iIy rc.grtz:lii:g: t i i t .  !, t . i  :it'v r\l:ir.ir 
occurred in the  attack on the heiglits c#r' IJ ,crx . i i  cis1 tf;i: 2t4:dr r ,it* ;. ~, lq? ,  
fully shares in the admiration cxprerscd liy t f ~ r .  Ct,1rl;ur.cl!r!r.1~-8~:-f.,~;1+:1' c,t the 
gallantry displayed by both OfEcers and nren uri rL.tr CicCa:~H,Et, 
In the assaults on the Sampagha and r21 l::tn~:r Ea.w w*, t8if' *kilt;!' rii-p - b -  
tions of the General Comrnandi~~g arid tllc cxcrlPernt c,u.li,tzt " . 1 - $ 6 ? . t ) 1  1 4iy tfte 
troops, enabled these strong positions to be uVun rv~llr ~trtariiaa,trnvcly little Iribe. 
Major-General G. de C. Morton. C.B., Aeljait.iaat-P';c*n~+r:tI i f t  l t r n l r  u, lu t>  r- 
warding the despatch to the Secretary to tlre Y;uvc*rurrrt*:!t a+t itrc!:a, fltlrr,try 
Department, said :- 
I have t h e  honour, by direction of t h e  (:nmrz~?nr!~ r-i~r-f i , ir l , t c .  fi ru ar4.  
for the information of the Govcrntnent r,f Int l~rn.  r h r .  , t ia t ,  # t i$  . iiviilap ;r,tt ! j  f r o m  General Sir W. S A. Loclzh:irt, IC.C.B., K.<".S.l , r 1 a . i ~  ,r!tirib: r t , c a  a \8tat.a. 
t i o n s  of the  Tirah Expeditionary Force fro~tl tlsr: 88th ?u liar 31-1 Qtitiitar 
3897. 
2. Thegeneral object of t h e  expedition ivnr4 to *x:~rt ~ P P B I I P ~ ~ ~  t i  ftrr tilr 
unprovoked aggression of the Afridi n11tI 0 r i l k r : i i  trtt,r~~.. ern tlica is". 1,.x\~*,,r rzsd 
K o h a t  borderers, in attacking our frcrrrtier pnct-, :uirl 1t'r st;*. tl.tnr.al:~+ a t 8  I r l * .  .snd 
proper ty  which had thus been itlflictetl on fb~tiwh * t i l l ~ r ~ r s t . t  atral r ti tltrrur r f r  tibr 
Brit lsh service. The despatch now su1inlitft~ci '.t~v,rv-, tlrr rrtr-a utr's \ t !~t i* lo  evrre 
taken by General Sir William Lorkllnrt to I-rtrry nclt thc* i4 tc i r r .s  c I titt .  tcror. 
merit of India and to enter Tirak, a coutltzy wkk$l uidt11 Z~UW f ~ u ~  xrtrrcr best> 
invaded by a B-~tish ~ O F C ~ .  
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3. The incidents which occurred between the 18th and 20th October, and 
which immediately preceded the concentration of both divisions of the force a t  
Khangarbur, in the Khanlii Valley, are  detailed in t l ~ e  despatch. Wi th  regard 
to paragraph a r  thereof the Commander-in-Chief agrees with Sir William Lock- 
hart that a flanking demonstration combined with a frontal attack xvould in 
all probability have enabled the Dargai heights to have beer1 taken at  less loss 
of life, but he is confident that the Government of India millshare his admira- 
tion of the distinguished gallantry and the marked devotion to duty evinced by 
all ranks in assailing that difficult position, defended as it was by a resolute 
and well armed enemy. 
4. T h e  measures subsequently taken by Sir William Lockhart to force' 
the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes, tvhere it had been anticipated the  greatest 
resigtance would be met, were  thoroughly successful, and to their skilful con- 
ception and the employment of concentrated artillery fire may be ascrtbed the 
small loss of life that characterised both operations. 
5. H i s  Excellency cordially endorses the remarks which the General 
Officer Commanding the Force makes regarding the behaviour of the troops 
engaged in these operations, and he desires to recommend for the favourable 
consideration of Government the distinguished services of General Sir V17illiam 
Loclihart, and of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men mentioned 
by him in the despatch. 
S I R  WILLIAM LOCKHART'S DESPATCH. 
The  despatch from General Sir  W. S. A. Lockhart to the Adjutant- 
General in India is dated Head-Quarters, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp 
Gwatoi, the 9th December 1897. It is a s  follows :- 
In  compliance with the  instrucflons conveyed in your letter No. 2235-F., 
dated the 20th November 1897, I have the  hvnour to submit, for the inform- 
ation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following account 
of the operations of the  force under my command from the  18th to  the g ~ s t  
October 1897. 
2. On October 16th, the  2nd Division of the Main Column had con- 
centrated at  Shinawari, with the  exception of the 
* No. q Mountain Eattery troops occupying the Samana ridge near Forts 
R.A.7 I s t  Uatta1lon, Nor- Loclihart and GulistanN; the 1st Division was  
champtonshire Regiment, 
36th Sikhs. expected to assemble at  the same place on  the 19th ; 
and I consequently issued orders for the march of 
the Main Column on the 20th and follomii~g days from Shina~vari  to Khorappa, 
each corps being directed to leave behind i ts  tents and heavy baggage 
under charge of a regimental guard. bleanlvhile the road from the Chagm 
Kotal towards Khorappa was  being improved by military and hired labour, 
working under the protection of covering parties. It was  reported, however, 
that the troops and labourers thus employed were being so molested by t h e  
enemy's sharp-shooters who  occupied the  heights to the west of the  Chagru 
defile, especially by those living in a small village called Dargai, about 1,800 
yards to the left of the road shortly after it crosses the crest of the pass, that 
the improvement of the road could not be continued until the heights had  been 
cleared, while two days' work  was said to be necessary to render the road 
sufficiently good for the passage of laden transport animals. It was  further re- 
ported that no water mas obtainable in t h e  immediate vicinity of Dargai, the.  
inhabitants getting water  from the valley below to the  west, where there were  
several rich Ali Khel villages and a number of cattle. 
3. I therefore determined to attack and destroy the village of Dargai, 
while by a simultaneous flanklng moven~ent 1 seized the heights overlookiug 
the raiEey to the west, and cleared out the lower villages referred t o  above. 
Althoilgtl I was aware of a hostile gathering in the Khanki Valley, t h e  inform- 
atior~ 1 had received through native channels led me to believe t h a t  the  
Or3kzai, otller than the Ali Khe: section of that tribe, did not intend seriously 
to oppose my advance until I had reached Khora~pa, and that t h e  A f r i d i ~  
\vere too busily engaged in fortifying the Sampagha and Arhanga P a s s e s  to b e  
able to assist the Orakzai in any considerable strength. 
4. . ~ ) ~ ~ i n g  my stay on the Samana, Major-General Yea tman-Bkgs  had 
been In lodifferent health, and though he was able to move to ~ h i n a w a r i  on 
October, the 17th, while the troops to be employed were drawn a lmos t  exclu- 
sively from the 2nd Division, 1 thought it better to spare him the fa t igue  of 
ccnducting the operations desigr~ed tu clear the road and ~ u n i s h  the ~ l i  Khels. 
These operations I accordingly entrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. P- 
Palmer, Commanding the Line of Communication. 
5.  The  front attack on Dargai was directed by Brigadier-~eneral  w e s t -  
macott, C.B., D.S.O., who had the following troops placed a t  his disposal  :- 
So. 5 (Bombay) hlountain Battery, Rocket Detachment, Royal ~ r t i l l e r y ,  
2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles. 
The Main Column employed on the flanking movement was  commanded by 
Rrigadier-General Kernspter, D.S.O., and consisted of the following t r o o p s  :- 
No. 8 Nountain Battery Royal Artillery, Machine Gnn Detachment, 16th 
Lancers, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders ,  
rat Battalion and Gurkha Rifles, 15th Sikhs, No. 4 Company Madras Sappers  
and &liners, Scouts of the 5th Gurkha Rifles. This column was  accompanied 
by Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer, K.C.B., with an escort  of one 
company of the 3rd Sikhs. 
Brigadier-General Kempster's Column left Shinawari at 4-30 A.M., and 
Br,igadier-General Wrstmacott's at 5 A.M. On the latter reaching t h e  Chagru  
Koatl at 8-30 A.M., it was joined by No. 9 Mountain Battery Royal Art i l lery,  
and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment from Fort Lockhart. At  
9 A.M. the attack was ccmmenced, the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas leading,  wi th  
the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers in support and the 1st Batta- 
lion Northamptonshire Regiment in reserve. At the same time a w o r k i n g  
party under Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Thurburn, Commanding Royal Engineers ,  
Line of Communication, consisting of the 21st Madras Pioneers, the S i rmur  
Imperial Service Sappers, and the hired labourers, was pushed forward beyond 
the Kolal to improve the road. 
6. The  advance of the troops which was covered by No. g Mountain Bat- 
tery Koyal Artillery and No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, was necessari ly 
elow, the slopes being extremely steep and affording but little cover. T h e  
enemy at first kept up a vigorous Ere from the walled terraces and r o c k s  in 
front of the village, but shortly before noon, when the flanking movement 
taegan to develop and the tribesmen's line of retreat was threatened, the  
cpposition slackened and the position was carried by a compally of t h e  3rd 
Gurkhas under hIajor Rose. About 20 of the enemy's dead were left o n  the 
ground, a sure indication of the heavy loss which had been inflicted. 
7. &.leanwhile the Main Column had moved in a north-westerly d i r e c t i o l ~  
along a track which had been reported as practicable for baggage animals. At 
the fifth mile, however, the road was found to be impassable for mules,  and 
No- 8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery with all laden animals had  t o  be 
ordered back to Shinawari, escorted by the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment 
and two companies of the 15th Sikhs. The remainder continued their march, 
led by the Gurkha scouts, a few of the enemy's marskmen firing at; tile 
advancing troops and wounding two riflemen of the xst Battalion znd Gurkhas. 
referred to above. b alley, the infornr- 
believe that the 
bt intend seriously 
d that the Afridis 1 nga Passes to be 
leatman-Biggs had 
/e to Shinaavari on 
.awn almost exclu- 
)im the fatigue of 
~ i s h  the Ali Khels. 
kenera1 S i r  A. P. 
ler-~eneral  West- 
a t  his disposal :- 1 Royal Artillery, 
rd Gurkha Rifles. 
;as commanded by 
lorving troops :- 
(:::LY;;;~;:;: 
Madras Sappers 
w a s  accompanied 
a n  escort of one 
I 
~t 4-30 A.M.. and 
jhing the  Chagru 
y Royal Artillery, 
brt Loclihart. At  
.has leading. with 
an,d the  1st Batta- 
tlme a working 
$Royal Engineers, 
neers, the Sirmur 
~d forward beyond 
b. 9 Mountain Bat- 
., was necessarily 
little cover. The 
:es and rocks in 
lanking movement 
s threatened, the 
3mpany of the 3rd 
were  left on the 
~flicted. 
~ e s t e r l y  directiou 
:age animals. At 
ble for mules, and 
nimals had to be 
setshire Regiment 
nued their march, 
]en firing at tlie 
st Battalion 2nd 
At I 1  A.M., heliographic comrcu~-iication was cstalrlishcd \vith brigadier- 
General \Vestmacott's Coiulnn. and shurtly hrforc num the ~ u t  H~ittnlion 2nd 
Gurkhas, which was leading, reached a comnlnndin~ position ;it K11:ind Tal:ru, 
about t\ro and a I~nlt'miles \vest of Dargai, th~ns causing :he tribesmen 11ahtily 
to evacuate that village as  well a s  the v i i l a ~ e s  in the valley Irelow. During 
their retirement the enemy, estimated to rrwrnber sonle Soo men, came under 
the fire of the 1st Enttalion 2nd Guri;has, and suffered considerable loss. 
8. At this point, on-ing to the great dificulties of the road, the Main 
Column had to be halted to ailow of tlie Gordon Hi:lilandel.s and 1 j th  Sikhs 
closing up, and also to cover the return to camp at hhinaxvari of the Jleuntain 
Battery and its escort. At 2-30 '2.31. the concentration had been completed, 
and the blain Column began to move towards Dargai in order to join Briga- 
dier-General S\restrnacott's force, ~vhich in the meantime had destroyed that 
village. The  path mas estremely ditlicuit, and in eonie places precipitous. so 
that progress \\-as slow, and it was found inipossible to reach villages belorv 
Dargai which it had been intended to deal with, and near ivhicll the water- 
supply to Dargai rr-as situated. The track to the water was at'tertmrds found 
to be about three miles in length, so commanded from \he  adjacent heights, 
that water cculd not have been obtained in the presence of an enemy unirss 
these heights as ~ r e l l  a s  Dargai itself had been held. 
g. At this time a hostile force, numbering about 4,000 men, was observed 
advancing from the Khanki Valley up the Narik Ijarra towards Khand Talno, 
while another body of the enemy began to ascend the Dargai heights from the 
same direction. I t  was clear, therefbre, that the gathering of tribesmen near 
Khorappa, having heard the  sound of the guns earlier in the dny, had resolved 
to reinforce the Ali Khels who had just been driven out of Dargai and the 
neighbouring viIlages. But before the enemy could come xvithin fightin- dis- 
tance, the  junction between the two columns had been effected, the 15th Zikhs 
covering the climb of Brigadier-General Kempster's Column along the rugged 
path described above and the retirement of the Sikhs being in turn covered by 
the Gordon Highlanders and two companies of the King's O ~ v n  Scottish Uor- 
derrrs, who took up a strong position just belo~v the village of Dargai. 
While this was  going on: Brigadier-General Westmacott began his avith- 
drawal to the Chagru Kotill, having first posted KO. 5 (Bombay) Rlountain 
Battery near the hotel itself, and sent No. g hlountain Battery Royal Artillery 
with the 1st Battalion Xorthamptonshire Regimerlt to a pusition on the Samara 
Suk, which flanked the road from Dargai to the crest of the pass. The enemy 
pre3sing on, a hot engagement ensued between then1 and the rear-guard, 
our guns making excellent practice, and the Gordon Highlanders with the two 
companies of the King's Oxvn Scottish Borderers, steadily holding their ground 
and checking the advance of the tribesmen. The heavy loss inflicted on the 
enemy caused them to lose heart, no reply being made t:, a final volley fired by 
the rear-guard abor~t 7 p.nI., after which the rvithdrawal to the Chagru Kotal 
and thence to Shinawari was  entirely unmolested. Camp was reached by the  
rear-guard at I r P.N. 
lo. Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer has commented most favour- 
ably on the steadiness and gallantry of the troops engaged on  October the rSth, 
and nas brought to my special notice the services of the follo\vir~g Officers with 
Brigadier-General Jl'estmacutt's Column :-Major H. Rose, 1st Battalion 3rd 
Gurkhas ; Captain A. P. Bateman-Champain, znd Battalion and Gurkhas ; and 
Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon, U.S.O., 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkfas, who led the 
attack on Dargai. Also Captain T. G. MacLaren, Captain I). R. 5laden, Captain 
A. E. Haig, Lieutenant H. F. Pipe-Wolferstan, and 2nd-Lieutenant T. H. 
Keyes of the 2nd Battalion King's Own Scotiish Borderers, who were engaged 
jn supporting the attack and covering the xvithdrawal. 
Wi th  Brigadier-General I iempst~r 's  Column:- 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. H, Mathias, C.B., 1st Battalion Gordon High- 
landers. 
I.reutrnant-Colonel H. A. Abbott. 15th Sikhs. 
I ,~ute-r~n~it-ColoneI E. A. Tmvers, 1st Battallon 2nd Gurkhas. 
C,iptau I. I'hiilips, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, Deputy Ass~stant  Adjutant 
and tJt:a:-trr->laster-(;eneral, Line of Communication. 
Capr.iin F. G. Lucas and Lieutenant the Hon'ble C. G. Bruce, 5th Gurkhas, 
whc -.ere in charge of the Gurkha scouts. 
So. 26;. Private W. Rennie, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who shot  
down four of the enemy a t  very close quarters. 
nr. The casualties on October 18th comprised- 
Major K. D. Jeunings-Bramly, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, killed. 
Lieutenant ?,I. L. pears, 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles, attached to the  
GorScn F4i:hiandrrs, severely wounded. 
British Son-Commissioned Officers and men :-Killed 2, wounded lo. 
S.::ive ranks:-Killed 6, wounded 21. 
Followers:-'Ci'ounded 3. 
12. I am much indebted to Lieutenant-Genenal Sir  A. P. Palmer and  
Bri~adirr-Generals Westmacott and Icempster for the skilful manner in which 
the troops were handled and the operatioo described above brought to a satis- 
f~ctory conclusion. 
r j .  Waving watched the action from the Samana Suk until Dargai had 
been captrlred and the two columns had established communication with each 
;.,tl:cr. I rctilrnrd to Fort Lockhart, where at 5 P.M. I received a heliogram 
ii'sa.:n I.i*.::trn:;nt-Gei~eral S i r  r l .  P. Palmer, informing me that the object of t h e  
r r3.. ~~n.~:s.ni,csl~aci been attained, and that the troops were returning to Shinawari. 
I ;rh~c.crdrnqiy directrd the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division to 
cr;r?!iriutt xvnrk 011 the road the nest day, under the prokction of two battalions 
: i i~i  a n;ountain battery. At I r  A.M. on October Igth, a heliogram w a s  
received from Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, reporting that the troops of his 
divisicn had rractird camp so late on the previous evening that he  thought it 
P~ckter r:u? to enipioy them in the manner indicated, especially a s  an advance 
to Kho:.appn had to be made the next day. I regret that my orders were  not 
car:.irci slut even at the  risk of fatiguing the troops, as  the presence of a force on  
tlic ('il.@jii.t~ Kotai might have detrrred the enemy from re-occupying Dargai, 
fntnti i:n any case xvould have enabled the road to be further improved. But the  
1:e:i:grnm reached me too late to allow of the employment of the wbrking 
part?., which otherwise might have been covered by troops detailed from the 
1st Ilivision. 
14. O n  October 19th the  Dargai heights were observed during the day 
fro33 the Samana ridge, but there was no sign of a formidable gathering, 
al:P.c:i:gP~ a few tribesmen w e r e  seen moving about near the village. 
5. Late on the evening of the 19th I. received a telegram from Shinawari, 
reporting that Dargai and the  adjacent heights were believed to be strongly 
held by the enemy, and that the  General Officer Commanding the 2nd DIVI- 
s i ~ s  proposed to advance the next day to Rhorappa virj Fort Gulistan, the  
S.irnaraa Suk, and the Tsalai spur: instead of down the Chagru defile. For reasons 
.ivhlch need not here be detailed, I was  unahle to accept this suggestion, 
and in reply desired Major-General Yeatman-Biggs to adhere to the original 
pEara of movement. I remarked that whiie it would be necessary to clear the 
Dargai heights overlooking the  road to the west, the enemy would probably 
retire as scot1 as troops had been pushed on to the point where the Narik Ljarra 
joins the Cllagru defile, a s  the enemy's rear would thus be threatened ; and to 
assis: him in  the frontal attack, I placed at his disposal two battalions and  
one moulltain battery from the  1st Division. I also informed him that No. 9 
hIoul l td r~  Battery Royal iSrtillery and the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire 
Iic.yin:ent ssurtld be directed to co-operate from Fort Loclihart, by rziliing up  
a i)t8bition on the Samnna Suk opposite Vargai at 7 A,M. 
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16. On October 20th the troops of the 2nd Division, as  detailed beloup,* 
moved as directed, the advance-guard leaving camp at Shiuawari a t  4-30 A.M. 
and reaching the Chagru Kotal at 8 a x .  At the latter hour the 1st Battaliou 
Northamptonshire Regiment and No. g Mountain Battery Royal Artillery were 
in position on the Samana Suk. Tlie troops detailed from the 1st Division to 
assist in the advance of the and Division were No. I (Kohat) Mountain Battery, 
the 2nd Battalion Derbyshii-e Regiment and the 3rd Sikhs. 
The 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster began its attack on the 
Dargai heights a t  10 Am., by a concentrated artillery fire from No. 8 Mountain 
Battery Royal Artillery, and No. I (Kohat) and No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain 
Batteries, these being posted slightly in advance of the Kotal. No, g Mountain 
Battery Royal Artillery, assisted by shelling the enemy's saxgars from the 
Samana Suk. The attack was led by the 1st Battalion and Gurkhas, supported 
by the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. The and Battalion Derbyshire 
Regiment was in reserve, followed by the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
By 11-30 A.nf. the above force was in formation, under cover, in  readiness 
to capture the heights, but when the and Gurkhas, accompanied by the 
Gurkha scouts c)f the 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas, made their first rush across the 
open, they were met by such a hot and well-aimed fire that all they could do 
was to hold cn to the position they had reached, without being able to advance 
further. 
At 2 P.M., the Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to storm the enemy's 
entrenchments, but though a few men were able to get across the fire-swept 
zone, an advance beyond the  line held by the 2nd Gurkhas was reported by 
the Commanding Oficer to be impracticable, owing to the large number of 
tribesmen lining the edge of Dargai plateau and the steepness of the slope 
leading up to it. Thc General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division accord- 
ingly ordered Brigadier-General Kempster to move up the Gordon Highlanders 
aud the 3rd Sikhs, the former r e ~ i m e n t  being replaced on the lower spur which 
it had hitherto occupied by the Jhind Imperial Service Infantry. The Gordon 
I-Iighlanders went straight up the hill without check or  hesitation. Headed by 
their pipers and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias, C.B., with Major Macbean 
on his right and Lieutenant A. F. Gordon on his left, this splendid battalion 
marched across the open. I t  dashed through a murdercus fire and in forty 
minutes had won the heights, leaving three Ofiicers and thirty men killed o r  
wounded on its way. The first rush of the Gordon Highlanders was deserving 
* The troops of the 2nd Division referred to above were as follows :- 
3rd IZ~icnrle. 
1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment. 
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
1st Bartalion 2nd Gurkhas. 
15th Sikhs. 
N o  ad Rritish Field Flospital. 
No. 44 Ndtive Field Hospital. 
4flr Brirade. 
2nd Battalion K i n z ' ~  Own Scottish Bordarcrs. 
1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas. 
Two sections, N o .  g British Field Hospital. 
Two sections, No. 2.3 British Field Hospital. 
No. 48 Native Field Hospital. 
No .  8 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. 
No.  5 [Bombxy) Mountain Eattery. 
Machine Gun Detachment, 16th Lancers. 
zrst Madras Pioneers. 
No. 4 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. 
Thind Regiment of Imperial Service Infantry. 
'sirmur Imoerial Service S a ~ o e r s  
One section, No. 13 British ~ ; e l d  Hospital. 
No.  43 Native Field Hospital. 
of the highest praise, for they had just undergone a very severe climb, and 
had reached a point beyond >vltich other troops had been unable to advance for 
over three hours. The  first rush was followed at short intervals by a second 
and a third, each led by Officers; and as  the leading companies went up the 
path for the final assault, the remzinder of the troops, atnoug whom the 3rd 
Sikhs were conspicuous, streamed on in support. But few of the  enemy waited 
for the bayonet, many of them being shot down as they fled in confusion. 
17. The position was won at 3-1; '.&I., with the loss of three Officers 
killed, namely :-Major C. B. Judge, 1st Battalion and Gurkhas;  Captain 
W. E. C. Smith, and Battalion Derbyshire Regiment; a n d  Lieutenant A. 
Laniont, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders; and nine wounded, namely:- 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Mathias, C.B., 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders; 
Major F. hlacbean, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders ; Captain H. P. Uniaclre, 
1st Battalion Gordon Iiighlanders; Lieutenant M. F. M. Meiklejohn, 1st 
Rattalion Gordon Highlanders ; Lieutenant K. Dingwall, 1st Battalion Gordon 
Highlanders ; Lieutenant G. S. G. Craufilrd, 1st Batta1ion:Gordon Highlanders ; 
Captain W. R. Arnold, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment ; Captain J. G. 
Robinson, 1s t  Battalion 2nd Gurkhas (since dead) ; Lieutenant G.  E. White, 
3rd Sikhs ; of other ranks ;5 were killed, and 158 wounded. 
IS. The  enemy's loss has not been ascertained, but must have been heavy. 
Nearly every section of the Afridis was represented, but nct in  full strength; 
and there were about I ,  joo Sheikhans, Mishtis, Mallakhels and Akhels, besides 
contingents from the Mamozai, Massozai and Althels. 
19. The  General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division has brought t o  
my special notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias, C.B., 
Commanding the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, in leading his battalion t o  
the assault of a most difficult position at a critical period of the fight, when  
previous attempts had failed. I recommend this Officer for the Victoria Cross. 
Major-General Yeatman-Biggs has also reported most favourably on the 
behaviour of the following British and Native Ofticers and soldiers :- 
Major F. Macbean, ~ s t  Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who  was  the first 
to  spring out of cover and lead his company to the attack, and who, being 
immediately afterwards wounded, continued to cheer his men on while lying 
on the ground. 
Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Travers, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, who led the  
first rush of his men. 
Captains D. C. F. Macintyre and J .  G. Robinson, 1st Battalion 2nd Gur- 
khas; and Lieutenant A. B. Tillard, 1st Battalion qrd Gurkhas. commandina - 
the Gurkha scouts of his regiment. 
- 
No. 2951, Piper G. Findlater, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, who, after 
heing shct through both feet and unable to stand, sat up under a heavy fire 
playing the regimental march to encourage the charge 
No. 3456, Private E. Lawson, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, w h o  
carried Lteutenant Dingwall, when wounded and unable to move, out of a 
heavy fire, and subsequently returned and brought in Privzite McMillan, being 
himself wounded in two places in so doing. 
Subadar Kirpa Kam Thapa, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, who, though 
wounded in t u o  places, corltlnutd to discharge his duties i n  the front hne. 
I recommend Piper Findlatrr and Private Lawaon for the Victoria Cross. 
20. The  General Officer Commanding the 2nd Divis~on has  also brought 
to notice the servlces of the following Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and 
men as deserv~ng of recognition :- 
Major G. T. F. Downman, ~ s t  Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
Captain C. C. Miller-Wallnut, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
Captain and Adjutant W. Campbell, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
Lieutenant G. D. Mackrnzle, 1st Battalion Gordon Highianders. 
Lieutenant G. E. E. G. Cameron, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
-y severe climb, and 
unable to advance fo r  
intervals by a seco~ ld  
lpanies went u p  the  
ainong whom the  3 rd  
r of the enemy waited 
d in confusion. 
loss of three Officers 
d Gurkhas;  Captain 
; and Lieutenant A. 
wounded, namely :- 
Gordon Highlanders ; 
ptain H. P. Uniacke, 
M. Meiklejohn, 1s t  
1st Battalion Gordon 
Gordon Highlanders ; 
ment ; Captain J. G. 
]tenant G. E. White, 
1. 
lust have been heavy. 
nct in full strength; 
and Akhels, besides 
$ion has brought t o  
lone1 Mathias, C.B., 
dding his battalion t o  
1 of the  fight, when  
r t he  Victoria Cross. 
~t favourably on  the  
soldiers :- 
, who was  the  first 
.ck, and who, being 
men on  while lying 
~ r k h a s ,  who led t h e  
Battalion 2nd Gur- 
rkhas, commanding 
'hlanders, who, after 
under a heavy fire 
Highlanders, w h o  
: to  move, out of a 
;tte McMillan, being 
:has, who, though 
s. in  the  front line. 
e Victoria Cross. 
I has  also brought 
jioned Officers and  
~ders .  
hlanders. 
n Highlanders. 
~ianders .  
Highlanders. 
8, KO. i 77? ,  Colnur-Scryeant J. Craib, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
Iqo. 2025, Colour-St rgeatit T. Xlackie, 1st Hzittalion Gordon H~ghlauders. 
No. 2021, Sererant  F. liichie, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
No. 3056, Sergeant D. RIathers, 1st Battalion Gordon H~ghlanders. 
No. 1952. Sergeant T. Uonaldson, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
No. 2465, Sergeant J. M'Kay, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders. 
No. 3711, Lance-Corporal (piper) G. Rlilne, 1st Battalion Gordon High- 
landers. 
Captain W. R. Arnold, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, w h o  led the  
first rush  of his batt:ilion. 
No. 3937, Private S. Vicker~r, 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regimmt, w h o  
ran down the slope, rescued a wounded comrade, and brought him back to 
cover. Th i s  soldier has subsequently greatly distinguished himself during the 
withdrawal of Brigadier-General Kempster's Column from the Waran  Valley, 
and 1 propose in due course to  recommend him for the  Victoria Cross. 
Lieutenant H. S.  Pennell, and  Battalion Derbgshire Regiment, who  en- 
deavoured to  bring in Captain Smith's body, and only desisted on finding that 
Captain Smith was dead. 
Captain C. E. de  M. Norie, 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, who  was  conspicu- 
ously forward at the  commencemect of the  action. 
21. In  recording m y  acknorvledgments t o  Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, 
C.B., and Brigadier-General Kempster, D S.O., for the success of the  opera- 
tions on October 20til I think i t  necessary to point out  that the  advance was 
not conducted in the  manner in which I had intended, and a s  I tllought I had 
clearIy indicated. Tl;e General Officer Commanding t h e  and Division restricted 
himself to  a frontal attack on tile Uargai heights, without employing a portion 
of the  !arge force a t  h is  disposal to turn the  enemy's rear by pushing on a s  
rapidly a s  possible to the point ofjunction of the  Narilc Darra with the Chagru 
defile Undoubtedly the  troops would have been urider fire and might have 
sufpred some loss in moving along the  road below the heights; but if full 
advantage had been taken of the  inequalities of the  ground, I am of opinion 
that the  loss would not have been heavy, and I fee1 confiderlt that. a s  soon 
a s  their line of retreat n7as  threatened, the tribesmen would have begun to 
disperse. 
~t the  same time, I recognise that the  enemy's defeat mas rendered more 
complete and decisive by their  being encouraged to hold on td t h e  last, and the  
result of the  action must, be regarded a s  satiuf%ctory, inasmuch a s  the move- 
ment of the  troop$, baggage and supplies from Shinawdri to Khorappa, 
subsequent t:, the  capture of t h e  Dargai heights, was  almost unmolested. 
22. On the night of October zoth, Dargai was held by the  1st Bartalion 
Dorsetshir-e Regiment and 3rd Sikhs, supported by the  1st Hattalion Gordon 
Highlanders, whiie the  remainder of the  troops bivouacked on  o r  near the  
Chagru Kotal. 
23. At daybreak on the  21st, t h e  march of the  2nd Division to Khorapp:~, 
or, more properly, to Khangarbur, on the  left bank of the Ichanki stream, was  
resumed, while in order to  avoid a blocls con the main road, 1 proceeded from 
Fort Locktiart to the  same point 0% Fort Gulistan and the Tsalai spur. taking 
with me  Pio. 9 Rlountain Battery Royal Artillery, the 1st Battalion Northamp- 
tonshire Regiment, t he  56th Sikhs, and E O  ; Company Bombay Sapprrs  and 
Miners. T h e  track from the village of Tsalai dolvn to its junction with the  
main road w a s  so bad, that  none of the  baggage of the  troops accorupenging me  
reached camp a t  Ichorappa until late the  r?ext day, that of the 56th Sikhs  co t  
arriving until mid-day on the ~ 3 r d .  
24. l h e  4th Brigade and some of the Divisional troops of the  2nd Division 
arrived a t  Khorappa towards  theevening of the  ~ 1 s t  October. The remainder of 
the  division coming in  the  next  day ; but owing to the  Eteepness and narrcwness 
of t h e  road, and the inferiority of a considerable proportion of the  transport 
( lii > 
animals, several days elapsed before all the baggage of the division had 
come up. On October q t h ,  the troops of the 1st Division began to move 
from Shinawari t o  Khorappa, and by the evening of the 27th the Main Column, 
with its supplies and transport, had concentrated in readiness for a further ad- 
vance. Advantage was taken of the halt at Khorappa to improve the road from 
the Chagru Kotal, to complete the organisation of the transport service, and 
to adjust t h e  loads of the several classes of animals employed, namely, mules, 
ponies and donkeys. 
25. And here I may mention that during the halt at Khorappa, though 
every military precaution was taken, the camp was fired into every night, 
sometimes by large bodies of the enemy, and our foraging parties were pertica- 
ciously opposed and followed up by the tribesmen. The losses from this  cause 
were heavy, aggregating three British Officers, twenty-five British soldiers, and 
twenty-one native ranks, killed or  wounded. The names of the  Otticers a re  
given below :- 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Hadow, 15th Sikhs, severely wounded. 
Captain F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, dangerously 
wounded. 
Lieutenant G. D. Crocker, 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, wounded. 
26. On October zSth, in accordance with instructions issued on the pre- 
vious evening, the force marched in two columns to Gundaki, t h e  1st Division 
across the plain and the 2nd Division up the bed of the l<andi Rlishti stream, 
while a detached column consisting of the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regi- 
ment and the 36th Sikhs occupied the hills to the right of my line of advance As 
the left column was threatened from the west, I also occupied three hills which 
commanded that flank with the 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment, a wing of 
the 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas, and a wing of the 3rd Sikhs, respectively. This 
display of force led the enemy to believe that I intended to turn their right, 
which they at once began to strengthen, and during the night of the 28tk the 
detachment of the 4th Gurkhas, which in the evening had been reduced to two 
companies, was continuously attacked at close quarters, suffering, however, but 
slight loss owing to the care taken in the day time to protect the position by 
sa?zxars. The strong flanking parties which had pushed out enabled me to re- 
connoitre the Sampagha Pass, and having settled on my plan of action, I direct- 
ed ths whole force to bivouac near Gundaki, and issued orders for the attack on 
the following day. 
Our casualties on October zSth were :- 
Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. K. Sage, 2nd Battalion ~ s t  Gurkhas, severely 
wounded. Other ranks :-Icilled two, wounded 10. 
27. Here it may be noted that, previous to my advance, on October A h ,  
I had to detach two battalions to strengthen the force on the Line of Communi- 
cation. The  30th Punjab Infantry was detailed to hold the Dargai heights, 
and the ~ 1 s t  Madras Pioneers to form part of the Khorappo garrison. 
28. On October ~ g t h ,  at 5 A.M., the 1st Brigade moved out of camp to 
cover the advance to the Sampagha. The 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment 
seized the village of Nazeno, thus protecting my right. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Yule quickly brushed away all opposition on that side. The 2nd Battslion 1st 
Gurkhas covered my left by occupying the  village of Kandi Mishti and met 
with no opposition. The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, advancing in the 
centre, occupied without resistance a low rocky hill stretching across the plateau 
between the  Kandi Mishti and Sampagha ravines, which I had chosen a s  my 
first artillery position. 
At 5-15 A.M., the 2nd Brigade, preceded by the Gurkha scouts, left camp 
with orders to enter the Sampagha ravine, and to advance by a path leading to- 
wards the enemy's position up a long bare spur as soon as the guns should have 
suEciently silenced the fire from the sa9zgavs; this advance to be supported in 
succession by the 4th and grd Brigades. 
At 6-30 n.nr, the first shots were fired by the enemy, hut the action did not 
really begin until 7-30 A.M., when the three mountain batteries of the 1st Divi- 
sion opened fire on the sn~zpnrs from the first artillery position above mention- 
ed. Their  fire wnseffective, the rangebeing r,Sjo yards, and the enemy quickly 
evacuated the entrenchments which commanded the lower slopes of the pass, 
these being seized by the and Brigade at S n.nr. The three batteries of the 
2nd Division, together with the rocket detachment, were now pr~shed on, 
and opened fire on the crest of the pass at  a range of 2,200 yards. The fire 
of the guns was, however, soon masked by the rapid advanceof the and Brigade 
which, with the 1st Battalion Royal West  Surrey Regiment (the Queen's) lead- 
inz, reached the summit of the pass at  9-45 A.nI. The artillery was again 
ordered up in support, No. 5 (Bombay) Mountdin Battery in front. On reach- 
ing the crrst this battery did excellent service in assisting the infantry of the 
2nd Brigade to dislodge the tribesmen from the heights they were holding on 
either flank, but w h ~ l e  ngaged on this duty I regret ti, report that Captaiu De 
Butts, Royal Artillery, Commanding the battery, was lnortally wnunded. The 
heights on the north-east of the pass were eventually cleared by t h e  1st Eatta- 
lim Royal West  Surrey Regiment and the 3rd Silrhs, while those on the north- 
west were stormed by the  36th Sikhs, supported by six companies of the and 
Battalion Ring's Own Scottish Borderers. The last shots were fired at 11-30 
A.M., and the 15th Sikhs were then sent on  as an advance-guard into the 
Mastura Valley, where 1 proposed to bivouac. 
29. While the troops were moving duwn into the valley some slight resis- 
tance was met with, but this ceased as  soon as  the hills commanding the camp- 
ing ground had been occupied by pickets. 
T h e  1st Brigade remained on the Sampagha for the night, with a view to 
protecting transport animals and baggage. 
30. The casualties during the action were :- 
Captain F. R ,  McC. De Butts, Royal Artillery, killed. 
Major R. T. Hanford-Fiood, 1st Eattalion Royal West Surrey Regiment, 
slightly mounded. 
Other ranks :.-Icilled one, wounded three. 
-71. On October ;oth, the  Main Column, with the exception of the 1st 
Brigade, which continued to hold the  Sampagha Pass: remained in camp on 
the;ight bank of the Rlustura stream. In the morning I made a reconnais- 
sance ofthe Arhanva Pass, and issued orders for the attack on the following 
day. My great difficulty was the want of food, some corps having absolutely 
nothing in hand and the steep and narrow track over the pass delaying the 
arrival of supplies. But by redistributing what there was, and making use of 
what could be collected in the  neighbouring villages, each man was  eventually 
prnvided with two days' rations. I therefore determined not to postpone the 
attack on the Arhanga Pass, a s  I was convinced that a protracted halt in the 
Mastura Valley, expedient a s  it might seem from a commissariat point of view, 
would not only encourage the Afridis and give them time to collect their fight- 
iug men, but also enable them to destroy, hide, o r  remove the forage and grain 
I stored in their villages, and thus render our sttiy in Tirah a matter of extreme 
I ditliculty. 
32, On October ~ r s t ,  t h e  4th Brigade crossed the Mastura stream at 6 A.M. 
and advanced towards the Arhanga Pass  across a broken plain up to a low de- 
tached mound, in  rear of which the brigade was  massed ar 8 A.M. Shortly after- 
wards the three batteries of the and Division opened fire from tnis mound, 
at a range of 1,300 yards, on the enemy's main position along the crest of the 
pass. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade had moved up on the right, and t h e  3rd 
Brigade was disposedin ecl~clolr on the  left. with the object of threatening the 
enemy's right and jsining the  central attack when ordered to  do so. The 2nd 
i Brigade began the action by a flanlc movement on the right u p  two rocky spurs and an interveningravine. thus gaining the cresc east of the pass;  while the 
4th Brigade attacked in tht: centre, supported Ly the 3rd Brigade. The 
2nd Rricndr's atkacl; was led by the  2nd Battalion Yorkshire Regiment a n d  
the Gurkha scouts, each gallantly racing up the steep slope, the summit 
of xvhich \vns reached by both s imul ta~~eous ly  at l o  A.M. The  main attack 
was led by the and Battalion King's Own Scottish Horderers. Neither attack 
met x i t h  serious opposition, and shortly after 10 A.BI. the pass was in o u r  
hands, and a11 opposition had practically ceased. 
T h e  casualties were :-Killed none, wounded two. 
I may here mention that the road up the Arhanga Pass though short, was  
i h e  steepest and worst that had yet been encountered, 
5;. Immediately after the action I gave orders for the concentration of  
the force in Alaidan with the  exception of the 1st Brigade, which I had to  
leave behind for the purpose of dominating the Mastura Valley and of guard- 
ing tile Line of Communication between Tirah and Khorappa. 
34. During the period dealt with in this report the troops under m y  
command were subjected to much privation and fatigue, to Ereat variations 
of temperature, to heavy losses in action, and to continual night alarms. NO 
body of men could have shown a better spirit. 
That a more formidable resistance was not offered in the passes leading 
respectively into Orakzai and Afridi Tirah, I attribute to the lesson taught 
those tribes at Dargai in the actions of October 18th and October 20th. They 
then lrnrnt t h a t  their strongest positions could not avail them against the valour 
of British and Sative troops. 
35. In si~bmitting this report, I desire to record my acknowledgments to 
the General Officer Commanding the Line cf Communications, the General 
OSficcrs Commanding Divisions and Brigades, the Chief of the Staff, and  the  
Rrigcidier-Generals Conlmanding the Koyai Artillery and Royal Engineers, t h e  
Wracls af Lkpartments, especially those of Ordnance, Supply and Transport, 
t h e  Officers of the Head-Quartel-s, Divisional, and Brigade Staffs, and the Com- 
manding and other Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the several 
corps under my command, all of mhoni have done their duty in a manner 
befitting Her Blajesty's Army. 
My recommendations for the recognition of the services of individual Officers, 
Ban-Cornmissicnrd Officers and soldiers, subsequent to the  action of October 
20th. v.-ill be embodied in my final despatch on the termination of the present 
expedition. 
General Sir William Lockhart's despatch describing the operations of t h e  
Tirah Expeditioilary Force from November 1st to January z6th, was published 
in a later issue of the Gn~ef t e  of I ~ r r Z i a ,  together with comments as follows :- 
I n  a covering letter the Adjutant-General on behalf of the Commander-in- 
Chief writes :- 
' 4  S o  campaign on the frontiers of India has been conducted under more 
trying and arduous circumstances than those encountered by the Tirah Expedi- 
tionary Force. Its operations have been carried out in  a country destitute of 
roads, the physical configuration of which i s  such as  to present the maxilnu~n of 
difficulty to tlte moremeilt of regular troops. The  enemy were for the most 
part skilled marksmen, exceptionally active and well armed, and expert i n  
guerilla tactics. tlihile avoiding serious resistance to the advance of our troops, 
they have lost no opportunity of harassing them both on the  march and in 
bivouac : a system of fighting admirably suited to the nature of the country, and 
which has necessaril~l occasioned us considerable loss not only in action, but 
also from toil and exposure. I n  spite of these difficulties severe punishment 
has bcen meted out to the tribes concerned, with the result that the entire 
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Orakzai tribe has submitted and con~plied with the terms of the Government, as 
have also a portion of the Afridis ;and i t  seems probable even now that the re. 
mainder of this tribe will not force a repetition of offensive operations, but 
tender their submission a t  an early date. During the operations tlle fighting 
qualities and endurance of the troops have been Ilighly tested, and it is  with no 
small sense of gratification and pride that the Commander-in-Chief brillgs to the 
notice of the Government of India the soldierly conduct and discipline of the 
troops amidst all the hardships and exposure which fell to them ; both Oflicers 
and  men having, whether in action or in bivouac, conducted themselves in a 
manner thoroughly befitting the traditions of Her Majesty's Army. His Ex- 
cellency deplores the loss to the Army uf the many brave OHicers and men who 
have died in the performance of theii duty, and amongst them such distinguished 
soldiers a s  the late Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton, 
36th Sikhs, and others whose careers were so full of promise. 
" The Commander-in-Chief would specially commend to the favourable 
notice of the Government the distinguished Oficer selected for the comqand of 
the  expedition, who has exercised an exceptionally dificult and responsible 
command with much skill, vigour and judgment; and His Excellency talres this 
opportunity of expressing his own acknowledgments to Sir William Lockhart 
for the able manner in which he has directed the operations of the Force under 
his  command. The Commander-in-Chief also endorses the commendatory 
remarks made by Sir William Lockhart on the services of General Sir A. Power 
Palmer, General Symotls and General Nicholson, and the Officers and others 
mentioned in paragraphs 22 to 31 of the despatch. His Excellency fully shares 
2. S i r  William Lockhart's appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial Service troops, whose association with our own troops has given them an oppor- 
4 tunity of paining valuable military experience which cannot fail to result in in- creased efficiency. , 
1' 
\ 
p " Sir George White has much pleasure in commending to the notice of the Government the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Partab Singh, who accom- 
panied the force throughout the expedition as extra Aide-de-camp to Sir William 
.Lockhart ; of Lieutenant-Colonel the Maharaja of Cooch Behar and of Major the 
Maharaj Rana of Dholpur, who were employed as extra Orderly Officers to the 
Divisional Commanders. 
IL As this despatch will probably be the last that Sir George White will submit 
during his tenure of command, he desires to take this opportunity of bringing to 
the  notice of the Government the valuable services rendered by the  following 
Officers and Departments in connection with the recent operations." 
The Officers named are: Sir George' Wolseley, Commanding the Punjab ; 
General Morton, Adjutant-General ; General Badcock, Quarter-Master-General ; 
Colonel Duff, Military Secretary ; Surgeon-Major-General Gore ; Major Mullaly, 
D.A.Q.-M.-G. for Mobilisation ; Veterinary-Colonel Tholnson ; Major-General 
I-Iobday, Commissary-General-in-Chief; Major-General Wace, Director-General 
of Ordnance ; Mr. Reynolds, Director-General of Telegraphs ; the Postal, Tele- 
graph and Survey Officers and subordinates with the Field Force; Colonel 
Brackenbury, Manager, Mr. Jacob, Traffic Superintendent, and the subordinate 
staff of the North-Western Railway. 
I t  is further remarked:-" It has been ascertained that between the 1st July 
and the 31st October the additional trains on the North-Western Railway re-, 
quired for military traffic amounted to 4,544, or an average of 37 trains per diem 
in  excess of the normal traffic. Any breakdown of the railway arrangements 
during the  period when troops and supplies were being pushed to the front 
would have had a very serious effect on the military operations ; and that no 
such failure occurred, is due, in  His Excellency's opinion, to the able administra- 
tion of his railway system by the Manager and to the untiring efforts of his sub- 
ordinates." 
The fL,]lo\\.ing are some of the observations in detail :- 
"011 I-ieutermnnt-General Sir G. Wolseley and the Staff of the Punjab 
Coillnln13d devolved the duty of carrying out the preliminary concentration of the 
rnriuun t;Jrcas \x-hic.h hare been placed in the field. This has been no light task, 
but it has been successfully performed. Of the staff at Army Head-Quarters I 
aIrl to ~ne:~tian General SIorton, Adjutant-General in India, who has throughout 
proved himself zealous and untiring in the performance of the duties which, 
c . ~ p ~ c i ~ ! l ~  during the Tvnr, pertain to his responsible position, and has at all times 
:!R;,l-dell to tlle Commander-in-Chief all the assistance in his power. I am especial- 
IF tt-, brint: to notice General Badcocl;, Quarter-Master-General in India, for his 
SupCrl.isi~i~ of all the arrangements for the mobilisation of the large forces now 
nrld recently in the field. The difficulty of the task has been greatly enhanced 
by the fact that we  \\-ere not only engaged in active operations in sevelaal direc- 
t i ~ : ~ s  at one :lild the same time, but were also compelled to be in readiness to 
lllect ally fi~rtl-ier complication which might suddenly arise aIong any portion of 
t!~e Sorth-\l7est ti-ontier. That we  have been able to mass the necessary troops 
withrrut delay on the point threatened by each successive rising a s  it occurred, 
and that our mobi!is3tion arrangements have worked smoothly and without 
fric:ic.,n. have been very largely due to the Quarter-Master-General's constant and 
nsiiduons work. Sir George White also wishes to bring to the special notice 
of the G ~ v e r n m m t  of India the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Duff, Military 
 secret:^^^, in \\.horn His Escellency has always found a Staff Officer of the very 
highest ability, most earnest sense of duty and soundest judgment, who has 
dtme all that n direct personal assistant could do to lighten the work and anxiety 
of the Commander-in-Chief in a time of exceptional difficulty." 
SIR WILLIAM LOCKHART'S DESPATCH. 
Sir William Lockhart, in his despatch, describes the military operations in 
Korember, December and January. 
Regarding Sir Henry Havelock Allen's death, for which h e  expresses deep 
regret, Sir \Villiam Lockhart says:-"Every precaution had been taken to 
emiure his safety, and on bidding him good-bye at Lala China, I had impressed 
on him the necessity of invariably remaining with the troops detailed for his 
prutection." 
The despatch continues :- 
"During the operations described I have received every possible support 
and assistance from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communica- 
tion, his Staff and the troops under his command. The requirements.of the 
blain Column have been promptly and fully met, while the arrangements made 
ta protect the long and exposed line between Kohat and the Sampagha Pass and 
afterwards to tramsfer the base from Kohat to Peshawar have been all that I 
could have desired. 
" In bringing this narrative to a close I wish to record my high appreciation 
of the conduct of the British and native troops serving with the Tirah Expedi- 
tionary Force. Up to the present date their losses have amounted to 1,050 
killed and wounded. They have been subjected to great hardship and exposure, 
harassed at  night by assaults at  close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and en- 
gaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on picket and in 
guarding foragng parties, have been specially onerous. Hardly a day or night 
has passed without casualties, and whether we advanced or  retired, every 
soldier had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy, who made no stand 
in the open but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen. The operations 
were carried out in a country which offered every natural advantage to the 
tribesmen and imposed on regimental Officers and rank and file the necessity 
for individual initiative, unremitting watchfulness and personal activity. I am 
glad to  say the troops responded nobly to the call made upon them. Cheeerful 
and soldier-Iike under exceptionally trying conditions, Officers and men to 
the utlnost the traditions of their corps and the honour of H~~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~  A ~ ~ ~ .  
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" The advance into Tirah was delayed, and the subsequent movements of 
the force were impeded, by the inferiority of a large proportion of the transport 
animals and the want of proper discipline and training amongst many of the 
transport drivers and Icahars. But it must be remembered that a peace 
organisation which has to be  rapidly expanded when war breaks out takes time 
to render it eEcient, and that the requirements, elsewhere had already absorbed 
much of the betterclass of pack transport which would otherwise have been avail- 
able. 
The results attained by the expedition may be summarised as fol- 
lows :-The troops under my command have marched everywhere within t h o  
Orakzai and Afridi limits and the whole of Tirah has now for the first time been 
accurately surveyed. Our enemies, wherever encountered, have been punished, 
and their losses are stated on unimpeachable evidence to have been extremely 
severe. The towers and walls of almost every fortified village in the country 
have been levelled to the ground, and the winter supply of grain, fodder and 
fuel of both tribes has been consumed by the force. The Oralrzai have been 
completely subdued and have complied with the terms prescribed for them ; but 
the  Afridis still hold out, although I have strong hopes that they may before 
long submit and thus save their country from a fresh invasion in the spring. 
" During the present expedition the scouts, drawn from the 3rd and 5th 
Gurkhas, have proved especially valuable Being trained mountaineers and 
accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb most precipitous hills, 
lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics. 
" The Imperial Service Corps attached to the force have taken their full 
share in the hardships of the  campaign, and fighting side by side with their 
comrades in the regular army have given a tangible proof of their readiness and 
that of their rulers to assist in the defence of the Empire. 
During the expedition the Mountain Artillery had an important part to 
play, and fully sustained its reputation as one of t h e  most efficient branches of 
that arm of the service. 
" Much work of a responsible and arduous nature, principally road-making 
and the destruction of village defences, devolved on  the corps of Royal Engl- 
neers, the companies of Sappers and Miners and the  Pioneer regiments. This 
work was carried out in a creditable manner." 
Sir  William Lockhart praises the administration of the Army and Civil 
Departments, and says that medical oilicers fully maintained thew high reputa- 
tion by their attention to the sick and wounded under fire and in hospital ; also 
that the signalling and survey work were well done. tlr acknowledges the 
public spirit evinced by Mr. Dhanjiboy, who by tonga service facilitated the 
transport of the  sick and wounded to the base hospital. 
In recording his obligations to the General Officers, Sir William Lockhart 
writes :-" Sir A. Power Palmer has commancled the Line of Communication to 
my entire satisfaction, and has displayed administrative talents of a high order. 
Major-General Symons has commanded the 1st Division with marked ability, 
and in a manner which has gained the  confidence of all ranks. Major- general^ 
Yeatman-Biggs was in a very bad state of health from the outset, but his indomit- 
able: spirit carried him through the whole of the  operations, only to die at  
Peshawar on January 5th. I would fain have sent him back to India from the 
Samana or subsequently from Korappa, but the responsible medical officers consid- 
ered him fit to remain in the field : a decision which gratified him, although I 
personally could not agree with it Owing to a regrettable accident t-, Brigadier- 
General Hamilton, Brigadier-General R. Hart wassent  to relieve him. General 
Hart joined the 1st Brlgade on October 24th, and has commanded lt t h r o ~ g h o ~ t  
the expedition with great ability and energy, Brigadier-General Gaselee 
has fully maintained his high reputation and proved himself to be an admirable 
excellent service, more particularly when withdrawing from the Bara Valley on 
December 1 3th and 14th. Brigadier-General Hammond. though until lately he 
has not participated in the active operations of the force, has commanded the 
Peshawar Column to my satisfaction. I am also much indebted to the Officer 
Commanding the Kurram Movable Column, Colonel Hill, who has shown energs, 
capacity and judgment in the performance of his duties. His troops were well 
handled, both in the reconnaissance to Hissar and during the operations against 
the Khani Khel Chamkannis. 
LL I desire to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief and the Govern- 
ment of India the following Officers who have rendered exceptionally good 
service :-Brigadier-General Nicholson, chief of the staff, an officer of brilliant 
abilities, fertility of resource and experience in war, the value of whose assis- 
tance it is difficult for me to acknowledge in adequate terms. I would very 
specially put forward his services for recognition and reward. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Barrow, Assistant Adjutant-General and Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, 
Assistant Quarter-Master-General, have fully justified their selection for their 
important post on the Army Staff. I consider these Officers are well deservirlg 
of advancement. Captain Haldane, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, is a 
staff officer of high promise, great abillty and untiring mental and physical 
energy." 
Other Officers included in this special list are Brigadier-General Spragge, 
C.R.A , and his Brigade-Major Captain C De C. Hamllton ; Bngadier-General 
Broadbent, C.R.E., and his Brigade-Major Captain Craster; Surgeon-Malor- 
G~nera l  Thomson, Principal Medlcal Officer, and his Secretary Surgeon-Major 
I 
Morris ; Colonel Scott, Senior Ordnance Officer; Colonel Christopher, Commis- 
sary-General of the Force ; Major Mansfield, Chief Transport Officer, and his 
Assistant Captain Hall ; Lieutenant-Colonels Dixon, Klng's Own Scottish 
Borderers ; Abbott, 15th S~khs  ; Travers, 2nd Gurkhas ; Haughton, 36th Sikhs 
(who are said to have commanded thelr battalions in a manner whlch merits 
hlgh approbation), Mr. Van Someren and Mr. Truninger, Postal Department; Slr 
Pratab Singh, Extra Aide-de-camp. Sir Wllliam Lockhart says, hls acknowledg- 
ments are due also to Lord Methuen, Press Censor ; Colonel Holdich, Ch~ef 
I 
I 
Survey Officer ; Veterinary-Colonel Glover ; Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, I 
Military Accounts ; Mr. Pitman, Chief Superintendent of Telegraphs, Punjah 
Division; Lieutenant Davie, 3rd Sikhs, Commanding the Personal Escort; and 
Subadar-Major Bishan Singh. 
The following list includes the names of Officers whose good services came 
under Slr William Lockhart's personal notice :-" Officers whose good services 
came under my personal notice :- 
~ 
I 
Army and Personal Staff.-Colonel More-Molyneux, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ealfe, Major Logan-Home; Captain Maconchy, Captain Swanston, Major Mercer, 
Captain Grimston, Surgeon-Captain Morgan, Captmo Shewell, Malor Scallon, 
in charge of Imperial Service troops, Captain Bajee (Haroda State Artillery), I 
Lieutenants Maxwell and Annesley (Aide-de-Camps), Lieutenants Collen and 
Smith (Orderly OEcers), Risaldar-Major Khan Bahadur Kisaldar Kadam Khan, 
Jemadar Abdul Ghani. 
1 
1 
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In addition to the transport officers mentioned.in the preceding paragraphs, 
the Commissary-General with the Tirah Exped~tionary Force brought to special 
notice the services of the following regimental officers :-Captains Weller, 
S. D. Browne, Cookson, C. Davies, Pollock, Cotgrave. 
Sir SVilliam Lockhart further records his acknowledgments to the Native 
Commanding Officers of the various Imperial Service Corps. Among the 
honorary commissioned and warrant officers mentioned are: Assistant Surgeons 
O'Connor, Charters, Hussey, Captain Bennett, Conductors Land and Thorne, 
Ordnance Department; Lieutenant Ezechiel, Conductor Falkland, Commissariat 
Transport Department ; L~eutenant J. McDermott, Conductor Morrison. Sub- 
Conductor Wiggins, Miscellaneous Departments. The Non-Commissioned Offi- 
cers mentioned are : Sergeant-Major Diblett, Sergeants Howell. Payne, Blaker, 
Tibbs, G. C. White, A. White, Pepper and Ashworth. The Rev. A. S. Dyer 
and the chaplains of all denominations were mentioned as having performed 
their duties satisfactorily. 
Sir William Lockhart concludes by recording his indebtedness for advice 
and assistance to Sir Richard Udny, Colonel Warburtpn, Mr. King and other 
Officers attached to the force in a political capacity. 
Comprehensive lists of Non-Commissioned Officers and men, British and 
native, who have shown conspicuous gallantry, and whom it is intended to re- 
commend for the Distinguished Conduct Medal or Order of Merit, will be sub- 
mitted in a supplementary despatch. 
THE VICEROY'S REMARKS. 
The Governor-General in Council, in directing the publication of the above 
despatch, remarks : - - ' I  These operations have been conducted in a country of 
great natural difficulty and against an enemy of extraordinary boldness and 
activity, armed moreover with weapons of precision, of which they thoroughly 
understood the use. The withdrawal from Tirah necessitated by the season 
formed part of the plan of operations from the outset, but it was nevertheless an 
operation of greatdifficulty under circumstances requiring not only most careful 
dispositions, but also avery high degree of discipline, courage and endurance on the 
part of the troops. The Governor-General concurs with the Commander-in-Chief 
in his opinion that the manner in which the campaign has been conducted 
reflectsvery great credit on Sir William Lockhart's skill and judgment, and shares 
His Excellency's admiration of the devotion to duty and soldierly spirit displayed 
by the t~oops  on all occasions. His Excellency tenders to all Officers and men 
of the Tirah Expeditionary Force the cordial congratulatio~ls and thanks of the 
Government of India. His Excellency also fully shares in Sir George White's 
appreciation of the assistance rendered by the Imperial Service Troops, and 
takes this opportunity of acknowledging the ready loyalty of the chiefs who have 
.placed their regiments and transport trains at the disposal of the Government 
and the personal services rendered by Sir Partab Singh, the Maharaja of Cooch 
13ehar, and the Maharaja Rana of Dholpur. His Excellency further desires to 
aclrnowledge the services rendered during the operations by the Officers of the 
Staff at Army Head-Quarters and of the Departments under the Government of 
India mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, and cannot allow this opportunity 
t o  pass without conveying to Sir George White his sense of the distinguished 
ability with which on this occasion and throughout his term of office the 'respon- 
sible duties of Commander-in-Chief have been performed." 
A despatch from Sir William Lockhart describing the operations of the 
Tirah Expeditionary Force from the 27th January to the 5th April, was 
published still later with comments :- 
The Governor-General in Council agrees with the Commander-in-Chief in 
$is appreciation of the services of the Officers named in the Adjutant-General's 
letter, and of the conduct ot the troops during the period in question. 
( lxi ) 
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T h e  Commander-in-Cliief endorses the commend at or^ remarks made by 
S i r  William Lockhart on the services of Brigadier-Ceneral Hamilton, 
Commanding the  3rd Brigade, Brigadier-General Ottley, Commanding the 
Royal Engineer Force, and the others named in  the despatch, as  also the 
soldier.lilre conduct shown by the  troops. 
Sir William Lockhart in his despatch describes the Shinkamar action, and 
adds :-'' Among the killed the country has to deplore the loss of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Haughton, 36th Sikhs, an officer whose able and gallant leading of the 
fine regiment which he commanded had repeatedly come under my notice." 
Sir William Lockhart, in concluding his despatch, remarks : " The Afridis 
s r e  now most desirous of resuming their former friendly relations with the Brit- 
ish Government, and admit that the recent operations in Tirah have convinced 
them of the folly of their unprovoked attack on the Khyber and the Samana 
posts and other host~le acts. They express contrition for their misconduct and 
acknowledge the justice of their punishment I trust that these tribesmen who 
have proved themselves as brave foes as the  Sikhs did, may like the latter 
become our firm friends. No finer iighting material can be found on the borders 
of India, and if by firm yet sympathetic treatment we  succeed in  gaining the 
ccnfidence and affection of these hardy mountaineers, we  may hope to utilize 
their services more fully than before in the  defence of the Empire. 
' I  In bringing this narrative to a close I would wish to record my appre- 
ciation of the soldier-like behaviour of the troops under my command, not only 
while actively engaged in the field, but also while employed on the tedious 
and  monotonous duties of a blockade. Their conduct during the second phase of 
the campaign has been as creditable as were their gallantry and endurance 
during the  first. The force can congratulate itself on having,carried out in the 
most thorough manner the task entrusted to it. In no  prevlous campaign on 
the  north-west frontier of India has a more exemplary punishment been inflict- 
ed, o r  a more complete submission been enforced. 1 have to record my 
obligations to Brigadier-General Hamilton, who has performed his duties 
with marlred ability and energy ; also to Brigadier-General Ottley, who has 
rendered valuable service as commanding the Royal Engineers of the force, 
more particularly in connection with the improvement of communications and 
the  restoration of the Khyber posts. 
<'Durinq the period dealt with in this despatch the follo~ving Officers have 
been brought to my notice a s  deserving of favourable mention : Major C. St. 
L. Barter and Captain H. Wells Cole, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry ; 
Lieutenant A. K. Robb, Durham Light Infantry (attached to King's Own 
Yorkshire Light Infantry) ; Surgeon-Lieutenant M. Dick, Indian Medical 
Service. 
" Since the publication of my previous despatches the undermentioned 
OFEcers. whose names were omitted in the first instance, have been specially 
recommended for their good services by the general officers concerned :-Lieu. 
tenant-Colonel C. H. W.Cafe, Royal Sussex Reglment ; Major G. F. A. Morton, 
Commanding No. I Mountain Battery Royal Artillery ; Major E. Hegan, 5th 
Dragoon Guards, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General ; Major H. R. 
Marrett. Base Commissariat Officer ; Major A. B. Helyar, Commanding 57th 
Field Battery: Surgeon-Major Spence, Army Medical Staff; Captain H. B. H. 
Wright, Commanding No. 4 Company Madras Sappers ; Surgeon-Captain J. 
B. Jameson, Army Medical Staff; Captain A. M. Lloyd, Base Transport Officer; 
Captain A. Nicholls, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General for Intelli- 
gence ; Captain U. W. Evans, in charge of the Engineer Field Park ; Captain 
F. H. Hoghton, Field Intelligence Officer ; Captain G .  W. Palin, Commissa- 
riat Transport Officer ; Veterinary-Captain Richardson ; Captain H. Smyth, 
Cheshire Regiment, Transport Officer; Captain H. F. Walters, Field Intelli- 
gence Officer ; Captain Birdwood, Orderly Officer; Captain G. C. Rigby, 
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling; Captain W. S. Nathan, Fi 
Engineer ; Captain H. J. M. MacAndrew, Brigade Transport Officer ; Lieutenant 
Hill, 15th Sikhs; Lieutenant C. S. D. Leslie, Brigade Commissariat Officer; 
Lieutenant Beatty, Transport Officer; Lieutenant H. 0. Pan, Orderly Officer ; 
Lieutenant Ballard, Transport Officer ; Lieutenant Herbert, Royal Horse Artil- 
lery, Transport Officer; Lieutenant Sheppard, Bengal Sappers ; Lieutenant 
A. E. Turner, Assistant Field Engineer; Lieutenant Harnmond, Orderly Officer 
(dangerously wounded and since dead) ; Second-Lieutenant Young, attached to 
the Gordon Highlanders. 
'' I am much indebted to Subadar-Major Yasin Khan, 24th Punjab Infantry, 
for his assistance in dealing with the Afridi representatives, and I trust his 
services may be duly recognised." 
Sir William Lockhart forwards lists of British, Non-Commissioned Officers 
and men and of native ranks who have shown conspicuous gallantry in the field 
during the operations subsequent to the 26th January, whom he recommends for 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Order of Merit. 



